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ABSTRACT

Presented are 11 papers discussing the following six models of emotional disturbance in children: biophysical, behavioral, psychodynamic, sociological, and ecological, models, and counter theory. Emotional disturbance is defined as a distinctive human state having multiple manifestations and involving disability, deviance, and alienation. All the models consider the disrupted pattern of human-environment exchanges resulting from emotional disturbance. Discussed in the biogenetic model are genetic, developmental, arousal, perceptual, neurological, and biochemical factors. The behavioral model of both learning and behavior theory discusses major divisions among the connectionist theorists, contiguity theorists, various reinforcement theorists, and applications of learning theories such as behavior modification. The literature review of the theory of psychodynamic model includes the Freudian perspective, changes in psychoanalytic theory, ego psychology, phenomenonological perspectives, and psychodynamics and education. The sociological model discusses such topics as mental illness seen as social deviance, the sick role, Emile Durkheim's theory of anomie functionalism, and socialization failure in children. The ecological model drives from plant and animal ecology the sociological, psychological, and medical principles of human ecology. Counter theory is discussed in three papers considering the educational institution and counter culture alternatives, the ideas of Paulo Freire and the Illich-Reimer alternative, and a description of a counter culture and sources of objection, respectively. A final overview paper toward synthesis concludes that the models are not necessarily competitive systems, but rather represent different facets of the community problem of emotional disturbance. (DB)

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A STUDY OF CHILD VARIANCE

VOL. 1: CONCEPTUAL MODELS

WILLIAM C. RHODES *MICHAEL L. TRACY*

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Conceptual Project In Emotional Disturbance

1972

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PREFACE

The Conceptual Project in Emotional Disturbance has addressed itself to functions in three areas.

1. Conceptual Research. The 1970-71 examination of models of disturbance is an example of this type of research. The product of this effort is the set of "theory papers" appearing in this volume. Another set of papers, the "intervention papers" were researched and written during 1971-72.
2. Integration and Synthesis. A workshop held in May, 1971, was an occasion for the kind of dialogue that will encourage a synthesis of concepts and practices in the area of child variation. Another effort in this direction is the paper by Dr. William Rhodes, entitled Toward Synthesis, also appearing in this volume.
3. Training. In 1971-1972, the Project conducted various training and dissemination activities among university trainers, university students, conceptualizers and programmers.

The 1970-1972 Special Project sampled six schools of thought within the field of emotional disturbance. These schools included psychodynamic theory, learning theory, ecological theory, biophysical theory, sociological theory and counter theory.

Participants in the Conceptual Project represent three distinct groups of people in the field of emotional disturbance: theoreticians, teacher trainers, and graduate students.

Selected graduate students in emotional disturbance and related areas at The University of Michigan did the actual preparation of the review papers. The "experts" were selected from the leading theoreticians in fields related to the major models in emotional disturbance. They assisted in selecting the literature sample and they assisted in authenticating the review papers. One representative of the experts in each of the five traditional areas of theory was selected as a "diplomat." He attended a conference with the other four diplomats, in which current and traditional issues in theory were confronted. A separate conference of four leaders in the field of counter theory was held. Video tapes of these conferences form part of the collection of materials generated by the Conceptual Project.

In 1971-1972, five regional meetings were held. The workshop participants were selected from teacher trainers, so that, in principle, every institution in the country with a graduate-level program in emotional disturbance was represented. A second source for participants was the fifty State Department of Education personnel in emotional disturbance. From a core body of seminal thinkers within the teacher trainers, which is called the "invisible college" though no formal structure is implied, the Project's advisory panel was selected. They provided overall guidance and direction to the Conceptual Project. With the help of the advisory panel, the "fellows" were chosen from the ranks of those emerging into the invisible college. The fellows attended a preliminary training workshop and then served as a guest faculty to facilitate group functioning at the regional dissemination workshops.

Acknowledgements

The support and contributions of numerous interested professionals was invaluable in the execution of Project goals.

Dr. Matt Trippe provided continuous support and encouragement throughout the project, as well as being instrumental in launching the idea initially.

Dr. Ed Peay, a research assistant whose expertise lies in mathematical models of psychology, provided valuable assistance in organizing the various theories of emotional disturbance in a systematic fashion.

Authors of the theory papers were:

Biophysical:	*Biological Bases of Childhood Behavior Disorders*, Mark Sagor
Sociological:	*Mental Illness as Social Deviance*, Don C. Des Jarlais
Behavioral:	*A Review of Learning and Behavior Theory as It Relates to Emotional Disturbance in Children*, Darlene F. Russ
Ecological:	*Ecological Theory as a Model for Constructing a Theory of Emotional Disturbance*, Lynn Feagans
Psychodynamic:	*A Limited Review of Theory of the Psychodynamic Model*, Virginia Rezmierski and John Kotre
Synthesis:	*Towards Synthesis*, William C. Rhodes
Countertheory:	*Some Different Ideas on Education; A Counter-Cultural Approach*, Alice Bron, Michael Tracy, Everett Reimer

The paper describing the psychodynamic model was reviewed by:

Mr. Erik Erikson, Harvard University
Dr. Rudolf Ekstein, Reiss-Davis Clinic
Dr. Jane Kessler, Case Western Reserve University
Dr. James Paul, The University of North Carolina
Dr. Richard Whelan, The University of Kansas, Medical Center

Dr. Marshall Shearer, Reproductive Biology Research Foundation
Dr. Samuel Braun, Somarville-Cambridge Mental Health and Mental Retardation Program
Mr. David Wineman, Wayne State University

The paper describing the biophysical model was reviewed by:

Dr. David Rosenthal, National Institute of Mental Health
Dr. Bernard Rimland, Institute for Child Behavior Research
Dr. William Morse, The University of Michigan

The paper describing the sociological model was reviewed by:

Dr. Walter Gove, Vanderbilt University
Dr. Howard Becker, Northwestern University
Dr. John Clausen, The University of California, Berkeley
Dr. Thomas Scheff, The University of California, Santa Barbara
Dr. Albert Cohen, The University of Connecticut

The paper describing the behavioral model was reviewed by:

Dr. Sidney Bijou, Child Behavioral Laboratory, Urbana, Illinois
Dr. Charles Ferster, American University
Dr. Leonard Ullmann, The University of Illinois
Dr. Richard Whelan, The University of Kansas, Medical Center
Dr. Leonard Krasner, State University of New York
Dr. and Mrs. Donald E.P. Smith, The University of Michigan
Dr. Henry Loess, College of Wooster

The paper describing the ecological model was reviewed by:

Dr. P.V. Gump, Midwest Psychological Field Station, The University of Kansas
Dr. Stella Chess, New York University, Medical School
Dr. John Calhoun, National Institute of Mental Health
Dr. Edwin Willems, The University of Houston

The "theory experts" who participated in the May, 1971 workshop were:

Dr. Jay Birnbrauer, Professor, Department of Psychology, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Behavioral Area)
Dr. Jane Kessler, Professor, Department of Psychology, Case Western University, Cleveland, Ohio, (Psychodynamic Area)
Dr. Bernard Rimland, Director, Institute for Child Behavioral Research, San Diego, California (Biogenetic Area).
Dr. Thomas Scheff, Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California (Sociological Area)
Dr. Edwin Willems, Professor, Department of Psychology, The University of Houston, Houston, Texas (Ecological Area).

Participants in the Counter Theory Workshop (November, 1971) were:

- Dr. Everett Reimer, Professor, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico
- Dr. Peter Knoblock, Professor, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
- Dr. Herbert Grossman, Professor, Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama
- Dr. Matthew Trippe, Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Guest faculty for the Regional Workshops were:

Detroit

- Frank Bruno, Professor, Special Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
- Beverly Kochan, Special Education Supervisor, Wisconsin State Department of Public Instruction, Madison Wisconsin
- Edward Schultz, Assistant Professor, Department of Special Education, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois

San Francisco

- Glenn Ohlson, Associate Professor, Department of Special Education, California State University, San Francisco, California
- Loyd Wright, Department of Special Education, University of Arizona, Tuscon, Arizona

Kansas City

- Judith Grosenick, Department of Special Education, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri
- Frank Wood, Department of Special Education, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
- Robert McCauley, Department of Special Education, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Atlanta

- Henry Boudin, Department of Special Education, The University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
- John Mesinger, Department of Special Education, The University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
- Ronald Neufeld, Frank Porter Graham Child Development Center, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Boston

- Evelyn Adlerblum, Department of Special Education, New York University, New York, New York
- Claude Marks, Department of Special Education, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware
- Gabriel Simches, Special Education Supervisor, Connecticut State Department of Education, Hartford, Connecticut

The papers were edited by Judith M. Smith, who also supervised the production of the book. Project Evaluator was Sabin Head; many secretarial and administrative functions were capably handled by Mary Morrison.

We are deeply indebted to Dr. Herman Saettler of the Bureau of the Educationally Handicapped, Office of Education, whose help and support has made the entire Project possible.

We are also indebted to the Institute for the Study of Mental Retardation and Related Disabilities under the direction of Dr. William Cruickshank for the use of facilities of the Institute and for continued consultation and support.

We would like to express our sincere thanks to Spencer Gibbins and Susan Swap for their innovative ideas and the great amounts of time and effort they devoted to the Project.

W.C.R
M.L.T.

Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972

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INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

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INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

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I. THE CRISIS IN THEORY

A bewildering and contradictory development has occurred in Behavioral Science. There has been a wide-scale and profuse growth of information about human behavior. We have an overwhelming richness of knowledge about the origins, development, influences, variations and outcomes of behavior. And yet, the very foundation of our behavior thought seems to be collapsing under the weight of this wildly flourishing accumulation of data and fact.

The profound insights which we owe to such giants as Pavlov, Freud, Durkheim, and others, have yielded a tremendous data pool, but have not eventuated in an organized, disciplined, integrated body of science. Such a state of affairs could be interpreted as a breakdown in behavioral science. It could be said that this vast effort has lacked substance and meaning, and has led only to confusion. However, if we look at the history of established sciences such as physics or biology, we might interpret this condition as an early phase in the development of behavioral science. It can be seen as a stage of fertile chaos, out of which a new, orderly system of thought will develop.

However, a necessary step in this process of development will be the anchoring of the profusion of data, facts, and concepts in a set of logical foundational doctrines. Just as there is a theoretical physics or biology to order, organize and give coherence to the separate and diverse data of these sciences, so there will have to be a theoretical behavioral science to lift the field out of its own chaos and into a discipline of science.

In spite of the glaring necessity for a theoretical basis, the major beneficiaries of such theory as does exist in behavioral science seem to be its most intense critics. Those who are oriented toward problem solving, such as the clinicians and the educators, and those who are oriented toward empiricism, such as the researchers and the experimenters, have a common cause in criticism of theory. They seek to bind themselves to method and to facts. They seem to argue that understanding will emerge out of method and facts. They borrow only those bits and pieces of theory that are useful to what they are doing at the moment and let the rest of theory go.

The empiricists and the doers, therefore, may not be bothered by the present uncertainty of theorists. Theory is only a tool, to be used or not used as the need arises. They may not feel the pressure for unifying doctrines. Nevertheless, facts themselves cannot make a science. They must be ordered and organized into a meaningful and useful pattern.

II. THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE: THE MODELS

Emotional disturbance as a human state, condition, or way of behaving has been particularly fertile in generating widely varying explanatory concepts and partial theories over the last half century. Some of these are mere fragments of theory, fragments which are unrelated to any network or system of concepts. Most, however, can be grouped into explanatory systems which are logically related ideas and observations about disturbance. These clusters are not purely arbitrary or artificial. Many of their authors make it clear that their contribution is part of a central school of ideas and concepts. Many not only identify the body of distinctive theory to which they are contributing, but also specify that their school of ideas is distinct from other schools.

One of the first steps in beginning to order and organize these theory fragments is to review the literature. This step has been taken by the Conceptual Project. The following rules[1] for sorting bits of theory were observed.

(1) Related theories should employ the same basic methodology for any explorations and constructions, (e.g., learning or behavioral theories share the experimental, laboratory investigatory method. Psychodynamic theories share the clinical approach to explanation and exploration).

(2) Related theories should share a common orienting outlook in examining and explaining human behavior, (e.g., for the sociological theorist all behavior has a social basis).

(3) Related theories should acknowledge a controlling preemptory principle of behavioral genesis (e.g., unconscious motivation, conditioning or learning, biogenesis). This principle is

---

[1] The writer is indebted to Dr. Edward Peay (U-M Working Paper, 1971) for some of the rules above.

heuristic, demonstrable in many contents, and ubiquitous in the explanatory system built around it. This principle might be called the basic paradigm of the cluster.

(4) Related theories should agree regarding basic ameliorating approaches. (The psychodynamic theorists see psychotherapy and its derivitives as indicated; the learning theorists are biased toward behavior modification.)

(5) Each should have a common ambience within its cluster group. These dimensions come together to form a basic model which places a stamp upon any single, isolated theoretical fragment. While it is possible to identify various combinations and permutations of these schools, each has an overriding identity of its own.

Each model and its paradigms has evolved through a separate historical stream. Each acknowledges an independent set of ancestors to whom its stream is particularly indebted. The psychodynamic theorists acknowledge indebtedness to Freud. The behaviorists acknowledge indebtedness to Pavlov. The sociologists, in the area of emotional disturbance, frequently acknowledge Durkheim as the founder of the sociology of deviance. In their day, and in their socio-historical context, each founding father so strongly impressed his point of view upon the field of disturbance, that he determined the broad outline for an independent stream of thought. This does not imply that the separate schools do not also have common historical roots (e.g., psychodynamic and biogenic explanations). But there was a definite historical point at which a departure in thought was established, and this departure led to related exploration and discoveries--only vaguely related to other explanatory systems.

One of the contentions of this overview paper is that these strongly independent bifurcations in conceptions have now matured to the point where logical mergers are indicated. Continued separate and independent development can only obscure and confuse, rather than clarify and deepen, our understanding of the phenomenon of emotional disturbance.

A. Clusters

The separate cluster of thought and action can be grouped in many ways. The paradigms and models chosen in this project have been previously organized by others in much the same way. For our purposes these precedents have been further developed by establishing rules for clusters of theories mentioned on the preceding pages.

The project grouped the theory fragments as follows:

1. Behavioral theory
2. Psychodynamic theory
3. Biophysical theory
4. Sociological theory
5. Ecological theory

B. Counter Theory Clusters

It is recognized, of course, that there are other natural clusters of theoretical statements and ideas with reference to emotional disturbance which could be included. For instance, another distinctive, somewhat independent, cluster of literature and practice which concerns itself with emotional disturbance, and which conforms to most of the criteria for a model in this project, is existential theory. (Husserel and Heidegger could be said to be the founding fathers of this model.) However, because of the growing influence of existential thinking on other models, (such as psychoanalysis, ecological theory and social deviance) and because of its common cause with a distinct group of revolutionary and reform movements, existential theories are grouped under a different umbrella. For purposes of this project this category is called counter-theory, and it includes a host of challengers of current models of deviation.

This cluster of counter-theory ideas and practices cannot be classified as a single model because it lacks the unifying criteria for a model which were discussed previously. Among challengers of the established theories are humanists, counter psychologists, counter psychiatrists, radical educators and counter culturists.

In some respects there is commonality in their challenges. They object to labeling, to attributive sickness or abnormality, and to the implications of the concept of deviance. They also excoriate the culture for its responsibility in creating the condition labeled abnormal. In this respect, they are reformers, with a concern for reformation of the culture which contributes to and participates in disturbance of some of its members. They are a mixed group, many of whom, even in their distinctiveness could have been included in one of the established models already defined for this project.

For instance, many of the existentialists concerned with human deviation are former analysts--the term chosen by Boss, "Daisanalysis," indicates this influence. Radical sociocultural reformers such as Herbert Marcuse or Norman Brown have definitely chosen the analytic model and its paradigms. Some of the current Gestalt therapists share the underlying perspective of the ecologists. Some of the counter psychiatrists, such as Laing, could be grouped with the psychodynamicists.

However, as a group, these individuals have a common cause in a radical challenge to accepted professional conceptions of disturbance, deviance, and psychosocial disability. Therefore, they are treated here as a group. In doing so it is recognized that this cluster is not as homogeneous as the other schools or models chosen for study. As a group they abhor methodology, they characteristically refuse to reduce their ideas to a preemptory principle of behavioral genesis, and they do not share a method of solution. It might be said, however, that they do share an orienting perspective on human behavior. In general, they seem to argue that all human behavior is to be freed of repressive institutionalization and cultural imposition, and that cultural definitions of abnormality be abandoned.

C. Impact of Counter Theory

What this group of counter theorists have to say and the way that they say it will require, at the least, a careful rethinking of the outlines and premises of each model. Their challenges may result in radical overhauls within existing models. The kinds of revisions which occur may so alter the model that it will no longer be recognizable. Another conceivable, though unlikely effect, is that counter theorist questioning of critical assumptions and principles will lead to a new amalgam or synthesis of models.

This project has concluded that at this time none of the preemptory principles of behavioral genesis in the major models studied has been soundly invalidated by their critics. We have not discovered crucial evidence, logical arguments, nor critical experiments which call into serious question the basic paradigms of learning, unconscious motivation, biogenesis, sociocultural determination, or ecological interdependence in emotional disturbances. If this statement is true, then any synthesis or amalgamation of models which may emerge at a later date will have to incorporate all of the preemptory principles.

Another conclusion drawn from the Project studies is that the phenomenon of emotional disturbance exists. It is experienced by individuals and by communities of individuals as a real phenomenon. It is not simply an arbitrary grouping of unrelated phenomena, a mere verbal contrivance as claimed by some investigators (i.e., William Scott, 1958). It could, in fact, be concluded that emotional disturbance is a more pervasive phenomenon, more critical human problem than we have hitherto recognized. Each of the separate models have exposed a different facet of the problem, like the proverbial blind men feeling the elephant.

D. Definitions of Emotional Disturbance

Furthermore, the problem of emotional disturbance is a genetic societal problem. Its solution is the solution to all derangements in communal life. Emotional disturbance is a distinctive and peculiar human state, having multiple manifestations. It is not simply something wrong in the organism--which is the disability definition of the problem. It is not simply a confrontation between groups or cultural conventions--which is the deviance definition of the problem. As a distinctive human process, it does involve disability, deviance and alienation. But the ubiquitous problem of emotional disturbance is even more central to human life than any of these single, varied manifestations.

Although the analysis offered in this project does not finally resolve the question of disturbance, and does not offer a single, distinctive and critical explanatory system, it suggests a path to be taken toward exploring synthesis of the diverse and

and separate schools of thought.

The disability definition of emotional disturbance is suggested in many of the psychodynamic and the biogenic theories. The deviation definition is explored in many of the sociological and anthropological explanatory systems. The alienation definition is developed by many of the ecologists and the counter theorists. Each speaks of a human system in distress. Each locates the distress in time and space within the system. Each speaks of a negative state and negative consequences to the system, and each suggests a method of relief within the system.

In each case, the theories attempt to encompass the fact of painful disjunction in a behavior-environment exchange pattern. Such disjunctions are common to all aspects of communal life. The disability definition looks only at the individual and his personal relationship to the environment and locates the disturbance within the contained system of self-regulating processes which constitutes that individual. The social deviation analysis looks at a second level of system which encompasses the individual as part of an aggregate relating to the environment. This definition of the problem presents disturbance as disjunction between aggregates and environments. The alienation definition looks at the individual and the social aggregate systems and uses the separation between the individual and the rest of the system as the building block for its explanations.

E. Human-Environment Exchanges

All of the models, then, address themselves to a disrupted pattern of human-environment exchanges. In every case the pattern overrides the disruption and moves continually toward assimilating the disruption, and toward an arrangement of behavior-environment exchanges into a composite whole. This striving toward a whole, toward a maximum patterning of exchanges is expressed in all of the various models.

The basic patterning nature of human-environment exchanges and the taraxis or pain which reverberates throughout the pattern when the exchanges are aborted or disrupted will be the central theme of this report.

III. THE WIDER USE OF THE FIVE MODELS

In this overview, we have concentrated upon the specific phenomenon of "child variation" within each model. In fact we have reduced our scope even further by trying to examine a particularized condition of child variation, namely, the condition labeled "emotional disturbance." In a sense, however, part of the complexity of our task is that each model purports to be a representation of the causes, dimensions, and explanations of all human behavior. For instance, learning theory, from its Pavlovian roots, offers an explanation for all aspects of human behavior. The basic paradigm of learning, which, in the Pavlovian sense, is reducible to a simple history of bonding between organism and environment, is the preemptory principle from which all human behavior can be predicted and controlled. On the other hand, the Freudian presentation of the psychodynamic model suggests that all human development and functioning is determined by the basic subterranean psychic forces and the ways these forces become structured in internal "institutions." The other models are just as all-embracing in building upon one basic paradigm of human life.

Therefore, the models which were investigated as models of disturbance in this project are actually comprehensive explanatory systems. This does not deny that disturbance as a human phenomenon is a dominant concern of every one of the models. There is not a single model which has not included disturbance explicitly as one of the states of human existence which it must explain. This is a very important consideration, because it highlights the universality of this characteristic of human functioning within society.

IV. WHAT IS A MODEL?

In this study, several criteria determined the grouping of theory clusters into a model--namely: a common methodology, a common orienting outlook, a paradigm or controlling principle of behavioral genesis, a common solution and a common ambience. The wider philosophical-scientific use of theoretical models should be considered further. The "model" has been a useful construction in science. It has provided a generic vehicle for scientific clarity and order.

Although there is some disagreement among philosophers of science with respect to the general characteristics of a model, this project has accepted, for its own guidance, a distinction made between models and theories by Dr. Edward Peay (1970).

> As commonly accepted in many areas of psychology, as well as in other scientific fields, there is a clear distinction between a "theory" and a "model." Briefly, a model is a representation or abstraction of some features of the "real world" in which elements of the model "stand for" real or hypothesized elements of the real world. For example, the concept of an electrical or magnetic field is really a model of the action of electrical forces, since no such "thing" as a field is assumed to exist, but the concept allows predictions of phenomena which actually take place. Having abstracted features of the real world into a model and made certain assumptions about them, one then makes predictions from the model--deduces implications from it--and then checks whether these implications also correspond to features of the real world. If they do, then the model provides a good representation of the relevant features of the real world, and one can derive information that he did not have before.
>
> A "theory", on the other hand, consists of a statement or group of statements--hypotheses--about the "real world." The check of a theory is whether these statements are true or not. The crucial point about the distinction between a theory and a model is that a theory is true or false, whereas a model is never "false" in itself; a model is an abstract system, complete in itself. A model is useful or not useful depending upon how good a representation of the world it is; i.e., how good are the implications that may be drawn from it. In summary, a theory is tested to find out whether it is true or not, while a model is tested to determine how good a representation

it is--how valuable are the implications to which it leads.

However, a given system can be both a theory and a model, depending upon the "reality" ascribed to its elements; it may fail as a theory and still provide a good model. For example, Hebb has hypothesized that "memory" consists of closed neural pathways in the brain, where neural impulses go around and around until called for in recall. More recent work has thrown considerable doubt upon the existence of such pathways as reality, but the concept still provides a fairly good model for memory, because it predicts many of the phenomena that actually occur in recall.

Most of what we have been referring to as "theories" of emotional disturbance or deviance actually fall within the category of theories because they make assertions of the type: "Such and such a set of factors or conditions leads to such and such a behavioral result." For example, "overcrowding produces certain pathological behaviors"; "anxiety follows (or precedes) symptoms"; "learning is produced by the temporal contiguity of stimuli." If they are theories, then some test should be possible to determine whether they are "true" or "false." Unfortunately, such a test is dependent upon how clearly defined and observable the factors in question are. If they are not capable of clear definitions as so many of the factors in this field are not, such a test may not be possible. For example, what is the "stimulus" in a given learning situation? What are "symptoms"? And most importantly, what is "pathological behavior?" Thus, a test of usefulness for a theory can also be stated: Is it possible to determine whether it is true or not? If not, then such a theory has limited usefulness for any practical application.

(Peay, 1970)

V. OTHER CATEGORIZING EFFORTS

A. Orientation of Researchers

This particular effort to order and organize the existing fragments of theory in ways which can make them available for comprehensive examination is probably one of the largest-scale projects of its kind; but other efforts have been made by individual scientists to collect, sort, organize and categorize theories of disturbance. It is interesting to note that the bases employed by these other overviews for grouping and schematizing theory fragments reflects the basic orientations of the scientists' work.

Siegler and Osmond (1966), as psychiatrically based workers, are very much concerned with treatment, and their organization of theories reflects the applied nature of their work-base. Whereas, the separate efforts of Scott (1958) and Cohen (1966) reflect their university locus and their scholastic orientation.

B. Models of Madness

Siegler and Osmond (1966) have looked at theories from the point of view of "models of madness." They have singled out schizophrenia as their basic referent for madness, because it is such a common diagnosis found in mental hospitals. Since their concern is for hospital treatment of madness, the schizophrenic paradigm is a logical nucleus for their review.

They begin their review by saying that the vast array of explanatory concepts of schizophrenia seem to share in the phenomena they are describing. Many explanatory systems are described:

biochemical, genetic, religious, psychoanalytic, sociological, cross-cultural, interactional, legal, moral, etc. The theories, while they display internal consistency, lack any comprehensible relation to each other.

The two authors attempt to develop a basis of comparability. They acknowledge that theorists are not required to compare their theories in a particular field of endeavor with theories in other disciplines. However, since madness is not only a scientific problem, but a problem with wide ramifications in everyday life, it becomes important to bring about scientific order to assist in the social order. The problem of madness, they say, has moral, legal, medical and social implications, and is, therefore, a problem of vast social importance.

Siegler and Osmond's point is well taken. The problem of disturbance has, in the past, stimulated an impressive array of resources, facilities and social institutions. Some of these structures and organizational forms are directly derived from the conceptual model employed. For instance, during the days in which the concept of "demonic possession" held sway, vast church facilities and personnel were developed; during the reign of moral-legal conception, vast correctional paraphernalia was created; during the current medical bias reign, huge hospital and clinical centers were developed. These organizational and conceptual structures still exist in our society. In some cases two of the alternative conceptual models can be seen existing side by side in the same structures. One sees the medical-psychiatric and the correctional model existing side-by-side in such former "correctional" institutions as Wiltwick School, or Hawthorne Cedar-Knolls, and in the federal drug treatment facility in Lexington, Kentucky. There are also instances where two competing explanatory models lead to diametrically opposed treatment of the individual in the same setting,as described in the early Ayllon and Michaels (1959) paper on the nurse as a behavioral engineer. A patient's schizophrenic language was being discouraged through the behavioral method of non-reinforcement on the ward, while, at the same time, this same schizophrenic language was being encouraged by the case worker whose psychodynamic approach led her to listen very intently to all of this illogical outpouring.

In their analyses they compared schizophrenic models along the dimensions of diagnosis, etiology, interpretation of behavior, treatment, prognosis, suicide, function of the hospital, termination of hospitalization, personnel, rights and duties of patients, rights and duties of families, and rights and duties of society.

They classify their models of madness as: Medical, Moral, Psychoanalytic, Family Interaction, Conspiratorial, and Social. Within each model they examine the dimensions already listed (i.e., diagnosis, etiology, interpretation of behavior, treatment, etc.). Each of the models conforms to the title given it. The conspiratorial model is the only one which may not be self-explanatory.

This model is based upon the fact that many families extrude a family member by conspiring to hospitalize that particular person.

C. Levels and Types

Cohen (1966) has also examined the abundance of theories of emotional disturbance and has developed an ordering schema upon the basis of "levels," and "types." He groups all theories into two explanatory levels: the sociological and the psychological. At the sociological level actions are not only events in the biographies of individuals--things that individuals do; they are also events located somewhere in the social system or structure--in a family, a neighborhood, a city, a region, an organization, a country. Different kinds of deviant acts are variously distributed within a given social structure and these distributions differ from one time to another and from one structure to another. From this perspective, therefore, it makes sense to ask: "What is it about source structures--their organization, their cultures, their histories--that accounts for differences within and between them?" For instance, in relationship to suicide, Durkheim noted that each country, each major region, and population segment has its own characteristic suicide rate and these rates are remarkably stable. It seems clear, then, that suicide is a property of the system, that there is something about the society, the region, the group, that generates its characteristic suicide rate. Such regularities of patterns are true of other deviant actions. What are the properties of the system that account for this property?

In general, whatever these properties are, they determine the behavior of the system through their impact upon personalities, the situations in which they operate, the conjunction of personality and situations, and the interaction processes between them.

The other theoretical level, the psychological level, attempts explanations of behavior by focusing upon the actor and motivational mechanisms. There are at least four distinct emphases among theories at the psychological level: (1) those theories that emphasize the actor and assume that most of the variance can be accounted for in terms of differences on the actor side; (2) those that emphasize the situation, and assume that people who commit deviant acts are not special sorts of people. Rather, anybody given the proper circumstances might do the same; (3) conjunctive theories, or theories that emphasize the conjunction of both actor and situational variables in determining the deviant act. In these theories, deviance is the outcome of interaction between actor and situation, but the interaction is treated as a single episode; (4) interaction process theories, which, like conjunctive theories, emphasize the interaction process, but the deviant actordevelops over time through a series of stages. At each decision point in time the actor may choose among two or more possible directions. Which direction he will go depends on the state of the actor and the situation at this point in time, and either or both may have, meanwhile, undergone change.

For Cohen, psychological inquiry is concerned with identifying variables and processes involved in the motivation of deviance and conformity and with constructing exact theories about the interrelationship. Sociological theory is concerned with identifying the variables and processes in the larger social system that in turn shape those that are involved in motivation, and that determine their distribution within the system.

D. Definitional Approach

William Scott (1958) uses still another composite model of theories of emotional disturbance. His definitional approach compares and organizes theories and theory fragments along definitional lines. His careful analysis collects, sorts, and groups the research definitions of mental illness and mental health which he culled from existing literature. His categorical schema is organized as follows: (1) exposure to psychiatric treatment as a definition of mental illness; (2) social maladjustment as defining mental illness; (3) psychiatric diagnoses as definers of mental illness; (4) subjective unhappiness as the criterion for mental illness; and (5) failure of positive identification as the index of mental illness. Each of these separate criterion variables has been used in research studies of mental illness. Scott reviewed most of these studies and provided a critical discussion of the adequacy of each definition. He then summarized the differences among the definitions by indicating their divergent approaches to certain basic problems in the conceptualization of mental illness and mental health.

He pointed out that underlying the diversities in definitions of mental illness one can discern certain basic differences of viewpoint concerning how the phenomenon should be conceptualized. He abstracted the major foci of disagreement and contention among definitions in the following questions:

1. Does mental illness refer to a unitary concept or to artificial grouping of basically different specific disorders?
2. Is mental illness an acute or chronic state of the organism?
3. Is maladjustment (or deviance from social norms) an essential concomitant of mental illness?
4. Should mental illness be explicitly defined according to values other than social conformity?

The different viewpoints in each of his six classes of definitions take one side or the other on these basic questions concerning the nature of emotional disturbance.

In summarizing the collected research evidence for each of the various categories of definitions, Scott points out that the dependent variables employed in empirical research under each category are clearly different, and the conceptualizations involved in the empirical criteria are often divergent. He notes that the research findings show certain basic incompatibilities among the various conceptions and approaches. He says that it is a moot question as to whether or not these incompatibilities should be reconciled by further theoretical and empirical explorations. Perhaps, he suggests, they may be regarded as valid indicators that mental health and illness constitute multidimensional phenomena.

E. Need for Further Exploration

This project is a refutation of the implication that further theoretical explorations of possible reconciliation should be abandoned. Even if the professional and scientific community abandoned the problem of emotional disturbance, the society would not. It has been a long-standing, constantly urgent problem of communal life. Society has devoted a major share of its energies over centuries to the control of this phenomenon in its many guises, whether it was considered wickedness or sickness. Society will not abandon it, because it cannot abandon it. As Freud said in his treatise on Civilization and its Discontents, "The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural processes developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction." Man now knows that his problems lie in the human psyche, that the current threats to his survival are psychological and not physical threats.

While the Project would agree with Scott's suggestion that emotional disturbance constitutes a multidimensional phenomenon, it concludes that the phenomenon might be seen as having a unity of its own which underlies all of the psychological pain of societies. Far from being a distinct deviation in life-style, on a par with other deviations, such as delinquency, retardation, drug abuse, suicide, etc., it is a basic process involved in all of the varied psychosocial sufferings in human systems.

It is argued here, therefore, that it is understandable that such a basic phenomenon should present itself in such a multitude of guises. This conclusion emerged late in the Project, after we had laid out all the pieces of theory and fact which overwhelmed us with theoretical implications.

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BIOLOGICAL BASES OF CHILDHOOD BEHAVIOR DISORDERS

Mark Sagor

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> Why do psychiatrists and psychologists believe there are people whose mental disorder is functional rather than organic? Why do they reject the plausible premise that the "functional" cases differ from the organic cases only in that our knowledge is at present too limited to identify the "organic" defect in the "functional" cases?
>
> I predict that research will ultimately show psycho-social factors to have minor, if any, relevance in causing the limited disorders called "neuroses" and even less relevance in causing a severe disorder known as psychosis.
>
> (Rimland, 1969)

I. INTRODUCTION: THE BIOGENETIC MODEL

A faith in the eventual discovery of organic causes for all mental disorders was articulated in the nineteenth century by John P. Gray, a dominant force in American psychiatry from 1855 to the 1880's. In fact, the development of psychoanalytic theory was bolstered by a growing impatience with the prevailing biological interpretations of psychopathology. In a similar way, the hegemony now enjoyed by psychodynamic concepts has intensified the efforts of some biogenetic theorists (see Rimland, 1964, 1969, 1970; Cott).

These theorists are offended by the tradition of blaming parents for their children's psychopathology, a practice which is rarely therapeutic and, they believe, based on invalid premises (E. Schopler, 1969). They are dismayed by the lack of evidence and negative evidence concerning the efficacy of psychotherapy with children (Levitt, 1957, 1963). They are bewildered by the acceptanceand proliferation of psychodynamic concepts which have little or no empirical support. They are skeptical of theories which can explain everything and therefore explain nothing: a child may become "emotionally disturbed" because his parents are too loving, not loving enough or too deliberately in the middle ground. Finally, they are disturbed by the myopia which often accompanies the uncritical acceptance of these concepts.

Rimland's discussion of one of Bettleheim's case studies illustrates this last point. The case involves a psychotic girl. Bettleheim reviews the history and attributes the illness to a lack of maternal affection. His analysis ignores four possible causes of the behavior disorder:

(1) Prenatal development in an unbalanced endocrinal environment due to maternal stress. (The girl's Jewish parents were hiding from the Nazis during World War II).

(2) Extremely poor pre- and post-natal sanitary factors.

(3) Extremely poor pre- and post-natal nutritional factors.

(4) Extreme post-natal sensory deprivation.

(Rimland, 1969)

For the most part, biogenetic hypotheses have not been included in Special Education curricula. The project which supported this research has collected the reading lists used for courses approximately titled "Psychopathology of Childhood" in various Special Education departments across the country. These bibliographies evidence the absence, or token representation, of biogenetic models of emotional disturbance.

The complexity of the natural science disciplines may have contributed to the reluctance of special education professionals to study the case for biological causation of behavior disorders in children. However, one need not be expert in the areas of genetics, biochemistry, and neurophysiology to explore the contrasting assumptions and implications of biogenesis and psychogenesis as they apply to children with behavior disorders. A teacher's attitude toward, and response to, a child is influenced directly by his assumptions regarding the "why" of a child's behavior. Consider the child who sits in a corner of the classroom without once moving from his seat during the school day. A teacher who supposes that the child has a disorder which makes movement of any kind physically disagreeable will react to the child in a manner appropriate to the supposition. If, on the other hand, stubbornness or fear or paralysis is suspected, different responses would be predicted.

The biogenetic model of behavior disorders is a disease model.* The pathology resides within the individual. Some theories consider the biological anomalies or deviations to be the necessary and sufficient factors in the pathogenesis of the disturbance. Others take the position that the chemical or neurological abnormalities are the necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of the disorder. In the latter case, environmental stimuli, which create stress, may or may not activate the constitutional predisposition to disturbance. Rimland, who takes the former position, has defined a biogenic mental disorder as:

---

* Underlining indicates technical term.

> ...a severe behavior disorder that results solely from the effects of the physical-chemical environment. Biological factors may exert their effects pre-natally, during labor and birth, and at any subsequent time.
>
> (Rimland, 1969)

For illustrative purposes this paper is organized into various sections: genetic factors, developmental factors, arousal factors, neurological factors, and biochemical factors. The purpose is to emphasize the different levels and types of analysis in the biogenic area. In reality, these factors are not discrete entities; perceptual processes and arousal are directly related to neurological functioning which, in turn, is a function of brain chemistry and genetic factors.

2. GENETIC FACTORS

> In order to understand certain basic principles in the formation of psychotic behavior patterns, it is necessary to delve into the substratum of gene action as well as into the unconscious. Though psychodynamic concepts make it possible to describe the frustrating phenomena experienced by psychotic patients, the genetic approach aims at supplying adequate answers to questions of why a particular member of a particular family at a particular time will undergo these particular experiences, and why other members of the same unity will not.
>
> In so doing, genetic studies have in many instances succeeded in confirming the belief, at least theoretically, that mental disorders are both preventable and potentially curable. At the same time, such studies have again focused attention on the importance of a systematic and well balanced approach to reach the given goals. It is now clearer than ever that only when attitudes of optimistic complacency towards the causes of severe maladjustment give way to realistic awareness of the incompleteness of knowledge regarding the genetic aspects of psychotic behavior patterns, will further significant progress be made.
>
> (Kallmann, 1954)

Meehl (1969) has pointed out that it is possible to make a reliable diagnosis of schizophrenia without any information concerning the patient's behavior. One only needs to know that the patient's monozygotic twin is schizophrenic. In fact, if an identical twin has schizophrenia, the chances (depending on which study is used) can be as high as 85 per cent that the other twin is or will become similarly afflicted (Karlsson, cited by Beavers, 1969).

Buss (1966) has summarized the data from a number of studies concerned with the genetics of schizophrenia.

TABLE I. RATES OF OCCURRENCE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (Buss, 1966)

	%
General population	1
Grandparents	4
Grandchildren	4
Nephews and Nieces	4
Cousins	3
Parents	4-10
Half-siblings	7
Siblings	5-4
Children	
one schizophrenic parent	16
two schizophrenic parents	39-68
Dizygotic twins	3-17
Monozygotic twins	67-86

According to this summary, the likelihood that a person will develop schizophrenia increases as a function of his biological relationship to schizophrenic(s). Buss concludes that "these rates are consistent with a genetic theory of schizophrenia."* (Buss, 1966)

These expectancy rates are less compatible with environmental approaches to schizophrenia. Because they have more similar life experiences, fraternal twins would be expected (following environmentalist assumptions) to be more concordant with respect to schizophrenia than siblings. This is not the case. Furthermore, "the expectancy rate for identical twins has been reported as being at least four times larger than the rate for fraternal twins." (Buss, 1966). Even though identical twins probably receive more similar treatment in family interactions, this factor alone seems insufficient to explain such a large difference in expectancy rates. If the environmental factor is potent enough to account for this discrepancy, we should expect a significant difference between the expectancy rates for fraternal twins and siblings.

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* Underlining added.

It should be noted that some twin surveys have reported evidence contrary to the genetic approach. There are cases where only one twin of a monozygotic pair is diagnosed as schizophrenic. However, while discordance in identical twins may mean that inherited factors alone do not account for schizophrenia, it does not necessarily imply a need for supplementary psycho-social constructs. That is, while environmental variables may play a role in the etiology of schizophrenia, these variables may be biological (pre- and post-natal physical environment) or psycho-social.

Rimland has responded to environmentalists who seek to strengthen their position by pointing to data discrepant with the biogenetic model:

> Actually, genetic familiar data on known physical disorders, such as tuberculosis and diabetes, give results very similar to those reported above for schizophrenia.

> Some critics claim the above data do not show genetic causation. By this they mean that the percentages do not follow the simple Mendelian model for dominant and recessive genes. Genetic disorders do not necessarily follow the Mendelian model.
>
> (Rimland, 1969)

The mechanism of inheritance in schizophrenia is far from clear. The evidence does not coincide with either dominant or recessive gene hypotheses. Some theorists have relied on the concept of penetrance to resolve the issue. Penetrance refers to the action of genes which provide a kind of 'immunity' to schizophrenia. This hypothesis does explain why empirical frequency rates are lower than those predicted by either the recessive or dominant gene theories; however, "the problem with assuming lowered penetrance is that one can easily account for any results by raising or lowering the presumed degree of penetrance" (Buss, 1966).

Consanguinity studies (assessment of the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the relatives of schizophrenic patients) have generally been confounded to the extent that investigators have been unable to experimentally separate the effects of environment from heredity. The task is problematic because "the deviant psychological experiences have usually been received at the hands of the patient's biological relatives (Wender, 1969)." To overcome this difficulty, certain 'target' groups have been utilized for quasi-experimental studies.

Children with one schizophrenic parent who are adopted in infancy, thereby separated from social interaction with that parent, comprise one target population. One study of this population reported that one third of the offspring developed psychiatric disorders of a schizophrenic character (Wender, 1969). Heston's (1966) investigation of foster-home-reared children of schizophrenic mothers found schizophrenic and sociopathic personality disorders among this group in excess of chance expectation ($p < .05$). Five of the 47 experimental subjects were schizophrenic, whereas no cases of schizophrenia were found in the 50 control subjects. All subjects had been separated from their mothers within a few days of birth.

In another study, Higgins (1966) compared the development of 25 children raised by their schizophrenic mothers with a similar group of children who were raised apart from their schizophrenic mothers. "It was predicted that the mother-reared children would display greater maladjustment on the various measures than would reared-apart children. The results failed to support the hypothesis."

Mednick (1971) followed the development of a group of "high-risk" children (those with schizophrenic mothers) and a group of "low-risk" children (with no record of mental illness in the family for three generations). Twenty-seven children (of 207) in the "high-risk" group became mentally ill ("sick group"). These children were matched with "high-risk" subjects who did not develop disorders ("well group") and with controls from the "low-risk" group, in order to determine which characteristics differentiated the children.

They found that certain electrodermal measures (GSRs) taken during psychophysiological testing divided the "sick" and control groups almost perfectly. In addition, they found that 70 per cent of the "sick group" mothers suffered serious pregnancy or birth complications (PBCs). This was in sharp contrast to the figures for the "well" (15 per cent) and control groups (33 per cent).

> This PBC-GSR finding suggests to us that pregnancy or birth complications damage the body's ability to regulate stress-response mechanisms. Since PBCs produced marked changes in GSR among the high-risk children, but made virtually no changes in the low-risk children, there seems to be an interaction at work between PBC and genetic predisposition. Pregnancy difficulties apparently trigger or exacerbate a genetic vulnerability in the autonomic nervous system.
>
> (Mednick, 1971)

Mednick postulates a heredity-environment (physical-environment) interaction which may be useful in analyzing data which resists a purely genetic interpretation. Another type of heredity-environment interaction has been developed by Meehl (1969). He hypothesizes an interaction between inherited neural defects, family interactions (social environment) and constitutional weaknesses (tolerance for stress, etc.). The inherited defect is the necessary but not sufficient factor in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia:

> All schizotaxics [those with the neural defect mentioned above] become, on all actually existing social learning regimes, schizotypic in personality organization; but most of these remain compensated. A minority, disadvantaged by other (largely polygenically determined) constitutional weaknesses, and put on a bad regime by schizophrenogenic mothers (most of whom are themselves schizotypes) are thereby potentiated into clinical schizophrenia.
>
> (Meehl, 1969)

Discussion

The preceding section reviews some of the evidence concerning the inheritance of schizophrenia. Most of the data deals with adult schizophrenia and may not be directly applicable to the study of childhood psychoses. Kallmann and Roth's (1956) investigation indicates that the same genetype (gene-specific deficiency state) is operative in both childhood and adult schizophrenia, but the question is far from settled. At any rate, the preceding section outlines some of the issues and problems involved in the investigation of the genetics of psychosis.

Despite several unresolved controversies "the evidence clearly supports two conclusions: (1) there is an inherited component in schizophrenia, and (2) heredity alone cannot account for schizophrenia, which undoubtedly has an environmental component (Buss, 1966)." Whether the environmental component is psycho-social or physical is not clear at this time. However, theorists are moving away from the confining polemics of nature versus nurture.

The movement seems to be toward what Rosenthal (1963) has called a *diathesis-stress model*. According to this view, a constitutional predisposition to the disorder is inherited, but an environmental stimulus is required to activate it. This stimulation may or may not occur. The diathesis-stress position is attractive because its case is not prejudiced by the emotion and dogma which have characterized nature-nurture arguments. On the other hand, there is some concern that the "it-takes-both" position may be enshrined before all the evidence is in (see Rimland, 1969).

The following inferential limits are implicit in the postulation of a specific etiology within the diathesis-stress framework.

(1) The etiological factor does not always or even usually produce mental illness.

(2) If illness occurs, the particular form and content of symptoms is not derivable by reference to the specific etiology alone.

(3) The course of the illness can be materially influenced by procedures which are not directed against the specific etiology.

(4) All persons who share the specific etiology will not necessarily have closely similar histories, symptoms, and course.

(5) The largest single contributor to symptom-variance is not necessarily the specific etiology.

(Meehl, 1969)

There are many issues which separate the adherents of the biogenetic approach from their psychodynamically oriented colleagues. However, one issue is most salient: can a behavior disorder develop in the absence of an inherited disposition?

3. DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS

Over the past thirty years Lauretta Bender has seen, studied and thought about many schizophrenic children. She has listed five major influences on the development of her theory of childhood schizophrenia:

(1) Psychoanalytic theories of personality,

(2) Studies in Gestalt psychology,

(3) Paul Schilder's understanding of the interaction between biological and psychological factors,

(4) Gesell's studies of the embryology of behavior,

(5) Kallman's studies of genetic factors in schizophrenia.

In her studies of schizophrenic infants, Bender was impressed by the fact that these children retain all of the early embryological features of the fetal infant as described and outlined by Gesell (see Gesell, 1945). She has observed the following characteristics in the schizophrenic child: inadequate pulse and temperature control; labile vascular system; uneven development curves; uncertain development of sleep, respiratory, and eliminative patterns; anal and oral fixations; and dominance of tonic-neck-reflex motility. These observations led Bender to conceive of childhood schizophrenia in terms of a developmental lag of the biological processes. Specifically, she suggests that the behavior of the schizophrenic child evolves by maturation at an embryological level. This, in turn, leads to anxiety and its concomitant defense mechanisms.

Recently, Bender has reviewed and summarized her concept of childhood schizophrenia:

> It is a total organismic disorder of the organism as a whole. It is inherited, according to Kallmann's dictates, as a vulnerability and an inability to compensate. It is characterized by a lag in maturation at the embryonic level and, therefore, carries with it embryonic plasticity in all areas of bodily function, particularly that which is integrated by the central nervous system. This plasticity means both a lack of differentiation into patterns and boundaries of every function, and a failure of determination. The individual can accelerate, maturate, regress, stand still or move in almost any direction as he gets older because this plasticity is retained throughout the individual's lifetime. (Bender, 1968).

The etiological factor which is primary in activating the inherited pre-disposition to schizophrenia is a physiological crisis such as anoxia at birth, severe illness or accident, or the pre-pubertal and pubertal crises. In other words, the hereditary predisposition is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of schizophrenia.

Social and psychological factors, according to Bender, determine the pattern of the psychosis and its defense mechanisms. There is a clear distinction here between the cause of the pathology and the content of the pathology. While the content or pattern of the psychosis is determined by social-environmental factors, the cause of the illness is discussed in terms of physiological variables. Anxiety, which arises as a result of the child's inability to perceive reality and experience lucid patterns, is discussed in psychoanalytic terms:

> Anxiety is at the core of the problem. It calls forth the defenses. The final clinical picture is very much influenced by the type of defenses the child has developed. The child may be pseudo-neurotic, pseudo-psychopathic, autistic symbiotic. These are all defense mechanisms and consequently, we find in schizophrenia, whether in a child or adult, multiple forms which are determined by the inherited pattern of the total organism, the inheritance of degree or type of schizophrenia (which is different in different families), the physiological crisis precipitating the breakdown and modifying the organic patterning, the age of the individual, the sex, and the social and emotional environment (such as the parent-child relationship).
>
> (Bender, 1968)

Ritvo and Ornitz (1970) have also noted a developmental lag in children diagnosed as autistic, schizophrenic, atypical or symbiotic. They contend that "these children almost always have interruptions, unevenness, and regressions in their developmental course (Ritvo, et al., 1970)." This symptomology results from common central nervous system disease probably involving the regulation of the brain's filter systems. Their neurophysiologic and neurobiological studies indicate that these children respond to various stimuli like normal infants rather than like their age-matched controls. Studies on the REM sleep of autistic children demonstrated that they maintain an immature EEG sleep pattern, similar to normal infants. In addition, it appears that autistic children do not modulate or handle incoming stimuli in a normal manner, at least during REM sleep. Their behavior is much the same as infants in this respect. Kennard (1965) found diffuse, slow dysrhythmic EEG patterns in his investigation of psychotic children. This pattern is often described as immature rather than clearly abnormal.

Fowle (1968) examined the leukocytes (white blood cells) of a group of psychotic children and normal controls. In the majority of cases she was able to ascertain whether the child was psychotic or normal from the blood sample. The leukocytes of the psychotic group were not qualitatively abnormal, but only developmentally abnormal. Consequently, Fowle concluded that they might reflect, in part, a disorder of maturation.

Ritvo and Ornitz (1970) have begun pilot studies to develop normative data on blood serotonin and platelet levels in normals and autists. Their preliminary findings suggest that the autistic children have a significantly higher number of platelets. In the course of development, normal infants have high levels which decrease as the child grows older. "The autistic children with high levels are similar to the normal infant." (Ritvo and Ornitz, 1970).

From their clinical overview of the disturbances involved in the childhood psychoses, Ritvo, et al. suspect the involvement of organic factors.

> This idea is supported clinically by the fact that these children are found all over the world. Within this country it has been shown that they come from all socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds and have all psychological types of parents. If this hypothesis were true, one could then understand their ego-pathology (difficulty relating to people and language development) as stemming from the organic pathology and explain the failure of psychological therapies, i.e., psychotherapy and operant conditioning, to alter the natural course of the illness.
>
> (Ritvo, *et al.*, 1970)

They assume that the organic pathology responsible for the maturational lag must be quite subtle; it has avoided detection by the routine tests. Because the symptomology fluctuates, they postulate the involvement of the regulation circuits of the central nervous system.

4. AROUSAL FACTORS

Carlson and Deslauriers also discuss early infantile autism in terms of developmental lag. They have been "led to view the condition of early infantile autism as one of a failure to develop rather than as an instance of abnormal development; i.e. as a developmental arrest rather than as a defensive or regressive behavior in the face of a destructive environment (Carlson, 1967)." A central assumption of their work is that early infantile autism represents a case of severe sensory and emotional deprivation. Unsatisfied with the psychodynamic explanation for this deprivation they postulated "within the child an internal barrier to normal levels of sensory and affective receptivity (Carlson, 1967)."

To account for this internally imposed barrier they conceptualized two reciprocally related arousal systems. Functionally System I acts as the activation-drive-energy-response system. System II involves the neuro-mechanism of reward, incentive, motivation, and affects (pleasure, pain, etc.) in the normal child. System I and System II are arranged in a state of dynamic equilibrium; each suppresses the activity of the other. A new stimulus activates System I and responses are emitted. As a consequence of a reward, System II is activated and its arousal dampens or reduces System I activity. "Therefore, in a typical animal learning system, the response is learned because the drive that produced the response is suppressed by the effect of the reward. One could then define reinforcement as that which suppresses the system which gives energy to the response (Carlson, 1967)."

The autistic child's arousal systems are in a state of imbalance from the time of birth and "this imbalance exists in the direction of a sustained ascendancy of System I, the drive-energy system, over System II, the affective-incentive-reward system (Carlson, 1967)." Consequently, while the autistic child is capable of attending to stimuli he is almost incapable of establishing associations between responses and rewards. Since System II does not suppress the activity of System I, these associations are not established or consolidated. Thus, the majority of stimuli in the autist's world remain novel to him. Appropriate responses are not learned.



Figure 1. Balanced functioning-appropriate reversal of system ascendancy. Adapted from Deslauriers and Carlson, 1969.

> Such a condition would not only account for the lack of affective content in the autistic child but also for this apparent inability to learn, to remember, to associate present experience with past events, his highly stereotyped, perseverative, limited, self-stimulatory behaviors and his insistence on the preservation of sameness since little if any experience in his life has acquired meaning.
>
> (Deslauriers and Carlson, 1969)

Autistic children, according to Carlson and Deslauriers, do learn or acquire associations under two conditions:

(1) With excessive repetition (reinforcement of the stimulus constellations).

(2) When the stimulus constellation is reinforced in an unusually strong affective climate.

Under these conditions, System II may be able to suppress System I enough to enable learning to occur.

Hutt, et al. have also discussed the stereotypies (bizarre and stereotyped behavior such as hand-flapping, twirling, etc.) of autistic children without an arousal context. They hypothesize that these behaviors are biological safety devices which serve to prevent further sensory input. In effect, the child is protecting himself from the deleterious effect of excessive excitation. There is some experimental evidence to support the suggestion that stereotypies are a functional mechanism. In an "empty room, where sensory input is at a minimum, level of stereotypies is low and EEG shows relatively little desynchronization; as stimuli are introduced, stereotypy increases as does the amount of low voltage, irregular rhythm in the EEG (Hutt, et al., 1965).[illegible] (The desynchronized EEG is thought to be a manifestation of increased electrocortical bombardment from the reticular system, i.e., an indication of high arousal.) Hutt, et al, have also related the characteristic gaze-aversion of autists to physiological and behavioral arousal. Psychodynamic theorists have focused on the symbolic significance of gaze-aversion (turning away from the world). Hutt and his colleagues have focused on the biological implications of the phenomenon. Gaze fixation, looking directly at another person, is understood to be an arousing phenomenon.[illegible] Hutt suggests that autists are already in a state of high physiological arousal. The autist's gaze-aversion is an attempt to reduce arousal.

In an experiment which has been widely interpreted as supporting psychodynamic concepts of autism, autistic and non-autistic children were placed in a room with five faces fixed on stands. The faces were: (1) smiling, (2) unhappy, (3) blank, (4) monkey, (5) dog.[illegible] The autistic children spent the greatest percentage of time gazing at the dog; gazing time decreased 5-4-3-2-1. Most of their time, however, was spent with environmental stimuli (doorknobs, etc.). Non-autists used their time to look at (in decreasing order) 1-5-2-4-3. Hutt, et al. concluded that the smiling face evoked the strongest avoidance reaction, probably because this combination of features has been most closely associated with approach and with social demands leading to arousal.

In another experiment, Hutt, et al. put autistic children in a room with non-autistic children and toys. The autists were never attacked for their toys, despite the fact that, to a naive observer, they appeared to be easy targets. Here, gaze-aversion is likened to a behavior pattern of the herring-gull which Tinbergen has termed "appeasement postures." It may be that the autists' gaze-aversion inhibited any aggressive or threatening behavior on the part of the non-autists in this experiment (Hutt and Ounsted, 1966).

> Much evidence from animal studies indicates that behavior withdrawal and stereotyped behavior occur in states of high arousal. It has been suggested that in these autistic children, too, and in particular those who engage in stereotypies, the non-specific activity of the ascending reticular system is at a chronically high level, perhaps due to some biochemical-metabolic lesion.
>
> (Hutt, et al., 1965)

5. PERCEPTUAL FACTORS

Ornitz and Ritvo (1968) have described a single disease process common to early infantile autism, symbiotic psychosis, childhood schizophrenia, the atypical child, and pseudo or primary retardation (see Fig. 2).

They note that the behavior of the autistic infant suggests that he is getting too little or too much input from the environment. They feel that this factor is associated with the autistic child's failure to distinguish between himself and the outside world and the absence or lag in the development of imitative behavior. These three characteristics are explained by the autist's inability to maintain constancy of perception.

> Thus, identical percepts from the environment are not experienced the same each time. This is due, we further postulate, to an underlying failure of homeostatic regulation in the central nervous system so that environmental stimuli are either not adequately modulated or are unevenly amplified. This postulated failure to maintain perceptual constancy results in a random underloading of the central nervous system.
>
> (Ritvo and Ornitz, 1969)

Early infantile autism as described by Ornitz and Ritvo is characterized by five subclusters of symptoms: 1) disturbances of perception, 2) disturbances of motor behavior, 3) disturbances of relating, 4) disturbances of language and 5) disturbances of developmental rate and sequence (Ornitz and Ritvo, 1969). Ornitz suggests that disturbances of perception are fundamental to the other


12
10
8
6
4
2
0
AGE
PRIMARY RETARDATION ± Psychotic ego development
ORGANIC BRAIN DYSFUNCTION ego development
AUTISTIC Minimal ego functions
SCHIZOPHRENIC Psychotic ego organization
BORDERLINE STATES Areas of psychotic ego function with capacity for acute regressions
± WELL Severe neurotic or character disorder residuals apparent
PRIMARY RETARDATION ± Psychotic ego development
ORGANIC BRAIN DYSFUNCTION ± Psychotic ego development
AUTISTIC Minimal ego functions - mute or echolalic
SCHIZOPHRENIC Psychotic ego organization
SYNDROME OF PERCEPTUAL INCONSTANCY Early infantile autism and variants

Figure 2. Developmental relationships among diagnostic categories.

(Adapted from Ornitz & Ritvo, 1968.)

aspects of the disease. He supports this contention by offering clinical and autobiographical accounts, and psychological, psychophysical and neurophysiological studies which indicate that sensory changes precede other symptoms in the development of a psychosis. Later symptoms, like hallucinations and delusions, are thought to be derived from earlier sensory changes. "These sensory changes are elemental, involving the basic units of sensory intensity, pitch or equilibrium, and more than one sensory modality is involved (Ornitz, 1969)."

In an attempt to distinguish between the cause of the pathology and the content of the pathology, Ornitz makes the following statement:

> There are indeed major differences between a mute or echolalic and completely detached autistic child ...and an actively hallucinating schizophrenic adult. The argument of this paper is that these differences represent secondary manifestations of the disease process and are determined in part by the developmental and maturational level of the patient during the time that the breakdown of homeostatic regulation of sensory input is active.
> (Ornitz, 1969)

At times, the bizarre behavior of autistic children (hand-flapping, whirling, finger fluttering, excited reactions to spinning objects) reflects hyperexcitation. At other times, prolonged immobility and non-responsiveness to external stimulation, reflects an over-inhibitory state. Ornitz attributes these behaviors to the physiological disequilibrium between faciliatory and inhibitory systems which regulate sensory input. This, in turn, interferes with the child's capacity to maintain perceptual constancy. "These symptoms may secondarily serve as foci for the development of bizzare or psychotic fantasies. However, neither a 'need' for self-stimulation nor the child's fantasy life explains the original development or sustained activity level of these symptoms (Ornitz and Ritvo, 1969)."

In another paper, Ornitz suggests that beyond its simple effects on equilibrium, the vestibular system has a profound influence on the mediation of vestibular input, general sensory input, and motor output. Motion, therefore, may induce unpleasant perceptual distortions. In order to avoid these subjective changes the individual may limit his movements. Catatonic immobility may develop. "Perceptual distortions rapidly become incorporated into paranoid delusional experience and they are elaborated and communicated in a way that often does not make their perceptual origin obvious or convincing (Ornitz, 1970)."

McGhie and Chapman (1961) interviewed 26 early schizophrenics in order to explore the nature of these perceptual distortions. They have recorded the patients' descriptions of the sensory changes which occur in the early stages of psychosis:

(1) Disturbances in the process of attention: 'Everything seems to grip my attention although I am not particularly interested in anything. I am speaking to you just now but I can hear noises going on next door and in the corridor. I find it difficult to shut these out and it makes it more difficult

> for me to concentrate on what I am saying to you. Often the silliest things going on seem to interest me. That's not even true; they don't interest me, but I find myself attending to them and wasting a lot of time this way. I know that sounds like laziness but it's not really.'

(2) Disturbances in the process of perception:

a) Sensory quality

> 'Colours seem to be brighter now, almost as if they are luminous. When I look around me it's like a luminous painting. I'm not sure if things are solid until I touch them.'

b) Perception of speech

> 'If there are three or four people talking at one time I can't take it in. I would not be able to hear what they are saying properly and I would get the one mixed up with the other. To me it's just like a babble--a noise that goes right through me.'

c) Perception and movement

> 'When I move quickly it's a strain on me. Things go too quickly for my mind. They get blurred and it's like being blind. It's as if you were seeing a picture one moment and another picture the next. I just stop and watch my feet. Everything is all right if I stop, but if I start moving again I lose control.'

(McGhie and Chapman, 1961)

The authors suggest that the disturbances of perception and thinking in early schizophrenia results from a loss of attention control. Some of the bizarre and ostensibly meaningless behaviors of schizophrenia may, in fact, be adaptive. The patient who closes his eyes and stuffs things in his ears may be protecting himself from disturbing stimuli.

Perceptual distortions in the form of unusual sensitivities in several sensory modalities have been studied by Bergman and

Escalona (1949). All five of the children reported by the authors as having unusual sensitivities later developed childhood psychosis. Bergman and Escalona propose that the psychoses developed because the children's biological equipment offered insufficient protection from external stimuli; consequently, the children were forced to prematurely organize an ego to meet the emergency. Psychotic manifestations set in when this premature ego breaks down, possibly as the consequence of a trauma.

6. NEUROLOGICAL FACTORS

Children with minimal brain injury have been described as erratic, emotionally over-reactive, hyperkinetic, impulsive, distractible, and explosive. Our assumptions regarding the etiology of this behavior obviously determine, in part, our understanding of the child. From the biogenetic perspective, the child's erratic behavior may be more apparent than real. That is, a perceptual disturbance resulting from neurological dysfunction may place the child in a genuinely 'different world,' what seems like aimless behavior may be a response to stimuli which are compelling to the child. These assumptions lead to certain approaches to the child and to his treatment; psychogenic assumptions may lead to different plans (Kurlander and Colodny, 1965).

The syndrome of minimal brain dysfunction has been the subject of increasing controversy. Simply stated, the controversy is this: environmentalists of various persuasions claim that neurotic and/or disturbed children are inaccurately labelled "brain-injured" children, while those sympathetic to a biological perspective argue that many children labeled "emotionally disturbed" are in fact neurologically impaired. The debate is complicated and perpetuated by the fact that a diagnosis of minimal brain dysfunction is generally made on the basis of behavioral evidence rather than "hard" neurological data.

The diagnosis of minimal brain injury is based on an analogy:

> We sort the group of individuals who behave in a certain fashion. The vast majority of these individuals will display definite signs of brain injury. About the few remaining we do not know one way or the other. It would seem that we are justified in assuming the factor which is causative in the few remaining, especially in view of the fact that the common neurological examination is known not to be infallible.
>
> (Strauss and Kephart, 1955)

Strauss and Lehtinen pioneered much of the work in this area. Their remarks provide an appropriate preface for the present discussion of the minimally brain-injured child:

> We shall follow in this discussion a neurological viewpoint, being aware that other interpretations are just as possible and that we consider this factor the outstanding one in understanding our methods of treatment and re-education of the brain-injured child. We shall describe here only those behavior manifestations which we consider the result of brain damage. We do not mean by this to imply that the brain-injured child is immune to the effects of inadequate environment or that all abnormal behavior symptoms are the result of destruction in the brain. We wish simply to emphasize that many overt behavior signs--in most cases the most disturbing kind of behavior--of brain-injured children should be interpreted as the outcome of brain-damage. All too often, we have seen the behavioral disturbances of brain injured children attributed to environmental circumstances, i.e., diagnosed as of psychogenic or neurotic origin, with consequently unsuccessful attempts at treatment.
>
> (Strauss and Lehtinen, 1947)

Strauss and Lehtinen's interpretation of the behavior of brain-injured children follows from their understanding of the relationship between the new brain and the old brain (*extra-*

pyramidal system). The old brain contains cell structures which regulate emotions and expressive movements. In the course of neurological development, the new brain becomes an inhibiting influence on the old brain. If the inhibiting effect of the new brain is impaired, the old brain acts unchecked. The excesses of emotional reaction and hyperactivity of the brain-injured child are the result of such an impairment.

Strauss and Lehtinen adopted W. B. Cannon's neurophysiological theory to interpret the psychomotor disturbances of brain-injured children. According to Cannon's theory, emotion is a function of the thalamus (a ganglion-cell center in the extra-pyramidal system). They quote Cannon to offer an explanation of the impulsive behavior of the brain-injured child:

> Powerful impulses originating in a region of the brain not associated with cognitive consciousness and arousing, therefore, in an obscure and unrelated manner the strong feelings of emotional excitement explain the sense of being seized, possessed, or being controlled by an outside force and made to act without weighing of the consequences.
>
> (Strauss and Lehtinen, 1947)

Another major influence on Strauss, which becomes more evident in his later work (Strauss and Kephart, 1955) is Gestalt theory. Thus, the behavior of brain-injured children is related to their inability to adequately combine parts into wholes and the concomitant tendency to respond to details rather than wholes. Because of the deficit, a specific stimulus tends to stand out and gains strength through not being integrated with the total stimulus configuration. Consequently, the brain-injured child may respond explosively to a stimulus that is not apparent to the people around him. The lack of structure in his perceptual field increases the relative intensity of extraneous stimulation, reduces the drive of goal-directed activity, and increases distractibility. The child's responses are intense (disinhibited) because he makes fewer non-overt responses than the normal individual; the energy normally released through these responses is stored, increasing the intensity of the overt responses.

In an epidemiological study, Graham and Rutter (1968) investigated the association between organic brain dysfunction and psychiatric disorders using all of the school-age residents on the Isle of Wright as subjects (N = 11,865). They compared the incidence of psychiatric disorders in four groups:

(1) Children with epilepsy or with lesions above the brain stem (e.g. cerebral palsy),

(2) A random sample of the general population,

(3) Children with lesions below the brain stem (e.g. muscular dystrophy),

(4) Children with chronic physical handicaps not involving the nervous system (e.g. heart disease).

They found five times more psychiatric disorders in Group I children than in the general population, and three times more than in Group 4 children. They concluded that the high rate of psychiatric disorders in the neuro-epileptic children was due primarily to the presence of organic brain dysfunction. Educational, socio-familial, etc. factors were operative only to the extent that they determined the type and content of the psychiatric disturbance.

The use of a comparison group 4 enabled Graham and Rutter to conclude that organic brain damage is a primary rather than secondary etiological factor. That is, the psychiatric disturbance is more than the child's reaction to a physical handicap.

In another epidemiological study, data was gathered on all children born in 1940 or after who were referred to the Department of Special Services in the Baltimore School System (Pasamanick, 1954). Presumably, children referred to this agency were children with behavior disorders. Hospital records for 816 of these children were sought and compared with a control group. They only considered children with IQ's above 80. Forty per cent of the experimental group were described as confused, disorganized, and hyperactive. The results ($p < .05$) indicated three times as much prematurity and one-third more of the various complications of pregnancy and delivery (factors correlated with brain injury) occurred in the experimental group.

Ucko (1965) compared 29 boys with a history of neonatal anoxia with 29 controls. He found that the asphyxiated children were much more difficult to manage because they were significantly more reactive temperamentally. This was especially evident in their responses to frustration, enjoyable events, and changes in routine.

Other investigators have focused on the incidence and nature of neurological abnormalities in psychotic populations. Goldfarb (1961) found the following minor neurological abnormalities in children diagnosed as psychotic: hypotonia, whirling, disturbances of body schema, and abnormal righting and postural responses. Hypo- or hypertonia and clumsiness were found in 40 per cent of the psychotic children studied by Eaton and Menolescino (1966). Hinton (1963) found the same minor neurological abnormalities in 56 per cent of his group. Gittelman and Birch (1967) found neurological abnormalities (epilepsy, abnormal EEG, choreiform movements, pathological reflexes, myoclonic jerking) in 19 per cent of the 97 psychotic children they studied. Sterotypies (ostensibly meaningless gestures or movements which are constantly repeated) are a frequently noted motor abnormality of psychotic children (Green, 1967; Lebowitz et al, 1961; Ritvo et al, 1968; Sorosky et al, 1968).

Rutter's studies have indicated that childhood psychosis is frequently associated with mental subnormality and organic disease of the brain (Rutter, 1965). Rutter contends that the intellectual impairment of autistic children is not a case of "pseudo-feeblemindedness" due to social withdrawal, but "real" retardation.

Rutter followed up the cases of 63 prepubescent children who received the unequivocal diagnosis of child psychosis at the Maudley Hospital between 1950 and 1958. When these children first attended the clinic, approximately 40 per cent scored below IQ 50, the same number between IQ 50 and 80, and approximately 20 per cent scored above this level. At follow-up it was evident that the bright children got brighter and the dull, duller. Nine children were no longer autistic at the time of follow-up: in no case was loss of autism associated with a rise in IQ. "This must be regarded as strong evidence that the subnormality is not secondary to autism. It is more likely that the IQ is low because of 'organic' brain dysfunction and that whatever abnormality of the brain leads to the autism also leads to the low IQ (Rutter, 1965)."

Sixteen of the children in this study had abnormalities of the central nervous system when only stringent criteria were used. Fifteen of these were epileptic. Only during the follow-up period did ten of these children begin to have fits. For another 18 children, the evidence strongly suggested brain damage. Only one child had normally developed speech. Even at follow-up, only half of the children had speech.

Of the speaking children, three-quarters exhibited echolalia. Nearly a quarter of the children spoke of themselves as "you" or "he" and referred to other people as "I". With one exception, all the children who reversed pronouns were also echolalic. "It seems more parsimonious to regard the abnormality, at least usually, as another aspect of echolalia, rather than add a doubtful, and very inferential concept (Rutter, 1965, p.523)." The inferential concept referred to is the psychodynamic hypothesis concerning the child's confusion about his identity. Rutter concludes that childhood psychosis:

> is a disorder which is usually associated with receptive and executive speech defects. These are often, but not always, part of a more general organic damage to the brain. Other disorders of perception are probably important in some children. Psychosis is not primarily emotional in origin and psychogenic factors usually play only a secondary role in the development of the condition.
>
> (Rutter, 1965)

Rimland has proposed that early infantile autism is the result of a neurological dysfunction. Like Carlson, Rimland contends that autism is characterized by the child's inability to relate new stimuli to remembered experience--a function which is basic to all cognition (Rimland, 1964). As a result, the child is virtually divested of the means for deriving meaning from his experience. Stimuli entering the brain are not sorted, segregated, redistributed or integrated with prior or subsequent input. Rimland suspects that an impairment of the reticular formation of the brain stem is responsible for the cognitive dysfunction.

Rimland lists several points which, taken collectively, indicate a biological basis for infantile autism.

(1) Some clearly autistic children are born of parents who do not fit the autistic parent personality pattern.

(2) Parents who do fit the description of the supposedly pathogenic parent almost invariably have normal, non-autistic children.

(3) With very few exceptions, the siblings of autistic children are normal.

(4) Autistic children are behaviorally unusual from the moment of birth.

(5) There is a consistent ratio of three or four boys to one girl.

(6) Virtually all cases of twins reported in the literature have been identical with both twins afflicted.

(7) Autism can occur or be closely simulated in children with known organic brain damage.

(8) The symptomology is highly unique and specific.

(9) There is an absence of gradations of infantile autism which would create "blends" from normal to severely afflicted.

(Rimland, 1964)

While Rimland does postulate the reticular formation as the locus of neurological dysfunction, his primary hypothesis--that infantile autism is biologically determined--does not depend on pinpointing the site of damage. His examination of the evidence for the psychogenesis of autism focuses on the inadequacy and/or ambiguity of this data. For example, while the stereotyped, pathogenic, parental personality (cold, intellectual, etc.) has been used to corroborate psychodynamic notions, it may be that the child's and parent's behavior are related to consequences of the same genetic factor. Because autists can speak under emergency conditions, psychodynamic clinicians infer 'voluntary' mutism. However, since adrenaline affects the reticular formation, a biological interpretation is also plausible.

Goldfarb's theory of childhood schizophrenia (1961) includes both biological and socio-environmental variables as causal factors. He presents a theoretical continuum based on the assumption that somatic inadequacies (neuro-physiological) are the primary basis for schizophrenia in some cases, while in others the child's family experience is the critical etiological factor.


Somatic inadequacies within child are primary etiological factors
Disturbances in child's family experience are primary etiological factor
(organic damage increasing)
(deviant family atmosphere increasing)

Figure 3. Goldfarb's theoretical continuum.

The result, in either case, is an impairment in personal identity related to ego deficits at all levels (receptive, integrative, and executive). According to Goldfarb, the ego preserves personal identity and continuity in the face of a perpetually shifting internal and external environment. His formulation, in this respect, is similar to Ornitz's construct of perceptual inconstancy.

Whether somatic inadequacies or deviant family experiences lead to impaired ego function is of little consequence. The interaction cycle which follows, (the precursor to childhood schizophrenia), is the same:

> As cyclical, reverberating interplay between the causes and consequences is postulated in a theoretical model, in which consequences dynamically induce new transactions or, in feedback fashion, facilitate prior transactions. Thus, parental perplexity is presumed to produce deviance in the child. In other instances, the gradual recognition of deviance in the child produces perplexity in the parents. Regardless of whether the child's deviance or the parent's perplexity came first, a cycle of reciprocal influences is brought into play. Regardless of cause, the deviant child lacks guides for self-directed action. The parent does not or cannot supply such adequate guides, or the child's confidence for self-regulation is limited. This, in turn, produces subjective feelings of strangeness and inconstancy, expressed in panic. Finally, the child's panic, in turn, frightens and bewilders the parents, and so the cycle is reinforced.
>
> (Goldfarb, 1961)

Discussion

Inferences from the literature on minimal brain damage should be made with restraint. Many of the studies in this area lack controls, use questionable or unstated diagnostic techniques, and are anecdotal rather than experimental (Werry).

> Though there is no unanimity, the majority of studies suggest that the behavior disorder of the hyperkinetic syndrome is associated to a varying extent with certain paranatal, neurological, EEG and cognitive abnormalities. The relationship between these variables and indeed their very significance is obscure, but they seem to be weakly suggestive of some kind of a cerebral dysfunction...
>
> (Werry)

In addition, the majority of studies have concluded that psychotic children have more minor neurological abnormalities than normal comparison groups.

7. BIOCHEMICAL FACTORS

The investigation of relations between brain chemistry and behavior has only begun in the past few years. However, "recent developments in neurophysiology suggest that most interactions between nerve cells (i.e. synaptic transmission) are basically chemical in nature (Thompson, 1967)." Synaptic interactions appear to be the only process by which neurons directly affect one another to a significant extent. "Thus, all activity of the brain and all behavior of organisms is ultimately reducible to the interconnections and synaptic interactions among neurons (Thompson, 1967)." Given the chemical nature of interactions among neurons, it is reasonable to assume that chemical processes play a fundamental role in learning and other types of behavioral change.

All nerve cell processes require energy. Metabolism refers to the chemical processes involved in the body's production and utilization of energy. Vitamins, serving as enzymes, participate in this process; without the necessary vitamins, the reactions cannot take place.

> A strikingly clear example of a metabolic 'lesion' is the relatively rare hereditary disease phenylketonuria (PKU). This is characterized by severe mental retardation and the excretion of a simple organic compound, phenylpyruric acid, in the urine. It has been demonstrated that these symptoms result from abnormal metabolism of one of the naturally occurring amino acids, phenylaline, which is present in many protein foods. Normally,

> phenylaline is converted to another amino acid, tyrosine, in the liver. However, in individuals suffering from phenylketonuria this conversion does not take place. Instead, the phenylaline blood and tissue levels increase and the phenylaline metabolism is diverted to phenylpyruric acid and phenyllactic acid. These, in turn, result in toxic effects on the CNS.
>
> (Thompson, 1967)

The PKU disease process has been explained at some length for three reasons.

(1) For many years, before the organic basis of the disease was fully understood, PKU was considered a 'functional' psychosis.

(2) It provides an illustration of a biological abnormality which is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of a mental disorder. The metabolic "lesion" results in a behavioral disorder only in connection with the ingestion of phenylaline.

(3) This understanding of PKU has resulted in remarkably successful preventive therapy. "If infants with phenylketonuria are placed on a special phenylaline-free diet, all abnormal symptoms are permanently reversed and the disease does not develop (Thompson, 1967)."

The treatment of PKU described above is an example of orthomolecular therapy which may be defined as the treatment of mental illness by the provision of the optimum molecular composition of the brain... (Linus Pauling, quoted in Cott). Orthomolecular therapy should be distinguished from the practice of giving children drugs to sedate or tranquilize them. The latter form of treatment may modify the child's behavior but does not necessarily attack the basic cause of the illness.

Cott has hypothesized that autism and schizophrenia result from the presence of toxic substances in the blood stream and an abnormal concentration of certain vitamin and enzyme substances in the brain cells (Cott). Cott has treated 175 children with schizophrenia, autism or brain damage. He claims that the results in the vitamin treatment have often been dramatic:

> The child begins to understand and obey commands, exhibiting a willingness to co-operate with his parents and others. Gaze aversion ceases; the hyperactivity, which is one of the cardinal symptoms of the childhood psychoses, subsides slowly.
>
> (Cott)

Osmond and Hoffer report improvement in the condition of schizophrenics treated with Vitamin B_3 (niacinamide) and Vitamin C (ascorbic acid) (Osmond and Hoffer, 1959). They suggest that these vitamins facilitate a desirable metabolism of adrenaline (epinepherine) or other chemicals which the schizophrenic otherwise metabolizes to toxic chemicals. Adrenaline (also serotonin, acetycholine, etc.) is believed to be a chemical vital to the synaptic transmission of nerve impulses within the body and brain. Rimland reports that vitamins (especially C and B_3) have effected from slight to striking improvement in 80 per cent of the severely disturbed children in his nationwide study (Rimland, 1969a).

There are at least two ways of conceptualizing the relationship between biochemical imbalances and disordered behavior. One is that 'poor' or 'inadequate' transmission of chemical signals in the neurons results in the unintegrated and incoherent processing of stimuli (Schildkraut and Kety, 1965). Another hypothesis is that chemical neuron transmitters (adrenaline, etc.) are metabolized into toxic or hallucinogenic compounds (Cutting, 1969).

While the limits of this paper preclude a review of the voluminous literature on this subject, it is possible to consider the types of data which are offered to support biochemical hypotheses.

One favored research method has been the analysis of brain tissue, urine, perspiration, and other body fluids of psychiatric patients. These analyses attempt to document an abnormal concentration of certain vital chemicals or compounds presumed to be related to the psychopathology of the subject. Another method involved injecting healthy organisms with certain vital fluids of 'sick' organisms. The experimenters then observe the behavioral effects of the injection. In addition, the experimental production of psychotic behavior in normal persons through biochemical means (LSD-hallucinations; reserpine-depression; amphetamine-paranoia) has been offered as support for the biogenetic position (Rimland, 1969b). The efficacy of biochemical treatment of certain behavior disorders has been similarly interpreted.

This type of experimental evidence must be interpreted carefully. As Kety has pointed out, physiological changes may be secondary to psychological changes in the patient. The period of emotional turmoil which precedes the diagnosis and treatment of a psychiatric disorder may affect dietary intake and, in turn, body chemistry (Kety, 1959).

In addition, other factors set the psychiatric patient apart from the normal control. The patient with a long history of hospitalization in over-crowded institutions faces a greater risk of chronic infections, especially of the digestive tract. The many physiological therapies to which the patient has been exposed also set him apart from the control subject.

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A REVIEW OF LEARNING AND BEHAVIOR THEORY AS IT RELATES TO EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE IN CHILDREN

Darlene F. Russ

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I. AN OUTLINE OF LEARNING THEORY

There is no learning theory per se, but rather many theories of learning. Most theorists have focused on only a few aspects of the total situation; consequently, the different theories may use the same vocabulary to consider different phenomena or may use different vocabularies in describing the same phenomena. "There are many approaches which might be used to express the relationships among research findings for all forms of human learning. Undoubtedly, the most elegant way would be in terms of theory. A general theory of human learning in which the particular findings in each area are shown to be deductions from the master set of statements and relationships is clearly an ideal solution. No such system is available (Underwood, 1964)."

Although great diversity exists among learning theorists, certain common assumptions are made in all the approaches. These assumptions are the identifying characteristics which allow differentiation of learning theories from other psychological theories. The following section presents the basic definitions, assumptions, and principles which characterize learning theory, and their relationship to disturbed behavior.

Basic Assumptions

Any theory of learning must include a defintion of learning.*

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*Underlining indicates technical term.

Hilgard and Bower propose the following definition: "Learning is the process by which an activity originates or is changed through reacting to an encountered situation, provided that the characteristics of the change in activity cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the organism (e.g. fatigue, drugs, etc.) (Hilgard and Bower, 1966)."

According to this definition, learning is a process which, though it can be defined, cannot be observed. The occurrence of learning is inferred from the occurrence of a new behavior or from a change in behavior. Many theorists, then referring to learning, use the term "conditioning." The two terms, learning and conditioning, can refer to the same process. However, conditioning usually implies learning within an experimental, laboratory setting, or it involves the application of laboratory procedures to a non-laboratory setting. Learning, on the other hand, usually refers to changes in behavior in natural settings.

The stimulus which preceeds a new behavior or change in behavior can consist of a wide variety of objects and events--past and present, internal and external (Bijou, 1968). For the stimulus to influence behavior, however, it must be perceived by the organism. The stimulus, then, consists of a past or present perception of the organism. Some theorists deal mainly with characteristics of the stimulus.

Other theorists look exclusively at behavior, i.e., performance variables. For them, learning consists of a sequence of behaviors which is modified by environmental experience (Skinner, 1953; Sidney W. Bijou, personal communication, 1971). This latter definition of learning, like the former, utilizes both the encountered situation (environment) and the sequence of behaviors (activity) as key concepts. These theorists are not concerned with intervening variables, i.e. unobservable processes occurring between the stimulus and the response.

Most learning theorists make these assumptions.

(1) Behavior is a basic characteristic of living organisms.

(2) Behavior is modifiable, and modification can occur through learning.

(3) Most human behavior is learning behavior (Wolpe, 1958; Skinner, 1953). Certainly other processes, such as growth and physical damage (Wolpe, 1958), result in relatively permanent changes in behavior; however, their importance is minimized by learning theorists.

(4) The creation, maintenance, and removal of behavior depend on environmental events or stimuli. With changes in events, changes in behavior result. An environmental change can occur as an antecedent or as a consequent event. In either case, the behavior changes, indicating adaptation to environmental conditions.

(5) A lawful, functional relationship exists between behavior and

environmental events.

Extensions To Disturbed Behavior

From the definitions and assumptions above, one can formulate a definition of emotional disturbance to which most theorists would ascribe. Emotional disturbance consists of maladaptive behavior (Ullmann & Krasner, 1965). As a learned behavior, it develops and is maintained like all other behaviors. A maladaptive behavior may be reinforced by many events. Society plays an especially important role. It defines the maladaptive behavior through the labeling process and administers reinforcement which maintains the behavior. Although learning theorists acknowledge biological bases of behavior, they are concerned with the effect of environmental response to the behavior.

2. MAJOR DIVISIONS AMONG THE CONNECTIONIST THEORISTS

It is not possible at present to set up the various learning theories as a unified theory (Hilgard & Bower, 1966; Deese & Hulse, 1958; Hill, 1963). There exist major divisions among learning theorists, and within each division there exist further divisions. (See Figure 1). (John R. Platt, personal communication, 1970; Marx, 1951).

This paper considers only those theorists who are recognized as connectionist psychologists (Hill, 1963), since most of the cognitive psychologists do not deal with the problem of emotionally disturbed behavior. The connectionist views learning as involving the establishment of a connection between a stimulus and a response. The basic assumption in such theories is that the response is functionally related to the stimulus, and a connection is formed between two stimuli (Pavlov) or between the stimulus and the response (Guthrie, Hull).

Though agreement exists among the theorists on the basic assumption, two major issues divide the theorists. The first major issue concerns the process by which the learned connection is established and maintained. One group of theorists contends that the connection develops because of contiguity, while the other group of theorists recognizes reinforcement as the important mechanism. The second issue involves the utilization of or the rejection of theoretical concepts (i.e., intervening variables and hypothetical constructs).

The structure of the chart on the connectionist learning theorists (Figure 1) points to a grouping of the major learning theorists based on the two issues mentioned above with the influence of one theorist on another emphasized.

Contiguity Theorists Versus Reinforcement Theorists

The contiguity and the reinforcement theorists disagree on the process by which a connection develops. For the contiguity theorist, the critical element is the temporal or spatial contiguity of the two stimuli, or of the stimulus and the response. According to reinforcement theorists, a connection can occur only if the final event is followed by reinforcement. Reinforcement is any event following a response which increases the probability of the recurrence of the response. Reinforcement theorists do not ignore the importance of contiguity. When they consider it, however, they relate it to reinforcement by specifying the temporal contiguity of the response and the reinforcement. Thus, a reinforcement must be contiguous to a response for learning to occur.

Not only do the theorists disagree about the associative process; they also have different conceptualizations of the learning task (Melton, 1964). For the contiguity theorists, the task involves merely an establishment of a relationship between two events. The stimulus is presented and a response is evoked automatically. The


CONNECTIONIST PSYCHOLOGISTS
CONTIGUITY THEORISTS
REINFORCEMENT THEORISTS (Thorndike--Law of Effect)
No theoretical concepts
Theoretical concepts
Theoretical concepts
No theoretical concepts
WATSON
PAVLOV
HULL SPENCE (influenced by Watson)
SKINNER (influenced by Watson)
EYSENCK
GUTHRIE
WOLPE
PREMACK
BIJOU
MILLER
BANDURA
GAGNE

Figure 1. The important divisions among connectionist psychologists based on the theorist's approach to the issues of contiguity versus reinforcement and theoretical concepts versus no theoretical concepts.

learning task is viewed differently by the reinforcement theorist. The organism must select or discover the response which leads to the reinforcement. Thus, not only must he connect the stimulus with the response, but he must also discover which stimulus and which response are appropriate in the situation (i.e., result in reinforcement).

Theoretical Concepts Versus No Theoretical Concepts

Theoretical concepts enter a system as intermediary entities inferred from independent (input) variables and dependent (output) variables. Two kinds of theoretical concepts are hypothetical constructs and intervening variables. Hypothetical constructs, though inferred intermediaries, are conceived of as concrete, empirical entities. It is implied that, given a more advanced technology, a hypothetical construct could be observed and measured. An intervening variable, on the other hand, possesses no existence or meaning beyond its functional relationship within the system. Unlike a hypothetical construct, it can never be directly observed or measured.

Among the theorists, wide differences exist in the use of inferred intermediary concepts in the systems. Some theorists develop their entire system around such inferred processes (Hull). Others reject the use of such processes completely, preferring to demonstrate and investigate empirical relationships (Skinner).

Learning Theorists On Disturbed Behavior

The remainder of this paper will focus on important learning theorists who have contributed to some understanding of emotional disturbance and disturbed behavior. Each of the approaches will be discussed separately by presenting relevant definitions, assumptions and principles, and extensions to disturbed behavior.

Discussion of the theorists will proceed in accordance with Figure 1. Thus, theorists will be grouped in the following way: contiguity theorists, reinforcement theorists utilizing theoretical concepts, and reinforcement theorists rejecting the use of theoretical concepts. A final section will be devoted to the practical uses of learning theory in behavior modification and instructional practices.

3. CONTIGUITY THEORISTS

Ivan Petrovich Pavlov

In any list of important learning theorists, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the Russian physiologist must be mentioned (Pavlov, 1927; Pavlov, 1941; Hilgard & Bower, 1966). He acknowledged Descartes and Sechenov as his philosophical and conjectural ancestors. Descartes presented the reflex as the basic mechanism of animal behavior. By viewing animals as machines, he defined behavior as the connection of the stimulus and the response through a structure in the nervous system. The response is a necessary reaction to the stimulus. Descartes' formulation considered only lower, motoric connections. Sechenov extended the reflex concept to the activities of the cerebral cortex.

This previous view of the reflex as the building block of higher neural activity was merely conjectural. Pavlov recognized the need for experimental studies. His physiological investigation concerned the mechanisms of the digestive system and, in particular, the activities of the digestive glands of dogs. During this work, he became interested in the "psychic secretions" of the glands which anticipated the presentation of the food to the dog. Assuming a need for investigation by purely objective methods, he began recording all external events and all behavioral changes which occurred. From these observations and from controlled experimental studies, he


UCS
(meat powder)
UCR
(salivation)
CR
(salivation)
CS
(bell)

Figure 2. A representation of the Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. The conditioned stimulus (CS) is presented almost simultaneously with the UCS. After repeated pairings of the CS and the UCR, which is elicited by the UCS, the CS can elicit the UCR, which now becomes a conditioned response (CR).

formulated his theory of learning and behavior.

Definitions. Central to Pavlov's work, then, is the reflex, the inevitable machine-like response of the organism. It is a connection of the stimulus and the response through neural paths from the *receptor nerves* to the *central nervous system* and from the central nervous system to the nerves of the *effector organ*.

Excitation and *inhibition* refer to two basic opposing neural functions. Excitation refers to an increase in neural activity. (Neural processing is inferred from a response.) Inhibition indicates the lack of an observable reaction to a stimulus. It refers to neural activity which results in no response by the organism.

The typical Pavlovian paradigm begins with an *unconditioned stimulus* (UCS) which *elicits* an *unconditioned response* (UCR). The classical experiment providing an example of the conditioning sequence involves the salivary response of the dog. Meat powder (the UCS) placed in the dog's mouth produces salivation (the UCR). A *neutral stimulus*, such as a bell (the CS), produces no such response. Then the bell is presented with the food powder several times. Eventually, the bell will elicit salivation (now the CR) without the presentation of the food. Pavlov is concerned with the eventual connection of the CS with the UCS. Although he refers to the UCS as the "reinforcement," he uses the term in a different way from that of the reinforcement theorists.


UCS
UCR
(loud sound)
(fear)
CR
(fear)
CS
(white rat)

Figure 3. Classical conditioning paradigm used to elicit fear of a previously neutral stimulus (i.e., the white rat).

Assumptions and Principles. Reflexes account for all human and animal behavior. Inborn reflexes are the connections of a UCS and a UCR. More complex behavior is elicited in accordance with the classical conditioning paradigm presented above. After conditioning occurs, the organism can "anticipate" future conditions. Even higher order systems, such as speech, can be described by the same paradigm (Anokhin, 1968). Thus, complex human behavior consists of a whole system of inborn and conditioned reflexes.

Conditioning of higher order levels occurs in accordance with the frequency principle. The UCS and the CS activate cortical analyzers, which exist as hypothetical constructs in Pavlov's system. The action of the UCS cortical analyzer elicits the UCR. By the frequency principle, the more frequently the actions of the cortical analyzers of the UCS and the CS are paired, the more likely will the CS elicit the CR.

Behavior occurring at any of the levels reflects the constant interaction and conflict of the excitatory and inhibitory processes. Hull's (1929) review of the characteristics of these two processes reveals the nature of the interaction. The excitatory process leads to the first trial approximation of an adaptive response to a situation. The inhibitory process acts to correct the maladaptive features of the excitatory process.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Pavlov defined the pathological state as a disturbance in normal cortical activity. He labeled pathological states either as neuroses or psychoses. Although admittedly arbitrary, the distinction can be supported by differences in the cause and the complexity of the two kinds of disturbance. Neuroses result from functional interferences and tend to be of a less complex nature, whereas psychoses result from fairly extensive physical damage and are usually complex disturbances. Though recognizing two forms of pathological states, Pavlov concentrated on the study of neurosis.

Neurosis, as a disturbance in cortical activity, arises from an intense conflict between the excitatory and inhibitory processes. Two conditions which produced neurotic behavior in dogs involved direct experimental manipulation of excitatory and inhibitory processes and the influence of strong and unusual stimuli. Examples of the first condition appear in many studies of experimental neurosis (Gantt, 1944; Liddell, 1944).

Four kinds of laboratory manipulations which create neurotic behavior are:

(1) difficult discriminations (i.e., where two objects are so similar that they elicit both excitation and inhibition);

(2) rhythmic alternation of excitatory and inhibitory conditioned stimuli;

(3) increased delay before presentation of the UCS in a delayed conditioned response paradigm; and

(4) the introduction of strong and unusual stimuli.

Pavlov reported the effects of flooding of the laboratory (caused by nature, not by the experimenter) on the behavior of the laboratory dogs. For some dogs, pathological disturbances characterized their behavior for a long period of time.

Pavlov also observed that two dogs might display different behavior effects resulting from the same disturbing conditions. To account for the differences, Pavlov hypothesized four types of genotypical nervous activity. Utilizing the ancient classification of temperaments by Hippocrates, he emphasized differences in the strength of the excitatory and inhibitory processes and in their equilibrium. The following table, adapted from Anokhin (1968), describes the four types of higher nervous activity.

Hippocrates	Pavlov
Choleric	Excitable, uncompensated
Sanguine	Somewhat excitable, compensated
Phlegmatic	Somewhat inhibited, compensated
Melancholic	Inhibited, unbalanced

To use such a typology, one must define the properties of the nervous system which allow categorization. In other words, some index must be available to determine the correct typology of an organism. Pavlov employed various combinations of the following four characteristics:

(1) The strength of the process of excitation or inhibition;

(2) The equilibrium between the processes of excitation and inhibition;

(3) The mobility of the nervous processes of excitation and inhibition; and

(4) The limit of working capacity of the nervous formation.

Pavlov hypothesizes that environmental conditions interact with the nervous system to produce varying reactions among different organisms. To test this hypothesis, he subjected two dogs classified as the extreme types (choleric and melancholic) to conditions which can produce disturbed behavior (development of a salivary response to severe electrical stimulation and subsequent application of the stimulation to new positions on the body). The two dogs exhibited different behavior changes. An extreme imbalance in the excitatory and inhibitory processes resulted from the interaction of the environmental conditions with the particular temperament of the organism. In order to restore balance, there must be a gradual development of the weaker process.

Pavlov extended the idea of the four-category typology to human beings. Therefore, the reactions of human beings to the same stimulus conditions may be very different, depending on the characteristics of their nervous activity. Clinical cases can be described by the type of balance existing between the excitatory and inhibitory processes. For example, according to Pavlov, neurasthenia results from an exaggeration of inhibitory processes and a weakness of excitatory processes. To overcome the disturbance, one must increase the strength of the weaker process by manipulating environmental conditions.

John Broadus Watson

John Broadus Watson (1930; Hill, 1963) conducted most of his research on animals because he felt more comfortable studying them in laboratory situations. His graduate work and his doctoral dissertation involved studies of the behavior of the albino rat. He formulated a psychology, which unlike the _structuralism_ and _introspectionism_ dominating the field, was not limited to the normal, adult, human subject. His famous paper "Psychology as the behaviorist views it" appeared in the _Psychological Review_ in 1913, thus establishing the behaviorist school.

Definitions. The definitions which Pavlov used to describe the conditioned reflex are utilized by Watson.

Assumptions and principles. All behavior, animal and human, is entirely composed of the physiochemical processes of glandular secretions and muscular movements. Since behaviors, and not conscious processes, are the object of the psychologist's investigations, attention must be directed toward behavior as manifested by these processes. By studying behavior, rather than consciousness, psychological work becomes a more objective science.

All learning involves classical or Pavlovian conditioning. A new stimulus occurs simultaneously with a stimulus which elicits a reflex response. After several pairings, the new stimulus by itself will elicit the response. Thus, the organism learns to respond to new situations (new stimulus conditions).

Not only must an organism learn to respond to new situations, it must also learn new responses. New responses consist of sequences of old responses. Thus complex habits and behaviors are composed of chainings and combinations of simpler reflexes.

Two principles, *frequency* and *recency*, account for the occurrence of old responses in new situations and for new responses in old situations. Application of the principle of frequency characterized the Pavlovian technique. Watson, though accepting the frequency principle, adds the recency principle. By the latter, the more recently a response has been made to a stimulus, the more likely it is to be made again.

Although a strong environmentalist, Watson does make one concession to heredity (Watson & Watson, 1928). There exist three innate emotional responses in human beings *fear*, *rage*, and *love*. Furthermore, each response is originally elicited in an infant by a limited number of stimuli. The fear response arises from the experience of a loud sound or a loss of support. Restraining bodily movement causes the rage response. The love response is elicited by stroking the skin, and in particular, by stimulating the erogenous zones.

Each of the emotional reactions consists of a standard set of responses. The fear response consists of a sudden stop in breathing, a startle response or "jump" of the whole body, crying, and often defecation and urination. The rage response may be a stiffening of the whole body, screaming, cessation of breathing, and reddening of the face. The love response consists of gurgling and cooing, and the cessation of crying.

Unlike the infant, the emotional reactions of an adult or an older child are varied, and they occur in response to many different situations. Since most of these stimuli do not originally elicit such responses, the number of eliciting stimuli must be increased through conditioning.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Watson and Rayner (1920) provided an example of the behavioristic conceptualization of emotional behavior. The child in the experiment, Albert B., was the nine-month old son of a wet nurse in a hospital for invalid children. A normal healthy boy, he had been raised in a hospital environment since birth. In tests for fear reactions to various stimuli, he demonstrated fear only when he heard a loud sound. At eleven months of age, he showed the same lack of fear. Then, a white rat was presented with a loud sound. After only seven pairings, Albert showed fear of the rat when it was presented alone. The fear extended not only to the rat; but generalized to a rabbit, a dog, a fur coat (seal), cotton wool, and a Santa Claus mask. Furthermore, this fear lasted for at least one month and was observed to occur in different experimental situations. The experimenters believed that, given more time with the child, they could have eliminated the fear. The three methods which they suggested were: constant repeated stimulation resulting in habituation, reconditioning by presenting some pleasant stimulation with the feared object, and imitation or manipulation of "constructive activities" using the object.

Although Albert disappeared from the experimental scene, Peter (Jones, 1942b) proved to be a child very similar to the "fearful" Albert. Peter, at two years and ten months of age, feared rabbits, rats, fur rugs, fur coats, and cotton balls. By using the direct reconditioning technique suggested by Watson and Rayner (1920), the child was brought to the point where he did not fear the objects. In the reconditioning, a rabbit was presented to Peter during a meal. The rabbit was first held at some distance from the child and at later sessions was brought closer and closer. Finally, the child actually showed some fondness for the rabbit.

In a related study, Mary Cover Jones (1924a) investigated the effectiveness of various techniques for removing children's fear. She used 70 children who varied in age from three months to seven years. The methods of disuse, verbal appeal, and repression were not successful. The conditioning method described in the report on Peter was used successfully, as was a social imitation method consisting of merely having the child watch peers who were not afraid of the object.

Edwin R. Guthrie

Though following the Pavlovian-Watsonian tradition, Guthrie (Guthrie, 1935, 1938; Hill, 1963; Hilgard & Bower, 1966) formulated his own behaviorism. His was not a scientific background. He approached psychology from the study of philosophy. His writings do not contain many technical terms and mathematical equations; instead he used everyday examples explaining his basic points. Though criticized for his theoretical formulation, he made few changes in his position over the years (Hilgard & Bower, 1966).

Assumptions and principles. Guthrie utilized Pavlov's ideas, but in a manner very different from Watson's. Guthrie accepted the principle of contiguity as the basis for his system. "A combination of stimuli which has been accompanied by a movement will on its recurrence tend to be followed by that movement (1935, p. 26)." As a general statement of classical conditioning, it appears to be quite similar to Watson's principle of recency.

Accompanying the contiguity principle is the principle of *all-or-none learning*. The association between a stimulus pattern and a response occurs with the first pairing. This principle refers to the conditioning of very small muscular movements. The final complex response consists of many stimulus-movement connections. While the learning of each movement connection arises in an all-or-none fashion, the learning of the total response takes place gradually.

As in Pavlov's theory, facilitation and inhibition are the two ways in which one action system can influence another action system. Guthrie tends to emphasize the importance of inhibition. Furthermore, he views the inhibition as resulting from response competition. Thus, associative inhibition occurs in all learning and all forgetting. In learning to do something, the organism must learn not to do something else, implying response substitution and response competition. Forgetting occurs gradually for the same reason that learning occurs gradually. Each element in the combination that forms an action is eliminated over a period of time.

Conflict arises when there is a failure of inhibition. When inhibition does not occur, competition between two responses results. Thus, conflict can arise from learning, as well as from organic dysfunction.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Neuroses are learned adjustments to conflict. The so-called nervous breakdown, which is actually a social breakdown, results from prolonged tension and conflict. A normal organism finds ways to remove the source of conflict. But when conflict is intense, that habit may not be established. The conflict both maintains itself and causes tension. It is the self-maintenance of the conflict which is the chief obstacle to treatment and cure.

Not only is the conflict self-maintaining, but the behavior resulting from the conflict becomes a habitual adjustment pattern and tends to remain in the behavior repertoire. Consequently, even with removal of the conflict situation, the adjustment behaviors may continue to occur.

Psychoses, arising from organic causes, are disorders of the capacity for progressive adjustment. The behavior is still adaptive, but it is adaptive to the organic defect. What may be adaptive behavior for the organism is considered maladaptive by society.

Whether the person is normal, neurotic or psychotic in his behavior, Guthrie recognizes three methods of eliminating an undesirable behavior. In the "threshold" method, the stimulus is presented very weakly so that the undesirable response will not occur. Gradually, the stimulus intensity is increased, making sure that at each increase the response does not occur. Finally, the stimulus presented at full strength will not elicit the original response. The "fatigue" method consists of having the individual repeat the undesired behavior an extraordinary number of times. Eventually, he will become very tired and may refuse or actively resist responding in the usual manner. At this point, the stimulus can be presented without eliciting the response. The final method is called the method of "incompatible responses" and is similar to the reconditioning method of Watson and Rayner (1920) and Jones (1924a, 1924b). In this method, the stimulus for the original response is presented along with stimuli which elicit different and incompatible responses. The new responses become attached to the "old" stimulus and will occur in place of the undesirable responses.

Albert Bandura

Assumptions and principles. Unlike most learning theorists, who propose either one-trial learning or multiple-trial learning, Bandura (1965 a,b) states that most human learning involves no-trial learning. New responses are acquired by observing the behavior of models. The person can thereby learn new responses without having performed the task and without having received reinforcement. Though acknowledging that operant conditioning and the application of reinforcement may be well suited for controlling existing responses, he states that the development of new behavioral repertoires must occur through *modeling*. After observing a model, changes may occur in the observer's subsequent responses. The observer may acquire new responses; the inhibitory responses of the observer may be strengthened or weakened. Finally, there may be a *facilitation effect*: previously learned responses, which are similar but not identical to the model's responses, are emitted.

Bandura reports the effects of modeling on the subsequent behavior of children who were observers (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1961; Bandura & Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1965a, b.). Some interesting findings were that observers more often imitated high status rather than low status models; and they imitated models that received rewards rather than punishment for their behavior. Though the children did not perform the model's behavior after viewing the punishment, they were able to reproduce the entire sequence then offered a reward for doing so. Thus, even though they never performed the model's behavior and they viewed punishment, they did learn it, as evidenced by their ability to produce it when requested.

These latter effects illustrate the distinction between learning and performance. The children did not spontaneously perform the sequence of behavior of the punished model. However, when reward was offered, the children performed the behavior, indicating that learning had occurred. Thus, the environmental conditions influenced the performance but not the learning of the behavior.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Bandura's social learning theory indicates the importance of the social environment which provides models for the learning of behavior. For example, Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) found that children who observed an aggressive adult model, subsequently emitted more agressive responses than did children who observed a non-aggressive model. Also, the environment supplies rewards or punishments, which influence the performance of the observed, learned behavior.

Bandura does not recognize a distinction between causes of normal and of disturbed behavior. Observational no-trial learning accounts for disturbed behavior. It may occur after the observation of such behavior. Normal adaptive behavior may fail to occur if the observer considers the behavior to be inappropriate to himself or to the situation (Bandura, 1961).

Bandura's theory suggests that disturbed behaviors are learned rather than caused organically. As learned behaviors, they can be eliminated through techniques derived from learning theory. Bandura (1961) reviews these various methods of altering behavior.

The counter-conditioning technique suggested by Watson and Rayner (1920) and utilized by Jones (1924), and discussed by Guthrie (1938), the extinction method characterizing most conventional psychotherapy, discrimination learning, and punishment can eliminate anxiety-evoking reactions and maladaptive behavior with varying degrees of success. Of the four methods, counter-conditioning seems to be the most effective in removing undesired behavior. None of the methods aid in the development of new, positive behavior. Behavior modifiers in the Skinnerian tradition can establish new behavior sequences. The process of shaping behavior, however, is slow and laborious. Bandura suggests, therefore, that social imitation and modeling be the techniques of choice for acquiring new behavior readily.

Summary of the Contiguity Theorists

Although Pavlov, Watson, Guthrie, and Bandura are described as contiguity theorists, it may be recognized that Guthrie is the only true contiguity theorist. The UCS in the Pavlovian paradigm can be considered a reinforcement, and Pavlov refers to it as such. However, he places most emphasis on the contiguity of and the connection between sensory analyzers. Watson, though utilizing the Pavlovian paradigm, concentrates on the establishment of conditioned reflexes in accordance with principles of frequency and recency. Finally, Bandura clearly recognizes the importance of reinforcement for the performance of a response; however, the learning of a behavior sequence can occur independent of reinforcement, he contends.

As for the issue of theoretical concepts, none of the theorists in this section make extreme statements in either direction. Pavlov uses such terms as conditioned reflex, sensory analyzers, neural pathways, excitation and inhibition, which are theoretical concepts. On the other hand, Watson, Guthrie and Bandura place little emphasis on theoretical concepts.

The contiguity theorists differ in the emphasis they place on biological and environmental factors which influence disturbed behavior. Pavlov presents a truly interactionist theory. He describes the interaction of the organism's type of nervous system and the stimulus conditions (e.g., noxious or ambivalent stimuli). Though recognizing three biological, innate responses, Watson goes no further in pursuing biological causes of disturbance. The three responses are generalized to greater numbers of stimuli through conditioning. Thus, environmental conditions determine the occurrence of disturbed behavior. For both Guthrie and Bandura, the environmental events contain the important factors in the development and maintenance of disturbed behavior. For Guthrie, failure of the conditioning process to inhibit a response leads to conflict, anxiety, and neurosis. Furthermore, the conflict is self-maintained through habitual behavior patterns.

Bandura sees the social environment as providing models for imitation which may lead to the learning of an inappropriate response. The environmental conditions also determine the performance of the behavior.

4. REINFORCEMENT THEORISTS:

THEORISTS UTILIZING THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Reinforcement theorists are those who concentrate on the effects of the environmental consequences of behavior. This section discusses reinforcement theorists who utilize theoretical concepts in their formulations.

Bijou (1968) distinguishes between hypothetico-deductive and analytico-inductive theories. Theories described in this section would be classified hypothetico-deductive theories. The theories are tested by deduction (i.e., experiments) from general theoretical statements. "Hypothetico" refers to the use of hypothetical constructs and intervening variables to explain behavioral phenomena. These inferred processes account for events occurring between the stimulus and the response.

Edward L. Thorndike

Just as Pavlov may be viewed as the originator of contiguity theory, Thorndike (Hilgard & Bower, 1966; Hill, 1963) may be considered the father of reinforcement theory. Much of learning psychology is based on the work of Thorndike (Tolman, 1938). Although he did not contribute directly to work on emotional disturbance, his ideas, especially the Law of Effect, have been assimilated into many theories.

Definitions. According to Thorndike, learning is based on the association between sense impressions and action tendencies. Thus, a connection formed between a stimulus and a response represents all learning. Even complex human learning can be understood in terms of this simple learning paradigm.

The strength of the connection is the probability of the response given the stimulus conditions. A connection is said to have been strengthened when the probability of the response is greater (given immediate repetition of the stimulus), or when an equal response probability extends over a longer period of time. Animal and human learning occur in accordance with three laws: the law of effect, the law of readiness, and the law of exercise.

Assumptions and principles. The law of effect states that a connection becomes stronger or weaker depending on its consequences. A connection is strengthened when it is followed by a satisfying state of affairs. A satisfying state of affairs is one which an organism does not avoid and attempts to maintain. Thorndike, in his later writing (1932), rejected his earlier idea that an annoyer, or a condition which an organism actively attempts to avoid, causes a weakening of a connection. Thus, only the positive half of the law of effect remained in the system.

The law of readiness forms the physiological basis for the law of effect by describing the conditions leading to satisfaction or annoyance (Hilgard & Bower, 1966, p. 18):

(1) A condition is satisfying when a conduction unit is ready to conduct.

(2) When a conduction unit, which is ready to conduct, does not conduct, an annoying state of affairs results.

(3) Conduction is annoying when a conduction unit which is unready for conduction is forced to conduct.

The law of exercise states that, with practice, a connection will be strengthened, and, with no practice, the connection will be weakened. In later work, Thorndike questioned the law because of instances where repetition did not result in improvement. Finally, he concluded that repetitions of connections produce negligible strengthening.

Extensions to education. In Thorndike's consideration of the problem of teaching and learning in the classroom, three issues related to the laws of effect and readiness arise. The teacher must identify the connections to be formed. There must be clarity as to what performance is expected. He must identify the satisfying states of affairs, or those conditions which will cause a strengthening of the performance. Finally, he must apply the satisfiers appropriately, so that the desired connections are strengthened. Later work in learning theory as applied to education (Skinner, 1963; Gagne, 1965; Homme, 1969) essentially agrees with Thorndike's ideas.

Clark L. Hull

Hull's learning theory (Hilgard & Bower, 1966; Hill, 1963) is the most formal and systematic behavior theory ever produced. Though his training and work began in engineering, he switched to psychology and carried with him a desire to construct an elaborate and precise theory. The theory stems from Watson's behaviorism and Thorndike's connectionism, but is a more refined and detailed system. Because of its formal and systematic nature, Hull's theory dominated laboratory and theoretical work in the learning area for many years.

Because of the complexity of the Hullian system, only the major points and those of importance to later formulations will be discussed.

Definitions. Habit strength ($_sH_r$) is a key concept in the Hullian system. It is an intervening variable, inferred from changes in dependent variables. Habit refers to the recurrence of a response in a given stimulus situation. Habit strength indicates the probability of occurrence of a response within the environment.

A second important term, also an intervening variable, is the concept of drive (D). It is an activated state of the organism, without which there would be neither reinforcement, nor response, nor regulation of habits in accordance with the organism's needs.

Stimulus intensity dynamism (V) and incentive motivation (K) are two intervening variables which combine with habit strength and drive to influence behavior. These two concepts were later additions to the Hullian system, contributed by his student Kenneth Spence. Stimulus intensity dynamism (V) refers to the intensity of the stimulus. Each drive possesses a characteristic drive stimulus, and the intensity of the stimulus increases with the strength of the drive. Incentive motivation (K) indicates the motivating effect of the incentive, which is determined by the size of the reward.

The reaction potential ($_sE_r$) refers to the tendency of the organism to make a given response to a given stimulus. It is a function of habit strength, drive, stimulus intensity dynamism, and incentive motivation. Net reaction potential ($_s\overline{E}_r$) is the momentary tendency to emit the response, a function of reaction potential and inhibitory factors.

The reaction threshold ($_sL_r$) accounts for the fact that, during the early stages of the learning experience, learning will occur, although it may not be apparent in overt behavior. It is the minimum value for the net reaction potential in order that an observable response will occur. If the value of the net reaction potential is not above the threshold value, then no overt response will occur.

Oscillation refers to the fact that the net reaction potential is not a definite value but the mean of a random distribution which is approximately normal. In each trial, oscillation of ($_sE_r$) may bring the value above or below that which was calculated. By introducing the term ($_sO_r$), Hull's system can account for the fact that a response may occur on one trial but not on the next, even though the $({}_{s}E_{r})$ was higher on the second trial.

Assumptions and principles. The Hullian system of the relationships between the independent variables, the intervening variables, and the dependent variables can be summarized in the following diagram.

Three assumptions are made in the Hullian system:

(1) An organism is motivated toward conditions which are optimal for survival.

(2) Behavior arises from a stimulus event which causes receptor action and consequent effector action. Thus, behavior results from some stimulus condition.

(3) Learning is completely automatic.

According to Hull, reinforcement is central to all learning. Habit strength increases with repeated reinforcement, since the latter leads to either drive reduction or drive stimulus reduction. Furthermore, learning can occur only with reinforcement.

In Spence's modification of Hull's theory, habit strength is not increased through reinforcement, but rather through repetition. Reinforcement affects the system through the intervening variables of stimulus intensity dynamism and incentive motivation. Stimulus intensity dynamism decreases with reinforcement leading to drive stimulus reduction. With larger rewards, incentive motivation increases.

Through secondary reinforcement, a previously neutral stimulus may acquire reinforcing properties. A neutral stimulus must be paired


N
C_d
S
w
W
$_sH_r$
D
V
K
I_r
$_sI_r$
$_sE_r$
$_sI_r$
$_s\bar{E}_r$
$_sO_r$
$_sL_r$
$\dot{\bar{E}}$
$_st_r$
A
N
Input or independent variables
Intervening variables
Output or dependent variables

N - number of prior reinforcements

C_d - drive condition

S - stimulus intensity

w - amount of reward

W - work required in responding

$_sH_r$ - habit strength

D - drive

V - stimulus intensity dynamism

K - incentive motivation

I_r - reactive inhibition

$_sI_r$ - conditioned inhibition

$_sE_r$ - reaction potential

$_sI_r$ - aggregate inhibitory potential

$_s\bar{E}_r$ - net reaction potential

$_sO_r$ - oscillation

$_sL_r$ - reaction threshold

$\dot{\bar{E}}$ - effective reaction potential

$_st_r$ - reaction latency

A - reaction amplitude

n - number of non-reinforced responses to extinction

Figure 4. Summary of Hull's system, as adapted from Hilgard and Bower (1966).

with some stimulus which causes a reduction in drive level. By a similar process, a previously neutral stimulus may become a drive-producing stimulus. Both secondary reinforcement and secondary drive are important concepts for later theorists.

Hull, incorporating the Spence modification, postulates a multiplicative relationship between (${}_sH_r$,D,V, and K) as they influence the reaction potential. That is,

$${}_sE_r = {}_sH_r \times D \times V \times K.$$

In such a formulation, if any one of the variables affecting (${}_se_r$) equal zero, the reaction potential will equal zero.

There may be times when one of the values equals zero (i.e., a lack of drive conditions) and yet learning does occur. To account for this situation, Spence (Hill, 1963) again modified the Hullian system. He changed the formulation to an additive function. Thus,

$${}_sE_r = {}_sH_r\ (D + V + K).$$

Although Hull's theory of learning and behavior is thorough, he does very little work in applying the system to abnormal behavior. For the extensions to disturbed behavior, this discussion must turn to the work of Neal Miller.

Neal Miller

Following the Hullian theory closely, Miller (Miller & Dollard, 1941; Dollard & Miller, 1956; Hilgard & Marquis, 1961; Sarason, 1966) attempted to analyze psychopathology and psychotherapy in terms of learning theory.

Definitions. According to Miller and Dollard, learning theory and research involves "...the study of the circumstances under which a response and a cue become connected (1941, pp.1-2)." The four elements involved in learning are drive, cue, response, and reward.

Assumptions and principles. The establishment and maintenance of the connection between the cue and the response occurs only under the conditions of drive and reward. Drive, an intervening variable related to tissue needs, arouses the organism to an active state. In that state, the organism attempts to satisfy the drive. Reward or reinforcement results when the drive is reduced. If the response which was aroused by drive occurs in the presence of the cue and is rewarded, the cue-response connection will be strengthened.

The concept of drive, as presented above, emphasizes physical needs; however, drive encompasses much more than internal biological states. A distinction exists between primary and secondary drives. Primary drives are unlearned and biologically based. Secondary drives are learned by being paired with primary drives in accordance with a classical conditioning paradigm.

The drives and the cues in a situation exercise some limitation on the potential response. Since this limitation is not complete, the organism can make any of several different responses. The responses possess differing probabilities of occurrence, depending on how often the response previously led to drive reduction. A response or habit hierarchy consists of an ordering of these responses according to their probabilities of occurrence.

Though Miller and Dollard (1941) would agree with Bandura (1965) on the importance of imitation in human behavior, they view imitative behavior as a reinforced, learned response. It consists of the chaining of previously learned behaviors into a "new" sequence of behaviors.

Extension to disturbed behavior. Both adjusted and maladjusted behavior consist of sets of responses which reduce fear and anxiety arising from conflict. Fear and anxiety, as intervening variables, are described as secondary drives. Similar to other drives, they function as both an activating mechanism and as a reinforcing mechanism. Furthermore, fear and anxiety have distinctive sets of associated stimuli which act as cues, arousing a certain set of responses. Those responses which reduce fear or anxiety are learned.

Anxiety arises as the result of conflict. Conflict is defined as a situation in which two or more incompatible response tendencies occur simultaneously. The four types of conflict most often discussed are: approach-approach, avoidance-avoidance, approach-avoidance, and multiple approach-avoidance (Hilgard & Marquis, 1961). Approach refers to behavior reaction to a desired goal, and avoidance refers to a behavior reaction to an undesired goal. Within the framework of maladaptive behavior, the conflict situation most often researched is the approach-avoidance conflict. Thus, a particular stimulus elicits both approach and avoidance behavior, a conflict state.

Because of the conflict, either overt or covert inhibition will occur. Overt inhibition suppresses the motor response tendency, while covert inhibition suppresses verbal responses. By suppressing and eliminating the response which originally reduced the anxiety or drive, the anxiety may appear again. Covert inhibition or repression, on the other hand, may lead to stupid and irrational behavior through the suppression of verbal thought processes. This suppression, by resulting in less adequate problem solutions, may, in turn, lead to an increase in anxiety.

In describing the neurotic person, Dollard and Miller (1950) emphasize three characteristics: he is miserable because of his conflicts; he is stupid about certain features of his life; and he has symptoms. The syndrome possesses a cyclical nature which Dollard and Miller diagrammed.

Dollard and Miller (1950) describe psychoanalysis utilizing their scheme of drive, cue, response and reward. Therapy involves the building of responses which are currently lower on the response hierarchy than are the maladaptive responses. For successful therapy, the new responses must provide greater reward than the maladaptive responses or symptoms. Otherwise the disturbed behavior will remain. The greatest problems lie in determining the cue for the disturbed behavior and the reward for the adaptive behavior.

Joseph Wolpe

Basic assumptions and principles. Wolpe's theory (1958) is a union of the theories of Hull and Guthrie. The definitions and assumptions are similar to those of Hull and Miller. However, Wolpe diverges from the mainstream of Hullian theorizing by emphasizing the process of inhibition, which characterized Guthrie's work on disturbed behavior.

According to Wolpe, the term "inhibition" refers to a tendency and a mechanism. First, inhibition is the tendency of the organism not to respond. This is similar to Pavlov's (1927, 1941) conception. The mechanism of inhibition functions, through response competition, to eliminate a response (Guthrie, 1938). Wolpe, then, describes reciprocal inhibition as one procedure for response elimination. It involves a decrease in the strength of a response by the simultaneous elicitation of another response. Other theorists have referred to the same mechanism using different terms, such as counter-conditioning (Bandura, 1961), the method of incompatible responses (Guthrie, 1938), and reconditioning (Watson and Rayner, 1920).

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Neurotic behavior is defined as any persistent, unadaptive and learned habit of behavior in a physiologically normal organism. The adaptiveness of the habit can be


Repression (conflict or inhibition of verbal or cue-producing responses) (covert inhibition)
Stupidity (interference with higher mental processes)
Less adequate solution of problems
Unaware of meaning of symptoms
Conflict producing inhibition of response that reduces drive (overt inhibition)
Fear (Guilt)
Misery (high drive)
May produce new dilemmas
Symptoms
A. Physiological
B. Learned by immediate drive reduction

Figure 5. Diagram of the interaction among the basic factors involved in neurosis. (Adapted from Dollard & Miller, 1950.)

measured by the probability of favorable consequences of a response. An unadaptive habit has a low probability of favorable consequences.

The severity of neurosis is determined by the intensity and duration of the anxiety which is aroused. Anxiety is an autonomic response pattern aroused by either of two situations, the presence of ambivalent stimuli, or the presence of noxious stimuli. In both cases, the stimulus must be presented to a subject under controlled conditions. The approach-avoidance conflict described earlier, and Pavlov's formulation of a "clash" between excitation and inhibition are congruent with Wolpe's formulation. Ambivalent stimuli and noxious stimuli both produce an antagonism between excitation (a tendency to respond) and inhibition (a tendency to not respond).

Wolpe outlines the progression of neurotic behavior in diagram form. To eliminate anxiety and neurotic behavior, Wolpe employs reciprocal inhibition. "If a response antagonistic to anxiety can be made to occur in the presence of anxiety-evoking stimuli so that it is accompanied by a complete or partial suppression of the anxiety responses, the bond between these stimuli and the anxiety responses will be weakened (1958, p. 71)."

Although Wolpe describes and uses several techniques which employ reciprocal inhibition, he is most famous for his method of systematic desensitization. Since relaxation is a response antagonistic to anxiety, the patient is first trained to relax. He then constructs his "anxiety hierarchy," which consists of stimuli which



Special predisposing preconditions (not essential)

Subject exposed to either stimuli directly evoking anxiety or to ambivalent stimulation so that anxiety of high intensity is evoked. (Many variables are involved, e.g. degree of constriction of psychological space [limitations of response possibilities], strength of anxiety at each exposure, number of exposures, degree of stimulus constancy at different exposures).

Conditioning is established of

high intensity anxiety responses and/or other responses, e.g. hysterical responses

to

specific stimuli and/or pervasive stimuli (free-floating anxiety)

Secondary anxiety-relieving behavior may ensue:

a. physical avoidance of stimuli conditioned to anxiety
and/or
b. displacement of attention
and/or
c. drug-taking
and/or
d. anxiety-relieving obsessions

Modifications in the constitution of neurotic responses following their evocation in contiguity with certain other responses

Figure 6. The development of neurosis according to Wolpe (Adapted from Wolpe, 1958.)

evoke anxiety for him. The stimuli are rank-ordered with the least anxiety-producing stimulus at the top. The patient is hypnotized or told to relax. During relaxation, he must imagine one of the anxiety stimuli. The weakest stimulus is the first to be presented. Stronger and stronger stimuli are presented as long as they do not disturb the patient's relaxation. Eventually, the strongest anxiety-evoking stimulus can be imagined without influencing the relaxed state of the patient. If the treatment is successful, anxiety-evoking stimuli will not produce anxiety responses in everyday life situations.

Hans Jurgen Eysenck

Assumptions and principles. Eysenck (1960; Eysenck & Rachman, 1965) draws his theoretical formulations from Pavlov and Hull. His theory extends beyond orthodox learning theory into the biological bases of personality. Thus, he transforms the typical S-R paradigm into an S-O-R paradigm.

Through factor analysis, he finds two personality dimensions: *extroversion-introversion* and *neuroticism-normal*. The extreme extrovert can be characterized as sociable, impulsive, aggressive, and optimistic, while the extreme introvert is quiet, introspective, serious, reliable, and pessimistic. On the second dimension, neurotic persons tend to be unstable, moody, anxious, and restless, whereas normal persons are stable, even-tempered, calm, and carefree.

The personality dimensions discussed above are associated with biological factors. Extroversion-introversion is related to the excitation and inhibition of cortical processes. The neuroticism dimension relates to the strength and speed of conditioned responses. The neurotic person suffers from excessive responsiveness of the autonomic nervous system, in particular, the sympathetic branch of the autonomic system. There is a predisposition to respond more quickly and more strongly.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Eysenck considers neurotic behavior as learned behavior, distinct from innate behavior resulting from damage to the central nervous system. Neurotic behavior is maladaptive for it fails to achieve its goal and produces unfavorable consequences. Eysenck (Eysenck & Rachman, 1965) explains the occurrence of neurotic behavior by extensions of his learning theory. He recognizes two types of abnormal reactions related to conditioning. Surplus conditioned or dysthymic reactions, such as phobic reactions, anxiety states, and obsessional and compulsive behaviors are learned, maladaptive responses. These responses are learned quickly and strongly in response to a traumatic experience, by an individual with tendencies toward neuroticism and introversion. The maladaptive response does not extinguish over time either because it is conditioned to a neutral stimulus or because the stimulus associated with the experience is avoided (e.g., Watson & Rayner, 1920). Treatment of a surplus conditioned reaction consists of extinction of the maladaptive response.

Eysenck recommends the methods of counter-conditioning (Watson & Rayner, 1920; Jones, 1924; Bandura, 1961) and of reciprocal inhibition (Wolpe, 1958).

The second type of reaction is called the deficient conditioned reaction. In this case, rather than the development of a maladaptive response, there is an absence of socially desirable behavior, as exemplified by the psychopath. Because of the defective conditioning ability of the person (extroverted and neurotic), he never acquires the socially adaptive response. Treatment for the deficient conditioned reaction is different from that for the surplus conditioned reaction. Instead of eliminating a maladaptive response, an adaptive response must be established. In this case, the treatment utilizes reinforcement for the establishment and maintenance of the positive response.

According to Eysenck, anxiety is a reaction characteristic of many neurotic conditions. It is produced by noxious stimulation or by conflict (see the sections on Pavlov, Miller, and Wolpe). Anxiety reactions are affected by such factors as personality (e.g. neuroticism), degree of confinement, intensity of the unconditioned stimulus, and strength of the competing responses.

Summary: Reinforcement Theorists Utilizing Theoretical Concepts

All the theorists in this section recognize the importance of reinforcement in behavior development. Thorndike, Hull, and Miller place great emphasis on the effects of reinforcement on behavior. Although Wolpe and Eysenck view reinforcement as theoretically important, they do not use the concept as a basis for intervention. In this respect, both appear to be influenced by Pavlov and Guthrie.

Each theorist utilizes theoretical concepts in formulating his system. Hull, Miller, and Wolpe employ intervening variables and hypothetical constructs in their theories. Thorndike (conduction units) and Eysenck (personality factors) use hypothetical constructs in their theoretical systems.

The reinforcement theorists, like the contiguity theorists, view environmental factors as providing important influences on behavior. Though Thorndike views the conduction units as the physiological basis for the law of effect, he does not indicate that interaction between biological and environmental conditions affects behavior directly. Hull, Miller, and Wolpe view biological conditions as a determiner of the drive state or drive stimulus. Drive interacts with the situational factors to produce a response. Both Miller and Wolpe recognize the importance of the environment in producing anxiety, conflict, and neurosis. Eysenck's theory is most clearly interactionist, for he describes the interaction of environmental factors and personality (with biological and genetic bases) which produce a conditioned response.

Miller, Wolpe, and Eysenck, though influenced by different theorists, make similar statements about conflict, anxiety, and neurosis.

The three theorists agree with both Pavlov and Guthrie that disturbed behavior arises from conflict. Disturbed behavior, as recognized by Guthrie, is self-maintained and, therefore, difficult to remove from a person's behavioral repertoire. Through manipulation of the environment, however, it may be possible to eliminate the conflict, the anxiety, and the disturbed behavior.

5. REINFORCEMENT THEORISTS:

THEORISTS REJECTING THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

The theories of Skinner and Bijou are analytico-inductive rather than hypothetico-deductive theories (Bijou, 1968). The two theorists build theory from the groundwork of experimental analysis. Basic empirical statements are tested, and relationships between empirical statements are formulated. Eventually, systematic relationships develop, indicating the emergence of a general theoretical position through induction. The "analytical" approach implies that detailed analyses are made of observable behaviors of the organism. No reference is made to internal processes; only relationships among empirical entities are considered.

B. F. Skinner

As a researcher in psychology, Skinner (Hilgard and Bower, 1966; Hill, 1963; Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1963) did most of his work with animals. From work in the laboratory, Skinner generated a theory of behavior which emphasized observable behavior and rejected inner causes.

Definitions. Skinner recognizes two types of learned behavior, *respondent* and *operant*. Respondent behavior is *elicited* by certain stimuli. Operants, on the other hand, are *emitted* responses, which need not be related to any particular stimulus. Strength of respondent behavior is a function of stimulus characteristics. Since operant strength cannot be measured with regard to a stimulus, some other measure must be used. Typically, rate of response and number of responses are used as measures of operant strength.

There are two types of conditioning. Type S, exemplified by the Pavlovian paradigm, results in the conditioning of respondent behavior. A stimulus (conditioned stimulus) is paired with reinforcement (unconditioned stimulus). The two laws relevant to Type S conditioning are the *law of conditioning* and the *law of extinction*. The law of conditioning states that conditioning depends on the temporal contiguity of the two stimuli. The law of extinction specifies that with repeated presentations of the conditioned stimulus without the conditioned stimulus, the conditioned response will disappear from the behavior repertoire. In Type R conditioning, a response is followed by reinforcement. It is the response rather than the stimulus which is important. The laws of conditioning and extinction also apply to Type R conditioning. The strength of a response increases with reinforcement and decreases without reinforcement. Within Skinnerian theory, reinforcement receives a completely operational definition; there are no inferred theoretical concepts to explain its functioning. Reinforcement refers to the increased probability of a response resulting from the application of a positive reinforcer or from the removal of a negative reinforcer. Punishment indicates a

REINFORCEMENT

	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Positive	Application of an event (a primary positive reinforcer) which then causes an increase in the probability of a response. (Application of food.)	Application of an event which originally does not cause an increase in the probability of a response, but which does so after being paired with a primary positive reinforcer. (Application of a tone which has been paired with the presentation of food.)
Negative	Withdrawal of an event (a primary negative reinforcer) which then causes an increase in the probability of a response. (Removal of a shock.)	Withdrawal of an event which originally does not cause an increase in the probability of a response, but which does so after being paired with a primary negative reinforcer.(Removal of a tone which has been paired with shock.)

PUNISHMENT

Positive	Primary application of an event (a primary negative reinforcer) which causes a decrease in the probability of a response. (Application of electric shock.)	Application of an event which originally does not cause a decrease in the probability of a response but which does so after being paired with a primary negative reinforcer. (Application of a tone which has been paired with the electric shock.)
Negative	Withdrawal of an event (a primary positive reinforcer) which then causes a decrease in the probability of a response. (Removal of food.)	Withdrawal of an event which originally does not cause a decrease in the probability of a response but which does so after being paired with a primary positive reinforcer. (Removal of a tone which has been paired with food.)

Figure 7. Skinnerian definitions of reinforcement and punishment. (Adapted from Skinner, 1953; Logan and Wagner, 1966.)

decreased response probability due to the application of a negative reinforcer or the removal of a positive reinforcer.

Punishment is not simply the opposite of reinforcement, for, in addition to decreasing the probability of a response, it may result in certain undesirable by-products. Though a punished behavior seemingly disappears from the behavior repertoire, it may not actually be eliminated, but merely repressed. If the punishing stimulus is removed, the response may return. Also, punishment may generate "emotional" behavior, such as fear and anxiety.

Reinforcement, defined operationally, does not include the concept of drive-reduction. Drive is not a stimulus, a physiological state, a psychic state, or a state of strength. It merely indicates the effects of deprivation and satiation on the probability of a response.

Premack (1959), following the Skinnerian example, refined the definition of reinforcement. "Reinforcement results when an R (response) of a lower independent rate coincides, within temporal limits, with the stimuli governing the occurrence of an R of a higher independent rate...Therefore, a response A will reinforce another response B...if and only if the independent rate of A is greater than that of B." Using this principle, one may increase the rate of B. The occurrence of the higher frequency response (A) is made contingent on the occurrence of the lower frequency response (B). The rate of response of B will increase and, eventually, exceed the initial frequency of A. Persons working in behavior modification have utilized this principle in many situations.

Skinner describes how a previously neutral stimulus can become a conditioned reinforcer. Through Type S conditioning, a relationship is established between a positive or negative reinforcer and a neutral stimulus. Eventually, the neutral stimulus can function as a reinforcing stimulus for other behaviors.

A generalized reinforcer results when a conditioned reinforcer is paired with more than one primary reinforcer. A generalized reinforcer is more effective and can be used in more situations than either a primary or secondary reinforcer. One example of a generalized reinforcer is the token. Though the token can exert behavioral control for long periods of time, it must at some time be exchanged for primary reinforcers (Skinner, 1953).

Two final terms which must receive operational definitions are emotion and anxiety. The term emotion is often used as an intervening variable to explain behavior. As such, the concept provides few strategies for altering behavior. Another approach is to focus on the emotional behavior itself, and on the conditions which can be manipulated to alter that behavior. Therefore, emotion is defined as a "...particular state of strength or weakness in one or more responses induced in any one of a class of operations (Skinner, 1953)."

Three types of responses occur after the application of an unconditioned or a conditioned aversive stimulus (negative reinforcer): escape behavior, avoidance behavior, and anxiety. Escape behavior results in a weakening or removal of the aversive stimulus, as when a person shuts his eyes or turns from a bright light. Other behavior is designed to avoid the actual experience of the unconditioned aversive stimulus. During the time between the onset of the conditioned aversive stimulus and the unconditioned aversive stimulus, the organism responds so that he completely avoids the unconditioned aversive stimulation. Anxiety, similar to avoidance, occurs during the interval between the conditioned and the unconditioned stimuli. It is an emotional response to the conditioned aversive stimulus. It serves no useful purpose, such as escape or avoidance. In fact, it usually interferes with normal behavior and may even reduce the effectiveness of avoidance behavior.

Assumptions and principles. Psychological investigations attempt to discover functional relations between an independent and a dependent variable. Skinner rejects the cause-effect model and does not use "inner causes" to explain behavior. Such causes can be postulated, but never proven or disproven. Instead, Skinner describes events which tend to occur together and in a particular order. The focus of scientific psychology must rest on the observable variables affecting the organism, variables which exist in the organism's environment or in its environmental history. Though "inner states" exist in the organism, they are not relevant to a functional analysis in which observed behavior occurs and is described as a function of independent variables.

Only a very small part of behavior results from respondent conditioning; rather, most behavior arises from operant conditioning. That is, behavior operates on the environment to generate certain consequences. Since the environment is not constant but is ever-changing, the behavior cannot be a constant. However, the behavior is lawfully and functionally related to the environment.

Therefore, the important element in learning and behavior is the environment. Most behavior is acquired through learning. Most learning, being operant conditioning, results from environmental consequences. Thus, most behavior is acquired, maintained, or eliminated by its environmental consequences. Skinner concludes that only a small fraction of behavior can arise from inherited characteristics, especially when comparisons are made within species.

Operant conditioning of a response does not occur in one trial, but is a process extending over time. The baseline rate of a response may be very low and almost nonexistent. In such a case, it may be a long time before the response occurs and reinforcement follows. Consequently, a new behavior must be "shaped" into existence. Approximations to the desired response receive reinforcement. Later, reinforcement only occurs as the approximations come closer and closer to the desired response. In a fairly short period of time, a rare response can become a high probability response.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Disturbed behaviors are learned responses to excessive or inconsistent control. Such control is usually punitive, and consists of an individual's aversive stimulus applied to a previously reinforced behavior by a group, religion, or government. Emotional by-products of the control include fear, anxiety, anger or rage, and depression. These by-products incapacitate the individual, and render him harmful to himself or society. The consequences of these by-products on operant behavior include drug addiction, excessively vigorous behavior, excessively restrained behavior, defective stimulus control, defective self-knowledge, and adversive self-stimulation.

Psychotherapy is a controlling device for dealing with disturbed behavior. The power of the therapist arises from the positive reinforcement of relief, or promise of relief, from the patient's aversive condition. The therapist provides the patient with a non-punitive audience. When a person has received excessive reinforcement for inappropriate behavior, the therapist may have to institute new contingencies so that the behavior will be extinguished. Extinction of the old behavior may not be sufficient to solve the problem. The therapist may have to help the patient construct new responses to deal with the environment.

Labeling of psychiatric symptoms is unnecessary and sometimes dangerous. It is an explanatory fiction, which allows the therapist to avoid specifying the behavior which must be corrected. It points to unobservable inner causes for behavior which may be impossible to manipulate. Rather than focusing on manipulable behavior, it forces the therapist to speculate on ways to influence these inner causes.

Sidney W. Bijou

Bijou (1965; 1968; Bijou & Baer, 1961) presents an analysis of child behavior and development which closely resembles the ideas of Skinner. At the very least, the two theorists subscribe to the analytico-inductive procedure described by Hull and by Miller and Dollard.

Definitions. Within the theory outlined by Bijou, all concepts are empirical and functional; that is, they are operationally defined. The important terms within the system include environment, organism, and stimulus-response interactions.

The environment consists of specific stimulus events and setting events which interact with the stimuli and responses of the organism. A listing of the specific stimulus events includes four categories of physical, chemical, organismic, and social stimuli. Regardless of type, all specific stimuli can be analyzed by their physical dimensions and can be recorded and measured. Setting events consist of stimulus-response interactions which influence later stimulus-response interactions. The organism is the source of the stimulus and response events which arise in the interactional setting. Thus, the unit of analysis is the stimulus-response interaction. Some responses by the organism are controlled by antecedent stimulation (respondents), some by consequent stimulation (operants), and most by a combination of both types of stimulation.

Bijou defines psychology as the investigation of the interaction of the organism and the environment. Child development concentrates on interactions at various stages of development. Emphasis is placed on the history of interactions of the organism and the environment. Thus, the study of child development includes information concerning the relationship of the past interactions to present interactions.

Basic assumptions and principles. Bijou (1968) outlines four assumptions underlying his ideas about child development. Psychology involves the study of interactions between a biological organism and environmental events. Thus, the question of the relative importance of heredity and environment is no longer interesting. The two do not exist as opposing forces, but as labels for specific types of variables which influence behavioral changes.

The interactions and relationships in behavior are continuous, not dichotomous. No separation or dichotomy exists in the locus of stimuli and responses. Thus, the child is viewed as the source of stimulus and response variables. The child responds to stimuli arising from the environment, and the environment responds to stimuli arising from the child.

Complex interactions develop from simple interactions, though not necessarily in an additive manner. Neither time (the approach of Gesell) nor hypothetical constructs (the approach of Piaget and Freud) adequately account for behavioral development, for they concentrate only on descriptions of behavior. Utilizing empirically defined concepts, Bijou suggests three stages of development. In infancy psychological and biological behaviors are closely related, with the psychological greatly limited by the biological. The basic stage, from infancy to early childhood, results in the construction of the personality. Then, from early childhood to the end of development, interpersonal and group relationships are extended and elaborated.

Bijou's fourth assumption deals with the methodology of theory building. A psychological system should be flexible enough to allow the incorporation of new ideas. Concepts and principles may be added at any time. They must, of course, be tied to empirical observations.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. Bijou (1963) restricts his view to consideration of psychological or behavioral retardation and disturbance. He recognizes that biological factors may affect psychological growth, but states that they constitute only one of many subsets of factors.

Psychological retardation results from a history of failure to coordinate stimuli and responses. The focus is on specific organismic, environmental, and behavioral conditions, rather than on theoretical constructs or on biological damage.

Biological and physiological factors can limit the development of behavior. First, an organismic impairment may lead to an inability to respond appropriately, or at all. In other words, an impairment may occur in the response equipment. Second, the stimulus receptors may be impaired. In this case, certain stimuli may be unavailable or only partially available to the organism. Finally, the appearance of the impaired person may be an aversive stimulus for other persons, which prevents or reduces opportunities for necessary social interaction.

Severe punishment may also contribute to retarded or disturbed development. Punishing stimulation may modify a previously reinforced response, so that the response no longer results in reinforcement. In addition, it may suppress continuing behavior patterns, at least in the punished situation. The punished situation, including previously neutral conditions, may become aversive, and the organism will tend to avoid it.

The reinforcement history of the person plays an important role also. In certain instances, the physical or social environment may reinforce behaviors which retard the child's development. For example, parents may reward a child's ineffective and infantile behavior. Necessary behavioral development may be weakened through extinction. Parents often extinguish independent behaviors by withholding reward.

Finally, a history of inadequate reinforcement and limited interactions may produce limited or disturbed behavior repertoires. Inadequate reinforcement may occur because of the economic condition of the family or limited social-emotional interaction (e.g. life in an institutional setting.)

An example of the effects of reinforcement and extinction on behavior occurs in Ferster's (1961) analysis of childhood autism. First, he defines autistic behavior in objective terms as being a "weakened" behavioral repertoire. The child exhibits a low amount of activity, minimal perceptual behavior, and atavistic behavior. It is as though only behaviors which act as aversive stimuli have a social effect on the child's environment. Ferster believes that the family environment provides the conditions for the appearance of autistic behavior. Because of environmental conditions (life in a rural or isolated community, physical or social isolation from other families or children, little interaction with siblings), the parents become the sole maintainers of the child's behavior. They consistently do not reinforce the child's behavior. To them, the child has become a conditioned aversive stimulus, for he signals a disruption of preferred behaviors. Nonverbal responses by the child occur because they are not dependent on social reinforcement. In the emergence of atavisms, the child gains aversive control of his parents. Reinforcement in the form of parental attention further strengthens the child's disturbed behavior.

Summary: Reinforcement Theorists Rejecting Theoretical Concepts

Skinner and Bijou emphasize the influence of reinforcement on behavior. Behavior occurs because it is reinforced. Therefore, they agree with other reinforcement theorists as to the importance of reinforcement.

The two theorists make no use of theoretical constructs. They prefer to focus on observable behaviors and empirical data rather than on hypothesized processes. In fact, Bijou (1968) describes the theories as behavior theories rather than learning theories, citing Watsonian behaviorism as a major influence. The behavior theorists strongly advocate the use of analytico-inductive procedures, rather than hypothetico-deductive procedures, as characterized by Hull's system. Skinner and Bijou analyze disturbed behavior without reference to internal processes, such as conflict or anxiety. From a detailed analysis of observable behaviors, they formulate statements about empirical relationships.

In looking at behavior, whether adaptive or maladaptive, Skinner focuses on the environmental contingencies within the situation. Although he allows for the influence of biological factors on behavior, greatest emphasis rests on the environment, the stimulus conditions. Bijou, on the other hand, emphasizes the interaction of biological and environmental factors. Both are important factors, for behavior arises from the interaction of the organism with his environment. A disturbance or anomalous situation in either or both factors can result in disturbed behavior.

6. APPLICATIONS OF LEARNING THEORIES

Behavior Modification

Behavior modification uses learning theory and experimental psychology to generate the techniques which it utilizes (Krasner & Ullmann, 1966; Ullman & Krasner, 1969). Clearly, the emphasis is on the environmental consequences of behavior. Thus, the mainstream of behavior modification incorporates the theoretical principles of Bandura, Wolpe, Bijou, and Skinner.

Behavior modification uses operational definitions from learning theory, e.g., Ullmann and Krasner's definition (1965) of maladaptive behavior. Because maladaptive behavior limits the possible reinforcement, behavior modification techniques must change the behavior so that the person will receive maximum reinforcement.

Extensions to disturbed behavior. A specific procedure is usually followed to achieve behavioral change (Ullman & Krasner, 1965). First, the maladaptive behavior must be defined objectively. Therapy focuses on observable activities. Not only must the behavior be identified, it must also be recorded. A record of the frequency of occurrence of the maladaptive behavior serves as a baseline measure, and is compared with records obtained after treatment. Determination of the environmental events which reinforce and support the behavior constitutes an important segment of the behavioral change program.

With the reinforcing conditions accurately identified, the behavior modifier can effectively manipulate the environment to bring about change.

During the actual modification, two different but related processes are occurring simultaneously. While the maladaptive behavior is being extinguished, desirable behavior is reinforced.

The reinforcement must be applied immediately, and consistently. As the desired response becomes more predictable, an intermittent schedule of reinforcement can be substituted for the continuous reinforcement.

Whelan (1966) advocated the use of the Premack principle in modifying the maladaptive behavior of emotionally disturbed children. Behavior is influenced by environmental effect on consequences. Accelerators are those consequences which increase the frequency of a specific behavior, while decelerators decrease the frequency of the behavior. Subsequent events are those which are neither accelerating nor decelerating. One other consequence is described: time-out, or antiseptic bounding. The procedure involves the removal of the child whenever he displays inappropriate behavior in a situation where appropriate behavior has been receiving accelerating consequences. Whelan reviews the use of these various principles in actual classroom settings.

The application of operant conditioning techniques to human behavior began with Fuller's (1949) conditioning of a "vegetative human organism." From treatment of mentally retarded persons, the use of the techniques has mushroomed into many areas of education and behavioral change. Though the techniques remain basically the same, many changes in emphasis have resulted from the widening use.

Originally, the reinforcements used by the behavior modifiers consisted of sweet foods (such as a sugar-milk solution [Fuller, 1949], jelly beans, [Azrin and Lindsley, 1956], m & m's [Patterson, 1965]). Unfortunately, such primary reinforcements soon lose their effectiveness, through satiation. To reduce the influence of satiation, behavior modifiers substituted token reinforcements, such as money (Patterson, 1965) or points (Warren, 1966).

In a token system, there must be a specification of the behaviors which will be reinforced and of the manner of exchanging the token for primary reinforcers. Since the token is paired with more than one primary reinforcer, satiation for the token rarely occurs. The earliest token reinforcement programs consisted of Staat's program for children in 1959 (Staats, 1969) and the Allyon and Azrin program in 1961 for adult psychiatric patients (Allyon & Azrin, 1968). For a more extensive review of token reinforcement programs, see O'Leary's review article (in press).

An important innovation appeared with the use of attention as a reinforcer (social reinforcement). Psychiatric nurses were able to modify behavior problems by the use of attention as a reinforcer (Ayllon and Michael, 1959). Zimmerman and Zimmerman (1962) showed that a teacher could effectively modify the behavior of a disruptive student by paying attention to the child when he acted appropriately and ignoring him when he behaved in a disruptive manner. Patterson (1965) noted that the social reinforcement of classmates aided in the maintenance of "attending behavior" for one hyperactive and academically retarded child. Though most of the operant conditioning occurred in a residential hospital, Wolf, Risley, and Mees (1964) instructed parents in the intervention procedure for use in the home. Acknowledging the importance of parents in the treatment of a child's behavior problems, Patterson, Brodsky, and Gullion produced a manual to educate parents on how a child's behavior is learned and how they, as parents, may be able to change that behavior.

Behavior modification techniques are not limited to the operant conditioning paradigm utilized by Skinner. Bandura's work on the influence of imitation on behavior provides another approach to behavior modification. In this case, change occurs merely from observing and modeling other persons. Wolpe's description of reciprocal inhibition illustrates another technique for modifying behavior. By eliciting a response which is incompatible with the maladaptive response, the therapist can force an inhibition of the maladaptive response. This latter technique has been applied more often in clinical settings than in educational settings.

Instructional Considerations

Haring and Phillips (1962) utilize many of the concepts and principles of learning theorists. They define emotionally disturbed children by the symptoms displayed in their behavior. The symptoms include hyperactivity, aggressiveness, destructiveness, inattentiveness, and withdrawal. Usually the disturbed child displays a combination of symptoms.

Emotionally disturbed behavior results from a lack of order or structure in the child's life at home and in school. The authors propose that by maintaining a structured situation in the school, the child will learn new, more adaptive behavior patterns. Two aspects of structure are especially important:

(1) ordered educational and emotional experiences, and

(2) a clear relationship between behavior and its consequences.

Experiences are ordered developmentally. The child's level and readiness in both educational and social situations must be assessed. Since tasks and environment are determined, only the child's response is variable. If a response is to remain in the behavior system, it must receive immediate and consistent consequences.

To determine the success of the structured approach, Haring and Phillips reported a comparison of three contrasting approaches used with three similar groups of emotionally disturbed elementary school children. The three approaches were the structured approach, the permissive approach, and the approach which allowed children to remain in the regular classroom. All the children were tested twice, using the California Achievement Test and the Behavior Rating Scale, in order to determine academic and behavioral changes in any of the groups. The group using the structured approach achieved greater gain scores on both tests than did the groups using the other approaches. Unfortunately, the children in the structured group were of a younger age than the children in the other groups. It may be that greater gain scores would normally be expected from younger children. Though the criticism does not invalidate the results, it does raise a relevant question.

"Contingency contracting" suggested by Homme (1969) certainly falls into the category of a structured approach. In fact, the system is so structured that it involves a contract of an agreement between the teacher and pupil. The teacher defines the behavior or tasks which the child must perform. The definition demands that the behavior is observable and can be recorded. Next, the teacher must determine which events will be reinforcing for the child. Using Premack's principle, reinforcers consist of high frequency behaviors. The teacher arranges a "contract" with the child, such that if the child performs the required task, he will be able to engage in a rewarding activity. The teacher and student will arrange several contracts for a specified task, each contract requiring closer and closer approximations to the task behavior.

Recognizing that children, as they develop, become more autonomous, Homme incorporates a transition from teacher-controlled to student-controlled contracting. The aim, therefore, of the contingency contracting system is to lead the student to a self-contracting system. The system begins with the teacher determining the task and reinforcement, presenting the contract to the student, and delivering the reward. During the transition stage, both the teacher and the student are involved in the determination of the task and the reward. The student gradually asssumes more responsibility until he can determine the task and the reward himself.

The developmental approach is carried even further by Gagné's (1965) specification of a hierarchy of eight types of learning. Excluding signal learning, described by the classical conditioning paradigm, higher levels of learning depend on learnings at lower levels. Therefore, stimulus-response learning, such as Skinnerian operant conditioning, forms the basis for all other types of learning. From it can develop chaining, verbal association, multiple discrimination, concept learning, principle learning, and problem solving. Furthermore, different conditions must occur to facilitate each level of learning. Lower levels depend largely on the occurrence of reinforcement and on the contiguity of the parts of a response. For higher levels, reinforcement becomes less important and contiguity exerts a greater influence on learning.

Gagné states that each type of learning is important. The higher-order types of learning cannot proceed unless the lower-order learnings have been established. In the school setting, the teacher must ascertain a child's level of learning. Providing the conditions which are necessary for each type of learning, the teacher can then aid the child in arriving at higher levels.

Hewett (1969) combines ideas from Skinnerian behavior modification and the structured approach with developmental ideas of Gagné (1965), Piaget, Flavell (1968), and Erikson (1950). He presents a formulation of the learning situation for a child. The teacher selects the appropriate task to assist the child in achieving goals which are defined by the developmental sequence. The reward consists of positive consequences which maintain or increase the probability of behavior necessary to accomplish the task. Structure describes the conditions under which the child must accomplish the task in order to be rewarded.

The child's learning should proceed through seven developmental levels:

(1) attention

(2) response

(3) order

(4) exploratory

(5) social

(6) master

(7) achievement

Each level specifies particular tasks, rewards, and structures which will allow the child to successfully master that level. Therefore, the teacher can determine the level of the child's functioning through behavioral observation. Utilizing the appropriate tasks, rewards, and structure, the child can attain the level and proceed to the next.

7. CONCLUSION

Learning theories provide a confusing multiplicity of definitions, assumptions and principles. They have provided, however, important insights about disturbed behavior, and strategies for intervention. All the theorists, even those utilizing theoretical concepts, concentrate on observable behavior, which one can recognize, record and manipulate. Thus, the learning theory approach contributes the idea of measuring behavior. Rather than advocating a particular methodology of intervention, it emphasizes a methodology of measurement (Whelan, personal communication, 1970).

To provide an understanding of behavior in the real world, the theories offer a functional analysis of behavior. They focus on the relationships between behavior and environmental variables. A functional analysis considers both antecedent and consequent conditions. A topographical approach, on the other hand, merely describes behavior without reference to its function in the environment.

Functional and topographical analyses of behavior produce different kinds of labels for behavior. Labels can arise as shorthand descriptions of the behavior. For example, "autistic" can communicate to another person a summary statement of a particular set of behaviors. However, a label can also be used as an explanation for behavior. In this case, the child acts in a particular manner, because he is autistic (Whelan, 1971). Clearly, the second kind of label may prevent a functional analysis of the behavior, by providing a topographical description.

Learning theory makes clear statements about the causes of behavioral change. The intervention techniques for modifying maladaptive behavior are tied directly to theory. The interventionists take theoretical statements and apply them to real life situations. Furthermore, because many of the techniques merely require systematic usage, nonprofessionals can successfully employ them (Wolf, Risley, Mees, 1964; Patterson, Brodsky & Gullion; Homme, 1969).

Though the techniques may be relatively easy to employ, the results may not always be successful. Errors arise from many sources. Though one variable may be thought to be controlling a particular behavior, it may be that some other variable is actually operant. A reinforcing event in one situation may not be reinforcing in another situation. Finally, human errors in observing and recording behavior may occur.

These errors notwithstanding, learning theorists are forever optimists. Most human behavior is learned behavior, and learning occurs because of environmental contingencies. If one can identify the behavior and the contingencies supporting the behavior, one can change the behavior. Therefore, most maladaptive behavior can be changed into adaptive behavior.

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A LIMITED LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORY OF THE PSYCHODYNAMIC MODEL

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper offers an overview of psychodynamic thinking regarding emotional disturbance in children. The focus is on the concepts and theoretical statements--the "language"--of various models, not on the manner and outcome of empirical testing that may have been done in connection with them.

It proved impossible to construct an overview by working inductively, i.e., by asking practitioners engaged in day-to-day encounters with disturbed children to describe the theoretical bases of their work. Theoretical outlooks of practitioners were so sketchy and of such variety that no meaningful unity could be found in them. Of necessity, then, the approach in this paper became deductive. Starting with theoretical statements about psychodynamics--in the normal and in the abnormal, in the child and in the adult--it extracted those concepts and propositions that were most relevant for an understanding of emotional disturbance in children.

Very often the terms "psychoanalytic" and "psychodynamic" are used synonomously. It will be useful to distinguish between these terms, however, for the purposes of this paper. The psychoanalytic theorists have been concerned with intra-psychic functioning--the internal dynamics of personality. Psychodynamic theorists, on the other hand, have attempted to apply some of the intra-psychic principles in a broader way, incorporating notions of experience into the body of explanatory thought.

This overview is not comprehensive in the sense of being a condensation of the vast amount of psychodynamic theorizing that has occurred recently. Nor does it chart completely the historical trends and counter-trends that have brought psychodynamic thought to where it is today. Several theorists were selected to serve as reference points in psychodynamic literature. This paper presents the slices of their thought that relate in some manner to the topic of emotional disturbance in children. Two of the theorists selected, Sigmund Freud and Erik Erikson, are historically representative of psychoanalytic thought. Freud is included not only because of his position at the origin of modern psychoanalytic thought, but also because of the unique emphasis he placed upon instinctual energy in development. Erikson was selected for an in-depth presentation because he is representative of those psychoanalysts who stress ego development and the importance of adaptation to the environment. (A different direction was taken by theorists such as Adler and Jung, who stressed the importance of socialization in the developmental process.) Carl Rogers, though not a typical representative of psychoanalytic thought, provides a counterpoint to the other theorists. Though Rogers has devoted relatively little effort to constructing a theory of child development, his succinct statements provide an example of how disturbance is defined from the experiential, phenomenological standpoint.

After presenting the views of these theorists, the paper concludes with a survey of attempts to relate psychodynamic theorizing to educational practice.

2. THE FREUDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Early in the modern era of "scientific" investigation of man's psyche came the view that mental life and overt behavior were a result of unconscious impulses whose basic configuration was set both by an inherited biological disposition and by the events of the first five or six years of life. The original proponent of this point of view was, of course, Sigmund Freud. Perhaps the aspect of his extensive theorizing that has the most direct bearing on emotional disturbance in children are his notions regarding psychosexual development. This part of the paper, then, concentrates on Freud's theory of the psychosexual stages and on how emotional disturbance is defined in terms of these stages. Most of the concepts presented are Freud's but some of them originated with his contempories or his immediate successors.

Background Concepts

According to Freud, the personality is composed of three major systems (Hall and Lindzey, 1957). The id is the only part of the personality present at birth. It is the reservoir of inherited instinctual energy that powers the total personality. The id operates according to the pleasure principle* (pleasure is the reduction of tension) and is characterized by primary process functioning (forming images of objects that reduce tensions and thus provide pleasure).

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* Underlining denotes technical term.

The ego is the personality system that mediates between the instinctual demands of the id and the constraints imposed by the external world. It seeks to procure objects in the real world for the gratification of the id and is thus said to follow the reality principle and to be characterized by secondary process functioning (logical, rational, realistic thinking). The ego develops from the id, derives its power from it, but often in the course of dealing with the real world has to use that power to repress the demands of the id. (Later theoretical efforts, particularly by A. Freud and Hartmann, have altered this view of the ego.)

The superego is the third system of personality to develop out of what originally was the id. It represents the norms and values of society which are presented to the child by his parents. In its negative, punishing aspect it may be thought of as conscience, and in its positive aspect as ego-ideal.

The energy supplied to the total personality by the id is known as libido. Libido is the energy of the life-instincts and is sexual in character. It is also fluid and displaceable, and so can be invested in a great variety of objects and activities. In Freudian terms, it can make any number of object- or activity-cathexes.

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1. In addition to drawing upon Freud for this portion of the paper, we have used summaries by Munroe (1965), Hall and Lindzey (1957), Wolman (1960), Baldwin (1967), Watson (1968), and Holzman (1970).

Anti-cathexes refer to the processes by which the ego uses some of the id's own energy to restrain the id from acting impulsively and irrationally. If the id's demands are too threatening, the ego will erect defense mechanisms against them. The most generic defense mechanism is repression: the threatening wishes of the id are simply forced out of awareness. Projection defends against an unwanted feeling by making the feeling a characteristic of someone other than the self. Reaction formation refers to the replacing in consciousness of an alarming desire (e.g., hatred of a parent) by its opposite (e.g., love of the parent). Displacement allows an impulse to be expressed by changing its object and thus disguising its real intent from the ego. Sublimation is the displacement of a "lower" (e.g., sexual) instinct into "higher," socially acceptable channels (e.g., artistic creation). Identification with the aggressor removes the threat experienced in the presence of a dominating enemy by adopting the characteristics of the enemy and making him a part of the self.

The list of defense mechanisms employed by the ego is a good deal longer, but these are the ones most important for an understanding of psychological development. Defense mechanisms are not in themselves pathological or indicators of disturbed behavior. Some defenses--in particular, sublimation--are characteristic of the mature adult. It is when inadequate psychosexual adjustment requires the use of extensive defense mechanisms that behavior comes to verge on the pathological.

Holzman (1970) has isolated six constructs he considers basic to Freud's early formulations:

(1) The first, called the "topographic" point of view, laid emphasis upon the existence of "areas" of the mind and insisted that unconscious as well as conscious processes were at work within the individual.

(2) The second construct, the "dynamic" point of view, emphasized that behavior was motivated, that all behavior was purposeful and meaningful.

(3) The "structural" point of view posited the existence of id, ego, and superego and implied that "conflict is implicit in all behavior and there are mental structures for mediating conflicts."

(4) The fourth construct, called the "genetic" point of view, emphasized that the "past persists into the present."

(5) The "economic" point of view, probably the most controversial of the underlying constructs, postulated a quantitative relationship between drives and resistances.

(6) The sixth theoretical construct, the "adaptative" point of view, saw the environment or real world as a "determining factor of behavior."

Stages of Development

Freud and his contemporaries[1] posited a sequence of developmental stages through which the child passes on his way from birth to adolescence. The major point of distinction between the stages concerned the locus of the child's pleasurable activities. In strictly Freudian terminology, the distinction concerned the erotogenic zone in which the major portion of the child's libido was cathected. According to Freud, the mouth is the primary erotogenic zone--the primary source of pleasure--during the *oral* stage, the anus during the *anal* stage, and the sexual organs during the *phallic* stage. These three pregenital stages are followed by a latency period in which sexual interest is dormant. At the beginning of adolescence, however, the pregenital impulses are reactivated, and the child enters the *genital* stage. If development during the three pregenital stages has been free of maladjustment, a mature "genital" adult will emerge from adolescence.

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[1] Karl Abraham was the associate of Freud who elaborated the concept of psychosexual stages and went on to explain adult character traits on the basis of childhood experiences during these stages. Freud subsequently accepted Abraham's work. See Watson (1968).

(1) *Oral stage*. In the earliest period of life, the mouth is the principal area of activity, and oral stimulation the principal source of erotic gratification. Sucking and swallowing, sensations in the lips, the tongue, the oral cavity, and the cheeks all provide pleasure for the newborn. Later, the infant becomes fascinated with spitting, gurgling, and bubble-blowing; he sucks his thumb; he tries to get everything he can into his mouth. Libidinal energy is invested exclusively in the pleasures of the oral region of the body.

The oral stage of development was divided by Karl Abraham

(1927) into two sub-stages, the oral-dependent and the oral-aggressive. In the oral dependent stage (which extends over the first few months of life), the infant is passive as regards the procurement of oral satisfaction. He fails to distinguish himself from the external world as represented by his mother's breast. All his libidinal energy is narcissistic (directed toward himself) since he is unaware of an independent world "out there."

The oral-aggressive substage begins with the eruption of teeth and lasts until some point in the second year of life. At this stage, the infant begins to differentiate himself from his mother's breast, a result, Anna Freud suggests,[1] of the fact that his needs are no longer responded to immediately (if the breast were always available, there would be no occasion to distinguish it from himself). With the mother beginning to exist as a separate entity, some of the infant's libidinal energy is directed her way. She becomes an object of love. But she also becomes an object of hate; the infant, beset by delays in gratification, becomes frustrated, and uses his teeth as a weapon. Attempting to receive his oral gratification through acts of aggression, he bites, chews, and, in the words of Sigmund Freud, becomes a "cannibal."

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[1] Anna Freud's contributions as an "ego psychologist" will be presented more fully in the second major portion of this paper. The above description of the oral stage, in reflecting some of the emphasis of ego psychology, goes beyond the outline of Sigmund Freud.

A characteristic of the oral stage of development is the tendency to introject the external world. The infant's first reaction to his realization that there is a world outside of himself is a desire to incorporate that world, to swallow that part of it which he values. Oral introjection necessarily involves the destruction of what one values. What is introjected--food--disappears as gratification takes place. Thus, incorporation is total. Love objects are not cherished--in the extreme case, they do not exist--after gratification.

Because the boundaries between ego and world are still ill-defined, the opposite of introjection also takes place. Projection "is a sort of reverse introjection--instead of the ego being perceived as having the object's characteristics, the environment is perceived as having the ego's characteristics (Blum, 1953)."

If introjection is a figurative swallowing of the world, projection is a figurative spitting out of the self. Instead of the world becoming "me" (introjection), the "me" becomes the world. Pain and unpleasant stimuli are eliminated by attributing them to the outside world.

In the initial development of a relationship between the self and the outside world, there is evident the first manifestation of the ego emerging from the id. The infant is becoming aware of and is beginning to relate to a world outside of his instinctual wishes. In Freudian terms, libidinal energy is being diverted from wish-fulfilling id function to reality-testing ego functions. The infant's ability, infinitesimal at first, to tolerate some delay in the gratification of an instinct is evidence of the secondary process functioning characteristic of the ego. The pleasure principle begins to make way for the reality principle.

(2) Anal Stage. Sometime during the second year of life, the primary source of erotic gratification becomes the anal region of the body. "Infants experience pleasure in the evacuation of urine and the content of the bowels, and they very soon endeavor to contrive these actions so that the accompanying excitation of the membranes in these erotogenic zones may secure them the maximum possible gratification (Sigmund Freud, 1917)."

Karl Abraham (1927) suggested dividing the anal stage into two phases, depending on what kind of anal pleasure is predominant for the child. In the early anal-expulsive substage, pleasure is obtained from the sheer expulsion of feces. The child does not show any concern about losing a part of himself. In the later anal-retentive period, pleasure is obtained from the feeling of a full lower intestine and thus from the sensation of holding feces in. The child may develop affection for his feces and may not want to give up this valued part of himself.

With the toilet training that accompanies the anal stage comes the child's first decisive experience of the outer world stepping in to regulate his instinctual impulses.

(3) Phallic stage. At approximately four years of age the child

enters the phallic stage of psychosexual development. Feelings associated with the functioning of the genital organs are now the primary source of libidinal pleasure. Erections occur frequently. Masturbation, voyeurism (looking at the genitals), exhibitionism (displaying the genitals), and sex play with other children are common. The child becomes curious about the differences between the sexes, about the origin of babies, and about the sexual activities of his parents. Although the child's focus is on his genitals, true heterosexual behavior has not yet made its appearance.

The fantasies that surround the pleasure the child experiences from his genitals set the stage for the drama of the Oedipus Complex.[1] For the first time in this discussion of psychosexual stages, events in the lives of boys and girls will have to be treated separately.

The boy enters the phallic stage still attached to his mother as an object of love. She has been the one, after all, who has satisfied most of his needs. In the phallic stage, the boy's affection for his mother is combined with an incestuous craving for sexual intimacy with her. The father thus comes to be perceived as a rival for the mother's affection and her sexual favors. Because the father is more powerful than he, the boy fears the father and even goes so far as to think the father will mutilate or cut off his genital organs. This fear of castration from the father (castration anxiety) leads the son to repress both the sexual feelings he has for his mother and the hostility he feels toward his father. Through the mechanism of identification with the aggressor he comes to identify with his father. Identification is through introjection. That is, the son incorporates his father's personality into his own (as he incorporated the world into himself in the oral stage). Introjecting the father means that the son now carries with him the father's wishes, values, and standards--at least as the son perceives them. In other words, the boy has acquired a conscience or superego.

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[1] The theory of the Oedipus Complex was developed by Freud long before the theory of psychosexual stages and, unlike the theory of the stages, it was his exclusive contribution. See Watson (1968).

Begun without a superego and in fear of the father, then, the Oedipus Complex terminates with the boy in possession of a superego and in a state of identification with the father.

Freud has a great deal of difficulty outlining a sequence of events in the lives of girls that would parallel the onset and resolution of the Oedipus drama in boys.[1]

His best attempt finds girls at the beginning of the phallic stage with the same attachment for the mother that boys experience. The girl discovers, however, that where boys have an external sex organ, she has only a cavity. Since the penis, according to Freud, is a valued object to both boys and girls, the girl feels cheated. Indeed, she feels her mother has deprived her of her penis (the castration complex) and so she breaks her original attachment to her mother. The girl is also jealous of those who have a penis (penis envy), desires to possess one, and so turns to the figure--her father--who has one. Thus, like the boy at the onset of the Oedipus Complex, the girl now feels a sexual attraction for the parent of the opposite sex (the father) and comes to perceive the parent of the same sex (the mother) as a rival for his sexual favors. This situation has been dubbed the Electra Complex, though Freud was comfortable with the designation "Oedipus Complex" for both boys and girls (Heidbreder, 1933).

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[1] Freud freely admitted his problem. See, for example, his essay on "Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes (1925)."

Freud was not clear in his own mind about how a girl's Oedipal complex is resolved. The daughter's attraction for her father is not repressed as severely as is the boy's for his mother, although the girl does replace her desire for a penis with the desire for a baby. She does finally introject the values of her mother and thus acquire a superego. How all these resolutions take place was not definitively delineated by Freud. He did indicate that the girl's resolution is not as complete or abrupt as that of boys and that, consequently, the superego of girls is not as independent and strong as that of boys (Freud, 1925).

Munroe (1955) stresses the point that much of the Oedipal drama in boys and girls takes place on the level of fantasy and that the sexual longings of the child are not as anatomically specific as those of adults. Children's knowledge of intercourse and the process of birth may be only general and somewhat confused. Nevertheless, because the boundary between fantasy and reality is a very fluid one--the child may often confuse the wish with the deed, the fantasized threat with the real threat--the dilemmas he faces during the Oedipal events are impressive ones.

At the end of the phallic stage of development, the child is in possession of the three major constituents of personality. The id was present from birth. The ego began to be differentiated during the oral stage when the breast of the mother was not immediately available. The superego became differentiated in a particularly dramatic way with the resolution of the Oedipus Complex. It is the Freudian point of view that the basic pattern of an individual's personality is set by the end of the phallic period.

(4) Latency period. Between the third and fourth psychosexual stages, there occurs a period (beginning around the age of six and lasting until puberty) in which sexual interest is dormant. The incestuous and aggressive feelings experienced in connection with the Oedipal conflict have been repressed and are forgotten. Identification with the parent of the same sex has taken place, and the child now learns the roles appropriate to his own sex, boys tending

to play only with boys and girls only with girls. School is begun. Psychodynamically--at least in the classical Freudian View--these are relatively placid years.

(5) Genital stage. The onset of puberty brings the repressed sexual urges out of eclipse. Physiological changes occur which have the effect of increasing the amount of libido available to the personality. The classical Freudian position has it that during this period the early attitudes and quasi-solutions of the Oedipal stage are reinstated (Munroe, 1955). Anna Freud (1937) notes the redirection of libido to infantile love objects, the re-appearance of Oedipal fantasies, and the intensification of aggressive impulses. In the genital as in the phallic stage, the genital organs are the major erotogenic zone. But gratification in the phallic stage was autoerotic, obtained through the manipulation of one's own body. Other people were used only to provide pleasure to oneself. The objects of libidinal energy were incestuous; that is, they were located within the family.

The genital stage differs from the phallic stage in that sexual relations are now sought outside the family. There is a shift in the narcissistic character of sexual interests with the result that love is viewed not simply as a means of egocentric gratification but also as a way of bringing happiness to the loved object. Tender feelings of concern for the loved object are combined with sexual longing to produce a mature relationship that is rewarding to both partners in a relationship. The adolescent becomes socialized, reality-oriented, and capable of altruistic love.

The mature "genital" adult does not leave behind the oral, anal, and phallic components of his sexual energy. Parts of his libido remain attached to these areas of his body. In the genital stage, oral, anal, and phallic components of sexuality are fused and synthesized under the primacy of the genital (Freud, 1905). In addition, a good deal of libidinal energy is sublimated into socially acceptable outlets. The Freudian approach to psychosexual development concentrates heavily on the first few years of life--on the events of the oral, anal, and phallic stages. This is in keeping with the belief that the basic configurations of the personality are set by the time the latency period begins. Such a belief led Freud (1908) and some of his contemporaries (e.g. Abraham, 1927) to look at various adult personalities and relate their characteristics to experiences during the psychosexual stages of childhood. Fenichel (1945) has produced an elaborate typology of adult personalities--basically they are the oral, anal, phallic, and genital "characters"--and described their origin in terms of event in childhood.

Emotional Disturbance

It is evident that even a "normal" progression through these psychosexual stages involves considerable stress for the child. Delay of gratification and eventual weaning at the oral stage, toliet training at the anal stage, the intricate and hazardous events of the phallic stage--Freud says, for example, that the Oedipus Complex "is literally smashed to pieces by the shock of threatened castration" (1925)--all these spell considerable turmoil even for the child who is making satisfactory adjustments. The practitioner of a Freudian persuasion is aware that all children, particularly when they reach the nursery school and kindergarten years, are undergoing severe emotional strain.

Abnormal or "pathological" adjustments can be understood in terms of the fixations of libidinal energy that occur as stages are entered and left. Investments of libidinal energy (the technical term is cathexes) first in the oral and then in the anal and genital zones of the body are not permanent ones. It is true that in the normal course of development some amount of libidinal energy remains cathected to a particular erotogenic zone--so that, for instance, in the "normal" anal stage, there is still interest in the mouth and in the objects that produce oral gratification. But most of the libidinal energy is not fixated at a given level of development and is consequently available to overcome the obstacles of a subsequent level.

In development considered pathological, the amount of libidinal energy fixated to a particular zone is excessive. Too much libido can remain fixated at a particular level for one of several reasons: (1) excessive gratification at that level, (2) excessive deprivation at that level, (3) the prospect of too severe a transition to the next level, and even (4) constitutional factors. If too great an amount of libido is fixated at a given stage, less is available for events to come. This increases the likelihood of regression to the level of heavy fixation when difficulties arise in later years. Again, some regression is looked upon as normal and healthy. When regression is extensive and more lasting, it is considered pathological.

Some of the difficulties in adjustment at each of the four psychosexual stages and their consequences for later development are delineated below.[1]

(1) If oral gratification has been overabundant, the individual may turn into a sanguine optimist who is overly dependent upon the world to care for him. On the other hand, if gratification in the oral period has been insufficient, the individual may become depressive and pessimistic. In either case, he is characterized as having oral interests: eating, drinking, smoking, kissing, and talking. These interests may be sublimated, displaced, or reacted against, and they may manifest themselves only as a general orientation that the world exists to nourish and take care of me.

As the Freudian view would have it, fixation at the oral-dependent substage makes for an individual who is passive, over-dependent, gullible and easily disappointed. Fixations in the oral-aggressive period create an individual who is sarcastic, argumentative, pessimistic, one who attacks others in order to extract love and affection from them.

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[1] This particular section relies heavily on the summary of Wolman (1960).

(2) Conflicts during toilet training can lead to fixations at either of the sub-periods of the anal stage. Freud (1908) noted three related traits of the anal character: orderliness (everything must be clean and in place), obstinacy (immoveability, defiance), and parsimony (tightness in money, speech, etc.). Excessive orderliness--which can become sublimated into a cognitive style that is intolerant of ambiguity--is seen as a result of extreme training for cleanliness. Obstinacy develops in the anal-expulsive period. The child may wish to say no to his mother's demands--to vent his rage at them--by expelling his feces at inappropriate times, a behavior that is "the prototype for all kinds of expulsive traits--cruelty, wanton destructiveness, temper tantrums and messy disorderliness (Hall and Lindzey, 1957)." In the anal-retentive stage, the child may continue his obstinate ways by refusing to give his mother his feces when she wishes them. He may become parsimonious, miserly, stingy--not wanting to give to another what he possesses. If the mother is especially strict, the child may become so retentive that he loses his spontaneity, doubts his own impulses, and insists on external guides for action.

(3) Experiences during the tumultous Oedipal Phase of development play a large role in shaping attitudes toward the opposite sex and

authority. Boastfulness, aggressiveness, self-assuredness, a devil-may-care attitude--in short, exaggerated masculinity--develop as a reaction formation in boys against castration anxiety, the inner fear that one's masculinity will be lost. If penis envy in the girl is not resolved or sublimated, it may lead to the assumption of a masculine role or to the adoption of the role of a vindicative female who uses her charm to overcome and humiliate men.

If excessive fixation has not occurred at these pregenital stages, adjustments in the genital period are satisfactory. The Freudian view finds little pathology in the genital period that cannot be traced in some way to difficulties in the pregenital stages of life.

In general, the, normal progression through the psychosexual stages is seen as emotionally disturbing. Pathology in its most generic sense is explained as regression to an earlier stage of development where an excessive amount of libido has been fixated. Specific disturbances are described as normal character traits that have become exaggerated to such an extent that adjustment to the present demands of life is difficult or impossible.

3. CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Psychoanalytic theory has contributed various concepts to psychological thinking. The most significant concepts are the following:

(1) that there is a predetermined developmental sequence of personality growth,

(2) that frustration, anxiety, and psychological crisis play an important part in energizing growth,

(3) that unconscious forces determine behavior,

(4) that all behavior is meaningful and purposeful, and

(5) that primary interpersonal relationships are of major significance in fostering or deterring growth of personality.

In Europe, in the late 1940's, analysts split into two major groups: those following the impulse psychology themes, such as Klein, et al., emphasizing the id, and those following the path of Anna Freud, emphasizing the ego. In this paper, developments within the latter group are described, as these are seen as most relevant to educational interests.

> The educational implications of the Kleinian concept are almost entirely negative. "Deep psychology" is considered to be solely the realm of the professional psychoanalysts and the antithesis of educational psychology...Anna Freud's work, however, has opened new, positive, and promising channels for the development of educational doctrine.
>
> (Hoffer, 1945)

Although psychoanalytic theory has taken new directions in recent years, many of its basic premises, such as those regarding the nature of impulses, remain basically unaltered. Others, particularly those concepts centering around the ego, have taken on new significance. Two significant theoretical changes are apparent; (1) a shift of investigative effort from study of the id to study of the ego, and (2) new theories regarding the genetic foundation of the ego.

Psychoanalytic theory is usually thought of as a theory of drives which account for individual behavior--therefore, a theory of motivation. In reality, however, psychoanalytic theory is not a single theory. It is a combination of theories about human behavior. Some are, as yet, loosely connected formulations and observations regarding a facet of life; others are much more abstract and are intricately developed. P. Holzman has grouped these theories within the psychoanalytic framework into three groups. He writes:

> One such group consists of psychoanalytic theories of thought processes such as memory, perception, attention, consciousness, action, emotion, and concept formation; another group is concerned with psychoanalytic conceptions of development; and still another group is a complex of clinical psychoanalytic theories focused on psychopathology and treatment.
> (Holzman, 1970)

Dr. Holzman's description of three groups is probably conservative, since theorizing concerning cognition, perception, mastery, and learning is becoming increasingly prevalent in psychoanaltyic literature, and there may exist several subtheories.

The most highly developed trend in psychoanalytic theory is the developmental-drive motivational branch. The concept of motivational force centers on drives which are rooted in the biological constitution of the individual. The drives are thought to be subject to maturational laws of development; that is, they change and develop according to a predetermined pattern. Because the motivational energy source exists within the individual, the theory has traditionally been seen as both internally and developmentally focused, rather than externally focused and subject to interactional phenomena.

Traditionally, the drives were considered sexual (libidinal) in nature. More recently, the existence and importance of another set of drives (aggressive) has been accepted by some analytic theorists.

There has been no change in the traditional conception that behavior is determined by genetic drives. The way in which these drives are studied, however, has changed dramatically. The effort which was once devoted to the study of the basic drives and their expression in the unconscious via dreams, hypnosis, paraphraxias, etc., has become less prominent. Increased attention has been focused upon the study of observable behaviors, the ego and its functions, and the secondary processes.

4. EGO PSYCHOLOGY

In this paper, Erik Erikson is considered prototypical of what David Rapaport, in his introduction to Erikson (1959), called the fourth phase in the history of psychoanalytic theory. Rapaport saw this phase beginning in the late thirties with the writings of Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and Erikson himself, among others, and extending to the present time. The emphases of the new movement were away from id and toward ego, away from the individual as an isolated entity and toward the individual as related to his environment. The outcome of the movement, in the work of Erikson, a psychoanalyst trained in cultural anthropology, was the addition of an entire social and cultural dimension to the concept of personality growth.

Freud ended his life with the belief that the "oldest portion of the mental apparatus (the id) remains the most important throughout life (1940)." One of the major developments in psychoanalysis after Freud was a significant revision of that statement. Taking their cue from another statement of Freud's--"we think it credible that, even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies and reactions are already determined (1937)"-theorists came to look at the ego not as an extension of the id, but as a possessor of autonomous functions which develop independently of the id and arise, like the id, from an undifferentiated state. This emphasis upon ego instead of id marked a significant change for psychoanalytic theory, moving it from the study of psychic depths to the study of psychic surface, from a centering upon the primary psychic process to a centering upon the secondary psychic process, and from a conflict-oriented psychology to a more general psychology.

It was the early theorizing of Wilhelm Reich (1933), in his work regarding "character armor," which brought the functions of the ego, and the relations of the ego to the id, into the light of investigation. Later, Anna Freud (1946), in an attempt to emphasize the important contributions which the study of the ego and its functions might have, pointed out that:

> The investigation of the id and of its mode of operation was always only a means to an end. And the end was invariably the same: the correction of these abnormalities and the restoration of the ego to its integrity.
> (A. Freud, 1946)

Anna Freud noted that the simple gaining of material regarding the impulses during hypnosis halts the expression of the impulses only temporarily and that the ego will assume a new defense against the expression of the impulses as soon as they re-enter consciousness. In her view, the id and ego are in a nearly constant state of conflict, the id clamoring for gratification of its drives, the ego attempting to facilitate this gratification, but adjusting the modes of gratification to the reality of the environment and its restrictions upon expression and behavior. Briefly, the relationship between the id and ego, which is described as harmonious, is as follows. The id bombards the ego with impulses and needs for satisfaction. This creates tension between the id and ego, and the ego facilitates the gratification of the needs by channeling the impulses to a source of gratification--a relieving behavior. This successful satisfying of need and channeling of impulses reduces the tension and constitutes the psychic secondary process. A conflictual state exists when the ego is unable to channel the bombarding impulses into acceptable modes of expression (perhaps due to superego restriction). In this case, the ego has to defend against some of the bombardment and at the same time channel some of the energy to partial sources of gratification. This may relieve some of the tension, or it may relieve no tension at all, precipitating a state of psychic conflict. The constant attempt to deal with impulses and to facilitate their satisfactory gratification and expression is the task of the ego.

A. Freud used this discussion of the defensive postures and maneuvers of the ego to illustrate that the organized fashion in which the ego goes about its work can lend insight into the processes which underlie that work.

Anna Freud was also the first, it seems, to begin looking carefully at the limits of analysis. That is, she made it clear that under some conditions the ego and its defensive functions need support and that the process of bringing unconscious impulses to the conscious level can be destructive rather than therapeutic.

> In such a case there is danger that we may annul the defensive measures of the ego without being able immediately to come to its assistance....All that the ego asks for in such a conflict is to be reinforced. Insofar

> as analysis...has the effect of disclosing the defensive processes and rendering them in-operative, the result of analysis is to weaken the ego still further and to advance the pathological process.
> (Freud, 1946)

The functions of the ego and the relation between id and ego are not seen as static, but rather as constantly changing. The changes occur most predictably at various developmental stages. Anna Freud points out that, because of the dynamic nature of the ego, a particular ego reaction to stimuli cannot be termed pathological or normal without extensive examination of the stage of development which is being reflected at that particular time. In her view (1952), retarded ego development had three possible explanations: (1) defective motor or sensory apparatus, (2) failure of the normal development of drives leading to too little stimulation of the ego apparatuses, and/or (3) failure to bring the apparatuses under ego control.[1]

Heinz Hartmann is credited with the position that the ego does not develop from the id, but that both ego and id emerge from an undifferentiated state early in life, and subsequently pursue independent courses of development (Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein, 1947). In Hartmann's view, the original undifferentiated condition is a mass of psychic energy. Consequently, the ego and its functions, as well as the id and its functions, are determined in part by biological make-up:

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[1] The concept of ego apparatus will be discussed shortly.

> This consideration of maturational processes also on the side of the ego development seems natural enough if we keep in mind that the ego aspect of development is no less "biological" than its id aspect...that it is particularly the study of the ego functions which might facilitate a meeting between the psychoanalytical and the physiological, especially the brain physiological approach.
>
> (Hartmann, 1952)

Hartmann hypothesized basic precursors of the ego which were biologically determined, developing functions. These functions, which he called the ego apparatuses, include perception, motility, memory, and stimulus screen. The apparatuses develop in response to stimulation and learning from the environment and in line with the maturational laws of their biology. They become integrated into a pattern of interdependent functions and become the ego. Not only is the ego determined by this mass of integrated functions; it eventually, at least to a partial degree, determines these functions.

Concurrent with granting autonomy to the ego, Hartmann stressed the importance of its adaptations to the environment. As early as 1939 he postulated that the way in which the ego deals with the task of adaptation is characteristic of the health or sickness of the personality, rather than indicative of the existence of symptoms. "A rigid ego," he said, "may interfere with the process of adaptation," whereas a mobile and plastic one is "one of the prerequisites of mental health." Later (1958), he said the function of adaptation in man

> ...is guaranteed in both its grosser and finer aspects, on the one hand by man's primary equipment and the maturation of his apparatuses, and on the other hand by those ego-related actions which (using this equipment) counteract the disturbances in and actively improve the person's relationship to the environment.
>
> (Hartmann, 1958)

In Hartmann's view, not only is the ego independent of the id in its origin, it is independent as regards its energy source as well. Instinctual energy is not just libidinal (sexual) as Freud thought; it is also aggressive. In the early stage of life, libidinal and aggressive energies are distinct. Gradually the two become fused, neutralized, and so available to the ego as energy independent of purely instinctual objectives. Neutralized libidinal and aggressive energy may be used by the ego for constructive purposes. Aggressive energy which has not been neutralized by a fusion with libidinal energy is considered pathological:[1]

> The unmodified aggressive impulse threatens the existence of the object and the investment of the object with libido acts as its protection. Through a simultaneous cathexis with libido, the aims of aggression are modified.
>
> (Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein, 1949)

Anna Freud wrote in a similar vein:

> Owing to the defects on the emotional side, the aggressive urges are not brought into fusion and thereby bound and partially neutralized, but remain free and seek expression in life in the form of pure, unadulterated, independent destructiveness.
>
> (Freud, 1949)

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[1] August Aichorn (Wayward Youth, 1935) describes a pathological condition and remedial techniques quite compatible with psychoanalytic concept of neutralization.

In two significant articles (1951, 1958), David Rapaport set out to expand and clarify Hartmann's concept of ego autonomy. According to Rapaport, the individual is constantly in a fluctuating state in which the ego is attempting to maintain its autonomy both from the id and from the environment. Maximizing autonomy of one automatically means decreasing energy devoted to maintenance of autonomy of the other. For example, when the ego must direct massive energy to defend against a flood of impulses, it by necessity becomes less autonomous and less flexible in response to the environment. On the other hand, when an individual is severely deprived of stimulation from the environment, he becomes less autonomous, more subject to impulsive overflows from the id. The ego enjoys its autonomy from the id precisely because of its biologically based ego apparatuses, much as argued by Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein. Regarding these apparatuses of "primary autonomy":

> They are evolutionary givens which, by the virtue of their long history of selection and modification, have become the primary guarantees of the organism's "fitting in" with (adaptedness to) its environment... The apparatuses of secondary autonomy are not "innate" but arise from "experience." Thus, the second guarantee of ego autonomy also involves reality relations.
>
> **(Rapaport, 1958)**

In regard to the ego's hypothesized autonomy from the environment, Rapaport writes:

> Man's constitutionally given drive equipment appears to be the ultimate (primary) guarantee of the ego's autonomy from the environment, that is, its safeguard against stimulus response slavery.
>
> (Rapaport, 1958)

Rapaport prefers the term "structural givens" to "apparatuses." Nagera (1967) summarizes his position:

> Rapaport refers to Hartmann's concept of inborn ego apparatuses (such as memory, perception, motility) as structural givens, clarifying that by structural givens he means neither the muscular apparatuses of motility, nor the end organs used for perception: for instance, those psychological structures through which control and triggering of the motor apparatus is effected.
> (Nagera, 1967)

In addition to structures present at birth, there are also structures that develop in the course of life. As Nagera reviews Rapaport:

> If we speak in terms of structures rather than apparatuses or functions, it is necessary to postulate the existence from the very beginning of life of a number of ready made primitive structures or organizations in charge of primitive mental processes that deal with the regulation of early perceptual activities, the laying down of memory traces, and certain motoric activities, etc... These traces exist at birth while most other structures have to be created during development; that is, further structuralization is taking place all the time as development proceeds.
> (Nagera, 1967)

Nagera goes on to list the factors important in structuralization:

> Three factors seem to be relevant as determinants of the rate and extent of structuralization that is acquired. First, there are innate limitations which account to some extent for inter-individual differences in general, and for differences in the individual's abilities in certain specific areas... Secondly, human needs and human nature partly determine the degree of structuralization required...Thirdly, there is the question of the environment into which we happen to be born.
> (Nagera, 1967)

Structures, then are constantly becoming more complex and organized through the process of learning, experiencing, and physical maturation. The extent to which these structures develop, are organized and reorganized, and the speed with which this occurs, seems crucial in determining the individual's adaptation to his environment and the degree to which conflict may be resolved.

Thus, psychoanalysis, after Freud, no longer conceives of the ego as simply responsive to conflicts between impulsive demands and reality conditions. The ego is now considered to have autonomy as regards its origin (it develops from inborn ego apparatuses which mature and integrate into an organized pattern of functioning) and as regards its source of energy (it draws on neutralized libidinal-aggressive forces). It is not always the mediator between conflicting demands; it has, in addition to this role, that of a constructive adaptor to the environment.

The writings of Erik Erikson show the concern with ego characteristics of the present phase of psychoanalytic thought. Like Rapaport, Erikson emphasizes that psychic processes are constantly being restructured and that the restructuring depends in large measure upon the environment.

Stages of Development

The Freudian view of psychosexual development was taken by Erikson and extended in a number of directions. While not abandoning Freud's concentration on the id and libidinal development, Erikson, as we have indicated, underscored the importance of the ego and the strengths and weaknesses that accrue to it during life. Emphasizing ego development meant that Erikson had to look at the importance of meaning in the course of human growth. Meaning, in turn, came to be viewed as a derivative of one's position *vis-a-vis* his society. Stages of human development, more psychosocial than narrowly psychosexual, concerning the ego as well as the id, were charted not just up to the genital stage of adolescence, but beyond it and all the way to the end of the life cycle.

But while he went beyond Freud, Erikson still saw the importance of strictly psychosexual development and used the Freudian psychosexual themes to describe a variety of social modalities. Thus, he describes the newborn as "incorporative" not only with his mouth, as Freud would have it, but also with his eyes and hands. The two year old is not only concerned with "holding in" and "letting go" in the anal zone but in his interaction with others as well. The boy in the Oedipal stage is not just bent on intruding with his penis but with his words and his whole body. The girl does not wish to catch simply with her vagina but to entice and endear with her whole self.

Central to Erikson's description of psychosocial stages is the concept of *crisis*. Crises, he says, are "characteristic of turning points, of moments of decision between progress and regression, integration and retardation." Basic oppositions--alternative attitudes toward life--overwhelm the child at various times in the course of development. He is "beset with fumbling and fear." But as a crisis is resolved, hopefully with a favorable ratio of the positive to the negative attitudes, the child "appears more himself, more loving, relaxed and brighter in his judgment, more activated and activating, in free possession of a surplus of energy." With a favorable resolution comes increased self-esteem, more strength, and a new positive dimension to the ego.

Each stage of development in Erikson's scheme is marked by the emergence of such a crisis and is named in terms of the basic antagonistic attitudes that precipitate it. There are eight important crises in life, and, hence, eight stages of development.[1]

(1) Basic Trust versus Basic Mistrust. Establishing "enduring patterns for the solution of the nuclear conflict of basic trust versus basic mistrust in mere existence is the first task of the ego." Basic trust, according to Erikson, is "a naive sense of confidence in others and in oneself. It implies that one has learned to rely on the sameness and continuity of the outer providers" and also "that one may trust oneself and the capacity of one's own organs to cope with urges." If trust is established, it will pervade conscious experience, unconscious inner states, and observable behavior.

The newborn "lives through, and loves with, his mouth." He is incorporative--he takes things in--not just with his mouth, but with his eyes, his sense of touch, and his other sensory receptors. He has to learn, however, to regulate his readiness to incorporate with needs, desires, and methods of his mother. The development of this mutual regulation between mother and child is "of prime importance for the first experience of friendly others." Ease of feeding, depth of sleep, and relaxation of the bowels are the first signs that social trust is developing.

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[1] For this summary we used Erikson (1959 and 1963).

The crisis of the oral period comes in the second half of the first year when the arrival of teeth leads the child into a 'biting' phase. There is a more violent drive to incorporate, and incorporation is now active: the eyes no longer passively receive; they actively focus, isolate, and 'grasp' objects; the ears discern and localize significant sounds. The infant is also becoming more aware of himself as a distinct person. Above all "it is now necessary to learn how to continue sucking without biting, so that the mother may not withdraw the nipple in pain or anger." The mother apparently turns away from the child, not only as a result of his biting or because weaning may have begun, but also because she wishes to return to some of the pursuits in which she had been engaged before childbirth. "It is against the combination of these impressions of having been deprived, of having been divided, and of having been abandoned, all of which leave a residue of basic mistrust that basic trust must be established and maintained."

The outcome of this crisis depends upon the quality of maternal care. "Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of administration which in its quality combines sensitive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness within the trusted framework of their culture's life style." If the mother trusts herself, it is most likely that her child will come to trust himself. It is not frustration per se that is damaging to the child; it is frustration without meaning. Parents must be able to convey to their child--even at this early stage of development--"an almost somatic conviction that there is a meaning to what they are doing." If parents are able to do this, the infant will develop a ratio of trust to mistrust that is on the positive side, an orientation that will serve him well in meeting the later crises of life.

(2) Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt. "Muscular maturation sets the stage for experimentation with two simultaneous sets of social modalities: holding on and letting go." Social interaction in the period corresponding to the Freudian anal stage is thus seen by Erikson in terms of the major themes of anality--retention and expulsion. The child clings lovingly to his mother at one moment and in the next ruthlessly pushes her away. He hoards and jealously guards his possessions but just as often is found throwing them down the stairs or out the window. Although retention and expulsion are seen in many forms of interaction with the environment, the anal zone is still the 'model' for these two contradictory modes. Bowel and bladder training enter in to make the child's problem at this time a difficult and significant one.

"This whole stage, then, becomes a battle for autonomy." The child is experimenting with holding in and letting go in many spheres, and thus comes to develop a sense of self-control. The outcome of the crisis at this stage hinges on the child's ability to acquire self-control, autonomy, and pride without a loss of self-esteem and concomitant shame and doubt.

Shame is self-consciousness. "One is visible and not ready to be visible." It is expressed in the impulses "to bury one's face, or to sink, right then and there, into the ground." Shaming the child exploits the sense of being small that develops in him as he stands up and surveys the adult world. Doubt has much to do with the awareness of having an unseen "behind" that can be invaded and dominated by outsiders "who would designate as evil those products of the bowels which were felt to be all right when they were being passed." Doubt leaves the child unsure of what he has left behind.

What the child needs from the environment to meet the crisis concerning his autonomy is firm reassurance. Reassurance is necessary so that his basic trust in himself and his environment is not jeopardized by his "sudden violent wish to have a choice." Firmness must be present to protect the child against the potential anarchy of his inability to retain and expel with discretion. If the parent is firm and tolerant with the child, the child will be firm and tolerant with himself. In addition, if the parent has a sense of dignity and autonomy, the child will be in a much better position to develop one in himself.

(3) Initiative versus Guilt. With a basic trust in existence and a firm sense of autonomy, the child of four enters upon a new stage of development and faces a third crisis. He is now an independent and vigorous walker; he has acquired the basics of language; his imagination is so vivid that at times "he cannot avoid frightening himself with what he himself has dreamed and thought up."

This is the period that Freud called the phallic stage. The child experiences pleasure from his genitals and is curious about sexual matters. He is interested in "being on the make," in "making." There is no simpler, stronger word for it; it suggests pleasure in attack and conquest. In the boy, the emphasis remains on phallic-intrusive modes; in the girl it turns to modes of "catching." Intrusive modes of behavior include physical attack (intruding into another's body), aggressive talk (intruding into another's ears), vigorous locomotion (intruding into space), and curiosity (intruding into the unknown). Catching modes include aggressive forms of snatching and milder forms of making oneself attractive.

The task of this stage is the development of initiative without overwhelming guilt. Initiative assumes the autonomy of the previous stage but adds to it "the quality of undertaking, planning and 'attacking' a task for the sake of being active and on the move." Guilt assumes the shame (being found out) of the second stage but adds to it the fear of being found out--even for thoughts or deeds which no one else has observed. Guilt aroused in the present stage is often expressed in the conviction that the child, as such, or a drive, as such, is bad.

Initiative, in Erikson's view, has to do with longing for the parent of the opposite sex--the Oedipal complex--but it includes much more. Exuberant over his new locomotor and mental powers, the child wishes to try them out everywhere. The genital area of conquest, however, is the one where the child will receive a severe jolt: "the increased locomotor mastery and the pride in being big now and almost as good as father and mother receives its severest setback in the clear fact that in the genital sphere one is vastly inferior" and that at no time will one have a sexual relationship with his opposite-sexed parent. The consequence of these Oedipal wishes are "secret fantasies of terrifying proportions" and "a deep sense of guilt--a strong sense, for it forever seems to imply that the individual has committed crimes and deeds which, after all, were not committed but also would have been biologically quite impossible."

Guilt is the great check on initiative. The child has to develop a conscience--morality, not moralism--without his conscience becoming a cruel and uncompromising superego that ultimately destroys all initiative and obliterates the self. To emerge from this crisis with both morality and a sense of unbroken initiative, the child needs "insight into the institutions, functions, and roles which will permit his responsible participation." Parents should alleviate the hatred and guilt growing in their children.

Hate is to be handled in the free collaboration of people equal in feelings of self-worth though perhaps different in age.

(4) Industry versus Inferiority. Corresponding to the latency period of the Freudian view is the Eriksonian stage at which the crisis faced by the child is one of industry versus inferiority. Industry is a "sense of being useful," "a sense of being able to make things well and even perfectly." Its antithesis is inferiority, a despair of one's skills, the feeling that one will never be any good, that he is "doomed to mediocrity or inadequacy."

The playing child now begins to work. Play to the child is not recreation as it is for the adult. It is a means of advancing forward in the mastery of things and one's own experience. But for children entering the latency period, play is not enough. The necessity of the third stage to "make" people has been sublimated and the child is now learning to win recognition by producing things. "To bring a productive situation to completion is an aim which gradually supersedes the whims and wishes of play."

This is the time when children of all cultures want to be shown how to do things, and so they go to school, whether school is a field, a jungle, or a classroom. Erikson describes how crucial the school experience is in developing a child's sense of industry. Grammar school education that emphasizes self-restraint and duty--doing what you are told to do--may teach the child much that is absolutely necessary but it may also develop such a sense of duty that the child "may never unlearn again an unnecessary and costly self-restraint." Education that carries the opposite tack to the extreme and allows the child to learn by doing what he likes to do may produce a child who has not learned anything and is frustrated in his desire to be shown. "Children at this age do like to be mildly but firmly coerced into the adventure of finding out that one can learn to accomplish things which one would never have thought of by oneself...things which thus provide a token sense of participation in the real world of adults."

A feeling of inferiority may come about in a child for a number of reasons: inadequate resolution of previous conflicts, lack of preparation for school life, the presence of talent which is unrecognized by a teacher.

Teachers are extremely important for the successful resolution of the industry-inferiority crisis. They must be healthy and relaxed themselves; they must know how to alternate play and work, how to recognize talent, and how to handle children for whom school is not that important. Parents must teach their children how to trust their teachers and can even see to it that trustworthy teachers are selected for their children's schools.

The crisis of the present stage is not as violent and abrupt as those of previous stages. It is, after all, a time when violent drives are dormant. But socially, says Erikson, "it is a most decisive stage: since industry involves doing things beside and with others, a first sense of division of labor and of equality of opportunity develops at this time." If a child feels that his sense of worth depends on skin color, family background, clothes, or some factor other than "his wish and his will to learn" his sense of identity may suffer irreparable harm.

(5) Identity versus Identity Diffusion. The onset of puberty--the Freudian genital stage--brings with it rapid body growth and maturation of the genital organs. This inner physiological revolution combines with the availability of a bewildering variety of social roles to precipitate an especially difficult crisis which, Erikson says, centers on the problem of establishing an ego-identity. In common language, ego-identity means "that you really know who you are, that you know what you want to be, that you know what you look like to others, and that you will know how to make the right decisions." More technically, ego-identity is "the accrued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity (one's ego in the psychological sense) is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others."

Identity--or Role-Diffusion is the danger of this stage. Diffusion may be a result of doubts about one's sexual and ethnic identity in which case delinquency or even temporary psychosis may develop. But it is the establishment of an occupational identity that is most disturbing for the majority of young people. The inability to find such a permanent identity leads them to overidentify with heroes and cliques of peers and to be especially receptive to simplistic totalitarian ideologies.

Establishing a strong sense of identity depends in large measure upon the event of previous stages, upon the self-esteem confirmed at the termination of each of the previous crises. "A lasting ego identity cannot begin to exist without the trust of the first oral stage" nor without the autonomy of the second stage nor the initiative of the third. It derives immediately from the sense of industry of the fourth stage. "What I call their accruing ego identity gains real strength only from whole-hearted and consistent recognition of real accomplishment", that is, achievement that has meaning in their culture."

(6) Intimacy vs. Isolation. With a sense of who he is, the young adult is eager for intimacy, for the opportunity to share his identity with that of someone else. Intimacy is "the capacity to commit himself to concrete affiliations and partnerships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments, even though they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises." The fear of this stage is the loss of the recently and preciously won ego-identity in situations--sexual union, close friendship, physical combat--that call for self-abandon. If the fear of ego loss is too great, there results distantiation, "the readiness to isolate and, if necessary, to destroy those forces and people whose essence seems dangerous to one's own." Isolation protects one from facing the next critical development, that concerning generativity and stagnation.

(7) Generativity versus Stagnation. Generativity is "the concern

in establishing and guiding the next generation." It includes, but is not synonymous with, the concepts of productivity and creativity. It recognizes that man is a teacher as well as a learning animal, that the mature need the young as much as the young need the mature. It is a psychosexual as well as a psychosocial concept: the ability to fuse one's identity with that of another leads to a "libidinal investment in that which is generated."

Erikson does not mean, however, that one must have or desire children to become generative. Indeed, young parents are often retarded in their ability to be generative toward their offspring. The reasons stretch far back, even to the lack of basic trust, basic "belief in the species, which would make a child appear to be a welcome trust of the community." Failure in generativity manifests itself in stagnation, a sense of "personal impoverishment." There is regression to a stage of pseudo-intimacy and even to a point of indulging oneself as if he were his only child.

Generativity is an outgrowth of successful resolutions of previous stages just as were the identity of the fifth stage and the intimacy of the sixth.

(8) Ego Integrity versus Despair. "The fruit of these seven stages" is ego integrity. It is an affirmation of order and meaning in one's life, "the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions." It is the awareness of the dignity of one's own life style amidst the variety of life styles evident in the

world. The possessor of integrity knows that "all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes."

Lack of accrued ego integrity is manifested in the fear of death and despair. "Despair expresses the feeling that the time is now short, too short for the attempt to start another life and to try out alternate roads to integrity."

With the establishment of integrity, life has run its full course and completed its cycle. "Trust," Erikson quotes Webster, "is the assured reliance on another's integrity." Put another way, "healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death."

Erikson cautions against thinking of these stages as achievements, as if the trust of the first stage or the autonomy of the second were orientations won once and for all with resolution of a crisis. The negative alternatives of the various crises are not eliminated with resolution. Mistrust, shame and doubt, guilt, inferiority, identity-diffusion, isolation, stagnation, despair: all these are with us in some degree throughout life. The healthy resolution of a crisis means that the proportion of a positive quality is greater than the proportion of a negative quality and that a pattern is set for making these proportions relatively stable.

Nor should it be assumed that crises of trust and mistrust occur only at the first stage of life, that difficulties concerning autonomy are found only at the second, and so on. Each psychosocial dichotomy exists in some form before its moment of crisis arises, and each continues to influence the personality after the crisis is met.

Emotional Disturbance

Erikson's account of psychosocial stages leaves one with a conclusion similar to that which followed Freud's account of psychosexual stages, namely that even "normal" or "healthy" progression through life is fraught with deep emotional upheaval.

During the course of normal development, the organism is faced with "deprivation" and "abandonment," with "sinister forces... leashed and unleashed...in the guerilla warfare of unequal wills," with "secret fantasies of terrifying proportions," with "physiological revolution," and so on, all the way to the "despair of the final stage of life." Healthy development is not at all a smooth progression; emotional disturbance is a matter of course.

Pathological behavior results from the inadequate resolution of various dichotomies. In general, the outcome of earlier critical conflicts depends upon the quality of significant others in the child's environment, while the outcome of later crises depends upon the quality of earlier resolutions in one's own life. Erikson is thus close to Freud, but not as extreme, in emphasizing the significance of the early years.

Manifestations of unhealthy resolutions of crises at various stages include the following:

(1) The lack of basic trust in the earliest stage of life is most evident in cases of infantile schizophrenia and appears later in life in withdrawal into schizoid and depressive states. Individuals "close up, refusing food and comfort and becoming oblivious to companionship." If the affection of the mother is taken away suddenly during the biting stage, acute infantile depression can result--as Spitz (1949) has documented--or there may be left in the personality a "state of mourning which may give a depressive undertone to the whole remainder of life." Unresolved conflicts at this stage may result in oral pessimism, to fear of being empty, of being no good, or in oral sadism, the need to take in from others in a cruel way.

(2) Excessive shaming in the muscular-anal stage leads to a secret determination to get away with things and even to deliberate shamelessness. "Many a defiant child, many a young criminal, is of such a make-up." Denied autonomy, a child may turn his urge to manipulate toward himself and develop a precocious conscience, becoming obsessively repetitive, providing "the infantile model for a compulsion neurosis." In adult life such a child may be the stingy, meticulous "anal character" described by Freud, one who is retentive with his money, his speech, his affection. Such a one's basic sense of doubt "forms a substratum for later and more verbal forms of compulsive doubting: this finds its adult expression in

paranoiac fears concerning hidden persecutors and secret persecutors threatening from behind."

(3) The danger in the locomotor-genital period is that of developing a primitive, all-or-nothing conscience that constricts to the point of inhibition, that is more literal than the parents wish, that consequently resents the parents who do not themselves live up to its exacting standards. The consequences of guilt aroused at this stage may not appear until much later in the form of conflicts over initiative and self-restraint and even in partial impotence or frigidity. Hysterical denial in adults, operating by paralysis, inhibition, or overcompensatory showing off is an expression of the residual conflict over initiative.

(4) Negative outcomes of the industry-inferiority conflict in the latency period--one relatively free of violent drives--are not as disturbing as those of previous stages, though their effects are still telling. A sense of inadequacy may lead to regression to the more isolated family rivalry of the Oedipal period. The child will be unable to identify with a section of the "tool world" and will fail to understand the meaningful roles in its technology. Never able to do at least one kind of thing well, he will fail to acquire a sense of worth as an apprentice in the adult world and so forfeit the base of the sense of identity to be developed in the next stage. Over-identification with a good teacher is also possible and may lead to a premature fixation of identity in the role of being a

good little helper.

(5) Erikson notes that if the role confusion of the fifth stage of development hinges on strong doubts about sexual and ethnic identity, delinquent and even psychotic episodes are possible, though these do not have the same fatal significance in adolescence they might have at other times. More commonly, adolescents defend against the identity diffusion of this fifth stage by "forming cliques and by stereotyping themselves, their ideals, and their enemies."

Pathology associated with later stages of development is beyond the scope of this paper and, in any case, is explained as a result of unfavorable resolutions at earlier phases. "Character problems" may develop from isolation, as might the tendency "to destroy those forces and people whose essence seems dangerous to one's own." Stagnation in the seventh period leads to "regression to an obsessive need for pseudo-intimacy;" its causes can be traced to an impairment in basic trust in the oral-sensory period. Finally, despair that results when ego integration fails to take place manifests itself in a "thousand little disgusts" and in the fear of death. Despair sums up the life that has failed to accrue ego strength as the seven previous crises were faced and resolved.

Most succinctly, then, disturbance on pathology is damage to the ego, suffered when a particular conflict is resolved unsatisfactorily. Frustration of instinct per se does not induce pathology, but rather frustration without culturally derived meaning.

4. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES: PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORY

The inclusion of the views of Carl Rogers in this paper is intended to provide a distinct alternative to the psychoanalytic perspective as represented by Freud and Erikson. Freud stressed libido the instinctual energy of the id and defined disturbance as fixations of libido at early stages of development which precluded the possibility of satisfactory adjustments at later stages. Erikson, still in the psychoanalytic tradition, did not deny the importance of libidinal development but considered as well, the necessity of healthy ego development.

His position was that instinctual frustrations were inevitable and would not lead to serious disturbance unless culturally assigned meaning was absent from them.

Rogers cannot really be understood as an outgrowth of either Freud or Erikson. They delineated stages of development; he did not. They emphasized sexuality, conflict, and crises; he did not. Proportionately more of Freud's and Erikson's efforts were spent on a theory of childhood, and hence their theories appear more complex. Rogers isolated and talked about only that aspect of childhood that was directly related to his definition of maladjustment.[1]

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[1] Rogers (1959) recognizes that his theory of development is based upon clinical experiences with adults and so advances it with caution.

Rogers' approach to personality development is phenomenological. That is, he considers the child's experience as it appears to the child and views what we have been calling emotional disturbance as a discrepancy between the child's experience and his concept of himself. Healthy development is not meeting and overcoming crises; it is allowing the innate tendencies of the organism to fulfill themselves.

Carl Rogers

Rogers states that the innate equipment of the infant is complex, but that only a few characteristics need to be listed for an understanding of personality development. The first of these is an actualizing tendency: "This is the inherent tendency of the organism to develop all its capacities in ways which serve to maintain or enhance the organism (1959)." This motivational concept--the only one postulated in Rogers' theoretical system--includes deficiency or tension-reduction needs as well as growth or tension-arousal needs. It is exhibited only by the organism as a whole.

In addition to a simple motivational system, the infant possesses a regulatory system that provides feedback on how the organism is satisfying its needs. The regulatory system is known as the organismic valuing process. It leads the infant to see as positive and to approach those experiences he perceives as enhancing his organism and, conversely, to view as negative and to avoid those experiences he perceives as detrimental to his organism. The infant "at one moment values food, and when satiated, is disgusted with it; at one moment values stimulation, and soon after, values only rest; (he) finds satisfying that diet which in the long run most enhances his development (1959)." In short, the infant engaging in the organismic valuing process reacts to experiences according to his innate actualizing tendency.

The third characteristic of the infant has already been referred to. It is his experience: "This term is used to include all that is going on within the envelope of the organism at any moment which is potentially available to awareness." For the infant, there is no distinction between experience and reality. Experience is perceived as reality.

Basically, then, the infant is an organism that desires to grow, be healthy, and actualize itself, and that chooses experiences in accordance with that goal. Choosing is neither conscious nor symbolic; it is organismic. Because it is organismic, it can be trusted. To confirm this point, Rogers (1964) cites an experiment in which young infants were allowed to choose their own foods and, over time, actually picked the ones that enhanced their own survival and growth. They followed the "physiological wisdom" of their bodies going on a protein binge when that was necessary, seeking out foods rich in certain vitamins when that became imperative.

As the infant develops, this experience becomes differentiated. This is a natural outcome of the actualizing tendency of this organism. A basic differentiation that arises is between experience itself and awareness of that experience. Awareness of experience (awareness of being, of functioning) becomes symbolized in consciousness as self-experience, and this, in turn, through the infant's interaction with significant others in his environment, becomes elaborated into a *concept of the self*. Thus, out of the undifferentiated mass of experience of the newborn, there emerges the self-concept of the young child.

Experience and a concept of the self: the child is now in possession of the two phenomena central to an understanding of his psychological health. Rogers' charting of the course of personality development and his definition of psychological maladjustment will concentrate on the degree of congruence between one's organismic experience and his self-concept--a point to which we shall return.

With the growth of the self-concept comes a *need for positive regard*, that is, a need for warmth, liking, respect, sympathy, and acceptance. The need may be innate or learned--it is irrelevant to know which--and it it is universal in human beings. A characteristic of the need is its reciprocal nature. That is, if an individual perceives that he is satisfying another's need for positive regard, he will experience satisfaction of his own need for positive regard.

The need for positive regard has a bearing on the developing relationship between self and organismic experience. The need of the self for positive regard can become divorced from and subsequently outweigh the needs of the organism. Rogers (1959) says, "The expression of postive regard by a significant social other can become more compelling than the *organismic valuing process*, and the individual becomes more sensitive to the positive regard of such others than toward experiences which are of positive value in actualizing the organism." Thus, a split may appear between the actualizing tendency of the organism and the actualizing tendency of the self. Indeed, the regulatory system based on the need of the self for positive regard may overpower the regulatory system with which the child was born.

Several examples may be of use. A toddler pulls his baby sister's hair and finds that it feels good when he hears her cry--a positive experience for his organism. But he receives a slap on the hand from his mother and is told he is a bad boy--a negative experience for his need for positive regard. His future behavior, according to Rogers, may be more determined by the latter experience than by the former. He may become more concerned about avoiding blows to the need of his self for positive regard, than he is about approaching experiences his organism feels are satisfying. Another example is the familiar case of the child having to eat foods he doesn't like. The child learns to approach experiences negatively valued by his organism (eating the food) in order to secure the positive regard of a parent. He thus betrays the wisdom of his organismic valuing process and sows the seeds of maladjustment.

The next development of consequence for the child is the emergence of a need for self-regard. The child comes to experience positive regard, or the lack thereof, independently of transactions with significant others in his environment. He becomes, in a sense, his own social other, experiencing satisfaction or frustration simply from his own self-experiences. Not only do parents express positive and negative regard toward him; he now expresses positive and negative regard toward himself.

With the need for self-regard comes the development of conditions of worth. "When a self-experience is avoided (or sought) solely because it is less (or more) worthy of self-regard, the individual is said to have acquired a condition of worth (1959)." Now the child avoids the organismic satisfaction of pulling his sister's hair and he engages in the distasteful behavior of eating undesirable food not only because these are the wishes of his parents but also because they are his own wishes. He is motivated not only by a need for his parents' love, esteem, and approval but by a need for his own love, esteem and approval. His worth, in his own eyes, is conditional upon not pulling his sister's hair and upon eating the distasteful food.

Another way of saying the same thing is that the child has introjected the values of his parents. His values are not the ones intrinsically satisfying to his organism.

The danger in living in terms of introjected values or conditions of worth is losing touch with the organismic valuing process. The child "relinquishes the laws of evaluation which was his in infancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic distrust for his own experiencing as a guide to behavior (1964)." If a need for positive self-regard leads one to value experiences his organism does not value, and not to value experiences his organism does value, there results over time an inability even to be aware of what one's organismic reactions are. If one does what he dislikes long enough, he loses touch with what he likes. The wisdom of the organism is deserted and one's own intrinsic valuing system becomes a stranger to him.

Thus there develops incongruence between self and experience. The individual perceives his experience only in terms of conditions of worth. Those experiences which are in accord with conditions of worth are perceived accurately. If a child genuinely likes an activity--playing in cooperation with others, for example--and the activity has the approval of significant others and therefore of the child's own self, the child will accurately symbolize his liking in awareness. Experiences, however, that are at odds with introjected conditions of worth are perceived inaccurately; they are distorted or even totally denied to awareness. The child, for example, may lose awareness of the fact that he enjoys pulling his sister's hair or that he genuinely dislikes a certain food.

Examples from adult life of introjected values and consequent distortion of experience are numerous. Rogers (1964) lists a number of introjected values that have this effect: sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad; making money is the highest good; learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable; to love thy neighbor is the highest good; cooperation and teamwork are preferable to acting alone; communism is utterly bad. The student who cheats because his peer group considers it clever is living according to introjected values, as is the student who has desires of being an artist but enrolls in medical school to please his parents. Most adults, according to Rogers, live by an accumulation of introjected value patterns.

> This, as we see it, is the basic estrangement in man. He has not been true to himself, to his own natural organismic valuing of experience, but for the sake of preserving the positive regard of others has now come to falsify some of the values he experiences and to perceive them only in terms based upon their value to others. Yet this has not been a conscious choice, but a natural--and tragic--development in infancy. The path of development toward psychological maturity, the path of therapy, is the undoing of this estrangement in man's functioning, the dissolving of conditions of worth, the achievement of a self which is congruent with experience, and the restoration of a unified organismic valuing process as the regulator of behavior. (Rogers, 1959)

Emotional Disturbance

Although Rogers does not use the term, "emotional disturbance" is most generally defined as a state of incongruence between self and experience, a state that, in some degree, is characteristic of all of us. Elaborated somewhat, psychological maladjustment "exists when the organism denies to awareness, significant experiences, which consequently are not accurately symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure, thus creating an incongruence between self and experience (1959)."

To concepts like neurosis and psychosis, Rogers prefers the terms defensive behaviors and disorganized behaviors. Defensive behaviors include not only behaviors such as compulsions and phobias that are usually regarded as neurotic but also some behaviors usually considered psychotic, notably paranoid behaviors and perhaps catatonic states. Disorganized behaviors include many of the irrational and acute psychotic behaviors.

Defense arises when the organism has an experience (for example, sexual fantasies) incongruent with the self-concept ("I am a good person") and its introjected values ("sexual desires are bad"). The organism subliminally perceives --Roger's term is subceives --the experience as threatening. The experience is threatening because, were it accurately represented in awareness, it would violate the introjected values and frustrate the need for self regard. Defense guards against accurate representation of the experience in awareness by using such mechanisms as rationalization, compensation, and projection. One might, for example, project the source of his evil sexual desires onto another with the thought "I am pure, but you are trying to make me think filthy thoughts." Incongruence between self and experience is thus defended against by distortion and/or denial of experience.

In some cases, however, the incongruent experience becomes so patently clear to the self that serious breakdown and disorganization occur. This can happen in therapy, for example, when an individual is faced with more of his denied experience than he can handle. If a significant denied experience hits him suddenly and with unmistakeable obviousness, defense will be impossible, the experience will be accurately represented, and the self-structure will break down. Behavior in such an acute psychotic state is likely to be consistent with the denied experience rather than the fractured self-concept. The person who has denied sexual impulses, for example, may suddenly make sexual overtures to those with whom he is in contact. Behavior may also alternate between consistency with the self-concept and consistency with the denied aspects of experience.

The relevance of Rogers' concept of incongruence to the emotional development of children can be found in his description of the ideal course of development, a course that is "hypothetically possible,... though it does not appear to occur in actuality." In such an ideal developmental sequence, the infant would receive only unconditional positive regard from his parents. He would always feel prized as an individual. His feelings would always be accepted even though some of his behaviors would be inhibited. If he received positive regard from his parents in such a way, his regard for himself would be likewise unconditional. He would introject no values, have no conditions of worth. He would be guided by his organismic valuing process. His self-concept would never be at odds with his organismic experience. No defensive or disorganized behaviors would be necessary. He would be, in Rogers' terms, a fully functioning person.

In theory at least, Rogers feels such an ideal can be attained "if the parental attitude was genuinely of this sort: 'I can understand how satisfying it feels to you to hit your baby brother (or to defecate when and where you please, or to destroy things) and I love you and am quite willing for you to have those feelings. But I am quite willing for me to have my feelings, too, and I feel very distressed when your brother is hurt, (or annoyed or sad at other behaviors) and so I do not let you hit him. Both your feelings and my feelings are important, and each of us can freely have his own (1959)." The child of such a parent, Rogers predicts, would lose the organismic valuing of his experience. His life would become a balancing of satisfactions, on some occasions hitting his baby brother and enjoying that satisfaction, on others, pleasing his parents and enjoying that.

Thus it is the conditions that Rogers sees as facilitative of personal growth in therapy that he feels are facilitative of personal growth in the developing child.

6. PSYCHODYNAMICS AND EDUCATION

The final portion of this paper reviews some of the attempts to bridge the gap between psychodynamic theory and educational practice. Early attempts at translating theory into practice reflected the prevalent concern of psychoanalysis with libidinal development, while later attempts gave more prominence to the role of the ego. After a sampling of these psychoanalytic efforts is presented, a synopsis is made of the views of Carl Rogers on the educational process.

The Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Education

Very early in the development of psychoanalytic theory, B. Low (1928) charged education with pursuing its way "unaware of the existence even of the individual's most important aspects, much less able to interpret them." She specified those psychoanalytic concepts which she thought were most applicable to educational practice:

> The dynamic influence of the unconscious upon consciousness, the fact of repression and its methods of functioning, with accompanying sublimation capacity, the dependence of intelligence and the more specific intellectual life upon emotional factors, the role of fantasy in the human soul---these are phenomena which, with their implications, we are bound to investigate if we would achieve effective education, which is, after all, only another name for helping human beings to develop for use and power what is within them.
> (Low, 1928)

In accordance with Freudian view of disturbance, Low saw the role of the teacher dealing with children under the age of six as preventing fixations, observing the processes of repression and sublimation, and providing opportunities for successful sublimations. In general, she said, "The less there is of repression and the more of sublimation acting as a developmental factor in the human being, the more change there is of mental health and power."

Long before the publication of his theory of psychosocial development, Erik Erikson (1935) wrote of his dissatisfaction as a classroom teacher with the educational process. Education, he thought, relied solely on the process of enlightenment and neglected "the entire world of the affects." Erikson was later (1959) to emphasize the need for competent teachers in the early grammar school years when the child is developing a sense of industry. Such teachers would alternate play with work and doing what one likes with doing what one is told.

Alpert (1941) illustrated the use of group discussion therapy within the classroom and its effectiveness in symptom removal. This emphasis on direct handling of children's feelings around conflict issues is a technique which the author considered of great potential value for educators. She wrote:

> Educational group therapy may be considered a periodic intensification of an intelligent educational program...one in which the subject matter and the approach to it are sufficiently challenging to the children to afford them ample opportunity for sublimation; one in which the teacher is as interested in the personality of the pupils as she is in the subject she is teaching, one in which group discussions are conducted informally and purposefully. Such an educational program is as feasible in public schools as in private schools.
>
> (Alpert, 1941)

C. Zachry (1941) reviewed the progressive education movement and concluded that it had been significantly influenced by psychoanalysis. "The absence of psychoanalytic terminology in education," she wrote, "is a superficial matter, for many of the basic principles of progressive education are entirely consistent with Freud's contribution to the understanding of psychic development." It was her opinion that educators, in their attempts to apply psychoanalysis to educational practice, did not take into account the significant differences between the educational and therapeutic settings. She concluded that "it is the preventive rather than the curative application of psychoanalytic principles that is especially adapted to the educative process."

Four years later, W. Hoffer (1945) reviewed the progress of child psychoanalysis and its relation to education. His criticisms of educational attempts to relate analytic principles to educational practice followed the same lines as those of Zachry. He pointed, for example, to the way in which the psychoanalytic position on the danger of sexual repressions led to a period of educational practice characterized by sexual enlightenment. He concluded that a crucial need existed for longitudinal research done by teams of analysts and educators. "Only after the experience of such research shall we be able to assess whether or not it is possible to prevent or modify early traumas and to what extent the ego's faculty to integrate id tendencies can be developed and utilized."

Anna Freud (1947) added to the discussion on psychoanalysis and education by listing three things psychoanalysis had to offer pedagogy: (a) criticism of existing educational methods, (b) an understanding of the relationship between the children and their teachers, and (c) repair of injuries inflicted upon children during the educational process. Previously (1946), she had questioned the benefits of a free atmosphere for the developing ego of the child:

> In the theory of education, the importance of the infantile ego's determination to avoid pain has not been sufficiently appreciated, and this has contributed to the failure of a number of educational experiments in recent years. The modern method is to give to the growing ego of the child a greater liberty of action, above all, to allow it freely to choose its activities and interests. The idea is that thus the ego will develop better and sublimation in various forms will be achieved. But children in the latency period may attach more importance to the avoidance of anxiety and pain than to direct or indirect gratification of instinct. In many cases, if they lack external guidance, their choice of occupation is determined not by their particular gifts and capacities for sublimation but by the hope of securing themselves as quickly as may be from anxiety and pain. To the surprise of the educationalist, the result of this freedom of choice is, in such cases, not the blossoming of the personality, but the impoverishment of the ego. (Freud, 1946)

Ernest Kris (1948) reflected a predominant concern of his time with the way in which non-psychiatric personnel translated and used the concepts and propositions of psychoanalytic theory. He feared that inferior products might replace sound translations of theory into practice due to both increasing demand and the infantile state of psychoanalytic theory.

Lilli Peller (1956) concentrated on the relevance of the concept of sublimation for education and noted the differences between activities which are simply substitutes and those which promote the cathexis which is characteristic of sublimation. She felt that "education fails when too much of the original strength of the instinctual drives becomes invested in rigid reaction formations, repressions or neurotic symptoms. This energy is then not available for other ego purposes which may be less rigid and more adaptive." Later (1967), she delivered a lecture in which she stressed: (a) that attention must be given to both the intellectual and emotional development of the school-age child; (b) that more attention should be given to the child's need for a stable "tie to a superego figure;" (c) that a positive self-image is crucial to the child; (d) that stable ties to playmates are equally as important; (e) that "sound education must encourage physical and mental self-activity;" and (f) that most children like to learn things provided their interest is not destroyed by adult regulations.

In their review of the history of the attempts of psychoanalysis and education to achieve a rapprochement, Ekstein and Motto (1964) discern two major trends. The first efforts were based upon a conception of psychoanalysis as education: the therapeutic process corrected via re-education problems which had arisen in the personality. After the war, psychoanalysis, particularly within the United States, was looked upon as therapy, and its relation to education was that of a provider of therapy for the disturbed and deviant in the school system. In this view:

> The contact with the ordinary school system is a comparatively peripheral one which serves, at best, as a bridge for the severely disturbed child for whom treatment is needed. The primary interest is the deviant child who needs treatment and the crv is for prevention.
>
> (Ekstein & Motto, 1964)

The coming trend, the authors suggest, is more growth-oriented:

> Education is not only seen in terms of mental health and the prevention of ill health, but in the didactic terms of growth, enrichment and meeting the tasks of life. The educational problem moves then out of the area of mental health or ill health toward the problem of learning, the acquisition of knowledge.
> (Ekstein and Motto, 1964)

The current work of the Reiss-Davis Clinic in Los Angeles is an example of the coming trend. Conferences and courses for teachers are presented in collaboration with the Los Angeles Institute for Psychoanalysis. Various educational concepts or concerns are viewed and discussed by persons versed in psychoanalytic theory. These contributions are published each spring in the first issue of the Reiss-Davis Clinic Bulletin. Topics which have been developed include play and mastery, task and conflict, the unconscious mind in teaching, curriculum and the development of creativity, learning readiness, discipline and educational therapy.

A major emphasis of those who have tried to extend psychoanalytic principles into education has been on the destructive nature of regulations that are imposed too early in the course of development. Out and out repression, it seems, is to be discouraged and sublimation encouraged. It is interesting to note that, at least until very recently, most of these prescriptions have come from persons who were basically theoreticians and whose major concern was other than educational. Efforts have been essentially one-sided, the theorists offering the hypothesized answers and the educators offering the questions--a situation described by Redl (1964) as "throwing crumbs from the tables of the rich."[1]

Carl Rogers has worked assiduously at applying his concepts of personality development to educational practice (1961, 1969). In line with his definition of full personal functioning as congruence between self and experience, he advocates an educational process that stays close to the experience of the student. Learning, he says, should be self-initiated and have the quality of pervasive personal involvement. It should be evaluated from the internal frame of reference of the only person who can truly evaluate it--the learner. The teacher, in Rogers' view, should not be an instructor but a facilitator. His task is, by a genuine trust and prizing of his students, to create the climate for learning. A climate of learning is not created by lesson tasks, assigned readings, lectures (except upon request), evaluation and criticism on the part of the teacher (again, except upon request), and required examinations. Programmed instruction in which the student sets his own pace, simulations of experiences and events, and work in small groups are methods that promote experiential learning. Rogers suggest the use of teacher-student contracts and is not opposed to the notion of basic encounter work in the classroom. The teacher, in his view, is like the therapist in non-directive therapy, and the parent of the child on the way to maturity. *He is not an authority or an evaluator.* He provides the warm, accepting climate which facilitates significant learning.

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[1] For further information on and examples of the applications of psychoanalysis to education, see Bower and Hollister (1967), Biber (1959), R. Jones (1960, 1968).

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MENTAL ILLNESS AS SOCIAL DEVIANCE

Don C. Des Jarlais

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I. OVERVIEW: THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Sociologists have studied mental illness from both medical and deviance perspectives. From a medical perspective, the sociology of mental illness can be studied like other forms of illness. The major concerns then include epidemiology*, particularly across cultures (Eaton and Weil, 1953) and across social classes (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958) and the role of social factors, such as social change, in the etiology of mental illness (Leighton and Hughes, 1959).

In contrast, the deviance perspective focuses on mental illness as the breaking of social rules. In particular, mental illness is related to implicit rules governing ordinary social interaction. From a deviance perspective, two important questions arise. (1) What are the social forces promoting conformity or rule-breaking? (2) What relationships exist between those enforcing the rules and those breaking the rules?

This paper will discuss mental illness from the social deviance perspective. This analysis does not deny the existence of important factors at other levels of analysis such as physiological states or personality characteristics, but is primarily concerned with "social facts" (Durkheim, 1938).

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*Underlining denotes technical term.

2. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SICK ROLE

The concept of role provides social facts relevant to the study of mental illness as deviance. A role is a position in a social system, carrying certain rights and obligations. Parsons (1951) describes the sick role in American society. He states that the test for the existence of such a role is the existence of institutionalized expectations for the behavior of the person playing the role in relation to others in the social system.

Parsons lists four expectations that constitute the sick role:

(1) the person in the sick role is relieved from his normal role obligations,

(2) he is not morally responsible for being sick,

(3) he must want to get well, and

(4) he must seek technically competent help to get well.

The above behaviors are closely related to being ill, but none of them are caused by the illness itself. The relief from normal role obligations and the command to seek technically competent help are expectations embedded in the social system. They are not characteristics of an illness or of a particular personality.

In American culture, mental illness is generally treated as an illness. To the extent that this is true, one would expect the mentally ill to adopt the sick role during their period of illness. On the whole, most of the mentally ill do seem to be playing the sick role. They rarely fulfill their normal role obligations and usually are not considered morally responsible for their actions. They often exhibit a desire to get well and are treated by doctors in medical settings.

A number of researchers have focused on the discrepancies between the institutionalized expectations that define the sick role and expectations about the mentally ill. One source of these discrepancies is the lack of clear indicators of mental illness. In particular, there is a lack of objective physiological tests for mental illness. As Erikson (1957) notes, this creates a state of social uncertainty about whether or not the person is legitimately ill. Erikson observes that the patient often responds to this uncertainty by emphasizing and exaggerating his symptoms so that he can legitimately claim illness and treatment.

A second discrepancy between the mental illness role and the ordinary sick role concerns the mode of entry into the role. The mentally ill are often forced into that role against their wishes and protestations. For members of the lower class, it is often an impersonal agent, such as the police, who is responsible for entry into the mental illness role (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958). In a study of the expectations of the staff of a mental hospital, Spitzer and Denzin (1968) found the role expectations for patients involuntarily entering the hospital are considerably less consistent than those for patients voluntarily entering.

A third discrepancy between the sick role and mental illness concerns how the patient experiences entry into the role. According to Parsons (1951) the person entering the sick role becomes dependent upon the other members of his social system. They take care of him and show concern for him. To properly play the sick role, the patient should receive social support upon entry into the sick role and express gratitude for that support and concern. Various studies (Goffman, 1961; Lemert, 1962) indicate that this is not how a mental patient experiences entrance into the mental illness role. Instead of experiencing a sense of support from others, he usually feels that his family or work group have coerced or deceived him into being removed from their lives. Instead of gratitude, he typically feels bitterness at this betrayal. These feelings do not encourage him to adapt to the sick role and make its application less viable to mental illness.

A final discrepancy between the accepted sick role and the institutionalized expectations about mental illness involves the stigma attached to being mentally ill. According to Parson's description of the sick role, the person in the role is not considered responsible for being ill. While few persons in the sick role are actually treated as blameless, there is considerable evidence that the mentally ill suffer a greater sense of stigma (Cumming & Cumming, 1968) and a higher possibility of rejection (Phillips, 1963) than those with other forms of illness. In addition, the stigma associated with mental illness carries beyond the period of illness (Goffman, 1963; Scheff, 1966).

The above considerations indicate that those who are considered to be mentally ill are not treated in the same way as those who have more physiologically based forms of illness. Sociologists argue that these differences stem from the fact that mental illness, whether or not it should be considered a form of illness (Szasz, 1963; Ausbel, 1961), is also a form of deviance.

3. MENTAL ILLNESS AS DEVIANCE

Deviance is the term currently used to denote the breaking of social rules. There are three components of deviance: rule-breaking by specific individuals or groups, negative evaluation by others, and punishment. Full deviance, the occurrence of all three components, is relatively rare compared to the occurrence of only one or two components. The next sections will discuss mental illness in terms of the three components of deviance: rule-breaking, negative evaluation, and punishment.

Rule-breaking. Scheff (1966) describes mental illness as residual deviance. Society has many classes of social rules--from codified criminal laws, to intricate manners, to simple lying. These classes of rules are usually specific and include a name for the person who breaks them. Scheff proposes a residual class of social rules. These rules are implicit, not specified, and involve everyday social interaction. The rules regulating eye contact during conversation (Argyle, 1967) provide an example of residual rules.

Without specifically giving a name to the rules broken by the mentally ill, E. Becker (1962) discusses the function of those rules. Building upon the work of Goffman (1956), Becker conceptualizes mental illness as the inability to treat the self as an important object of social ritual. The mentally ill person has not been properly prepared for participation in social interaction. He lacks the deference to treat the social selves of others with due respect and lacks the demeanor to require others to treat his social self with due respect.

G. H. Mead (1934) theorized that social interaction requires taking the role of the other. A person must be able to successfully predict the meanings another assigns to the messages sent between them. Mental illness involves a disruption of this communication. Other people are not able to take the role of the person considered mentally ill. They cannot predict the meanings he gives to messages nor can they empathize with the motives for his actions. His communications are excessively idiosyncratic and his actions seem incomprehensible and crazy. To the extent that a person sees himself as mentally ill, he does not think he can successfully communicate with others, considers himself responsible, and does not understand the motives for his own behavior.*

Gove (1970) proposes two types of mental illness based upon how the person interacts with others. One type, the distressed, exhibits extreme signs of personal distress in social interaction. The other type, the disorganized, is not capable of directing his behavior in an orderly manner. Gove also includes a residual category of disruptives. These persons are considered mentally ill because they disrupt preferred types of social interaction, e.g., behavior problems in a classroom.

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*It should be emphasized that the "mental illness" of one individual in an interaction is not the only possible cause of difficulties in taking the role of the other. Differences between subcultures, particularly language and value differences, also lead to difficulties in taking the role of the other.

Three sets of social rules are involved in Gove's typology. The first set concerns limits on reaction to stress. The second concerns controlling one's own behavior. The third set is even more general.

Sociologists would probably agree with the following statements. (1) Mental illness involves breaking the rules that regulate ordinary social interaction. (2) Mental illness is an open-ended category of deviance; many examples of deviance are considered mental illness because they do not fit other more specific categories of deviance.

Negative evaluation and punishment. The previously mentioned aspects of deviance, in addition to rule-breaking, are negative evaluation and punishment. Rule-breaking would seem automatically to include a negative evaluation. If rule-breaking is not negatively evaluated, then the social structure and cultural values supported by the rules are in jeopardy. There are, however, examples of mental illness that are rewarded in certain cultures (Benedict, 1934).

In American culture, it is safe to say that the behaviors termed "mental illness" are negatively valued. The words used to describe this category of deviance also have negative connotations. In a society that values health, the behaviors in question are called an illness. Other terms used to describe these behaviors include disorder, disturbance, and pathology, all of which carry clear negative connotations. All imply a deviation from the desirable order. There are, however, special subcultures, such as some artist groups, that may positively value some forms of mental illness.

There are a considerable number of studies (e.g., Goffman, 1963; Phillips, 1963; Cumming & Cumming, 1968) that show the negative evaluation of mental illness. The term stigma is used to describe the "spoiled identity" of the mentally ill. The term denotes a mark of imperfection in the character of the mentally ill person.

The question of whether or not mental illness is punished is more a matter of values and ideology than of empirical data. The official positions of the health professions, the police and courts, and the educational systems in the United States is that mental illness is treated rather than punished. What is done to the mentally ill is done for their benefit, and in an attempt to relieve the illness.

Another perspective, however, points to the similarities in the treatment of the mentally ill and the punishment of criminal deviants. Goffman (1961) strikingly compared mental institutions to prisons in terms of incarceration and degradation of the inmates. Szasz (1961) has repeatedly pointed to the loss of legal rights and civil liberties that accompanies official finding of mental illness. The most common form of 'punishment' of the mentally ill is ostracism, exclusion from the community. Recent efforts in the mental health field are reversing this trend by focusing on maintaining the mentally ill in the community (Pasamanick, et al, 1967; Klein, 1968).

Deviance theories. This paper will survey some of the major theories of social deviance. The term deviance is relatively new in sociology, although social rule-breaking has been studied for a long time. Previous terms used to define the field include crime, social pathology, and social problems.

To some extent, theories of deviance have developed cumulatively, building upon each other, but to a greater extent they have developed in opposition to each other. A new theory is often built around a newly emphasized aspect of deviance. The previous theory is not necessarily refuted, but rather is shown to be inadequate. The emergence of a new theory of deviance may reflect a change in the value perspective of sociologists (see Mills, 1962; Becker, 1963).

The theories will be presented in historical order. Four questions will be asked of each theory: (1) What is the major concept in the theory? (2) What source of deviance is emphasized? (3) How does the theory handle the concept of social pathology? (4) How is it applicable to mental illness?

4. EMILE DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF ANOMIE

Major concept. In his classic study, Suicide, Durkheim (1951) developed the concept of anomie. He conceptualized society as limiting and regulating individual needs. These limitations take many forms. The "common sentiments" or values developed during socialization define what constitutes crime in the society. Innate needs are not allowed to violate those sentiments. A stable economic system serves to inhibit individual needs to acquire wealth. A strong institution of marriage inhibits sexual needs for men.

Source of deviance. Durkheim wrote that human needs are infinitely expandable and require external reference standards. The norms of the group define how much of a particular need, e.g., wealth or power, is appropriate for persons in different status positions in the society. Without these group norms as indicators of appropriate levels of need, individual needs expand easily beyond the point at which they can be filled. This leads to a state of perpetual frustration. The frustration encourages many types of deviant behavior, from theft to aggression to suicide.

According to Durkheim (1964) anomie results from rapid social change. The social rules which limit needs and aspirations develop through interactions among the various sectors of an industrialized society. A high level of social interaction among the specialized roles provides both the need and the opportunity for the development of common norms.

The development of norms is often a relatively slow process. Social change often occurs at a rate greater than the society's capability to produce new norms. When these new norms do not develop fast enough (Durkheim uses the business cycle as an example), a state of anomie results. Anomie leads to various forms of deviance, including mental illness.

Social pathology. Durkheim is quite explicit about the relationship between individual pathology and social pathology (1950). Individual pathology is crime, suicide and other forms of deviance. According to Durkheim, the deviant individual is pathological. The deviant is not guided by the social norms which define the appropriate level of his needs. Consequently, his needs expand beyond the levels at which they can be met, and frustration results.

According to Durkheim, the presence of individual pathology does not necessarily indicate the presence of social pathology. He theorized that any society includes some members who are not guided by the group norms. The causes of such individual variation are many, including genetic factors, and unique environmental factors. The natural variation among the members of a society leads to individual pathology independent of the specific content of the norms of the groups.

Social pathology arises from the absence of appropriate group norms or the presence of norms which are no longer applicable to changed social conditions. If anomie is at a high level, there are fewer guides to the appropriate levels of needs for individuals. This results in higher rates of individual pathology. Social pathology is thus indicated not by the presence of individual pathology, but by relatively high rates of individual pathology.

Mental illness. Durkheim's concept of anomie, like Freud's theory, is a control theory. Both theorists picture man as having an inexhaustible potential for needs, requiring regulation and limitation. Freud used the concept of the id to denote this set of needs.

Freud and Durkheim differ in describing the mechanisms which limit human needs. Freud posits two internal psychological mechanisms, the ego and the superego, that serve to regulate the actions of the id. Durkheim proposes a source of control external to the individual--the norms of the individual's society. He describes the individual as being susceptible to changes in social influence patterns and as needing a continual reiteration of limitations from an external source.

Durkheim's theory, like Freud's, is difficult to test operationally. Concepts such as inexhaustible human needs, anomie, and superego are resistant to operational definitions. It should be noted that Durkheim used anomie to explain rates rather than cases of deviance. Strictly used, Durkheim's concept of anomie is applicable to the analysis of high rates of mental illness in a society, rather than individual cases of mental illness. Few, if any, cases of mental illness can be explained by anomie alone. On an individual case level, explanations must include factors from the genetic background and personal history of the individual.

As an explanation of high rates of deviance, including high rates of mental illness, Durkheim's concept of anomie is still a relatively cogent explanation. The stress caused by the uncertainty inherent in a state of anomie logically leads to higher rates of mental illness. The theory is limited not by its logic but by the great difficulty in defining anomie operationally.

5. SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY

Social disorganization theory was developed during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The concept was developed by such writers as Thomas and Zaniecki (1918) and Park and Burgess (1925). It was specifically applied to the study of mental disorders by Faris and Dunham (1939).

Basic concepts. The theory of social disorganization was developed primarily through the study of urban areas, particularly in the city of Chicago. The urban sociologists at the University of Chicago studied characteristics of several natural areas of the city. A theory of urban ecology, based on types of land use, transportation access, and economic forces, accounts for the development of the natural areas of the city (Park and Burgess, 1925; Hawley, 1950).

Some areas of the city are termed disorganized. These areas are characterized by the highest rates of deviance, including crime, divorce, juvenile delinquency and mental disorders. They are also the poorest areas of the city.

Source of deviance. Social disorganization implies the breakdown of orderly ways of interacting within the community. More specifically, the 'community' is a place in which the various psychological needs of its members are met. In the 'disorganized areas,' social institutions do not provide for these needs. Conditions place great stress on traditional institutions such as the family and the church, and opportunities for education, economic advancement and for recreation are severely limited. Inadequate functioning of social institutions accounts for the high rates of deviant behavior in disorganized areas.

Social pathology. The stress of acculturation to a new society is suggested as a cause of social disorganization. In Chicago, the majority of persons living in problem areas were newly arrived European immigrants. Ways of behaving learned in European peasant villages were not appropriate to the new urban American setting. Adapting to the new setting involved prolonged stress.

Differential rates of acculturation increased pressures in the community. Children, being younger and going to American schools, acculturated more easily than their parents. They often lost respect for their parents. Lack of respect for elders contradicted the traditional patterns of social interaction and served to increase the amount of stress and disorganization within these areas.

The replacement phenomenon provided evidence that acculturation was the source of stress leading to social disorganization. As an immigrant group adapted to the culture and became wealthier, its members would move out of the disorganized areas. They were replaced by a newer, poorer immigrant group. If high rates of deviance were characteristic of the first immigrant group, the high rates should have followed the first group to other areas of the city. Instead, the rates of deviance in the disorganized area remained the same. The new immigrant group followed the same pattern.

The social disorganization theorists see basically the same relationship between social and individual pathology as did Durkheim. Social pathology consists of high rates of individual pathology. However, these theorists broaden the bases of social pathology. The social change which results in Durkheim's anomie is increasing internal differentiation within society. Acculturation is a different type of social change involving mechanisms such as intergenerational conflict.

Social disorganization theory is less a control theory than Durkheim's formulation. The social disorganization theorists claim that social organizations limit deviant behavior through provision of positive needs, e.g., status, emotional support, as well as by providing controls on needs.

Mental illness. Faris and Dunham (1939) applied the social disorganization framework to the study of mental illness. They surveyed the incidence of mental disorders in the city of Chicago and found the highest rates in the disorganized areas. The incidence of schizophrenia, in particular, was greater in those areas.

Since Faris and Dunham's studies, the epidemiological study of mental illness has grown greatly. Hollingshead and Redlich's

(1958) study of the relationships between mental illness and social class has become a classic in the sociology of mental illness. Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) stated they had no comprehensive theory to relate social class to mental illness. The statement is still true.

In general, social class has replaced disorganized areas as the independent variable in studies of the incidence of mental illness. In a recent review of such studies, Fried (1969) concluded that the incidence of mental illness, particularly schizophrenia, varies inversely with increasing social class. Fried noted that higher levels of stress and lower levels of social resources are the most likely explanations for this relationship. Both factors appear in the original formulations of the concept of social disorganization (e.g., Thomas and Zaniecki, 1918).

An important contribution of the social disorganization theorists is the description of the interaction effect in the social production of deviance. Not only do disorganized areas produce disorganized behavior in the residents of the areas, but the disorganized areas attract persons with disorganized behavior from other areas. Faris and Dunham cite examples of schizophrenics who come to live in disorganized areas after failures in other areas of the city. Faris (1944) cites the case of a schizophrenic who came to live in a "rooming house" area, where lack of social contact led to the full development of the schizophrenia.

Social disorganization theory, with its emphasis on socially induced stress, is congruent with psychological theories of mental illness. The replacement finding, that high rates of mental illness are peculiar to disorganized areas rather than particular immigrant groups, is also significant. Social disorganization, however, is quite difficult to measure operationally. As Matza (1969) has noted, the tradition of excellent field studies begun by the University of Chicago urban sociologists later came to undermine their concept of social disorganization. Studies such as those by Anderson (1923) and Whyte (1947) showed a considerable amount of social organization in the disorganized areas. The organization occurred in informal groups rather than in the formal associations that early disorganization theorists had studied.

More recently, the distinction between social disorganization and deviance has been emphasized. Cohen (1959) cites Garfinkel's game analogy. Disorganization is a complete breakdown in the game. Deviance is breaking the rules of the game, cheating. The game provides penalties and special rules to handle deviance without becoming disorganized. Deviance, even at high rates, can thus exist independently of disorganization.

6. CULTURAL TRANSMISSION THEORY

The cultural transmission theory of deviance was derived mainly from the study of crime and juvenile delinquency. The theory was developed from the study of the same natural areas of Chicago which figured in the development of social disorganization theory.

Basic concepts. Cultural transmission theory, includes a major reformulation of deviance theory when it describes deviant behavior as learned rather than instinctive. Control theories, such as anomie or social disorganization theory, imply that deviant behavior is inherent in man's nature. Cultural transmission theory suggests that deviant behavior is learned.

Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942) studied juvenile delinquency in disorganized areas. They collected life history data on how juveniles became delinquent. They observed that most delinquent behavior occurred in groups meeting the same psychological needs met by non-delinquent boys' groups. Shaw and McKay also noted the replacement effect. Delinquency rates stayed high in certain areas despite a gradual replacement of the population.

Shaw and McKay concluded that juvenile delinquency had become a tradition in some areas of the city. The tradition of delinquent behavior was passed on to succeeding generations of youth in the same way that other traditions are passed on--through social interaction between the generations. They noted that motives of delinquent youth are not fundamentally different from those of non-delinquent youth. Delinquency was explained by reference to the local traditions of the area in which the youth was socialized rather than by differing psychological characteristics.

Sutherland (Sutherland and Cressy, 1960) formulated the most systematic cultural transmission theory of crime. He started with the sociological assumption that all groups in a society are composed of psychological normals. The problem is to explain how similar types of people come to engage in quite different patterns of behavior.

The mechanism that Sutherland proposes to explain this phenomenon is differential association. A heterogeneous society contains many definitions of appropriate behavior. Some of these definitions include obeying the law. Others include some methods of breaking laws as part of the definition of acceptable behavior. A person's behavior with respect to laws results from the definitions of appropriate behavior which he comes to accept.

During his socialization, a person usually comes into contact with a number of different definitions of appropriate behavior. The definitions he eventually learns are mediated by association with others who already hold these definitions. The strength of associations with persons holding different definitions varies greatly.

According to the principle of differential association, a definition of appropriate behavior is learned from the persons with whom one has the strongest associations. The variables related to the strength of differential associations are the frequency, intensity, duration and priority of the associations. Sutherland proposes differential association as a general theory of criminal behavior. He does not deny the importance of other factors, such as social disorganization, but these other factors are important only as part of the process of differential association.

Source of deviance. Cultural transmission theory is a social learning theory. It assumes the essential psychological normality of both deviants and conformists. It assumes the existence of both deviant and conforming traditions within a society. Recruitment into deviant behavior and recruitment into conforming behavior occur in the same manner. Both types of behavior are learned from one's associates.

Cultural transmission theories are not intended to propose a source of deviant behavior. The original sources of deviant behavior are not necessarily the primary focus of inquiry. Cultural transmission focuses on the processes through which deviant behavior is continued in a society through succeeding generations.

Social pathology. The cultural transmission theory of deviance radically changed the conceptualization of individual and social pathology. Previously, social pathology had been defined as high rates of individual pathology. Cultural transmission theory proposed the existence of social pathology without individual pathology. A person could be deviant though having the same psychological motives as a person who was not deviant. Deviance was described as value conflict between different groups rather than as high rates of individual pathology.

Mental illness. When one applies cultural transmission theory to the concept of mental illness as a form of deviance, the theory does not seem to fit at all. The assumption that deviants have essentially the same psychological characteristics and structure as non-deviants is contradictory to most definitions of mental illness. Cultural transmission theory, when applied to mental illness, produces a radically sociological perspective. Later studies of mental illness (e.g., Goffman, 1961; Scheff, 1966) adopted this perspective, and produced great insights into the social processes surrounding mental illness, while not producing a comprehensive picture of mental illness itself. (These studies will be discussed under the labeling theory of deviance.)

The emphasis on deviance as learned behavior links cultural transmission theory to learning and dynamic theories of mental illness. To the extent that mental illness is learned behavior, the learning is social learning; that is, it is learned from other people.

Criminal behavior is also socially learned. The same social processes that produce conforming behavior produce criminal behavior. The learner adopts the characteristics of a model with whom he has strong contact. Thus, with analysis of criminal behavior, cultural transmission theory examines the traditions and subcultures existing within the larger society.

However, there does not appear to be an identifiable subculture of the mentally ill in American society. At least there is no publicly identified subculture with distinctive values and behavior patterns of its own. There are subcultures, such as the drug subculture (Blum, 1969), to which mental illness is incorrectly attributed. These have distinctive culture complexes and rituals which are independent of the mental health of the participants. Furthermore, to the extent that those considered mentally ill have severe problems in social interaction, formation of a distinctive subculture would be inhibited.

Cultural transmission theory can be more easily applied when the family is considered to be the relevant subculture. The family interactionist theorists (e.g., Bateson, et al, 1956; Vogel and Bell, 1960; Laing and Eterson, 1964) describe mental illness as the normal or natural reaction to being socialized in a deviant environment. The double bind theory of schizophrenia comes close to being a specification of Sutherland's association variables of frequency, duration, intensity, and priority.

While cultural transmission theory offers considerable insight into mental illness as it exists in society, it is probably most applicable to mental illness within mental institutions (Goffman, 1961; Spitzer and Denizen, 1968; Redlinger, 1970). These institutions do have a distinctive subculture and powerful tools, such as drugs, to facilitate socialization into the role of mental patient.

7. FUNCTIONALISM

During the late nineteen-forties and the nineteen-fifties, functionalism became the dominant theoretical school in sociology. The theory was associated primarily with the work of Parsons (1951) and Merton (1957) and was developed from the work of earlier British anthropologists.

Basic concepts. The functionalists picture the social system in a state of dynamic equilibrium. A social system is in balance between forces that continue and maintain the system, and forces that disrupt and disorganize the system. The functional approach emphasizes the long term effects of a part upon the whole of the social system.

Functional, or eufunctional, forces in a social system promote the long-term maintenance of the system. They provide for the gratification of universal human needs, such as sexual needs, within the framework of the existing system. The institution of marriage may be taken as a prototype of the integration of needs into the structure of the social system. The functions of a given institution or pattern of behavior are the ways in which it serves to reinforce and maintain the social system.

Dysfunctional is the opposite of functional. An institution or pattern of behavior is dysfunctional to the extent that it disrupts or destroys its social system. The concept of dysfunction is similar to the earlier concept of social disorganization. The major difference is that disorganization is used mostly to describe temporary phenomena, such as acculturation, while dysfunction is applied to more permanent features of society. Dysfunction, also, is referred to negatively, as social pathology.

Source of deviance. The dynamic equilibrium of the social system is a result of many social forces. Most of these forces have both functional and dysfunctional aspects. The conflict between the forces in the equilibrium is called social strain. Social strain is the source of deviance, or rule breaking, in the society.

An example of social strain is Merton's (1957) formulation of the concept of anomie. Merton described anomie as a disjuncture between culturally approved goals (e.g. material wealth) and institutionally provided means (e.g. well-paying jobs). The possible combinations of goals and means produces five types of behavior:

	Goals	Means	Type
(1)	+	+	conformity
(2)	+	-	innovation
(3)	-	-	retreatism
(4)	-	+	ritualism
(5)	±	±	rebellion

Figure 1. Types of behavior derived from combinations of goals and means.

(1) Conformity (both cultural goals and institutional means accepted).

This type of behavior is not considered deviant. The individual successfully articulates his cultural goals with the means provided by the social structure. A society is stable when conformity is the dominant type of behavior.

(2) Innovation (acceptance of cultural goals but not of institutional means).

Most deviant behaviors of the innovative type are commonly called crimes. The cultural goal of wealth and material success is accepted, but the institutionalized means, i.e. conventional jobs, are not accepted. Robbery, theft, or a similar form of deviant behavior is substituted as a means to achieve the cultural goals. This type of deviance is most common among the lower economic classes where the institutionalized means are not available. It also occurs, however, as white collar crime or as unethical business practice.

(3) Retreatism (rejection of both cultural goals and institutional means).

The deviant behaviors classified as retreatist involve a psychological withdrawal from the main body of the culture. Retreatists are deviants such as psychotics, drug addicts, and members of millenarian religious sects. The pattern of behavior which precedes retreatist behavior is conformity meeting with repeated failure. This type of deviance is particularly disturbing to conforming members of society, and periodic attempts are made to cure or rehabilitate retreatists.

(4) Ritualism (rejection of cultural goals but acceptance of institutional means).

According to Merton, this type of deviance results from anxiety produced by competitive striving. The anxiety is reduced by a withdrawal from such accepted goals as status and wealth. A more complete withdrawal, such as quitting one's job would be too threatening. The result of these cross pressure anxieties is "ritualistic" deviance, conformity in action without personal commitment to one's actions. This type of deviance is most prevalent in the lower middle class.

(5) Rebellion (rejection of both cultural goals and institutional means, with an attempt to institutionalize new ones).

This is the revolutionary type of deviance. It refers to the behavior of individuals and groups who reject their present society and work towards the establishment of a new one. The process involves legitimatizing new values, creating new social institutions and struggling against the representatives of the established order.

In functionalist theory, a distinction is made between manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are relatively direct. Socializing children is a manifest function which maintains the social system. Latent functions are indirect. Prostitution, by bolstering the institution of marriage (Davis, 1957) maintains the social system. It is an example of a latent function. Merton advised sociologists to focus on latent functions, since their unexpected consequences are potentially harmful. Consequently, sociological inquiry focused on the functions of deviance, the ways in which rule-breaking maintains the social system.

Cohen (1966) compiled a list of some ways in which rule-breaking is functional and promotes social organization. Bureaucratic rules may occasionally paralyze part of an organization. Bending such rules is an example of deviance that is functional rather than dysfunctional.

Deviance may also serve as a safety-valve for a social system. Davis' (1961) analysis of prostitution shows how prostitution supports the institution of marriage by relieving strain. Other forms of deviant behavior signal serious problems within the social system. High rates of absenteeism or vandalism may be indicators of more serious threats to the system.

The existence of rule-breaking may actually facilitate conformity to social rules. Examples of deviance help to define the rules within a given social system. Erikson (1964) has pointed out the difficulties in teaching social rules. Examples of negatively valued deviant behavior establish the boundaries of correct behavior. In addition to clarifying social rules, deviance may encourage conformity through a contrast effect. By censuring the deviance of another, one rewards one's own conformity to social rules. Deviance provides one with an opportunity for favorable social comparison.

A group may unite in support of the deviant, thus increasing the degree of social organization. Members of the group subordinate their individual interests and expend effort towards a group goal. The effort may be either to reclaim the deviant or to protect him from the results of his deviance.

Conversely, the group may unite against the deviant. It may punish him for his deviance, or scapegoat him. Group members may react against the deviance in order to relieve anxieties and guilt feelings that are only tangentially connected with the rule-breaking behavior of the deviant. Mead (1964) describes the unifying effects of common aggression against a rule breaker, and Frazer (1935) gives many examples of the unifying effect of choosing and acting against a scapegoat.

Another possible function of deviance, not mentioned by Cohen but specifically stated by Durkheim (1938), is implicit in Merton's innovator type of deviance. It is the function of social invention. All social systems change, though at greatly differing rates. An action that may be deviant at one time may later come to be highly valued. Durkheim points to the example of Socrates, punished as a law-breaker, who later became a model for education.

Social pathology. As Matza (1969) has noted, functionalist theory successfully undermined the concept of social pathology. Insights into the functions of deviance made the condemnation of deviance as pathology too simplistic. Functionalist theorists describe society as an interrelated system, with every part having multiple functions and dysfunctions. This multiplicity precludes simple identification of any part of the system as either wholly pathological or wholly non-pathological.

Mental illness. Functionalist theory may be applied to mental illness in several ways. Merton's anomie theory specifically links social factors--cultural goals and institutional means--to deviant behavior. Mental illness is clearly a type of retreatist behavior. Such behavior includes a rejection of the cultural goals and institutional means of the society.

Ritualistic deviance also is related to mental illness and mental health. Ritualism, though not a form of mental illness, is close to the concept of alienation. Alienation is not a disease entity in itself, but could easily function as a facilitator of other forms of mental illness (Laing, 1960; Josephson and Josephson, 1962).

Critics charge that Merton's theory of anomie is more elegant than fruitful (Clinard, 1964; Douglas, 1969). Research data have not unequivocally supported the theory. A self-generating body of theory has not developed from the original formulation, despite many attempts.

Merton's anomie concept is similar in many respects to psychodynamic theory. The psychological processes which form the bases of the different types of deviance resemble various defense mechanisms. The ritualist is decathecting his cultural goals. The innovator has a weakly developed superego. The retreatist is regressing to more primitive modes of behavior. Psychodynamic theory, like the concept of anomie, has a cogent system of logic that has not been fully validated in non-clinical settings (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).

Mental illness seems to fulfill some of the functions of deviance noted by the theorists.

(1) Safety valve. Temporary insanity may often serve as a safety valve for relief of both individual and social system tensions. The literature on collective behavior (Lang and Lang, 1965) is filled with cases of mass hysteria resulting from high levels of tension within groups. Many societies have institutionalized occasions, e.g., carnival, or Fasching, when crazy behavior is officially permitted and encouraged.

(2) Clarification of social rules. Mental illness is probably quite effective in defining rules for proper behavior. It also provides a flexible, negative standard for evaluating behavior. Many behaviors can be proscribed by saying, "Don't be crazy," or "People will think you are crazy if you act like that," without providing an explicit rationale for the social rules being invoked.

Becker (1962) describes mental illness as an inability to follow cultural rituals in face-to-face interactions. He shows how children test the limits of rules for these situations. Mentally ill can be a descriptive term for those who have failed to learn the rules for face-to-face interaction. This category of mental illness functions by helping to define the rules for interaction and by providing a negative standard of behavior.

(3) Uniting the group. The existence of mental illness may also prompt the group to unite. They may unite to help the deviant. A less benevolent form of group unification occurs when the mentally ill person is scapegoated. Mild scapegoating takes the form of ridicule (Klapp, 1967). More serious forms include the inducing of mental illness in the deviant, often a child, as a way of coping with psychological problems of other members of the groups. The family interactionists (Vogel and Bell, 1960) hypothesize that mental illness in some children maintains the stability of the family as a social system.

Functionalist theory is capable of generating important insights into the social processes involved in mental illness. In particular, functionalist theory offers explanations of why many attempts at cures are not successful, i.e., interventions are opposed by powerful forces in the social environment.

Nagel (1957) has described functionalism as a logic of discovery rather than a logic of validation. Functionalist theory is well-suited to generating hypotheses that may be contrary to normal expectations. It is quite difficult, however, to generate data to support functionalist statements. To prove that X serves function Y in system Z, one would have to remove X from system Z and note that function Y was not being filled. It is difficult to establish such a proof in a complex social system. Thus, the usefulness of functionalist theory is limited.

8. LABELING THEORY

Basic concepts. During the nineteen-sixties a theory of deviance developed which has come to be known as symbolic interactionist, societal reaction or labeling theory. The term symbolic interactionist reflects the contributions of George Herbert Mead (1934). Mead theorizes that a human develops his self through communication with others. The process involves "taking the role of the other" in communication, so that symbols communicate the same social meanings. Mead's theories have been applied to the communication between rule breakers and rule enforcers. The term societal reaction is often used because of the emphasis given to society's reactions to rule-breaking. Earlier theories, in contrast, placed emphasis on the rule-breaking itself.

The labeling concept is the most distinctive feature of this theory. Societies distinguish between their conformists and their deviants. Conformists are expected to follow social rules, while deviants are expected to break social rules. The expectations of others powerfully influences the behavior of an individual with respect to social rules.

Source of deviance. Labeling theorists emphasize that one does not become a deviant by breaking rules. One must be labeled a deviant before the social expectations that define the role are activated. Examples of the labeling process are criminal conviction, commitment to a mental institution, and placement in a special education class. It is also possible to be labeled without having broken a rule.

Labeling theory defines the relationship between rule-breaking and deviance. Lemert (1951) distinguishes between primary and secondary deviance. Primary deviance is the initial breaking of social rules. Secondary deviance refers to the rule-breaking that occurs after one is perceived as a rule breaker. Not finding employment because of a criminal record is an example of secondary deviance. Later labeling theorists (e.g., Becker, 1963) confined use of the term deviance to those instances in which the social expectations of rule-breaking had been activated.

A deviant identity is formed in the same manner as a non-deviant identity. In both cases, individuals conform to the expectations of others. The deviant role is conferred upon a rule breaker by the audience which directly or indirectly witnesses the rule breaking. The role usually has a specific name--prostitute, thief, drug addict, problem child. Since the role is functional for the social system as a whole, there are social pressures on the individual to play it fully. There are covert rewards for skillful performance, e.g., money, attention, control over group actions, forbidden pleasures; and obstacles are erected to prevent individuals from abandoning the role.

The deviant label need not follow rule-breaking. Probably in most cases, the label is not conferred upon the rule breaker. Everyone breaks social rules, and many do so consistently. Yet few are chosen for deviant roles.

Some individuals are not labeled as deviants merely because their rule-breaking is not discovered. In some cases, however, known instances of rule-breaking escape the labeling process (Becker, 1963; Scheff, 1966). There are a number of factors that influence whether or not deviance will be attributed to the rule breaker. These factors include the extent to which the system needs to have a deviant role filled, the frequency and visibility of the rule breaking, the tolerance level for rule breaking, the social distance between the rule breaker and agents of social control, the relative power of the rule breaker in the system, the amount of conflict between the rule breakers and agents of social control, and whether or not anyone has a special interest in enforcing penalties against the rule breaker.

Labeling theory stresses the role of agents of social control. Agents of social control are those with the responsibility for enforcing social rules. They include the police, the court system, psychiatrists, teachers, and parents. The agents of social control invoke the labeling process. They are responsible for selecting, from among a number of rule breakers, those who will play deviant roles. This process is often carried out under the rubric of treatment or rehabilitation.

Cultural transmission theory emphasizes the psychological similarities between deviants and conformists. Both have the same set of motives and psychological characteristics. Deviants are socialized into a non-conforming value system. Labeling theory goes one step further. It emphasizes the behavioral similarities between deviants and conformists. Both groups break social rules often, and both groups conform to most social rules; e.g., the thief may be a good parent. The differences between deviants and conformists are apparently in their behaviors, but are actually a result of the social perception of their behaviors.

Social pathology. In a curious way, labeling theory reintroduced the idea of social pathology into deviance theory. Social pathology has customarily treated the damage done by those who break social rules. Labeling theorists focus on the damage done by agents of social control to those who break social rules. The pathological agents are those who are enforcing rules, rather than those against whom the rules are enforced. Much of labeling theory has been consciously written from the perspective of the deviant (Becker, 1963), rather than that of the agent of social control or the neutral observer.

Historically, labeling theory may have crested in popularity. Recently, a number of critiques of labeling theory have appeared.

Several (Matza, 1969; Gove, 1970) have discussed the lack of emphasis on the contributions of the rule breaker to the process of becoming deviant. Labeling theory emphasizes the contributions of the agents of social control, but tends to ignore any contribution by the rule breaker. Matza focuses on the self-determination of the person becoming deviant and argues that his active cooperation is necessary to the process. In some cases an individual may obtain a label voluntarily, as in the case of self-admission to a mental hospital (Gove, 1970).

Other criticisms of the theory emphasize the gap between rule-breaking and the labeling process. Blum (1969) argues that labeling theorists merely assert the existence of the labeling process without explaining it. He calls for more theory and research into labeling as a "social construction of moral meaning (Douglas, 1969)." Gove (1970) argues for more specificity in the image presented by the labeling theorists. He presents evidence for systematic, if informal, selection processes among rule breakers to determine which are labeled as deviant.

A final criticism of labeling theory focuses on the reversibility-irreversibility of the labeling process. Labeling theorists emphasize irreversibility. Once labeled, a person remains in a deviant role. On the other hand, Robbins (1966) presents evidence that most children labeled as deviant grow up to be conformists. Gove (1970) points to the large number of mental patients who are released. The reversibility of the labeling process may vary greatly with the type of deviance involved. 'Juvenile offender' is considerably more reversible than 'drug addict.'

The critics of labeling theory have not attempted to refute the dynamics of the labeling process. They show that labeling theory is incomplete, rather than invalid. The study of the relationship between rule-breaking and labeling is a significant contribution to deviance theory. Future investigation will probably focus on error factors, particularly subcultural and racial biases, in different types of labeling.

Mental illness. Scheff (1966) has systematically applied labeling theory to mental illness as a form of deviance. He describes mental illness as an integral part of the social system. Scheff cites evidence to support his hypotheses. His work is summarized below.

(1) A stereotype of mental illness exists in American culture. Different forms of this stereotype are presented in the mass media, held in public opinion, and held by expert opinion (Nunnally, 1967). The stereotype defines the deviant role. It can be easily learned by individuals.

(2) Residual rule-breaking, the breaking of implicit social rules, is widespread in society (Srole, et al., 1962). The causes of residual rule breaking are "fundamentally diverse:" they include biological, psychological, and situational factors. Most acts of

residual rule breaking are ignored with no official reaction to them.

(3) Some cases of residual rule breaking come to the attention of authorities. The authorities presume illness and proceed to label the residual rule breaker as mentally ill.

(4) The residual rule breaker then adopts the role of being mentally ill. He is rewarded for successfully playing the role and punished for not playing it.

Scheff concludes that the labeling process is the most important determinant of the behaviors associated with the term mental illness. He presents evidence in support of his formulation, including a number of his own studies. The evidence appears sufficient to indicate the existence of most of the processes he is describing.

The question of the relative importance of these processes, compared with other processes, is still open. Criticism of Scheff's theory follows lines similar to the criticisms of labeling theory in general.

Gove (1970) argues that the individual contributes to the process of mental illness. The psychiatric symptom is the most important part of the individual's contribution.

There is also considerable evidence that when residual rule-breaking comes to the attention of psychiatric authorities, it is a result of conflict rather than accident. The conflict may be with the police (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958) or within the work setting (Lemert, 1962) or within the family (Yarrow, et al., 1955; Samson, et al., 1962). Admission into a mental hospital may be seen as either extrusion or escape from conflict.

Labeling theory deals with the specifics of mental illness. It is easier to test empirically than are other theories of deviance. While labeling theory is not a complete theory of mental illness, any general theory written in the future will necessarily include elements of labeling theory.

9. DEVIANCE, MENTAL ILLNESS: FUTURE THEORY

It is difficult to predict future directions of any body of theory. Since the phenomena studies under the rubric of deviance involve highly cathected values, the difficulties increase. It is possible, however, to make some predictions about future areas of study.

Critics of labeling theory (Matza, 1969; Gove, 1970) focused on the lack of emphasis given to the deviant's contribution to the labeling process. It is likely that future deviance theory will attempt to specify the points at which an individual exerts control over the process of labeling. Lemert used the term secondary deviance to denote rule breaking resulting from the attribution of deviance to a person. It is likely a similar concept, a secondary gain, will be developed to denote the rewards accompanying deviant role.

A second probable direction of future deviance theory is a study of conflict associated with deviance. Labeling theory emphasizes conflict between deviants and agents of social control, while functionalist theory describes society as an integrated whole, stressing consensus. Lofland (1969) has recently formulated a concept of deviance that centers on social conflict. According to Lofland, a large, pluralistic society has no set of rules; instead it has different groups in competition and conflict.

Deviance arises from conflict between large, well-organized, powerful groups and small, poorly organized, weak groups, with a high level of fear. While the concept of rule breaking will probably continue to be important in deviance theory, the role of conflict in producing deviants may receive closer examination. Such a theoretical development would be particularly valuable in investigating conflict between the pre-mental patient and his family, and conflict between the deviant child and his family.

A third area for further study is the influence of deviants upon non-deviants. Deviance theory has already described the effects of agents of social control and the ways in which social organization produces deviance. The influence process is probably mutual. Many deviant activities have spread and have been adopted by the non-deviant culture. The recent increase in the use of illegal drugs may be an example of such a process. Future deviance theory will have to account for the incorporation of deviant behavior into conforming culture.

A fourth direction for development of deviance theory involves the examination of morals in action. Douglas (1969) has criticized deviance theory for being concerned with values without carefully examining the nature of morality. Douglas feels that the use of the term 'values' less clearly reflects the strength of the phenomena, than does the use of the term 'morals.' A clear formulation of morals, and the social construction of moral codes, will probably accompany interest in conflict and more participation by sociologists in public policy making.

Present classification schemes for mental illness include terms such as psychosis, neurosis, mental disorder, emotional disturbance, *et al*. Clausen (1950) has called for better classification schemes to provide a basic taxonomy for scientific study. To the extent that mental illness is a deviant role, physiological and psychological investigation cannot provide an adequate classification scheme. A sociological perspective is required, clarifying the characteristics of the mental illness role, naturally occurring changes in the role, and possibilities for role change through intervention.

10. DEVIANCE IN CHILDREN: SOCIALIZATION FAILURE

Sociologists have not studied deviance in children to the same extent as deviance in adults. There is a voluminous literature on juvenile delinquency, but sociologists and social psychologists have tended to treat adolescence as a period distinct from both childhood and adulthood (Gold and Douvan, 1969). With respect to rule breaking and deviance, adolescents have more of the characteristics of adults than the characteristics of children. Adolescents and adults are expected to know the content of the rules of their society, while children are not. Adolescents and adults are also expected to have developed the proper motives for conformity, i.e., control of impulses, while children are not.

Theories of deviance are concerned with rule breaking and the consequences of rule breaking. Children commonly break social rules. The consequences of rule breaking for children, however, are often different than those for adults. Theorists interested in socialization have emphasized these differences, while deviance theorists have emphasized the similarities in rule breaking by adults and children.

Clausen (1968a) has recently reviewed the history of the concept of socialization. He concludes that socialization is the process of learning how to play social roles. Children must learn how to play present as well as future roles. Through socialization a child acquires the knowledge, skills, motives and attitudes appropriate for playing social roles.

Socialization makes a continuous society possible. No society would survive without inculcating its preferred patterns of behavior in its new members. Socialization insures a continuous replication and adaptation of a culture by a new generation.

A child, in the process of socialization, must learn not only what rules to follow, but he must learn to want to follow the rules. Rule breaking by children (only partially socialized beings) receives a different response than rule breaking by adults. It is often assumed that children do not know the rules they are breaking. Furthermore, they have not yet had the opportunity to learn the motives that promote conformity to the rules. This makes the assignment of moral responsibility to the child difficult. In both cases, ignorance of the rules or lack of proper motivation in the child, the responsibility for rule breaking is generally assigned to the socialization agents rather than the child himself.

A child is no better prepared to play a deviant role than he is to perform the conformist role. Children have not learned the rules and motives for being any specific type of deviant. Therefore, rule breaking by children is likely to be generalized and diffuse, and not easily defined as a specific type of deviance. For example, it is harder to distinguish between criminality, mental illness, and mental retardation in children than in adults.

Therefore, accurate labeling of the deviant behavior of children is difficult. There is already a tendency for mental illness to be used as a residual category of deviance (Scheff, 1966; Gove, 1970). The definitions of emotional disturbance are even more vague for children than they are for adults.

Erikson (1964) analyzes deviance in terms of learning social rules. Most social rules, such as the rule against lying, are not absolutes. The systematic testing of the rule by learners defines the situations in which the rule is applicable and those in which it is not applicable. The response to testing behavior by the socialization agent defines the limits of the rule. Testing is also functional in resolving conflict between different social rules. Different rules, apparently applicable to the same situation, often have contradictory implications for action. The response to rule breaking by socialization agents clarifies which rule is to be followed.

Labeling a person a deviant may serve to generate rule breaking behavior. Deviants are expected to break social rules. The more specific the label, the more clearly the form of the rule breaking may be predicted.

Labeling may also have a deterrent effect. The stigma associated with certain labels may deter others from breaking the rules in question.

Clausen (1968b) describes socialization as the achievement of certain tasks by both socialization agent and socializee. Among the tasks that parents must fulfill, he lists:

(1) training and channeling of physiological needs,

(2) teaching and providing practice for motor skills, language, cognition skills, social skills,

(3) transmitting cultural goals and values, and

(4) controlling the scope of the child's behavior.

The child has a corresponding set of tasks to achieve. He must learn what the parents teach and internalize the goals and values of the parents. According to Clausen, both child and parent normally strive to competently perform these tasks. Failure produces anxiety in the child and the parents. The reasons for failure, and the resulting anxiety, may include biological deficiencies in the child and inadequacies in the parent.

Failure in a socialization effort usually involves interpersonal conflict. The rules defining proper behavior are not abstract. They take the form of interpersonal demands, by the parents and by the child. Therefore, the distribution of power in the socialization unit is of critical importance. It determines who will be labeled as deviant and how family members will cope with their anxieties.

For a number of reasons, mental illness is the most common form of deviance resulting from a socialization failure.

(1) Mental illness acts as a residual category for non-specifiable rule breaking.

(2) Considerable anxiety is involved in the socialization of children by parents.

(3) Interpersonal conflict is usually present.

(4) The greatly unequal distribution of power in the family may lead the child to internalize the anxiety and conflict produced.

The above discussion has centered on the potential for generating rule breaking, deviance, or mental illness within the family as a socialization unit. In a discussion of ways of improving socialization agents, Lippitt (1968) focused on the faulty socialization which results from conflict between different clusters of socialization agents. Lippitt defines the socialization community as those members of the total community with an interest in influencing the growth and development of the young. They form a community of interest even though they may not be in effective communication with each other, and many of the key figures in each of the clusters may have little contact with the young.

The ten clusters in the socialization community include the following:

(1) the formal education system;

(2) the churches;

(3) the leisure time agencies with recreational, cultural, and character evaluation programs;

(4) the social control and protection agencies such as the police and courts;

(5) the therapeutic, special correction, and resocialization services, such as social workers, counselors, programs for the handicapped;

(6) employment offices and work supervisors of the young;

(7) political leaders who have an investment in involving the young in political activities;

(8) parents;

(9) like-age and older peers; and

(10) the mass media.

To some extent, there will be conflicting definitions of appropriate conduct within each cluster, and among the different clusters. Each conflicting group proposes its own set of rules for the young. In such a conflict situation, the distribution of power, i.e., who can enforce his version of the rules, is of critical importance.

Conflicting demands from different socialization agents produces a stressful situation for the person being socialized. Lippitt notes several different coping styles which may handle this type of stress:

(1) Compartmentalized Loyalty. In this response, conflict loyalties are denied and the child attempts to adapt completely to the dominant influence of the moment.

(2) *Pervasive Dominant Loyalty*. A simpler way of resolving the conflict is to choose a single source of influence. This source is then followed in all possible situations.

(3) *Rejecting the References*. Another method of coping with conflicting demands is to reject the sources of the conflict. Since the socialization agents disagree, their legitimacy as influence agents is denied.

(4) *Striking a Balance*. Children will often try to resolve conflicting demands through finding a compromise that will please everyone. This type of response may be successful if the conflict is not serious, but it usually results in dissatisfaction and discontent. Repeated frustration resulting from this response will lead to the simpler types of responses described above.

(5) *Integration and Reciprocal Influence*. Two conditions are necessary for this response to be successful. First, the individual must feel control over his own decisions. Socializing agents are seen as resources for the individual to utilize. Second, he must be able to influence the socialization agents. In this case, the individual and the socialization agent(s) are interdependent.

Lippitt indicates that mental health is most likely to follow from the fifth response to conflicting socialization demands.

Socialization theory and deviance theory have not yet been successfully integrated to produce a comprehensive theory of deviance in children. Socialization theory is closer to psychological theory. Deviance, mental illness in particular, is likely to be seen as imperfect development. Deviance theorists, in contrast, have emphasized that the norms violated by deviants, including the mentally ill, are social norms rather than developmental norms.

There is, nevertheless, a considerable amount of overlap between the two theories. The following concepts might be expanded to permit integration of the two theoretical positions.

(1) The self. The theoretical distinctions between normally developed selves versus abnormally developed selves, and between conformist selves and deviant selves need to be more clearly elucidated.

(2) The function of deviance in socialization. Erikson (1964) provides brilliant insight into the function of deviance in socialization; alternative processes which accomplish socialization have not yet been demonstrated.

(3) The labeling process. The labeling concept has definite implications for the interpretation of deviance in children. Further research is needed to determine when labeling is incidental to therapy and when it permanently establishes a person in a deviant role.

(4) Conflict and power. Conflict and the distribution of power are important in both deviance and socialization theories. Conflict often leads to the labeling of deviants; and conflict in the

socialization process produces stress in the individual. Power distribution determines who gets labeled and influences responses to socialization stress. The parallels are present but need further development.

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ECOLOGICAL THEORY AS A MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

Lynne Feagans

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1. ECOLOGICAL THEORY AS A MODEL

The word model* is often misused in the social sciences to describe any hypothesis, generalization or other minor statement of study. The use of the word "model" described below is one which we would particularly like to avoid.

> The first unnecessary use of "model" is as a synonym for "theory." In particular, the term is used for theories which have some or all of four different characteristics. (1) Any as yet untested or even untestable theory may be dubbed a "model." Speculative theories, like those about the neurophysiological correlates of behavior or the doctrines of psychoanalysis, for which empirical evidence is scarce, are sometimes called models, apparently because of a reluctance to honor them as full-fledged theories.
>
> (Brodbeck, 1968, p. 585-586).

An appropriate alternative use of the word "model" is elaborated by Rudner (1966), Hesse (1966), and Brodbeck (1966). An area of study about which much is already known can be used to suggest laws for an area about which little is known. The area of greater knowledge provides the structure of the laws and is said to be a model for the area about which little is known. In this paper, ecological theory as it is known in biology will be used as a model for constructing a theory to explain emotional disturbance.

Not all of a model need be isomorphic with the newly constructed theories but at least some of the laws should be shown to be alike. In order for the use of a model to be productive, one must state explicitly the one-to-one correspondence between the two areas in regard to (1) concepts and (2) stated relationships within the law-like generalizations. In this paper it will be shown that some concepts and some law-like generalizations in an "embryo theory" of emotional disturbance are similar to concepts and law-like relationships in ecological theory.

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*Underlining denotes technical term.

Ecological theory differs from other theories dealing with disturbed behavior. However, there is definite overlap between the sociological approach and the ecological approach; in many instances, arbitrary division lines were drawn between the two areas for the sake of clarity. This similarity of approach is a function of a common concern, i.e., human behavior. Two main differences were found between the two areas. The ecological approach uses ecological theory, as formulated in biology, as a model for constructing theory, emphasizing the role of individual differences. The sociological approach emphasizes the environment almost exclusively.

2. INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGY

In a cursory way, ecology is the study of the interaction between organism and environment. A better definition is given by Odum (1953) and it is the one which will be emphasized in this paper. He says ecology is the "study of structure and function of nature." Structure includes a description of: the composition of the living population, including life history, number and distribution of each species in the system; the composition of all nonliving things and the range of conditions under which the population lives. Function refers to the action of the energy within the structure. It is the rate of energy flow in the system, the rate of cycling of nonliving material, and the biological regulation of the system. Thus, according to Odum, organism and environment are structural components, and their exchange of energy or interaction are functional components.

Ecological theory as somewhat formalized in biology has systematically categorized behaviors of species within their natural environments. In addition, the patterns of behavior which account for adaptation or maladaptation to the environment have been examined. Biology has "recognized that every species and class of living organism has evolved by adaptation to a particular set of environmental conditions with reference to which its morphologic structures, physiologic systems, and behavior response repertoire are optimally suited. This environmental pattern is defined as the ecologic niche and represents the adaptive match between circumstances and species schema (Sells, 1966, p.134)." This kind of naturalistic observation and classification is the basis on which the theory was formulated in biology.

Human ecology has tried to emulate the systematic classification procedures of biology and has evolved a methodology to collect and analyze the data. It is called naturalistic research. Until recently little naturalistic research has been done within psychology. This kind of research is particularly difficult because a myriad of variables are necessary to encode man's environment. Nevertheless, it is a valuable tool which helps ecologists understand the behavior of man within a variety of settings, focusing on similarities and differences across people and settings in the real world.

A concept which is of central importance in ecological theory is the ecosystem. Tansley coined the word in 1935, defining it as the "interaction system comprising living things together with their nonliving habitat. . . In its fundamental aspects, an ecosystem invokes the cumulation, transformation, and accumulation of energy and matter through the medium of living things and their activities (Evans, 1956)." For example, an ecosystem could be a swamp, a forest, or a city. These ecosystems are open, not closed systems. Energy and matter can flow in and out of them in the process of their growth. Ecosystems are linked one with another and it is often difficult to determine their limits. Each ecosystem at its inception has few roles for its members, and its energy use is inefficient. As information and population accumulate, the number of roles increase and energy is utilized more efficiently. In a mature ecosystem the population is stabilized and growth is in the direction of more efficient use of available resources. Naturalistic research describes the content of the ecosystem.

Human ecology views man only within the context of his environment. It studies the effects of man on environment and environment on man. The totality of this dynamic interaction comprises the ecosystem. Duncan (1965) presents an extensive discussion of the ecosystems of man.

Human ecology brings into question the results of psychological experiments which study man isolated from his material environment. Ecology has questioned the relevance of laboratory studies because of the extreme control which is exerted on the environment. The most important variables may be missing in the laboratory study in which only a few selected variables are allowed to operate. Furthermore, the variables which have been left out may interact with the laboratory variables to produce a different outcome (Barker, 1968; Sells, 1963). In addition, human subjects are placed in unnatural situations in which behaviors emerge which are never found in the natural environment.

For these reasons, false hypotheses and conclusions may be drawn from laboratory studies. A famous example of this kind of error is the Barker, Dembo, and Lewin article (1943) in which frustration in children was studied in a laboratory situation. They found a high degree of frustration occurred when children saw toys behind a grid. The children exhibited a variety of deviant behaviors. The value of their results were questioned, however, because of the artificial nature of the situation. In a natural setting (Fawl, 1963), frustration in children was found to occur very rarely because children engaged in various behaviors during play and avoided frustrating experiences. At this point in time, ecologists are unwilling to examine or treat behavior except in natural settings. They are clearly distinct from traditional psychologists or psychoanalysts who believe a patient's problem can best be solved in an office or a mental hospital.

Human ecologists do not speak about emotional disturbance; they speak of a disturbance within the ecosystem which, to paraphrase Sells (1966), is a mismatch between circumstance and species, or a lack of "goodness of fit (Henderson, 1913)." The disturbance is not centered within the individual as the psychoanalytic and biophysical theory presumes, or within the environment as sociological and learning theory assume. It is the interaction between the idiosyncratic individual and his unique environment which produces the disturbance. The disturbance within the ecosystem interests ecologists. They hypothesize about those particular features of the individual and the environment which together have a high probability of producing a disturbance. The interaction among many variables within the environment and the man is seen as the most important factor in disturbance.

A word of caution is needed to underscore the danger as well as merit of using ecological theory as a model for explaining part of human behavior.

> It must be acknowledged that there is no real harm in using the patterns disclosed by animal and plant ecology as models for initial characterizations of human communities. Boulding (1958, pp. 14-16) for example, conveys a vivid sense of the extent of interdependence in human affairs by indicating how human society is "something like" an ecosystem. At the same time, the analogy quickly plays out, as all analogies must. More important, it lays no firm bases for elaborating a genuinely ecological approach to human collective life. You cannot throw away what is most distinctively human--communication without symbols, custom, and the artificial or cultural tranformations man makes in his environment--and treat the residue as the ecology of the species.
>
> (Duncan, 1965).

Important differences exist between animal and human ecosystems. In the human ecosystem, intricate climate and cell growth hypotheses are of little relevance. On the other hand, information and cultural flow are far more important in a human ecosystem than in an animal ecosystem. An analysis of linguistic communication is particularly important in discussing the ecological significance of emotional disturbance.

Human ecologists interested in disturbance come from a myriad of disciplines. Much of their research seems divergent and unrelated. Yet because each of them uses ecological theory as a model, it is possible to describe a uniquely ecological approach to the problem of emotional disturbance.

3. PLANT AND ANIMAL ECOLOGY

Definitions

(1) Ecosystem has been defined as the interaction of organism and environment; or, the study of structure and function. It is the central concept in ecological theory. For human ecologists the term refers to the community of people studied, together with their natural habitat.

(2) Naturalistic research is the tool for describing the ecosystem. From observation, a taxonomy is constructed, and is used as a basis for theorizing.

(3) Natural habitat is the place or places (environments) in which a species lives. In ecology the species is never studied outside this environment. Isolated from his natural environment, man cannot be examined in detail, nor can man function adequately in isolation.

(4) Ecologic niche is the role the organism plays in the ecosystem. This is to be distinguished from habitat which refers to the place where the organism lives.

(5) Niche breadth refers to the range of roles which the organism is able to carry out; in human ecology it will refer also to the restraints which society places on individuals in certain niches such that these individuals may or may not shift to various divergent niches.

(6) Goodness of fit refers to the congruence between the organism's individual characteristics and the environment in which he is placed.

(7) Adaptation is the rate of adjustment to a new niche or habitat, and the range of environments to which the species can adjust. If a species is very adaptable, it will be able to adjust to a variety of different environments and niches at a relatively fast rate.

(8) Cultural relativity of adaptable behavior is not found explicitly in ecological theory, but is an important concept in human ecology. Man is extremely adaptable and can change his behavior in many ways. The cultural system in which one lives dictates which behaviors are adaptable and which ones are not. Thus, a particular adaptable behavior can have a + adaptable value in one culture and a - adaptable value in another depending on the value system of that culture.

(9) Individual differences are basic to man. There are wide differences among people: biological, genetic, and developmental. These must be taken into account in making an evaluation of or a prediction about a system. The environment alone is not a good predictor. The interaction between man and environment is the important factor.

Law-Like Generalizations about the Ecosystem

(1) Principle of Succession. "Any self-organizing system involves the substitution of some piece of the system by some other pieces that allows the preservation of the same amount of information at a lower cost, or the preservation of more information for the same cost. In the context, information is anything that can influence and shape the future, and the cost is represented by the energy used, which amounts, practically, to the energy entering the ecosystem as a

primary production (Margalef, 1968)." Succession is orderly and directive. Older, more complicated systems replace younger, less complicated systems. Within a large ecosystem all possible states of succession are possibly found.

(2) Principle of Equilibrium.

a. An ecosystem moves toward a state of equilibrium in which there is a balance of forces. When there is a rapid change or an imbalance of forces caused by a catastrophe or any other intrusion into the system, the result is often disequilibrium.

b. As an ecosystem matures, the rate of population growth decreases until, in equilibrium, it reproduces at a rate which will maintain a stable population. Thus, for every ecosystem there is some optimum stable population.

(3) Principle of Energy Flow. If two systems meet, energy flows from the low energy system to the high energy system. A more complex, mature system in equilibrium exploits or de-energizes a less mature one.

(4) Principle of Energy Use. As an ecosystem masses information and subsequent complexity, it requires less energy flow per unit biomass (material) to maintain itself. With information available it is more efficient in its use of energy.

(5) The Principle of Mutual Dependence. There are three kinds of independence: "(1) the dependence of organic forms on others of like kind, i.e., intraspecies relationships; (2) the dependence of several kinds of organisms each upon at least some of the others in

the interspecies community, or biocoenesis; and (3) the dependence, indirect or immediate, of all organisms upon the inanimate environment, together with the reciprocal influence upon the environment of its occupance by living things (Duncan, 1965)."

(6) Principle of Adaptation. The more adaptable a species, the more habitats and niches in which he will live, i.e., the greater distribution the species will have. Man is the most adaptable species, and is thus found in more places.

(7) Principle of Endurance. The structures or institutions that endure through time are those most able to influence the future with the least expense of energy.

(8) Principle concerning the physical environment's influence on behavior. The physical properties of the environment including space, arrangement of objects, and kind of objects can have an effect on behaviors. In various ecosystems the same species may adapt quite differently to the structure of the ecosystem and thus display behaviors different from other ecosystems in which he is found.

Animal Behavior and Principles in Ecology

Some principles and law-like generalizations of animal behavior are also relevant to the discussion of the ecology of human behavior. The principles are not nearly as well verified as the general principles already enumerated because of the recorded exceptions to the principles, and because of the difficulty of observing the behavior.

Most of the work in the area has been carried on by ethologists interested in the mechanisms which control the behavior of animals.

It is important to remember that the behaviors discussed in this section are dependent not only on innate mechanisms but on environmental stimulation. Schneirla stresses the importance of the interaction in animal behavior.

> We must discard the traditional notion, still prevalent among ethologists that specific behavior patterns arising in an organism raised in isolation from the "natural environment and from species mates must *ipso facto* be innate or inherited in the sense of being exclusively gene-directed.
>
> (Schneirla, 1960)

Schneirla states that the environment of the animal's own body influences him in isolation. The animal's own order and movement may direct his development in isolation. Dobzhansky (1964) discusses human behavior in similar terms, emphasizing that culture as well as environment is influenced in development.

Some ethologists believe all behavior can be divided into two categories, *aggressive behavior* and *approach behavior* (Schneirla, 1960). Aggressive behavior whether learned or innate, is important in animal and human ecology. There is a controversy within ethology over the definition of aggressive behavior, and the extent of its occurrence. Ardrey (1962) sees aggression in inter- and intraspecific conflicts. Some believe that there is no necessary relation between predation (inter-specific conflicts) and aggression within a species (intra-specific conflicts). Eating plants and attacking a species for food is quite different from the act of killing for the sake of killing. Ardrey (1966) and Lorenz (1966) believe aggression is innate, while Scott (1960) believes aggression is learned. This controversy about the nature of aggression for food is mentioned because of its importance in ethology, but will not play a part in this discussion of human ecology.

(1) Territoriality. Many animals defend certain areas of their habitat against their own and other species. This area is known as a territory. The territory may be defended by an individual or by a group.

Territorial behavior ensures that the individual or group has a certain amount of living space. Further, it prevents an over-exploitation of the living space. "This principle holds whether individual animals, pairs or large groups oppose each other as intolerant units (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, p.306)." Males and females may defend a territory, but during mating the male retains sole possession of the territory. The hamster defends its den, but may retreat in the field from other hamsters. Animals mark their territory by natural landmarks and by chemical or odor markings. Badgers mark objects with a secretion from a gland pocket under the base of their tails.

According to Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970) a prerequisite for the occurrence of aggressive behavior is ownership of a territory. One observes that the fighting sticklebacks swim together peacefully when they are not seeking or protecting a territory. Only when the colors of reproduction are on them does fighting begin for defense of a territory (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970). (Territoriality in humans will be discussed later in this paper.)

(2) Stranger extrusion. Attacks against strangers entering a territory is a familiar form of aggression in animal colonies. The presence of a strange polecat elicits aggression from the group of adult cats (Poole, 1966). The black-tailed prairie dog sets up a definite territory. If a stranger intrudes, both animals go through a display of threats. The stranger invariably retreats (Kind, 1955). Wolves (Murie, 1944) attack or extrude strangers.

Attacks on strangers seem to occur only under extreme circumstances. The population in the territory may be disorganized and the stranger may not have an available route of escape (Terman, 1960). According to Tinbergen (1951) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt, aggressive behavior is shown only in an animal's own territory. He will retreat from another's territory.

> An animal trainer who enters the cage first, and only then allows the lions to enter, utilizes this knowledge. In this way he is the territory owner and the lions are inhibited in their aggression from the start.
>
> (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970).

(3) Bonding. One of the most interesting aspects of aggression for our purposes is that "individual acquaintance generally inhibits

aggression (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, p.330)." Lions, according to Schenkel (1966) have no qualms about killing lions outside their family group. When groups become too large for individual recognition, the species usually develop a signal to unite them, e.g., an odor or a sign. Man uses symbols like flag or country to unite the group.

Sociability, readiness to cooperate, and altruism according to Eibl-Eibesfeldt is as much a part of human nature as man's occasional incompatibility. Female animals' aggression is always inhibited by individual acquaintanceship with the young. The bonding happens after birth and allows the mother to adopt strange young. Siblings are also bonded whether of the same species or not, if they are brought up together.

> All gregarious animals display an obvious desire for contact. Separated from their group and kept forcibly in isolation, they do not do well... This is true in chimpanzees, gorillas, and many other primates, which, if kept alone, often deteriorate unless their keeper permits them to make contact, plays with them, and scratches or strokes them.
> (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, pp. 344-345).

(4) Ritualization. Ritualized behavior is a part of most animal's repertoire of behaviors. It serves as a mechanism to inhibit destructive aggression. Animals often have ritualized mating forms which allow mating without destructive behavior. This is seen clearly in the ritualized mating behavior of rats and rabbits

(Rubin, 1969; Bermant, 1969). Ritualization may also allow an alien animal to join the colony. Rood (1958) states that mice can coexist with an alien mouse after the following is done: they sniff the alien body, act out an attack by grasping the stranger and placing teeth at the back of his skull. After two or three repetitions of this behavior, they will share the nest with the alien. In fighting over females in mating, ritualization insures the survival of the two males. The Bighorn sheep engage in battle in an extremely ritualized way. Their horns serve as weapons. Yet, since they are not sharp, the sheep who loses is relatively unharmed. Lorenz (1966) discusses the utility of ritualization in his book. He feels human culture has not profitably redirected its aggression in this fashion. He says, "Redirection of the attack is evolution's most ingenious expedient for guiding aggression into harmless channels (Lorenz, 1966)."

(5) Expulsion Reaction. This is the aggressive reaction, by members of a group against a member of the group. Schjelderup-Ebbe (1922) found that chickens who deviate from the normal behavior by being weak or deformed are killed by the others in the group. Tinbergen (1960) reported the attack behavior of gulls at seeing a fellow wounded gull. Goetsch (1957) found that monkeys who have been isolated from the group since birth will show fear of the other monkeys when returned to the cage. This deviant behavior is not tolerated by other monkeys. If this kind of animal is left in the

cage he will be killed. Lorenz (1966) observed that a strange rat entering the territory of the Brown rat colony, is at first ignored. Gradually information about the intruder is spread through the colony. The rats are transformed into an agitated state and finally attack and kill the stranger. Calhoun (1960) made detailed descriptions of the behavior and appearance of rats who were attacked and killed by other Norway rats. Some of the characteristics manifested by such outcasts were the following: (1) slow growth rate; (2) low adult weight, (3) tendency to enter traps, (4) activity when other rats rest, and (5) avoidance behavior in the presence or absence of other rats.

The expulsion reaction has not been studied so thoroughly that all parameters have been identified. There are cases of wounded animals being cared for by the others (Carpenter, 1964). The expulsion may be due to an unstable ecosystem or to some particular feature which makes the colony fearful of certain kinds of appearances or behaviors.

(6) Rank Order. "Animals in groups can be ranked according to dominance, and the top animal maintains his position through possessing more territory or food than his fellow animals (Esser, et al, 1965, p. 36)." This can be seen in chickens where there is a pecking order. The chicken on the bottom is pecked by all others. No one pecks the dominant chicken. In the red deer, animals with equally large antlers are allowed to fight for rank order in the herd. As

soon as a deer loses his antlers, he falls into a low rank. Pawlowski and Scott (1956) found that Shetland dogs who were dominant had free range of the territory while the submissive ones stayed in the corners.

In higher intelligence mammals, intelligence plays a part in ranking members. Lawick-Goodall (1965) observed that a low ranking chimp named Mike improved his rank by an intelligent accident. Chimpanzees are known to be afraid of loud noises. Mike discovered that he could make loud noises by dragging or throwing empty kerosene cans. Mike would do this often when the other chimpanzees were around and they would shrink from him. Even after Lawick-Goodall had hidden the cans from Mike, the other chimps would shrink from Mike in acknowledgement of his dominance.

(7) Overpopulation. Mammals in an overpopulated territory experience stress which leads to deviant behavior. In woodchucks crowding causes enlarged gland and heart disease (Carrighar, 1965). Tree shrews show the strain of stress in the delayed development of young. Females produce less milk. There is a cessation of the sternal gland secretion which is used to mark the young. Without this secretion on the young, they are often eaten by the shrews and even by their mother (Holst, 1969). Calhoun (1967) has simulated human environments in rodent colonies. These various environments illustrate the danger inherent in overpopulation which disturbs the balance of the ecosystem. The overpopulation imposed on the animal group produces deviant behavior in most members. Calhoun assumes

that every environment of a species has an optimal population. When population exceeds the optimal pathological behavior occurs. In rats, this pathology takes the form of excessive aggression, excessive withdrawal, homosexuality, and indifferent mothering, depending on individual differences. He hypothesizes that animals need a certain amount of frustration and gratification. In the optimal population size this equilibrium is maintained. In the crowded situation, social interaction is too frequent, lowering gratification and raising frustration. When this occurs, the surplus of frustration builds up and the animals' velocity (activity) decreases in order to minimize social interaction. At low levels of activity, deviance probability increases. "Thus, an individual's behavior will deviate from the ideal main in proportion to the frequency with which he is frustrated in his attempts at satisfying his need for social intercourse (Calhoun, 1967)." Calhoun describes the interaction between inherent behavioral needs, instincts and the environment.

(8) Dissocial Ecosystem. One of Calhoun's findings was with respect to setting up an environment so that when one animal is eating, there is a fair chance of a nearby associate doing likewise. After reaching a critical frequency of engaging in similar actions side by side, each participant will associate the presence of another with the execution of the act. Each animal will serve as a secondary reinforcing stimulus for engaging in the act. Once this happens, each animal will tend to remain in areas where there are more associates.

This leads to higher and higher crowding in small areas and eventually, to animals living and being active in groups whose numbers far exceed the optimum. This in turn, culminates in the types of deviation discussed above in "overpopulation." This dissocial situation leads, among other pathologies, to failure in procreation, death before maturity, and high frequencies of extremely inappropriate behaviors.

4. HUMAN ECOLOGY

Ecological Theory

In order to make a systematic examination of the ecology of emotional disturbance it is helpful to separate the body of formulations into various areas. Anthropologists are called the "original human ecologists." Their use of naturalistic research and the concept of the cultural relativity of behavior began long ago and has influenced all present day ecologists. Sociologists could be called the "classical ecologists" because they have most often represented the ecological viewpoint within psychology. The "biological ecologists" come from medicine and they are interested in individual differences. The psychodynamic ecologists are called "family interactionists." Their background is in the psychoanalytic theory, but they have become disillusioned with the traditional treatment methods. These therapists have evolved theories of emotional disturbance based on the concept of family interaction imbalance.

A schema of the various groups within human ecology is found in Figure 1. The names of men associated with the groups are listed under each area. Gross relationships among the areas are sketched by the arrows but are only to be suggestive of influences.

Original Human Ecologists

Anthropology has for many years incorporated in its theoretical structures some of the basic postulates of ecological theory. Anthropologists were conducting naturalistic research long before its


Ethologist
Calhoun
Lorenz
Schneirla
Eibl-Eibesfeldt
Harlow
Tinbergen
Ecologists
Odum
Duncan
Margalet
Psychodynamic "Family Interactionists"
Vogel and Bell
Ackerman
Bateson, Jackson,
Haley, and Weakland
Sociologists and Psychologists
"Classical Ecologists"
Early Chicago School
Faris and Dunham
Barker
Anthropologists
"Original Human Ecologists"
Kluckholm, Mead,
Frazier, Benedict
Lewin
Brunswik
Heider
"Offshoots of Classical"
Medical Ecologists
Dobzhansky
Dubos
Chapman, Hinkle, and Wolf
Langner and Michael
Eclectic Ecology
Thomas, Chess, and Birch
Gump
Kounin
Fawl
Willems
Raush
Kelly
Rhodes
Clausen and Kohn
strong link between schools
weak link between schools

Figure 1. Ecological theory.

overwhelming evidence for the cultural relativity of "normal" behavior. Ruth Benedict wrote a paper in 1934 which espoused a view which is only now being accepted within parts of psychology.

> One of the most striking facts that emerges from a study of widely varying cultures is the ease with which our abnormals function in other cultures. It does not matter what kind of "abnormality" we choose for illustration, those which indicate extreme instability or those which are more in the nature of character traits like sadism or delusion of grandeur or of persecution, there are well-described cultures in which these abnormals function at ease and with honor, and apparently without danger or difficulty to the society.
> (Benedict, 1934)

Anthropology claims that temperament types are probably universal and thus a range of types is found in any culture of adequate size. The proportion of particular behaviors within a culture or ecosystem is different, since people tend to conform to the cultural norms. Many examples are given in the anthropological literature of people who would be labeled deviants in our culture, but whose behavior is considered exemplary in another culture. (Kluckholm, 1944; Wood, 1934; Mead 1961; Benedict, 1934). In Northeast Melansia there was a paranoid culture reported by Benedict (1934). It was normal in this culture to suspect everyone outside your family of trying to kill you. They would starve to death rather than eat another's food. A deviant in the culture was a person who was friendly and trusting.

In human culture, adaptation to the physical environment is probable , but cultural norms of "good" social adaptability greatly restrict the individual who does not conform to these norms. It is likely that the schizophrenic in some cultures would have great niche breadth; in ours they have very little.

The treatment of the deviant and stranger in a culture is related to the concept of "cultural relativity" but distinct from it. The exclusion of strangers has been well documented in anthropology. Frazer (1913) gives enumerable examples of captive slaves, and strangers of all kinds being scapegoated or killed by various Indian and Greek primitive cultures. Wood (1934) states that a stranger who enters an original tribe is immediately killed for fear he is bringing evil spirits.

The expulsion behavior seen in animals is also seen in man if a deviant is found in the group. In many primitive cultures described by Frazer (1913) individuals who are in niches unnecessary for the functioning of the ecosystem are scapegoated. These include deformed persons, sick people, and slaves. This kind of ritual act has a variety of hypothesized causes. It may be that human scapegoating is one way of bringing a community into equilibrium. It may also be functional to the survival of the fittest, most adaptable, useful people; just as natural selection operates in plant and animal ecosystem. Rhodes has been particularly interested in such behavior.

> Human deviation in a group or a community seems to have a somewhat similar effect upon the collective. Deviation produces a pattern of recoil and activities directed toward either bringing him into the group, or isolating him from the group. A child who deviates in the classroom, the neighborhood, or the community will attract attention and effect to bring about changes in him...In terms of responses of immediately surrounding members of the collective, behavior takes many

> excited forms. There is an obvious release of charged emotions and moods in the observers--bearing marks of a medley of fear, anger, attraction, repulsion, etc. While one or the other of these mood-behavioral manifestations predominates in different observers of the collective, instances of all of them seem to appear. It is as though a variant individual releases a parliament of mood-behaviors in the collective.
>
> (Rhodes, 1971)

Faris, (1944), although he is a sociologist who will be discussed later, wrote an anthropological article about a schizophrenic named Albert Ritter in the United States. The article illustrated the normality of the man if one looked at him independent of our culture. In this man's attempt to cope with his troubled life, he set up an elaborate system which was superior to the order of most normal people. Albert Ritter's system was a somewhat mystic, existential organization of existence which was so foreign to the middle class norms that he was diagnosed schizophrenic. Faris says that our disorganized social system contributes to producing such deviant individuals and at the same time presents a culture which is inhospitable to them.

An interesting counter example to the exclusion of the stranger phenomenon is similar to the strong bonding behavior of mammals discussed previously. In a Patawasiwa tribe in Western Seran engaged in headhunting, it was customary to kill the victim from behind. If they attacked him in front, it was considered murder. As long as the headhunter is not able to look his victim in the eye, he has not established a personal bond; yet, if he does look him in the eye and kills him, it is considered a crime (O. D. Tavern, 1918).

This is an example of bonding. The bonding impulse is found in a variety of cultures. In New Guinea tribes, a stranger who eats with them cannot then be killed (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970). In this case, the bonding impulse is as strong or stronger than the aggressive response.

> To a great extent, the struggle for life consists of cooperation. Our aggressive impulses are counteracted by our bonding impulses and they indeed are so strong that, for example, in trench warfare soldiers have to be shifted from time to time in order to prevent landing over the lines by exchanging cigarettes. Indeed, any war propaganda has artificially to build up barriers against communication and bonding. And all efforts aim at making the members of their own group believe that the others are not real human beings.
> (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970)

In regard to the emotionally disturbed, by placing deviant individuals in institutions and labeling them as different, we avoid bonding and thus can act aggressively toward them. They, likewise, can act aggressively toward the culture since they too have avoided bonding. Criminals in jail are likewise isolated from bonding impulses.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt goes on to say:

> It is my personal feeling that this capacity of man (to prevent bonding with other humans) made man more murderous than the invention of armament. Control of aggression requires the diligent pursuit of friendly, altruistic behavior.
> (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970)

This means that the degree of cultural adaptation is rather small in our society. Individual differences are not tolerated. Our bonding behavior is for a select few since we are not exposed as children to a variety of individual differences which must be accepted.

Animal studies in bonding indicate that bonding must occur when the individual is young, since it happens less often with adults. (See Bonding Principle.)

The anthropologists have dwelt on those aspects of animal behavior which are like human behavior. In the next section, some principles derived from the human ecosystem will be discussed.

Sociologists: "Classical Ecologists"

Ecological psychology has been most often associated with this group. The early Chicago school began in the "classical" ecological movement in sociology in the 1920's. Books by Park & Burgess (1925) and Cavan (1928) started mapping out the human environment. From urban research, a concentric zone theory grew, which postulated higher rates of mental illness in the center of the city than on the periphery of the city.

Faris and Dunham's book, Mental disorders in urban areas (1939), was the culmination of the work of the Chicago school. It confirmed generally the concentric zone theory but in addition it presented a hypothesis to account for the phenomenon. They found:

(1) Mental disorder as plotted by residence showed a decrease from the center to the periphery of the city,

(2) Each local community had a characteristic disorder,

(3) Psychoses and community conditions were correlated, and

(4) The socially disorganized areas of the city showed high rates of mental illness.

The manic-depressive psychosis was the only mental disease for which no particular residential pattern was found. They hypothesized that this was due to different social processes at work. It was thought that the manic depressive state was concentrated in the rooming house, hobo, and foreign born areas in the center of the city.

They formulated a theory to account for schizophrenia in particular, but other mental disorders in general. It was an innovative theory; the cultural relativity of behavior, individual differences, and the social isolation of people were postulated to explain disturbance. They propose that the human mind is never independent of its physiological base but is a product of social interaction. Normal mentality develops over time from successful interactions between the person and the agencies of society. Defects in this relation lead to deviance from the norm. The necessary elements for cultural mental health are:

(1) Intimacy and affection between the child and members of his primary group,

(2) Reasonable consistency of influences on the child, and

(3) Reasonable harmony between the influences of home and those of formal situations outside the home.

A failure in any of the above leads to a "different" individual. A person might experience life in a very unusual way, which produces a mental organization so foreign to others that the person's actions are unintelligible. Persons who are culturally normal cannot communicate with "different" individuals from a different axiological world. The deviant individual perceives his failure to communicate and withdraws. In the disorganized areas of the city (usually the inner city) many people are not able to obtain sufficient social interaction to form normally organized existences. The rooming house areas, hotels, and other isolated residential structures are believed by the authors to place constraints on the social behavior of those individuals. Thus, those people are not able to organize their conception of the world conventionally. "The result may be a lack of any organization at all, resulting in a confused, frustrated and chaotic personality, or it may be a complex but unconventional original organization...It is just this type of unintelligible behavior which becomes recognized as mental disorder..."The definition of insanity, then, is not a description of any list of actions, but consists in a lack of fitness between actions and situations (Faris & Dunham, 1939)."

This definition of disturbance typifies the ecological conception of disturbance. The Chicago school began the trend of epidemiological studies. All the later studies tended to support their basic findings although later studies elaborated on the theory and changed it somewhat.

These particular findings can be considered in terms of ecological principles. The people in the most disturbed areas were isolated from human interaction. Under these conditions, bonding does not occur, and aggression may become dominant. Other deviant behaviors may occur as it does in animals. Since the area was disorganized, the ecosystem was out of equilibrium. This allows for exploitation by other groups or areas.

Another possible ecological interpretation could be based on the principle of energy flow already discussed. If the inner city is disorganized, and if it has fewer resources, and if it is not able to use the resources efficiently, then we can call the inner-city a low efficiency, less mature ecosystem. This condition is evidenced by the high unemployment, the disintegrating buildings, etc. The large industrial complexes as well as the suburban communities are very efficient. They use their resources well. According to the principle then, a highly efficient mature ecosystem will exploit a less efficient immature ecosystem. In this way industry and suburban areas continually take resources from the inner city, leading to the deterioration of the inner city and the people who live there. This exploitation may be physical as well as psychological.

Ecological Psychology

About ten years after the Faris and Dunham study another ecological movement, this one within psychology, became prominent. It called itself ecological psychology and its representative was Roger Barker. Much of the impetus for mapping the environment undoubtedly came from the Chicago school of sociologists, but in addition it was influenced by the more theoretical work of Lewin (1951), Brunswick (1947), and Heider (1959). Kurt Lewin coined the phrase "ecological psychology" in a paper he wrote in the 1940's but published more recently (1951). He called ecology the interaction between psychological and nonpsychological forces.

Barker used this definition some years later and attempted through the years to use Lewin and others to help him develop a theory of behavior settings. Barker's first attempts in the ecological area were concentrated on an attempt to encode the environment of man. He was very interested in a methodological approach to the task. Oskaloosa, Kansas, was the town chosen by Barker to carry out his research. In one of his first articles on his research (1949), Barker explained the need for encoding the environment (naturalistic research). Biology and other sciences had profited from a detailed description of the natural habitat of the species studied. Psychology now needed such a description of man. He believed the absence of good naturalistic research precluded examining problems which had a great effect on the psycho-social adjustment of the child.

From his naturalistic observations of children's and adult's behavior over a period of some twenty years, Barker synthesized his theory (1968). Brunswick's work (1947) was instrumental in the formalization of the methodological aspects of his theory. Barker made operational Lewin's concept of the life space as a system in which different forces operate. Barker set out to describe the life space of individuals in a systematic way and to indicate the forces which operated there. The various environments of any individual are classified as behavior settings, i.e. a drugstore, a football game, etc. In ecological theory they would be called small ecosystems.. Ninety-five percent of all behavior is contained within these settings. A setting is not only a geographical location and constituent objects. It is also the occasion for certain consistent patterns of behavior. These patterns of behavior are independent of the individuals involved. Behavior settings demand certain behaviors by the people for maintenance of the setting. In other words, particular behavior patterns tend to belong to certain nonpsychological milieu. This "fit" of behavior to milieu is called synomorphy. For example, a church meeting is synomorphic with people sitting quietly, smiling, speaking pleasantly, dressing neatly, etc. Behavior settings show both internal and external dynamics, i.e., they are affected from within and from without. Barker found that behavior differed considerably from setting to setting. These findings suggested to him a theoretical basis for his work. In his first book with Wright (1954) he said, "behavior settings are at present empirical facts. They can be demonstrated to the hardest empiricist. However, they are theoretically promising. Their internal structure and dynamics and their external relations suggest that they can be profitably conceptualized and incorporated into productive theory (Barker and Wright, 1954)."

In an article by Fritz Heider (1959) called "Thing and Medium" the author defines and uses two concepts related to perception which Barker has found very useful. Heider postulated relationships between things and media. Things are intrinsically constrained and are relatively independent of extrinsic events for their form and for the distribution of energy. Things are inanimate objects like rooms, chairs, rocks, etc. These objects are relatively compact and impenetrable. They are not easily malleable by outside forces. Media are to a high degree extrinsically constrained and dependent upon extrinsic events for form. They are like clothes, water, or a sponge. They depend on outside forces for their form. Things are unitary and their parts are interdependent because of the compact nature of their form. Media parts are more independent since they are not constrained; water is not constrained. A medium complies with the forces of a rock. A perfect medium would always yield to the thing forces. A perfect thing is unaltered by the medium. If the compliance of the medium could be measured on its terms and the forces of thing measured on its terms, it might account for the consequences that occur between them.

This led Barker to assign thing qualities to behavior settings and medium qualities to people. Barker found that the majority of people did conform to the standing patterns of behavior set up by the setting. For example, a church meeting requires people to sit quietly, to respond when spoken to, to be pleasant, etc. It also requires that a leader or president be there, as well as a secretary and other officers. People tend to conform to these requirements. Conforming to the standing patterns of behavior could be called "cultural adaptation." When a person deviates from the patterns he is usually considered a deviant or "culturally maladaptive." That classification might be modified by some circumstances. The requirements of a setting are not easily changed, even when few people inhabit the setting. There are forces on the individuals in the setting to maintain the equilibrium of the setting. With few people available, individuals become more active and engage in more activities in order to fulfill the requirements of the setting. In a setting which is undermanned, deviants are more acceptable because there are many tasks and few people. Even if his behavior differs from the norm of the setting, he is still a functional element. There is a goodness of fit between the individual and the environment. In an overmanned setting deviance and individual differences are not tolerated nearly as well, since equilibrium in the ecosystem can be attained by using those who exactly fit the requirements of the setting. Efficiency dictates the choice of those whose behavior is most synomorphic with the setting.

The formulation above is similar to that of Faris and Dunham who hypothesized that the rooming house, hotel, and other isolated areas of residence fostered social disorganization and isolation. Barker might have described a rooming house as a behavior setting. The standing patterns of behavior there would be keeping to oneself, and not interacting with others. Since the forces of the thing (setting) are great, people conform to the pattern although the conformity is probably detrimental to their good mental health.

Through this cursory look at the work of Barker and his associates, one can see the beginning of a mapping system in which it is possible to measure the interaction between man and environment. Barker was able to empirically map out the variables of the microsystem and then build a theory upon this data to account for future outcomes.

Barker, himself, was not interested in emotional disturbance, but many of his associates and students looked at emotional disturbance in a very different way from that of traditional psychologists. These men have conducted research on the specific behaviors of emotionally disturbed children in various behavior settings. They are certain that personality and counseling centered approaches to helping children have been ineffective. Only when a child's behavior is analyzed within his various real life settings could any help be attempted.

Proshansky, _et al_, (1970) have elaborated principles about behavior in settings (ecosystems) based on the Barker approach. Their research has been done in mental hospitals. There they found that space, administrative guidelines, furniture, and number of people have a great deal of influence on the behavior of the patients. Examples of some of the more interesting of the thirteen principles are:

Assumption 1. Human behavior in relation to a physical setting is enduring and consistent over time and situation; therefore, the characteristic patterns of behavior for that setting can be justified.

Assumption 3. The physical setting that defines and structures any concrete situation is not a closed system; its boundaries are not fixed either in space or in time.

Assumption 6. Changes in the characteristic behavior patterns of a physical setting can be induced by changing the physical, social, or administrative structures that define that setting.

The above principles are similar to some of the principles mentioned in the beginning sections. The ecosystem structure is used to postulate relationships. Assumption 3 is merely part of the definition of any ecosystem. The other two assumptions arise from Barker's work and from the work of those in ecology who emphasize the importance of physical environment. This approach is particularly interesting because it was used to change the behavior of patients on a ward by changing physical objects in the structure (administration) of the ecosystem. Another group, influenced by Barker's methodology, has investigated territoriality and dominance in humans (Esser, et al., 1970). They observed 22 schizophrenic patients on a hospital ward. From local observations, the territory of the patients was ascertained and the range of their movements was examined. Patients in the upper third of the hierarchy moved wherever they wanted and did not seem to need any one spot. Middle range patients were somewhat restricted in their movements and tended to have a territory in a well occupied place with great chance for social interaction. The lower third occupied the corners and secluded areas and were restricted in their movements.

Fights occurred among those with unstable dominance positions in the hierarchy. They fought with those equal in the hierarchy as well as those lower than themselves. Patients who were new on the ward fought more, probably in order to establish their rank. In 10 out of 12 cases, aggressive behavior was related to unstable dominance positions. They also found that only three of the patients who owned territories did not show aggressive behavior. This would tend to support Tinbergen and Eibl-Eibesfeldt's hypothesis that without territoriality aggression is not exhibited by animals or humans. Their data is also in accordance with the principles of dominance and territoriality which exist within animal colonies. In the animal studies (discussed previously) conflict among closely ranked individuals was frequent. Also, new animals entering a flock fought to establish their rank.

This kind of ecological study adds a new perspective to our knowledge about aggression. It also has implications for interventions which do not emphasize intrapsychic conflicts but merely examine the disturbance and then seek to alleviate the disturbance by changing the territorial pattern.

Gump, et al. (1963) found that the behavior of a disturbed child was very different at camp than at home. The impact of a behavior setting on behavior can be measured in these studies. It also emphasizes the flexibility in behavior of one child in two different settings. Thus, it may be incorrect to diagnose deviance on the basis of behavior in one setting (e.g., school), when other settings have not been observed. It may be that the school structure requires or encourages deviance by the child. Fawl (1965) found that childhood disturbances decrease with age. By naturalistic observation he was able to categorize which types of disturbance occur most often at various ages and with certain types of children. This kind of study gives a picture of the causes of disturbance in the system of a child at a certain age.

Willems (1967) has extended Barker's hypotheses about undermanned behavior settings in a series of studies of marginal high school students. *Marginal students* are those with a low IQ, low grades, and low socio-economic status. In comparing the marginal student to the normal student, Willems found that in small schools (undermanned behavior settings) marginal students felt as much obligation to and membership in nonclass activities as the regular students. In a large school (overmanned behavior settings) the marginal students felt much less sense of obligation than the normal students. This supports Barker's theory that deviants are more easily assimilated to a setting in which people are in demand. Willems concludes (1967):

> It is consistent with both Durkheim's view and the present adaptation of Barker's view to postulate that induced forces, of environmental feedback, (a) define the person's social obligation for him and direct him to it, (b) inform him of possible consequences of his actions in the forms of sanctions and rewards. As a result of this definition, direction, and potential return, an internalized, subjective disposition, that is, sense of obligation is shaped. If this mode of theorizing is tenable, then the possible cumulative, long-range personality and social learning effect of experiences in small and large groups becomes an important research question.
>
> (Willems, 1967, p. 1259)

Kounin's observations (1966) in a classroom setting revealed the power of the teacher over behavior in this setting. The dimensions of teacher style are relevant in any ecological description of the classroom.

> They justify a degree of skepticism about extrapolating dimensions of adult-child relations from other settings (homes, psychotherapy, clinics) and applying these directly to teacher-child relations. They also raise questions about the fruitfulness of analyzing teachers on the basis of "personality characteristics" as compared to concrete techniques of programming activites and initiating and maintaining movement in the program.
>
> (Kounin, 1966, p. 13)

A New Focus in Ecology

The classical and neo-classical ecologists within sociology and psychology have given almost exclusive consideration to environmental factors although they accept the existence of individual differences. They have concentrated on mapping environments. Few have given attention to the idiosyncratic character of the children. Clausen and Kohn (1960) in a brief overview of their epidemiological study of Hagerstown, Maryland, critically review past epidemiological and ecological studies of mental health. Clausen and Kohn say:

> Theoretical discussions of personality development usually begin with a recognition that the interaction between an infant and his environment is influenced by the genic constitution of the organism, the interuterine experience and birth process, and the nature of the environment, past and present. Having recognized the interaction between constitution and environment in the forging of personality, we tend, however, to pass immediately to exclusive consideration of one or the other. Perhaps we do so because the inseparability of the two sets of potentialities precludes any attempt at quantitative analysis of their interaction. Yet the failure to formulate a theoretical model of the interaction between genotypes and environments leaves us with incomplete research designs when we attempt to study the relationship between such phenomenon as schizophrenia and the psychodynamics of family life.
>
> (Clausen and Kohn, 1960, p. 308)

Their comment was in response to the innumerable findings which suggest that parental or environmental pathology is not enough to account for the pathology or non-pathology of a child. Ecology has responded to such criticism and several spokesmen have emphasized the importance of both man and environment. Among these are Raush (1959, 1959, 1960), Kelly (1966, 1971), and Rhodes (1967, 1970). Raush's methodology and research has contributed much to the analyzation of interaction data. He believes that it is meaningless to ask whether setting or environment is more important. The components are inextricably intertwined. More relevant is the question of which setting and which individual. Rhodes has said (1970) that the emotionally disturbed child affects and is affected by his community. This reciprocal relationship should be taken into consideration in any attempt to describe or treat the disturbance. Kelly and Rhodes have both been influenced by the ethologists' study of animal behavior. Their findings have a bearing on the nature of the "person" side of the interaction. Kelly (1970) postulates four biological principles, for example, which he believes are applicable in analyzing an ecosystem or a community.

(1) Functions within a social unit are interdependent.

(2) High exchange environments make more efficient use of resources than low exchange environments.

(3) Environments affect styles of adaptation.

(4) More complex units replace less complex units.

Kelly studies coping styles and adaptation in man's ecosystem. His main thrust has been to develop preventive interventions using these principles. He has thus far been involved in several studies using the principles as a basis for observation and manipulation of the ecosystem.

Recently, interesting studies were conducted in high schools (Tricott, et al., 1971) and in three Mexican villages (Mills and Kelly, 1971). By using ecological principles it was often found that the deviant individual is the one who, by observation, is adapting best to his situation. In a high school study they found that members of a marginal group showed helping and friendship behavior among its group. The achievers group showed deviant helping behavior, only showing such behavior when it would help them gain good grades or higher school achievement (Tricott, et al., 1971).

Rhodes has focused on emotional disturbance in children. By using the principle of succession in ecology, he notes that institutions in our culture have not been replaced; instead more are added. Institutions which are out-dated remain intact and merely hinder progress. For example, we build more and more mental hospitals and special classes. As soon as such an institution is established, it is filled with people. Barker would say the forces of the thing (institution) are stronger than the media (people), accounting for the tendency of people to fill these institutions. Institutions may endure because an established structure is most able to influence the future with the least expense of energy. In addition, it requires less energy to maintain than to change them. Rhodes gives an example of a former prison converted into a mental hospital. The old prison still has bars on the windows and armed guards in the halls, yet within the rooms are quite harmless mental patients. Rhodes asserts that some institutions for the deviant are needed in order to vent the aggression of man. Man needs a scapegoat to attain equilibrium. Many of his thoughts reflect the work of ethologists like Lorenz and Calhoun. Some ethologists have a more optimistic view of the aggressive impulse. Eibl-Eibesfeldt claims institutions are bad because they prevent bonding of individuals and thus allow aggression to operate. Eibl-Eibesfeldt's solution would allow equilibrium without the need for scapegoating. Bonding would counter and replace any aggressive activity.

Medical Ecologists

The biological ecologists have made a response to Clausen and Kohn because they are interested in genotypic variation and the environmental effect on it.

This group has made a real contribution to our understanding of adaptation in man. Adaptation is of central importance in the thinking of all ecologists.

Dubos (1968), a famous biologist, has an abundance of evidence to show that in the process of adaptation to a new situation, disease often occurs because stress is placed on the individual. If the adaptation (1) is a great one, or if (2) man needs to adapt quickly to a series of changes, then disease is more probable. Unlike Calhoun, Dubos does not believe crowding, of itself, leads to pathology.

> The readiness with which man adapts to potentially dangerous situations makes it unwise to apply directly to human life the results of experiments designed to test the acute effects of crowding on animals. Under normal circumstances, the dangerous consequences of crowding are mollified by a multiplicity of biological and social adaptations. In fact, crowding per se, i.e. population density, is probably far less important in the long run even in animals than is the intensity of the social conflicts, or the relative peace achieved after social adjustments have been made. (Dubos, 1968)

Dubos has a much more optimistic view of the capabilities of man than some other ecologists. This difference is evident in the basic attitudes which ecologists have about man and his future.

Dubos has traced disease through history and has found that it peaks at times of rapid change. He charts the rate of tuberculosis at the beginning of the industrial revolution. As people adjusted to city life, the disease rate decreased markedly without any improvement in sanitary conditions. His list of examples is impressive evidence of the physiological changes which accompany adaptation. Cows who are transported to another place by trailer often develop pneumonia or other disease and die on arrival at the new location. If tranquilizers are given to them before the trip, the death and disease rate drastically declines. Although Dubos is talking only about physical disease one can generalize his results to mental disorders also, since he is describing an interaction which involves the adaptive styles of individuals and the environment.

Chapman, Hinkle and Wolf (1960) discuss the effects of maladaptation. They propose that maladaptation is equivalent to mental disorder. This is a hypothesis based on Dubos' findings. They take the extreme position that improper adaptation to changes over time can lead to apparent brain damage. This is often manifest in schizophrenia. When a person sees himself threatened for long periods of time, there is a disorganization of neural patterns. Defensive reactions to stress reduce the open interaction man needs with his environment. Faris and Dunham's hypothesis also places emphasis on adaptation to stress.

An epidemiological study closely related to the work of Dubos and Chapman, Hinkle, and Wolf, is that of Langner and Michael's _Life Stress and Mental Health_ (1963). In this, the second volume of a three volume series about the Midtown Manhattan study, these men present their hypotheses about emotional disturbance. Interviews conducted with hundreds of people in Manhatten reveal that it is the accumulation of stress over time which leads to a disturbance. Thus, they reject Freud's single trauma hypothesis. Their results confirm the data of Faris and Dunham (1939). People in the inner city have high rates of mental disturbance. Stressors disturb the basic equilibrium of a person's environment. The person reacts by adapting to the change, but the adaptation itself produces _strain_. Although Dubos does not mention accumulation of stress and Langner and Michael do not mention strain as an adaptation, the two seem to be addressing themselves to the same phenomenon in the same manner. Both believe that factors which disturb the equilibrium of the ecosystem, cause, in turn, a state in the person which is culturally debilitating.

Langner and Michael are careful to point out that their stress-strain model is not in any way an adequate model. It is only accurate in describing the average reactions of a large group of people. It does not reflect individual differences, since under the same conditions, various people will react differently. This hypothesis is similar to one discussed in the ethology section. In that case, stress caused by overcrowding of animals resulted in deviant behavior.

The medical ecologists emphasize the biological side of man and they also discuss environmental factors. The weakest area, from the ecological point of view is their minimum acknowledgement of the cultural relativity of "good" adaptation. That is, in another culture the avarice of our businessmen might be classified as extremely maladaptive, while our neurotic could be said to be adapting well in another culture.

One of the most significant recent ecological studies about children and emotional disturbance is a compilation of the concerns of biologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists. This book is called Temperament and behavior disorders in children (1968). The authors are from the biophysical area, but their book is characteristic of research in the ecology of disturbance.

According to these authors, children are born with certain identifiable temperamental characteristics and behavioral styles which are peculiar to them. These characteristics influence behavior independent of the task being performed. There is no perfect relationship between specific patterns of temperament and the emergence of a behavior problem. There is a group of children with "culturally negative" temperament qualities who are likely to develop pathologies, but there are a substantial number of children in the group who do not develop pathologies. Likewise in the group of children with culturally favorable temperament qualities, there is a small percentage who develop pathologies. The identifiable temperamental dimensions are as follows:

(1) Activity level,

the tempo or frequency of the motor component in activity;

(2) Rhythmicity,

the regularity or irregularity of biological functions (wake, sleep cycle, bowel movements, etc.);

(3) Approach or withdrawal,

initial reaction to any new stimuli;

(4) Adaptability,

sequences of response to new or altered situations;

(5) Intensity of reaction,

energy content of response;

(6) Threshold of responsiveness,

level of extrinsic stimulation that is necessary to evoke a discernable response;

(7) Quality of mood,

Amount of pleasant, joyful, friendly behavior as contrasted with unpleasant behavior;

(8) Distractibility,

effectiveness of extraneous environmental stimuli in interfering with or in altering the direction of the ongoing behavior;

(9) Attention span and persistence, length of time spent in an activity

Any level of the above qualities (high, low, or medium) can result in a behavior disorder under the right environmental conditions. Certain characteristics are more likely to result in pathologies because of the negative value which our culture places on them.

Thomas, Chess, and Birch were interested in finding out what kind of interaction between inborn qualities and parental behavior resulted in pathology. They looked at the microsystem of the home. Of the 136 children followed from birth to ten years of age, 42 became clinical cases. They found that clinical cases were characterized by both high and low levels of activity, irregularity, nonadaptability, intensity, persistance, and distractibility. These findings refer to the increased probability of the development of behavioral disturbance and do not verify the hypothesis that a given temperament will by itself produce a pathology. The authors insist that a given temperament can never be considered a pathology.

According to Thomas, Chess and Birch, the symptoms (temperamental qualities) arise first and anxiety occurs only after the parents and society have responded to the symptoms as abnormal or pathological. According to the authors, psychoanalysts believe symptoms arise to avoid anxiety. Sleeplessness in a child would be diagnosed as a protest against his environment. The ecologist would say it is merely a temperamental quality that can be modified if it is treated as a normal quality of the child. Learning theorists also suggest that anxiety precedes symptoms. Sleeplessness might be interpreted as a learned defensive response to avoid painful arousal.

While Thomas, Chess, and Birch have a biological orientation they were certainly influenced by the anthropological view of the cultural relativity of deviant behavior. They found that the one characteristic of a child which upset parents most was distractibility. Since our culture puts such a high value on concentration and good school work, distractibility is definitely a negative quality. This particular temperamental quality was the most difficult for parents to accept. They found that of all the methods of help in clinical cases, the most effective was to counsel the parents to accept the child's individual difference.

Psychodynamic Ecologists

The psychodynamic ecologists, for the most part, have derived their theories from clinical practice. They are therapists who have become disillusioned with the traditional psychodynamic approach and have developed new theories from which successful interventions have been devised. These men are often called family interactionists.

They emphasize a malfunction in the interaction between family and child. Thomas, Chess, and Birch found that child disturbance sometimes occurs in the absence of a pathological husband-wife relationship. However, this group postulates unsatisfactory marital relationships within the family as a necessary condition for disturbance. In the pathological families studied by Vogel and Bell (1960), it was found that a particular child had become involved in the tensions existing between the parents. In normal families the tensions between parents are not as severe, or are handled in a way which does not involve the children. The parents of an emotionally disturbed child minimize contact with each other and hostility toward each other by using the child as a scapegoat. In this way they maintain equilibrium in the microsystem. The conflicts in the family are of several sorts, including conflict between family and cultural values and conflict as a result of community rejection. Vogel and Bell hypothesize that the child is the most likely candidate for scapegoat because he is powerless, easily molded by the family, and the family function is not impaired by the malfunction of only one unit. Thus the parents use the child as a focus of their conflict. The child picked as the scapegoat is usually representative of their problem in some way. He might resemble one of the parents; or he may be deviant, being crippled, ugly, or dull in school. Anthropological studies of scapegoating as well as the literature on the aggressive drives of animals recalls a similar phenomenon which led to the killing or estrangement of deviant members.

An example of another approach is the renowned double-bind theory of schizophrenia (1956). "Originally" according to Mishler and Waxler (1965) "the theory was arrived at deductively, that is, by considering the nature of schizophrenic communication and 'deducing' a set of requirements in the family that would lead to this form of pathological communication. Since that beginning, the formulation has developed through observations and analysis of family therapy sessions and more recently, experimental studies of family behavior." A discontinuity is found in the logic of the schizophrenic's communication patterns with himself and others. It is purported that this aberration in metacommunication stems from his early childhood experiences with his family. The preschizophrenic finds himself in a double-bind situation with people who insist that they care for him,but act as though they do not. In addition, they insist that the child carry out the same kind of contradictory behavior. These conflicting messages directed toward the person by people close to him lead him to cope by treating the conflicting messages as equivalent. In this way the schizophrenic avoids the dilemma but he then must resort to a fantasy or other non-logical world. He may respond in incomplete sentences and metaphors or pretend he is someone else. The schizophrenic process is a form of communication shared by all members of the family. Thus any member of the family may become an "overt" schizophrenic under the right conditions.

Haley (1963) gives more emphasis to the family unit as a system. He specifies the constraints which are placed on individuals within the system. According to Mishler and Waxler (1965):

> Haley considers this overt psychotic phase of schizophrenia 'an intermittent type of behavior occurring in situations of a particular kind of stress. When the patient is staying within the rules of his family system, he is behaving 'normally.' However when he is required to infringe the rules, and at the same time remain within them, he adapts by schizophrenic behavior. (Haley, 1960, pp. 466-467).

Haley acknowledges the "familial relativity" of adaptable behavior if not the cultural relativity of behavior.

Ackerman's (1960) classic book on the family proposes family therapy. At the time of its publication, his outlook was much closer to the psychoanalytic base than it is now. In a recent New York Times Magazine section (1970), he views the disturbed child within the entire ecosystem of friends, neighbors, and family. In an effort to clear up the disturbance, he solicits the support of all these people in changing their behavior toward the child.

These family interaction theorists, like the biologists, do not emphasize the cultural relativity of adaptable behavior. They place emphasis on parental attitudes toward the child. Although these two factors weaken the ecological orientation, these theorists are convinced of the need to manipulate the system as well as the individual in his natural environment, to alleviate disturbance. They contribute to ecological theory a description of extreme pathology which can exist within a microsystem of communication. Previously, ecological theory has not been able to examine linguistic communication.

5. CONCLUSION

The preceding descriptions of ecological approaches to the study of emotional disturbance demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of ecological research in this area.

Ecological theory provides the weakest explanations for human communication patterns and cultural transmission. It is nevertheless valuable in having already formulated biological principles which may be synomorphic to human behavioral principles.

A brief summary of the areas of human ecology is a helpful way to explain their relationship to each other and to ecological theory.

The anthropological area is related to all the other areas, although its strongest link is with sociology. The sociological and anthropological areas are similar in their research techniques (naturalistic research) and in their emphasis on the importance of the environment of man. The clearest difference lies in the greater importance placed on individual differences within anthropology. This area more than any other has modeled itself after animal ecology.

Researchers of the classical group use methods similar to those of anthropologists and are close in theory to the sociologists. Clausen and Kohn are between the sociological environmental approach and the new approach which gives equal weight to individual differences and environment. Transitional theorists in psychology, like Rhodes and Kelly, were greatly influenced by the biological ecologists.

The sociological and psychological group tend to derive principles from a study of the ecosystem rather than from the principles of animal behavior. They contribute most by investigating the effect of ecosystems on behavior.

The biological ecologists have expounded on the unique abilities (adaptation) and drives (aggression) in humans. The interaction between these innate qualities and environment was described by the medical ecologists and Thomas, Chess, and Birch. The latter group was more strongly influenced by the anthropological view of the cultural relativity of normal behavior.

The psychodynamic theorists have the fewest links to other areas. They look at the interaction in the microsystem of the family, but because of its lack of emphasis on cultural relativity of behavior and because of its emphasis on the intricate communication process within and between men. This is not to say that it is not a valuable contribution but its uniqueness separates it from others.

It is clear that an ecological theory of emotional disturbance has not been formalized at the present time; present theory is a combination of hypotheses, research, and attitudes toward emotional disturbance. No other area has the eclectic multidisciplinary nature of ecology. This is both its strength and weakness. Its strength lies in the multiple views brought by the expertise of a myriad of disciplines. Its weakness lies in the lack of unification and systematic formulation which characterizes the diversity of the area.

What is needed is a systematic attempt to combine these contributions into a general theory which could account for emotional disturbance. This might be done with a systems or ecosystems approach to the problem. Until that time, the methodology and concerns of ecology can continue to promote insights into the nature of emotional disturbance.

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INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER THEORY

Man's ultimate goal may be seen as "self-actualization," or "realization of potential." This process involves the establishment of a functional relationship between mind and body. Speculations regarding the nature of this relationship, of psyche and soma, are prevalent in the literature of the counter-culture. The "body-awareness" cults emphasize the re-discovery of the body. The political or educational theorists speak of unchaining the mind through de-institutionalization. All speak of creating a new environment in which the individual is permitted new freedom in exploring and developing new interactions between mind and body.

The source of the tension within man, between mind and body, has been attributed by Freud to the socialization processes in which mind and body are made antagonists. Areas of concern within the behavioral sciences may reflect the mind-body dichotomy. Biophysical studies explore man's "given nature," while sociology investigates man's "created nature." One task of behavioral science may be the re-integration of these concerns.

It is possible to employ the processes of analysis or synthesis in the effort to relate the diverse concerns of behavioral science. Analytic processes attempt to define relationships by separating a whole into its constituent parts; synthetic processes seek the same results by examining the combination of separate elements. The behavioral sciences have tended to rely exclusivel, upon analytic processes, probably because these techniques were used by the natural sciences. Analysis of natural phenomena has resulted in an increasingly specialized body of knowledge. Natural sciences, such as zoology or botany, have evidenced the increased specialization of effort.

The result of the analytic approach in the behavioral sciences may be seen in the development of psychoanalytic and behavioral thought. While psychoanalysis attempted to relate and integrate the biophysical and sociological sciences, the analytic process used involved fractionation of physical and social phenomena into small hypothetical units. The analytic process does shed light on causal relationships. Psychoanalytic theory interrelates biophysical and sociological factors to define cause-effect relationships in a post hoc manner.

In reaction to the psychoanalytic approach, learning theory was developed. But this new approach also involved an intensive effort to analyze behavior, this time by reducing it to the smallest possible unit. Learning theorists were particularly concerned that their efforts and results could be replicated by other investigators. Since replication is usually possible only within a laboratory or artificial setting, the usefulness of generated prescriptions is limited.

Ecological theorists in the area of emotional disturbance have used both the analytic and synthetic modes. Should ecological thought reject the analytic tradition of the scientific community, in the manner of systems theory, it may provide a conceptual framework for counter theory conceptualization. There are, however, trends within ecological thought which differentiate it from other viewpoints by its emphasis upon interaction. Such a viewpoint is not synthetic, but a further application of analytic process. A statistical study of interaction effects does not contribute to an understanding of how either whole functions, any more than does the study of main effects. The study of interaction seems the very essence of analysis in that it generates new levels of variables to be identified, separated out, and added for study. It is evident that some interaction studies would be in fact counter-productive to the synthetic mode because of the resultant complexity of reassembling a composite whole.

Thus, no analytic attempt has been successful in developing really effective intervention procedures. The analytic process may advance scientific discovery, but should not be used to generate models for the delivery of mental health services. While it leads to the development of diagnostic models, it generates few, if any, treatment models.

Analytic processes can prove frustrating to the behavioral scientist. The more information he uncovers, the more distant becomes the solution, since more variables and more problems are uncovered. Though most of the "professional" establishments have much to gain from the proliferation of variables and the resultant professional specialization, the outcome for delivery of services is disastrous.

Special education is a case in point. The diagnostic methodologies are extremely well developed, but few effective treatment programs have been defined. Diagnostic categories continue to undergo a process mitosis. What were first "problem children" were then divided into "retarded" and "disturbed" children. These are now divided into the "learning disabled" (subdivided into perceptually handicapped, learning disordered, brain injured, etc.), the "disadvantaged," the "educationally handicapped," ad infinitum.

Counter theorists reject the analytic mode in generation of descriptive facts and intervention strategies. They describe mind-body unity instead of mind-body separation, not in the individual but in the culture. Delivery of services is an overriding concern, and synthetic processes are more appropriate conceptual modes. Service delivery is seen as a process wherein known configurations of resources are functionally combined. Counter theorists seek new ways of relating such dichotomous wholes as mind and body, self and society, or biophysical and sociological conceptualizations of deviance.


BY SYNTHESIS
BY ANALYSIS
BIOPHYSICAL
COUNTER THEORY
DYNAMIC THEORY
LEARNING THEORY
SOCIOLOGICAL

Figure 1. Two modes of relating biophysical and sociological conceptualizations.

The body of literature generated by counter theorists about the basic mind (psyche or social self) and body (biologic, "natural" self) relationship is extensive. Instead of reducing each element into its component parts, attempts are made to relate these two basic elements wholistically. The paper that follows is an attempt to trace one group of counter theorists, primarily "radical educators," through one dimension of the above scheme, that of "community." It was this approach which was used to sample the literature of the counter theorists about alternatives to present methods of handling deviance.

This quest for the re-unified man takes many forms, and all aspects of current culture are criticized. To attempt a comprehensive overview of this enormous literature would be presumptuous. Instead, three separate papers were prepared with different purposes in mind. The first paper, "Some Strands Within Counter Theory," is intended to give one the "feel" for the counter culture and its philosophy. The second paper, "Unusual Ideas in Education," has been prepared by one respected counter theorist who directs his salvos against the institution of the school. The third paper, "Conceptual Models of Emotional Disturbance: Some Other Thoughts," again focuses upon the "content" of counter theory but from a broader perspective. The various counter theoretical positions are examined and related using the concept of the "school as community" as the unifying theme.

The authors of the counter theory papers attempt to acquaint the reader with the counter-commentary on emotional disturbance by presenting: 1) its historical, philosophical roots and an overview of their educational implications; 2) a sample of counter-commentary as it might view itself; 3) a description of one model as an alternative to schooling.

SOME STRANDS WITHIN COUNTER PSYCHOLOGY

Alice Bron

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PROLOGUE: A CONCEPT IN SEARCH OF DEFINITION

What is meant by "counter psychology?" It is difficult to say. There are no organizations, schools, publications, authors which can lay exclusive claim to the title and thereby define the parameters to be explored. Each person is left to apply the label to whatever overlapping and divergent views strike some chord of recognition, some feeling of "ah, here seems a thread of counter psychology." Thus what each so identifies is in a sense peculiarly personal, a partial reflection of tastes, attitudes, experiences which prompt him to say, this seems to fit, this does not. For there is no coherent, unified assertion, no set of authorized tenets against which a writer must be measured before laying claim to the title. There is no Karl Marx or Sigmund Freud of counter psychology, no arbiter of membership or "ism." It is not completely accidental that the counter theory position, unlike the others within the project, failed to seek bibliographic references from recognized authorities. And yet this is not to say that counter psychology rests purely in the eye of the beholder. There is a community of beholders, of persons for whom the label rings some bells of recognition however dimly. And it is with the community of beholders that rests the ultimate task--and pleasure--of creating and re-creating the parameters of counter psychology.

It should be clear by now that this paper claims to be neither authoritative nor exhaustive. It is not an attempt to write the beginnings of the counter psychology position. There is no inevitable reaction to those viewpoints "countered," as is well illustrated by the diversity to be found within the counter-culture. To codify a set of tenets seems somehow antithetical, a replacing of old dogma with new.

The strands of counter psychology found within this paper--what can be said about them?

The writers dealt with here are identifiable as social scientists or social philosophers; they are people who make their living at these enterprises or who spend a large segment of their time engaged in them. They are so included not because they have a market on the experiences of humanity, but because they do have something to say, and because a lot of what they say is not really heard (not acted upon). This paper is not identifiable with a paper on strands within counter culture, though many of the authors and views herein are both valued by elements within counter culture and are reflections of what is happening within counter culture (Perls, like more and more hippies and activists, moved into communal living, while Laing's Kingsley Hall has suffered physical attack, not simply verbal opposition).

Yet while this is not a paper on counter culture, I seem to come back again and again to what seems to me are important themes of counter culture--anger, celebration, unfolding: an anger with those views and practices which stifle free, uncoerced choice and experience; a celebration of the natural man within the killing corpse he has become; a faith, however tenuous, in the potentialities of the evolving process.

Much in this paper is not new, yet it is striking that the Conceptual Project left no room for these viewpoints in its definition of the main stream positions to be explored. Perhaps it is not newness, nor even the eliciting of strong verbal opposition which defines the appropriateness of their inclusion within the framework of this paper's title. Perhaps what makes these views strands of a counter-psychology is the widespread failure to actualize in behavior the consequences of adhering to their premises. (There are very few who fail to give lip service to the value of freedom; there are very few who live their lives freely; there are fewer still who do not seek to obstruct the freedom of others).

This is written in the midst of a jumble of notes already abstracted and a pile of books yet to be explored. It is hoped that such a paper, however expanded and changed, will always be so written.

So let us begin, and see where it takes us.

LET FREE THE FLOW OF A NATION'S
CONSCIOUSNESS, EXPANDING!

Painted cars Stained glass windows Street vendor man Green grass warmth and Country Joe sound Be-decked me, jangling in the winds of acid allatonceness (Be still mind, I want to feel my body way deep down inside) Pulsing energy and growth, a reaching--the thrust and flow of Aquarian Renaissance.

Gay liberation, proclaiming; Black is beautiful, proclaiming; Sisterhood, proclaiming; Freedom Now, proclaiming an end to shattered self.

Encounter. Rap. Awareness. Bringing it all back home.

A billion flashing lights shrieking the Fillmore beat of the body's rhythm. Mind pierced with crystal facets of sigh and sound, fusing the shattered fragments of the self with the oceanic flow of NOW. A mind-bending journey to the center of the soul.

Raunchy bodies in fecund leather, Kit Carson shag. Cityheads bringing it all back home to the green grass roots of individuation (Hey groovy grandad--Hippie patriot--Homespun blue boy with musket coiled to bite: this is our day. I dig you.

The land belongs to the People, Yes! Camp Pop Burlesque Twohundred thousand spaced out kids flying the colors upside down The pastel haze of Sunday found happening in the park Pepper bite of tear gas pig stick line advancing: Here I stand, rooted in the Third World of the self, asserting, senses inundated by the raucous cry, I am!

And always, always, the thrust and flow of the joyous "sounds of freedom flashing"

> I am a dreamer. Romantic action dreams. The stifled self straining against the bonds of fear which hold it fast, afraid to choose, afraid to commit, afraid to be, choked in the wispy strands of ancient mothers' hair bent low, stirs and shifts, lets the rich healing oils of the sun shine in. Percolating warmth--hope repotentials expanding----Rebirth.

IT'S TIME!

> Words in a poem, sounds in movement, rhythm in space, attempt to recapture personal meaning in time and space from out of the sights and sounds of a depersonalized, dehumanized world. They are acts of insurrection. Their source is from the Silence at the center of each of us. Wherever and whenever such a whorl of patterned sound or space is established in the external world, the power that it contains generates new lines of force whose effects are felt for centuries.
>
> R. D. Laing (1967, p. 43-44)

It is happening all around us.

PART I: THE UNFOLDING OF A COUNTER CULTURE

While the past twenty-five years have been a period of increasing economic affluence and physical comfort, they have also been a period of increasing meaninglessness, of increasing awareness of a profound sense of alienation--from our work, from our self, and from the people around us.

As Goodman (1960, p.12) describes it, "our abundant society is at present simply deficient in many of the most elementary objective opportunities and worthwhile goals that could make growing up possible. It is lacking in enough man's work. It is lacking in honest public speech, and people are not taken seriously. It is lacking in opportunities to be useful. It thwarts aptitude and creates stupidity. It corrupts ingenuous patriotism. It corrupts the fine arts. It shackles science. It dampens animal ardor. It discourages the religious convictions of Justification and Vocation and it dims the sense that there is a Creation. It has no Honor. It has no Community." With the social life organized around the profit motive there has been decreasing opportunity for anyone but the Capitalist to participate in the decisions which effect his labors, while for all there has been a scarcity of labor which is humanly satisfying. Living as we do in a profit-oriented system in which genuinely needed products are built for planned obsolescence, in which "our inheritance, our immense productivity, has been preempted" (p.xvi) to create pseudo-products, a system in which "little direct attention is paid to the object, the function, the program, the task, the need, but immense attention [is paid] to the role, procedure, prestige, and profit," a system in which there are, in sum, no "real opportunities for worthwhile experience (p.12)," and it has been impossible to sustain "feelings of justification, sociability, servicibility (p.8)." We are left with "disbelief in the enterprise as a whole, with a resulting attitude of profound indifference (p.20)" and, "thwarted or starved in the important objects proper to young capacities (p.12)." Our young have grown up absurd, developing into "useless and cynical bipeds, or decent young men trapped or early resigned, whether in or out of the organized system (p.14)."

More and more have come to share with Laing (1967) an awareness that we are "a shriveled, desicated fragment of what a person can be (p.26):" "As adults we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world: we barely remember our dreams and make little sense of them (p.25)," while we experience our fantasy, "that contrapuntal interweaving of different experiential modes (p.26)," "merely as an intrusive, sabotaging infantile nuisance (p. 31)." As for our bodies, "we retain just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements, to ensure the minimal requirements for biosocial survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, sleep; beyond that, little or nothing. Our capacity to think, except in the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is self-interest and in conformity with common sense, it pitifully limited: our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell is so shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of unlearning is necessary for anyone before we can begin to experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love (p.25)." We live in a world in which "around us are pseudo-events, to which we adjust with a false consciousness adapted to see these events as true and real, and even as beautiful (p.11):" "we are bemused and crazed creatures, strangers to our true selves, to one another, and to the spiritual and material world (p. 13)."

One Dimensional Man; Man in the Gray Flannel Suit; the Hucksters; the Academic Marketplace; the Lonely Crowd: Sick, Sick, Sick. With the late 1950's, a rush of books proclaiming the atrocity of our organized world and the ensuing devastation of the self. With the 1960's, a rush of actions joired the increasing outflow of words.

Culture Against Man. But the atrocity is not new. Only the growing sense of alienation and the surge to reclaim an authentic existence. Beatnik--Hippie--Yippie--Activitist: Counter culture. Why now?

The history of white civilization has been one of continuous marginal struggle for physical survival, and, in those moments when we could raise our consciousness above the press of hunger, fatigue, and cold, a desperate struggle to create an immutable Meaning which could make it all somehow bearable. God. Reason. The inevitability of Western Civilization. The past 70 years has been a slow but increasing dissolution of those edifices which had made this the best of all possible worlds. Darwin toppled God from His heaven so successfully that the modern theological vanguard has had to re-create Him in Man's image, a less-than-actualized, evolving force. Freud destroyed the omnipotence of Reason, and in the process painfully sensitized us to our omnipresent potential for deception and delusion. Anthropology, under the banner of Relativism, toppled the sanctity of our Western Way, making it clear that ours was but one among many coherent creations.

And as if this loss of our culturally shared world view were not enough, accelerating industrialization with its increasing mobility, harried urbanization, and Kafka-esque bureaucratization encrouched upon the personal meaning to be found in face to face encounter with intimates and community.

Meaning. The 1890's-1930's was a period taken up with the nitty-gritty struggle for wages and working conditions. The struggle in itself must have radicalized its participants, making them increasingly aware of society's myths. Taking place as it did in a Freudian world increasingly sophisticated to awareness of sophistry, and in the context of both a violent crusade which did not after all make the world safe for democracy, and an economic upheaval belying the assumption that "all's right with the system," it must have done a great deal to lay the ground for disillusion. Despite this, however, it did not produce alienation, for as Goodman (1960) points out, it was a struggle which supplied meaning for its participants--dignity, commitment to a greater good, a sense of solidarity, belonging, and a hope for a brave new world.

Meaning. The 1940's. Our country under physical attack, plunged into a moral crusade grand enough to supply purpose for all.

Meaning. The 1950's. Thousands dead, and beyond that nothing. No crusade, except the fear-driven thrust of the witch hunt which strangled on its own insanity. Yet the relative success of the white labor movement had made it possible for an increasing number of people to turn their sights toward existential needs. And white middle class America came face to face with itself.

> In our 'normal' alienation from being, the person who has perilous awareness of the nonbeing of what we take to be being (the pseudo-wants, pseudo-values, pseudo-realities of the endemic delusions of what are taken to be life and death and so on) give us in our present epoch the acts of creation that we despise and crave.
>
> R. D. Laing (1967)

The initial response of those perilously aware--depression, cynicism, despair, disaffiliation: "These, not boys, but early disillusioned, hip, and resigned young men...[were]...the Beat Generation (Goodman, 1960, p.62)." "Cool" was their by-word, black their color, for "sometimes it seems that it is not possible to do more than reflect the decay around and within us, than sing sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat (Laing, 1967)." The inevitable first step toward change was their depression. Yet their movement gave us far more, for as Goodman (1960, p. 65-6) comments, writing in its present (1956), despite the limitations of its procedures and the weakness of its artistic products, "the fact of it, of a culture that is communal and tending toward the creative, is so capital that it must have a future." It did.

The minorities' alienation from the nature of our existence gradually took the form of massive commitment--commitment to the creation of "meaningful alternatives" for both individual and social man. The 1960's saw a lifting of depression and a re-owning of self, will, and the sense of possibility. The cool dispassion of progressive jazz gave way to the inundating sound of acid rock, somber black was washed over with the psychedelic splash of color, the by-word became Do It Now, and those who dropped out "turned on" and "tuned in." A Renaissance. And like all such creative bursts, its members came from different places at different times, and are at different points in the intertwining complex surge to reclaim body, to reclaim awareness, to reclaim the present, to reclaim intimacy, to reclaim power, to reclaim meaning.

It is too much to paint the flow of the fifty's legacy, and it is tempting to say with Laing (1967) that defeat "is not a perennial possibility of the human spirit" and let it go at that. Yet perhaps in the work of Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967) is to be found a theory of history which can make sense of the present burgeoning fermentation--of the Renaissance restructuring and reintegration of mind and body, cognition and emotion, logic and phenomenology, reflection and action, detachment and commitment, linear progression and Gestalt present. For explanation, Marshal McLuhan points toward the changing sense ratio and the transformation to a global village brought on by the media of electronic circuitry. His thesis appears important enough to present in detail.

"Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate than by the content of the communication...All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the message. An understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments.

"All media are extensions of some human faculty--psychic or physical." The book, the primary medium of the post-Gutenberg printing press culture, is an extension of the eye; electric circuitry, the primary medium of the present period, is an extension of the entire central nervous system. "Media, by altering the environment, evoke in us unique sense ratios of perception. The extension of any one sense alters the way we think and act--the way we perceive the world. When these ratios change, MEN CHANGE."

In pre-literate society, the primary medium was the spoken word, producing an environment where the sensory ratio was heavily weighted in terms of ear and sound. With the development of a printing press technology, the medium became the printed page and our significant input was through the more static visual mode. The "Gutenberg" mode, an extension of the eye, produced a change in the sensory ratio and restructured our perceptions in terms of visual space which is itself relatively uniform, continuous and connected, making the line and the continuum the organizing principles of experience. The effect on our subsequent development was profound, and all encompassing. The printed page's presentation of linear, uniform sections that are interconnected and continuous led to the development of logical thought which depends on the presentation of connected, sequential, relatively unchanging data. ("The rational man in our Western culture is a visual man. The fact that most conscious experience has little 'visuality' is lost on him)." It likewise led to specialization, since, "The fragmenting of activities, our habit of thinking in bits and parts--'specialism'--reflected the step-by-step linear departmentalizing process inherent in the technology of the alphabet." Printing as a duplicating process and mode "provided the first uniformly repeatable commodity, the first assembly line" and set the environment for mass production. The fact that reading is an individual, private mode of receiving in which revision of data-input is a slow process "added much to the new cult of individualism" and made possible the private, fixed point of view. At the same time, it fostered an emotional orientation of detachment and noninvolvement, since much of our awareness of others' experiences and of our experiences with significant others was channeled through an abstract, symbolic medium (the alphabet) which intervened between reality and experience, and through the eye, a less involving sense modality.

"Electric circuitry" (encompassing television, tape recorder, radio, movie, computer, Telestar, amplifier,--the communication modes of our electronic technology) is the primary communication medium of our age. It is an extension of the entire central nervous system. It is producing an environment which re-emphasizes ear and sound and calls into play multiple sensory channels, in interaction, changing the sense ratio so that we no longer are living in a primarily visual world. The result is a profound restructuring of our patters of social and personal being. Television, the electric medium par excellence, is characterized by its simultaneous presentation to a large portion of the social body; by its multi-channel sensory input which involves the channel of sound; and by its near instantaneous transmission of information-in-process ("in process" referring to the omnipresent fact of sights and sounds in motion, to the fact of literal here and now "you are there" presentation of real events unfolding, to the TV Ad kaleidoscopic imagery of abrupt zooms, flash cuts, elliptical story-less editing, and to the medium's ability to rapidly replace information input with still newer input). It wraps around us, inundating our senses, emersing us in a hear and now multichannel allatonceness experience. Adding, as it does, the sensory input of the ear ("the dominant organ of sensory and social orientation in pre-alphabet societies..." where "hearing was believing)," and substituting visual images which, unlike words, are dynamic images closer to direct experience rather than second order symbolic abstractions of experience, it brings us into more immediate contact with our reactive, emotional experience, fostering involvement. At the same time it compels commitment, participation, and unification, pouring upon us as it does, instantly and continuously, the concerns of all men. "Participation via television in Freedom Marches, in wars, revolutions, pollution, and other events is changing everything"--it is creating a global village of emotional and experiential interdependence profoundly involving men with one another. Equally important, "our electrically configurated world has forced us to move from the habit of data collection to the mode of pattern recognition. We can no longer build serially, block-by-block, step-by-step, because instant communication insures that all factors of the environment and of experience co-exist in a state of active interplay." "Electric circuitry is Orientalizing the West. The contained, the distinct, the separate--our Western legacy--are being replaced by the flowing, the unified, the fused."

"Ours is a brand-new world of allatonceness. Time has ceased, space has vanished. We now live in a *global* village ... a simultaneous happening. We are back in acoustic space. We have begun again to structure the primordial feeling, the tribal emotions from which a few centuries of literacy have divorced us."*

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*(Footnote. A few comments: (1) Despite my summary, I think McLuhan's primary focus when contrasting the pre- and post-Gutenberg cultures is upon the inherent differences between auditory and visual experience, rather than on the difference between direct sensory experiences and experience as mediated through the symbolic abstraction of written words. While I would agree that auditory experience is more involving than visual, I think the difference between direct and indirect experience is likewise important. (2) McLuhan sees the Gutenberg culture as one in which the sensory ratio is shifted from auditory to visual primacy, and the electronic circuitry culture as involving an extension of the entire central nervous system. At the same time, however, he views it as a return to the auditory primacy of the pre-Gutenberg culture. It seems more correct however, if we take television as the epitomy of the electric circuitry medium, to view the electric circuitry environment as one in which visual stimuli have taken on the characteristics of auditory stimuli (the primary characteristic of which is flow). In this sense, the effect indeed is that of an extension of the entire central nervous system. (3) The role of books, as measured by their mushrooming availability and consumption, has increased hand in hand with the increase in the electric circuitry medium. This may, of course, simply be a reflection of our era's pivotal position in the move from one cultural environment to another. Still, it seems to me that the book is undergoing a profound change, a change which reflects the electric circuitry mode of experiencing. More and more, books--including those presenting intellectual content--are becoming more personal, reflections of inner experience and personal reactions to outer events. Cleaver's

While McLuhan's thesis is that medium rather than content is the important message, two concrete events experienced via electric circuitry seem to have had an outstanding impact on the formation of the counter-culture. The role of the historically second event--Vietnam overkill, strategic hamlets, rigged elections, and burning children, coupled with the government's demand that the young risk body (and soul) in a blatently ugly repression--has become too obvious to elaborate. The role of the black civil rights movement is not only historically primary, but perhaps of primary importance as well, and a word seems in order.

The freedom rides of the early 1960's (spurred by a smoldering black rage which was ignited by the segregated fight against German racism, the shrieking discrepancy of an affluent white T.V. world, and the Northern "dream deferred") not only initiated the process of black liberation but of white liberation as well. The black liberation struggles freed a large body of the as yet unalienated youth from the illusion of complacent comfort for all, showing up the hypocrisy of the social system in such pure and startling form that middle class youth, trained in at least the belief in "liberty

---

Soul on Ice is an excellent example. They are also becoming more kaleidoscopic in their presentation (see Laing's Politics of Experience). And more and more, people are "writing" their books via the medium of dictaphone rather than pen, a change which has a profound impact on the product, making it more fluid, personal, immediate, less rigidly logical. Just as the visual input of electric circuitry is becoming auditorized, so with the printing press mode. If this is so, then the book is not dying. It is evolving).

and justice for all" was shook to its idealistic core. At the same time, it freed the white from his bemused inability to imagine alternatives for effecting changes in his own life. The importance of the black civil rights movement for white middle class Americans rested not in its mobilization of white energies toward actualizing black liberation, but in the consequent raising of white consciousness to awareness of the power-structure shackles operating daily in their own lives to rob them of self-determination. It is not accidental that the first massive university revolt of the 1960's, the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement, used the black tactic of sit-in, and that the Berkeley students' cry for self-determination was first raised en mass in the context of a struggle which was in large part a reaction of outrage to a dean's refusal to allow campus recruiting of nickles for SNCC. And it is no accident that the slogans which were once the property of a black liberation struggle became that of people everywhere engaged in freeing themselves--blacks, students, women, homosexuals: "We shall overcome," "Freedom Now," "X Liberation," evolving into the all embracing demand "All Power to the People." The struggle for freedom is contagious. There could not have been a People's Park without a freedom rider.

Thus, the present expansion of both social and personal consciousness, represented in middle class youth's embracing of activism, psychedelica, and the human potential movement, is the inheritance of both an absurdly empty social system and of the enveloping medium of electric circuitry with its re-creation of the global village and its alteration of the sensory ratio. Many who had come from the deepest strata of uninvolved rat race inner emptiness chose the path of personal consciousness expansion, seeking to revolutionize their personal lives through the immediate creation of the meanings they could not see in their parents' choices--trust, intimacy, experiential awareness, a genuine living in the here and now community. Such is the way of the hippie (see Haley, 1968, for a delightful exposition of this life style) and of tne Human Potential Movement. Others, perhaps those experiencing a less gaping chasm of personal emptiness, chose the path of social consciousness expansion. Such is the way of the activist. In between stands both the Yippie (with his active thrust to smash the state through the flounting of his revolutionized life style) and the vast majority of the youth movement.

It is happening all around us.

LET FREE THE FLOW OF A NATION'S
CONSCIOUSNESS, EXPANDING!

PART II: SOME SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS

A. Introductory Comments

When I first started to think about how to write this paper, two primary approaches emerged. The first, encompassed here, was to focus upon prevalent positions within psychology, presenting objections or counter positions which, although enunciated by social scientists, would presumably find some support among members of the counter-culture. This approximates the "man looks at science" approach suggested by the site visitors. The second was to ignore prevalent positions and concentrate instead upon presenting counter approaches to what we have in this project called deviancy. Such an approach takes an anti-adjustment position and centers on the assertion that the well-enculturated man is a poor model for emulation. This view variously includes the position that our social system is "sick," that deviance is a needed leap toward freedom, that deviance is simply another mode of being, and that the deviant, while not necessarily "on course," is the reactive product of coercive and mystifying macro- and microsystems and is no less "off course" than are the systems producing and "treating" him (usually these views intertwine). Originally I had intended to present both approaches, adding to the first paper on "The Unfolding of a Counter Culture" a second paper on "Sources of Objection" and a third on "Counter Adjustment." As it turned out, the middle paper became more extensive than intended. Thus rather than an independent paper on anti-adjustment approaches, I have both relied upon the first paper and upon the implications of the present paper (see in particular, "To Somewhere Else") to present this view, as well as subsuming this topic under objections to the adjustment concept, letting the science fiction writers R. A. Lafferty and H. G. Wells speak for me.

This paper consists of a series of relatively independent essays (not necessarily produced in the order presented), written as objections to functionalism, diagnostics, man the monster, science as logical positivism, adjustment, and the medical model. As such, two comments are necessary.

First, it will be noted that the views presented are not necessarily in accord, particularly with regard to the issue of the nature of man. The "sick society" position, encompassed in the writings of Laing, Goodman, and Fromm (referred to in the first paper and in the sections on functionalism and man the monster in the present paper) suggest the possibility of making useful, relatively explicit statements regarding human nature (although these writers do not necessarily hold the same hypotheses regarding this nature), and imply that one may speak of "health" and "sickness" of being "on course" and "off course," of "congruence" and "deviance," insofar as an individual or social system fosters or fails to foster development in accord with this nature. Juxtaposed to this are positions which sidestep the issue, maintaining that for all practical purposes man is free to create his nature and that the individual and social problems or behaviors or experiences which in some way get labelled (either by individuals or social systems) as sick or unnatural, are in fact simply disliked by someone, and that the labels reflect man-created values regarding solutions to problems in living. Both positions, however, stress the creative, influx, process aspect of the life experience.

Second, insofar as the text was written as a series of relatively independent essays, there is no indication of relative importance, each section being treated with equal emphasis. For me, the section "To Somewhere Else" is most important, and if I were to present only one section of this paper this would be it. In next order of importance stands the section, "Wanted: A Meaningful Phenomenology."

B. Functionalism

The position of Functionalism boils down to one which asserts that "man's mental constitution is a blank piece of paper, on which society and culture write their texts," a tabula rasa "which has no intrinsic quality of its own." (Fromm, 1955, p. 22). As Goodman (1960, p. 34) summarizes it, it asserts "you can teach people anything; you can adapt them to anything if you use the right techniques of 'socializing' or 'communicating.' The essence of 'human nature' is to be pretty indefinitely malleable. 'Man,' as C. Wright Mills suggests, is what suits a particular type of society in a particular historical stage." Thus, the Functionalists postulate that each society is normal inasmuch as it functions, and that pathology can be defined only in terms of the individual's lack of adjustment to the ways of life in his society (Fromm, 1955, p. 21)."

This position developed from the liberal social scientists' distress at the reactionary use of the concept of human nature to bolster the status quo (as for example, in the use of Social Darwinism to justify capitalism). Thus, the liberal scientist, backed by increasingly available data on the diversity of human cultural solutions to the problems of living, stressed the malleability of human nature and the influence of environmental factors. Ironically, this has led to the view that what is is good. Good for whom? With Functionalism the focus became that of a particular social system and its efforts to maintain equilibrium, and the villain became that which disrupted the ongoing system-change.

Goodman (1960) points out that Functionalism confounds man the social animal with man the enculturated animal, and social with harmonious. The enculturating process is treated as if it is that which produces a social human being. For many social scientists, "'human nature' implies 'not social' and refers to something prior to society, belonging to an isolated individual (p.8);" "growing up is now interpreted as a process of socializing some rather indefinite kind of animal, and 'socializing' is used as a synonym for teaching him the culture (p. 8)." While "only society is the carrier of culture (it is not inborn)...it does not follow that socialized and cultured are synonymous. What follows, rather, is that, since culture is so overwhelmingly evident in observing mankind, social properties must be the essence of original 'human nature,' and indeed that the 'isolated individual' is a product of culture (p.9)." But being a "social animal" does not imply "harmonious belonging." Fighting, dissenting, rebelling, initiating fundamental change are social functions. We cannot say that "if something does not run smoothly...it has been improperly socialized," that "there has been a failure in communication (p.10-11)." We cannot use conformity to a particular social system as a measure of an individual's socialness. The nonconformist is not antisocial. His failure to become an assimilated part of the system in which he lives is not evidence of his failure to become a social being; rather, it is evidence of the system's failure to be pro-human.

While "It is true indeed, that man in contrast to the animal, shows an almost infinite malleability" in that "There is hardly a psychic state in which man cannot live, and hardly anything which cannot be done to him, and for which he cannot be used," nonetheless, "the statement that man can live under almost any condition is only half true; it must be supplemented by the other statement, that if he lives under conditions which are contrary to his nature and to the basic requirements for human growth and sanity, he cannot help reacting; he must either deteriorate and perish, or bring about conditions which are more in accordance with his needs (Fromm, 1955, p. 26-27)." As Goodman (1960, p. 6) maintains, "the loss of force, grace and feeling seems to be evidence that somehow the acquired cultural habits do not draw on unimpeded outgoing energy, they are against the grain, they do not fit...needs or appetites." And "we do not need to be able to say what 'human nature' is in order to be able to say that some training is 'against human nature' and you persist in it at peril.....cling stubbornly to the presumption that at every stage there is a developing potentiality not yet cultured, and yet not blank, and that makes possible the taking on of culture. We must draw 'it' out, offer 'it' opportunities, not violate 'it' except for unavoidable reasons. What 'it' is, is not definite. It is what, when appealed to in the right circumstances, gives behavior that has force, grace, discrimination, intellect, feeling."

C. Logical Positivism

(1) Mechanistic science and its fragmentation of the whole person: Reactions to logical positivism as it operates within psychology are old. They first became most clearly crystalized by such writers as Gordon Allport and Henry Murray who, writing in the late 1930's and early 1940's were objecting to the powerful force of American behaviorism which had all but encompassed psychology. While the strand they represent, labeled by Maslow "The Third Force" to distinguish it from behaviorism and psychoanalytic thought, has been with us a long time and might on these grounds appear too well-established to be given room here, they do in my opinion belong. First, because their objections to psychological science as then practiced are still valid today. Second, because aspects of their views in more evolved forms are to be found in the "body" psychologists who Keen (1970 a) labels members of the counter-therapeutic. Third, because we can see within them the beginnings of the anti-scientism and anti-intellectualism of strands of the counter culture. Fourth, because many elements within the counter culture either explicitly identify with the "Third Force" (see, for example, Kreps in Firestone and Koedt, 1970) or create positions highly compatible with it (see, for example, the S.D.S. Port Huron statement of 1962).

Gordon Allport (1965), writing in 1937, comments, "Perhaps the simplest way to characterize the positivist view of man is to say that he is regarded as a reactive being" whose behaviors are "determined by outer forces or inner drives (p. 35)"over which he has little control. Following a 19th century model of physics, "positive psychology sees movement as caused and determined by pressures (p.35)" and views man as one would view elementary organisms or inanimate objects such as machines. Thus, for the most part positivistic psychology "looks at man not in terms of pro-action but of re-action (p.35)." It represents a deterministic and quasi-mechanical view of man. In some respects the psychoanalytic view is like that of positivism: "Man is a quasi-mechanical reactor, goaded by three tyranical forces: the environment, the id, and the superego. Man adjusts as well as he can within this triangle of forces. Since he is full of defenses and prone to rationalize, his search for final truth is doomed to failure" (p. 37). Both views leave little room for man's experience of himself as a free, willing agent who creates his own destiny, who in Kluckholn's phrase, "makes himself."

Interwoven with objections to positivism's mechanistic and deterministic model is the objection that its views and methods fragment man, disregarding man's experience of himself as a whole, integrated person. Speculating that perhaps "Positivism is...a reflection...of the fragmentation of personality in the modern world (p.37)," Allport (1965) views positivism's self-assigned task as that of finding "small facts under controlled conditions" the "fact" being necessarily small "since reliability can, as a rule, be obtained only when one deals with a limited fragment of behavior (p. 35)." Thus, "Attention is devoted to the partial, the physical, the quasi-mechanical, the regular, the logical, because these aspects can be controlled. Attention is correspondingly withdrawn from the symbolic, the illogical, the uncoded, the configured because they cannot be reliably controlled (p. 35-36)." As Murray (1965) commented in 1938, "the psychologist who does this should recognize that he is observing merely a part of an operating totality, and that this totality, in turn, is but a small temporal segment of a personality (p. 48),"and that "without some notion of the whole there can be no assurance that the processes selected for intensive study are significant constituents (p. 50)." For Murray this meant we must stop creating a science which leaves out the person, and create a "science of men, taken as units (p. 49)." In calling for such a science, both Allport and Murray were calling for a psychology in which the concept and experience of "self" is both relevant and central, since in Allport's (1965, p. 39) words, "it is the ground of all experience," it "provides the platform for all other experiences." Allport and Murray are arguing that "the individual personality as a patterned entity must serve as the center of gravity for psychology (Allport, 1965, p. 38)."

These views are echoed by the existentialists. Without here becoming enmeshed in the intricacies and divergencies of existentialism, let us simply accept Allport's (1965, p. 46-47) summary of its outlook on psychology:

> There is a tendency among existential writers to seek for one basic intentional theme in human life. A fairly wide range of proposals is the result--and yet the varied proposals seem for the most part to be complementary and concordant, not in actual opposition. Man is inherently restless and anxious, desiring both security and freedom. He strives to counter his condition of alienation by seeking a meaning for existence which will cover the tragic trio of suffering, guilt, death. By making commitments he finds that life can become worth living. Along the way he enhances his own value experiences. If necessary he will sacrifice his life in order that some primary value can continue to be served. He is capable of taking responsibility, of answering by his deeds the questions life puts to him. In this way he rides above his own organic and spiritual urgencies, and achieves true self transcendence. Although different writers place emphasis on different parts of this formulation, the picture is consistent.

Existentialist psychology hopes to establish a psychology of mankind whose pivot will lie in the perennial themes and crises of human life. Deterministic reductionism, S-R sequences, drive and habit hierarchies miss "the catastrophic coloring of life (Allport, 1965, p. 24):" "psychology should be more urgently human than it is (p. 42)." This position is that of personalism, which asserts that the final answer to the question, what sort of a creature is man, "will disclose a creative unity, a purposive, growing individual--and not a dismembered reactor as pictured by positivism. The secret of man will not be found in a reductive analysis of his *being*, but only by tracing coherently the course of his becoming."

Allport's plaintive question, "Where is the person in psychology?" is in modern idiom the assertion that science isn't relevant. (2) *The "neutrality" of positivism* has come under attack a great deal recently. Its failure to either achieve its claim of objectivity or to forthrightly acknowledge its value orientation when dealing with anything important has become increasingly clear, in particular to those who find themselves with a set of values outside those widely accepted in the culture (as is exemplified by both the complaints of the Left and the Women's Liberation movement). In this vein stands Women's Liberation's strenuous objections to the psychology of women as perpetrated by males; the movement is more than ready to agree with Laing, (1967, p. 60), that "much of current social science deepens...mystification. Violence cannot be seen through the sights of positivism."*

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* (Footnote: Mystification refers to attempts by others not only to invalidate a person's experience, but "to overlay this devastation by a false consciousness inured...to its own falsification (p.57)." Violence refers to "attempts to constrain the other's freedom, to force him to act in the way we desire, but with ultimate lack of concern, with indifference to the other's own existence or destiny," in contrast to love which "lets the other be; but with affection and concern (p. 58).")

At the same time that there is an objection to positivism's failure to achieve neutrality, there is also much objection to a neutral science. As the following excerpt from Laing (1967, pp. 60-62) captures the dual complaints, as well as the emotional flavor of a counter-culture which demands both relevance and commitment in those endeavors concerning man, it seems worth quoting despite its length:

> Much current social science deepens the mystification. Violence cannot be seen through the sights of positivism.
>
> A woman grinds stuff down a goose's neck through a funnel. Is this a description of cruelty to an animal? She disclaims any motivation or intention of cruelty. . If we were to describe this scene "objectively," we would only be denuding it of what is "objectively," or better, ontologically present in the situation. Every description presupposes our ontological premises as to the nature (being) of man, of animals, and of the relationship between them.
>
> If an animal is debased to a manufactured piece of produce, a sort of biochemical complex--so that its flesh and organs are simply material with a certain texture in the mouth (soft, tender, tough), a taste, perhaps a smell--then to describe the animal positively in those terms is to debase oneself by debasing being itself. A positive description is not "neutral" or "objective." In the case of geese-as-raw-material-for-pate, one can only give a negative description if the description is to remain underpinned by a valid ontology. That is to say, the description moves in the light of what this activity is a brutalization of, a debasement of, a desecration of: namely, the true nature of human beings and of animals.

The description must be in light of the fact that the human beings have so brutalized themselves, have become so banal and stultified, that they are unaware of their own debasement. This is not to superimpose onto the "neutral" description certain value judgements that have lost all criteria of "objective" validity, that is to say, any validity that anyone feels needs to be taken really seriously. On "subjective" matters, anything goes. Political ideologies, on the other hand, are riddled with value judgements, unrecognized as such, that have no ontological validity. Pedants teach youth that such questions of value are unanswerable, or untestable, or unverifiable, or not really questions at all, or that what we require are metaquestions. Meanwhile Vietnam goes on.

Under the sign of alienation every single aspect of the human reality is subject to falsification, and a positive description can only perpetuate the alienation which it cannot itself describe, and succeeds only in further deepening it because it disguises and masks it the more.

We must then repudiate a positivism that achieves its "reliability" by successfully masking what is and what is not, by serializing the world of the observer, by turning the truly given into capta which are taken as given, by denuding the world of being and relegating the ghost of being to a shadow land of subjective "values."

The theoretical and descriptive idiom of much research in social science adopts a stance of apparent "objective" neutrality. But we have seen how deceptive this can be. The choice of syntax and vocabulary is a political act that defines and circumscribes the manner in which "facts" are to be experienced. Indeed, in a sense, it goes further and even creates the facts that are studied.

The "data" (given) of research are not so much given as taken out of a constantly elusive matrix of happenings. We should speak of capta

> rather than data. The quantitatively interchangeable grist that goes into the mills of reliability studies and rating scales is the expression of a processing that we do on reality, not the expression of the processes of reality.

Where does all this leave us with regard to science? Ironically, while some thirty years ago Murray and Allport were able to crystalize the beginnings of a Third Force, they were not able to bring it to fruition. They were too enmeshed in the values of positivism to do little more than seek reforms, to seek more meaningful instruments for measuring broader, more meaningful human variables. Perhaps there can be no positivistic science of man. Perhaps we need to turn away from such a science and turn instead toward thinking, philosophizing, doing, experiencing. Perhaps we need to recognize that it is not only the concept of "mental illness" which obscures the fact that we are dealing with "problems in living," and thus with values and ethics (Szasz, 1960, 1961), but the concept of a positivistic science of man as well.

(3) Wanted: a meaningful phenomenology: When psychology first emerged from philosophy, it was a personalistic, phenomenological, experiential science, or at least it was attempting to be. Wundt defined it as investigating "the total content of experience in its relations to the subject;" James saw it as "the science of finite individual minds;" and Titchner viewed it as "the study of experience considered as dependent on some person (quoted in Allport, 1965, p. 36)." Unfortunately, our ancestors did violence to this

study, and their method of introspection became a tool for maintaining that the experience of lemonade is composed of discrete fragments of yellowness, sourness, wetness, and what have you. Needless to say, ordinary human beings could not be used to obtain such data, subjects became well-trained performers, and colleagues revolted. Perhaps Gestalt psychology, which came on the scene at that time, was too close to experience to be accepted by psychologists who had witnessed the travesties of an experientially based attempt to understand man. In any case it was Behaviorism which prevailed. McDougal and Watson held public debate on the existence of consciousness, McDougal lost, and "black box" psychology was born. We have been trying to get back into the box ever since.

I am finding myself completely overwhelmed in the various attempts I have made to produce a coherent statement regarding phenomenology, which is one of the most important ways we have of re-entering the black box and coming out with something valuable to ourselves.

Perhaps there are two statements which need to be made. The first is a simple statement that the human being is an experiencing being, a self-aware being, and we cannot fully understand him unless we respect this aspect of him. Laing (1967) speaks well for this position:

> Natural scientific investigations are conducted on objects, or things, or the patterns of relations between things, or on systems of

> "events." Persons are distinguished from things in that persons experience the world, whereas things behave in the world. Thing-events do not experience. Personal events are experiential. Natural scientism is the error of turning persons into things by a process of reification that is not itself part of true natural scientific method. Results derived in this way have to be dequantified and dereified before they can be reassimilated into the realm of human discourse.
>
> Fundamentally, the error is the failure to realize that there is an ontological discontinuity between human beings and it-beings.
>
> Human beings relate to each other not simply externally, like billiard balls, but by the relations of the two worlds of experience that come into play when two people meet.
>
> If human beings are not studied as human beings, then this once more is violence and mystification (p. 62-63).
>
> [We need a science of experience if we are to understand people.] We need concepts which both indicate the interaction and interexperience between two persons, and help us to understand the relation between each person's own experience and his own behavior, within the context of relationship between them (p. 48).
>
> Any theory not founded in the nature of being human is a lie and a betrayal of man. We are not concerned with the interaction between two objects, nor with their transactions within a dyadic system; we are not concerned with the communication patterns within a system comprising two computer-like subjects that receive and process input and emit outgoing signals. Our concern is with two origins of experience in relation (p. 53-54).

The second statement about a call for phenomenology is more difficult to make clear. It can too easily be misunderstood as a request for naive rationalism, for an acceptance of our thoughts about our experience as some kind of ultimate statement about the nature of things. Before continuing on with this however, perhaps something should be said here for a point of view which comes very near to this and which is, in fact, one of the most valuable and one of the most disregarded contributions of existential psychology --the acceptance of the individual's perception of his reality as the most important statement that can be made about the realistic nature of his world. Let me try an illustration. When someone asserts with conviction, "I am Christ," we can take his statement as a symptom of a biological pathology, we can view it as the product of inner defenses (as for example, when we call it a delusion of grandeur manufactured to protect him from his frightening sense of inadequacy), we can view it as a veiled communication obscured to guard him against the consequences of our comprehension, or we can view it as a valid existential statement, free from brain pathology and defensive alienation, an apprehension and expression of reality experienced through a mode of awareness other than the one most familiar to us. When the Three Christs of Ypsilanti failed to give up their individual assertions of Christliness when confronted with each other they may have failed to recant because each knew he was right, because each correctly comprehended his existential reality: "My basic Being, which is special and precious, which must be cherished and be allowed to cherish in return in order to survive, is being squashed, killed, denied by you; you cannot accept my being nor my love and sacrifice my existence to your inability both to accept me and to acknowledge your unacceptance. If you could accept me, then I, and I and you together, would be saved, redeemed, resurrected." This all is a digression from where I was heading. Let me try again.

Phenomenology is not a call for a return to introspectronism, for the used of the internal analytic mode or for an acceptance of whatever intellectual abstractions or reasons we come up with when we think about things. Our immediate experience contains far more than our immediate thoughts and is far more than our present reflections on either previous events or the ongoing process we're in. Man doesn't just think, he experiences. Ongoing thoughts are not our ongoing reality. They simply represent the raw data of sensations, feelings, images, motor movements, etc. These sensory experiences are the basic unit from which all others develop and are truly "of the present." (The existential psychologists understood this, but somehow while they spoke a lot about the need for a study of man based on the phenomenological method, they never came up with a very adequate method, with the possible exception of Rogers and the definite exception of Perls.) Thinking, remembering, imagining are all subjective experiences derived from this basic "sensory data." Now partly because we have an incredible capacity for symbolic thought, for organizing our raw data; partly because our particular culture values this form of experience to an outstanding extent, making it a much-sought after mode of experience; partly because we're still immersed in strong remnants of Puritanism which distrust, or reject, or endow with a certain sense of shame, our getting in touch with sensual perceptions ("sensual perceptions" include emotions--"I am afraid" is only a cognitive label attached to a complex set of sensations, not the experience of afraidness itself); and partly because we developed mind in the Gutenberg mode, a mode in which body doesn't function (the younger generations which developed their symbolic capacity in the message of the electronic circuitry media are less cut off from body)--for all these reasons we don't have easy access to being in touch with those elements of our ongoing experience which are not thinking. This is also perhaps because if we got in touch with the raw data (like the tension in our chest, for instance) we might find out more about our situation and what it does to us than we wish to. One of the tenants of those valuing phenomenology is that if we are to achieve a meaningful understanding--one that frees us for action which is congruent with our being at the moment--we must get in touch with our raw experiences, our bodily sensations. If we want to know what we feel, what we want, we can't get there by simply asking ourselves, by thinking about it. In fact there are many pitfalls in entrusting to our "computer," to "mind fucking" as Perls calls it, for rational primacy dilutes the reality of our experience, distancing us from it by interjecting an encounter with a symbolic abstraction. We can only find out what we are, what we want--reown our experience--by letting ourselves become fully aware of our sensations. The tenseness in our neck, the tightness in our voice, our clenched fist, welling tear ducts, swinging foot, downcast eyes--these tell us a great deal, and are our most reliable ways for building and checking out the verbal abstractions we make about our experience. Phenomenology rests on the insistance that "man is essentially incarnate, that he *is* his body. Knowledge begins not with 'I think, therefore I am,' but with 'I sense, therefore I am' (Keen, 1970a, p. 56)."

A lot of the rediscovery of this and a lot of the elaboration of what this means for us comes from a series of recent interventional endeavors, called the counter-therapeutic by Keen (1970), aimed at getting people both freed-up from bodily tensions and back in touch with bodily pleasures, emotional experience, and encountering of others. Included here should be such people as Fritz Perls, Bernie Gunther, Ann Halprin, Bill Shultz, Alexander Lowen, Ida Rolf. These people refocused on techniques that concentrate upon integrating kinesthetic and psychological awareness--dance, massage, yoga, Gestalt, bioenergetics, sensory awakening, experiential interpersonal encountering exercises, structural integration. Their significance rests not only in their discovery--rediscovery of ways to get alienated mankind back into his feelings, relationship with others, but also in their contribution to the phenomenological method.

I'm finding that with that last sentence I've written myself into a box that I'd like to get out of. I started this section from a "scholarly" viewpoint--the history of psychology as a science--and not surprisingly ended up with a framing statement which puts the contributions of the body psychologists and their counter-therapeutic back into the stream of the development of psychology as a science. To the extent that I did this I'm made conscious of how I stand on an interface between two worlds. In doing this, however, I have distorted myself, the body psychologists, and the strands of the counter culture preoccupied in their own ways with the same concerns. Let us forget science--the understanding of mankind--and look only at ourselves. That, in a sense, is the most important message in both the body psychologist's and the counter culture's involvement with experiential modes. Even the word "look" distorts this message however, for it implies intellectual understanding, a switch simply from developing a theory about a generalized mankind to developing a theory about a concrete self. And theorizing is a destruction of experience--not because it is rational, but because it is only rational. In a sense, the counter-culture and the counter-therapeutic are truly counter theory. The attempt to get back in touch with experience has nothing to do with understanding either self or other as understanding is usually thought of. Getting in tune with experience--consciousness expanding--is to get more fully in tune with oneself. Its consequence is being more fully oneself. And when people are themselves, the world changes. Our need as a culture is not for abstract understanding upon which to create programs for action. It is for each of us to re-center the power back within ourselves, as fully experienced. The consciousness expansion of both the counter culture and the counter-therapeutic is in a sense both a call for and an actualization of interventions on self--interventions which spring, not from an intellectual analysis of the nature of man, or the nature of our personal or social status quo, but from a deep-felt need to be more deeply real. There is for many a faith that if I/you become deeply real, so will you/I (the essence of Rogers' and of Carkhuff and Berenson's conditions for growth) and that if we become more deeply real, the essence of our world will change. Science, neither physical nor social, is not the basis for a brave new world; only you and I are.

I am somewhat distressed that a discussion of intervention has been ruled out of order for this paper. While this exclusion makes sense for the project as a whole, it is somewhat inappropriate for counter theory. This can most clearly be seen if we attempt to link up strands of the counter culture with strands within counter psychology.

Within counter-culture there are two somewhat distinct polarities despite the fact that both share certain overlaps with regard to life style and both encompass immediate intervention.

The first strand, exemplified by New Left political activism, can more easily be dealt with in a paper excluding intervention. This is because it is a strand which has focused upon social ills, and it is a strand which has done so within the traditional duality of intellectual analysis (theorizing) and intervention. Intervention has always been closely tied to the analytic process for this strand. Action tends to stem from theorizing (since by and large the New Left is a product of the intellectual middle class), and action and its consequences are always fed back into an analytic-theoretical framework, such that action and its consequences both, in a sense, test theory and result in a restructuring of theory. In this sense, activism fits within the broad Western conception of scholarship and the scientific method, and one could indeed write a paper which deals exclusively with theory and excludes intervention without doing too great a disservice to the activist position. Even here, however, we must be aware that the term "activist" has not accidently replaced the older term "left wing," and that within this position is the conviction that one cannot commit mind without committing body--there can be no mind-body split. Nevertheless, we can write about it as if there could be. And likewise, we can write about the various counter psychology positions which take some version of the "sick society" stance without referring to intervention.

There is, however, a second strand within counter culture that is quite different--the way of the hippie. In dealing with this strand, it is impossible not to deal with intervention, for the hippie position is not an analytic one. It is, in a sense, pure intervention, and it is not so much an intervention upon society (although it has societal effects) as it is an intervention upon the self. While the activists have plenty of journals and newspapers which spread in print their theoretical position, the hippies strikingly do not, although they do have newspapers which communicate news of the community and recipes for living (from food preparation to astrological charts). Hippie is a way of life, not a way of thought. It is "counter" not so much in the sense of opposing and advocating, but in the sense of choosing to behave differently: "you do your thing and I'll do mine." It is engaged in back-to-earth, back-to-body living, not advocating, from raunchy bodies to handmade goods to primitive magical mysticism to here and now consciousness to organic-peasant food to commune living to psychedelic consciousness expanding to free form dance to yoga exercises to acid rock. Its group action is the Be-In, not the protest march. While one could look at its life styles (interventions) and infer theoretical positions with regard to the prevailing culture, to do so somewhat distorts the hippie, since the hippie life style is not one which is usually adopted from conscientious intellectual analysis of what's wrong with me and thee, but from a deep felt need to live differently.

The counter-therapeutics are perhaps the most radical happenings within the outreaches of psychology and share much more in common with the way of the hippie than with the way of the activist. It is true that they are much more consciously analytic and that they have a literature. It is also true that within their writings one can often find statements about such abstractions as normalcy, deviance, the nature of human needs. But this is not the primary focus of their writings. They do not deal with theoretical analyses of "the problem" so much as with the methods they have chosen for themselves for reaching solutions.

The historian Arthur Mendel defines counter culture as that segment of society which seeks to escape the values of the death culture "by nurturing the joys of life in the here and now... (Stark, 1971)." He could as easily have been defining the counter-therapeutic. Berke (1970), when writing about the counter culture, likewise describes the revolution in terms congruent with the thrust of the counter-therapeutic. "What we [in the counter culture] do is to penetrate, de-structure and destroy the system and at the same time re-structure, create it anew in our own terms, and vice versa. THESE ARE INSEPARABLE. One does not wait for the other (p. 6)." When the counter-therapeutic attempts to move the self out of the mind and back into the body, out of isolation and back into encounter, it is actively engaged in these two processes. Its objection to the status quo is inherent in that which it seeks to build. And for Berke (1970, p. 6) the destruction-restructuring of the institutional system is not enough. The revolution must include an internal revolution as well:

> Of great importance is that even when the larger parameters of power are taken over, the process--movement of criticism, conflicts and confrontation must continue. You destroy the structure in order to create the structure in order to destroy the structure in order to create the structure...[sic]
>
> THE STRUCTURE IS OURSELVES. THE REVOLUTION IS OURSELVES. THE REVOLUTION IS THE REVOLUTION.
>
> THE REVOLUTION NEVER OCCURS. BUT ALWAYS IS IN THE PROCESS OF OCCURRING. THIS REVOLUTION IS CHANGE. THIS REVOLUTION IS THE MOVEMENT BY WHICH ANY INDIVIDUAL OR SOCIETY CONFRONTS, CREATES AND RECREATES ITSELF.

The structure is ourselves, the revolution is ourselves. This revolution is the movement by which any individual or society confronts, creates and recreates itself. When Bernie Gunther drinks a glass of water on a national network T.V. show for children, suggesting that they too look at its light-speckled dazzle, listen to its gurgle, see it flow into the glass, taste it slowly and fully, he has engaged in a revolutionary act which goes far beyond any polemic on our sensual death.

Intervention is an integral, defining characteristic of counter culture. It cannot be omitted in a paper on counter theory. When you make your statements about the world your own, when you realize that you speak, not from some distant place in an unearthly space probe, but as a being of the world you are examining, you move beyond critical analyses of the cultural status quo and condemnations of the social order, to statements centered on the self. In thus moving from the impersonal to the personal, you necessarily move toward intervention: I may be content with theorizing when I speak of thee; not when I speak to me. Thus, the lines between me and thee, between "normal" and "sick," between intervener and intervened upon become blurred. The aim becomes that of finding ways to make my life more real. Now.

The counter-therapeutic, like the counter culture, is an intertwining complex surge to reclaim body, to reclaim awareness, to reclaim the present, to reclaim intimacy, to reclaim power, to reclaim meaning:

"Come together (the Beatles):" this is in a sense both the beginning and the end point. More and more, the counter therapeutic is exercised in groups (many of which occur in the broader structure of the communal living group of the "trainer"), participants seeking the intimacy and change-producing experience of "I-thou" relationships and experiential, rather than intellectual, encounter.

"Let it all hang out :" In the groping attempts to share with one another--to take the risk to "tune in" to both oneself and the other, to tell it and hear it like it is--comes the beginnings of trust, in oneself and the other.

"Let it be (Beatles):" An acceptance of myself for what I am and how I become ("Don't push the river, it flows by itself --Stevens, 1970);" an acceptance of the other ("I don't want to fake you out, take or shake or forsake you out, I ain't looking for you to feel like me, see like me or be like me, all I really want to do is, baby, be friends with you--Dylan)."

"Turn on (Leary):" to joy, to energy, to possibility, to sensuality, to impulse, to creativity, to spontaneity.

"Do it (Ruben):" Recenter the power back within the self and act upon it.

> Once, I told Fritz [Perls] why I didn't want to do what he had told each of us, in turn to do. Then I thought, maybe there's some value in this that I don't see, and asked him, "Do you want me to do it anyway?" He said nothing. Like an Indian he said it altogether. There wasn't any part of him anywhere that was saying anything. It was up to me.

> Another time, when I was about to take the hot seat, I noticed a folder containing some of his manuscripts on the chair on which I was to sit. I said, "Am I supposed to sit on it, or take it off?" He said, "You are asking me."
>
> Both times, I had to decide for myself. I don't do so much asking now. This brings some of my power back into me.
>
> (Stevens, 1970, p. 2)

"Now:" is where we live, if we let ourselves, if we live incarnate.

(4) To somewhere else: I want now to deal with something quite different. The following stems from McLuhan, from Laing, from the psychedelic sacrament, from the Zeitgeist.

For centuries now, reason has prevailed. It has been valued, not simply for what it has built in the world, but as the epitomy of man's humanness. Whole histories of humanity have been written, the focus of which is the tracing of man's progress toward rationality. And they have been read by generations of readers booing the villains and cheering on the heroes who struggled to assert the inevitable product of reason, civilization. We have come to value the Gutenberg mode with its dispassionate, linear, step-by-step logical progression as the ultimate expression of our human nature. Reason is the measure of man. "I think therefore I am."

We have come so far on this road that the experiences of our 10th century ancestors, the textures of their existence with its mysticism, unseen spirit presences, pervasive symbolism, are alien and unsettling to us. Most of us are left ajar, not quite able to comprehend such a mode of being so close to our conception of insanity--out of mind, out of head, out of reason. "Medieval" has become a distainful epitaph. We label that period of our history as childhood, or seek to explain its mode and expressions as due to conditions fostering alienation and escape. And we rush on with our journey to become more "mature," more "human," more reasonable.

Jung has said the insane man is a waking dreamer. And the dream experience, the furthest most of us can move from what has become the logical mode of being, is greeted by most with either dismissal or uneasiness. Dreams, semi-conscious reveries, the realities of contemplative and meditative states, visions, hallucinations, auras, the transcendental experience, are viewed by most as simply "the effulgence of a pathological process or of a particular alienation (Laing, 1967, p. 138-39)."

"Paradise Lost"--a monumental myth flowing from our collective unconscious awareness of what we lost when we started to develop our amazing capacity for reason. "And they ate from the tree of knowledge and thereby fell from grace and were exiled from paradise forever." Our capacity for memory, for logical thinking, for abstraction, for superimposing categorical structures upon our free-flowing here and now experience alienated us from our capacity to rest within the grace of pure being. When we gained the capacity to reflect upon our experience we lost the ability to be truly in touch with the thoughtless moment of our experience, to be at unity with the ongoing sensations and images comprising our being. And as we moved more and more into the world, into an effecting, mastering relationship with nature, a relationship made possible by the logical process, we invested more and more of ourselves in that process, and increasingly lost contact with other inner modes of experiencing and comprehending. We came to view rational understanding as identical with reality apprehension, and all other modes of experiencing as distortive and delusional. Both the transcendental state (the return to the undifferentiated state of human existence through the breaking down of the superimposed mind structures which separate our experience into a me and not me), as well as the vision, have become suspect, have become warily regarded as products of a pathological process. Even the Church has stopped producing saints.

Is the dream nothing but the product of a sleeping madman or the compromise solution of a watchful guardian?

I sense therefore I am

Loose your mind and come to your senses

Mind bending

Trip out

Turn on, tune in

Blow your mind

There have always been two strands within our culture--the rational and the mystical--each straining in its own way to overpower the other, to claim primacy, to divide the self.

United we stand. Divided we fall.

Two modes of human apprehension. Alone--computer or catatonic.

We are embarked on a McLuhan journey to 2001: From joyous wonder of rational tool power found, to plastic efficiency of streamlined technocracy power, expressionless faces, bodies asleep in space cocoon: super computer brain supreme--breakdown. Many die thereby. Survivor--he who didn't sleep a living death within the ship. Whorled through psychedelic inner space to the far out reaches of imaginability: A confrontation with himself, a stripping off of ordered lineal constraints, of 18th century trappings. "I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now:" Shriveled death--and birth, an evolution into something new (no cave man he). And wondrous fetus returns to the solidity of earth, there to become our future.

"2001: A Space Odessey." A myth as monumental as the first. Not a regaining of paradise, of innocence lost. But a youth myth flowing from collective awareness that we are on the brink of something new. A wedding of our human modes of being.

IT'S TIME!

D. NOSOLOGY AND OTHER DIAGNOSTIC GAMES

Crushed
   Schematized by you
   I am no longer me becoming
   only you
Caught in a cage.

E. MAN THE MONSTER:

> There are three activities on the behalf of others which one may be sure will not be rewarded with the gratitude of those who benefit from them: governing a state, raising a family, and conducting a psychoanalysis.
>
> Sigmund Freud (quoted by Parade 10-14-70)

> All secrets of past tense have just come my way, but I still don't know what I'm going to do next.
>
> R. Brautigan (1970, p. 75)

Freud's picture of man is essentially one of a being whose basic drives (whether we refer to the sexual or aggressive) are such that, if they were allowed free expression, devastating social consequences would ensue. As such they must be controlled, and the most valued of our social products are in fact the result of successful control--of sublimation or the subordination of id to the reality principle. This view seems to me to have remained basically intact despite the developments of ego psychology: Hartman asserts that every person needs to surrender himself to his id at times--as in sleep and intercourse (Ford and Urban, 1964), regression is valued, but only in the service of the ego, the concept of apparatuses of secondary autonomy refer to learned behavior, and the conflict-free ego sphere seems to deal primarily with such autonomous ego functions as the operating of the sensory apparatuses. Even Erikson is tied to the primacy of the erogenous zones, and intimacy and competency become issues because of the problem of sex and aggression rather than the reverse.

Freud's picture of man is not one he developed by himself. It extends into the prehistory of Christianity. Ironically, while his puritanical society saw his theory and therapeutic practice as a frightening call for revolution, for free impulse, psychoanalysis can be reviewed as a puritanical society's safety valve, as an attempt, not to restructure its assumptions, but to loosen its corset strings, to repair the damage caused by excessive adherence to its ideal norms. Psychoanalysis' view of man as a bundle of dangerous impulses needing the restraints of socialization and civilization, its preoccupation with the assessment of impulse control, its concern with "binding energy," its aim as summarized by Freud's dictum, "where id was there shall ego be," are all highly congruent with the assumptions of the society out of which it grew. Psychoanalysis tried to secure a little more freedom of movement for id, while adhering to the prevalent definition of man. Freud made the mistake of assuming that because something is deeply buried it is deeply basic and somehow more real.

There are many things which can be said about the consequences of accepting such a view of man. Perhaps the most important is that it fosters a distrust of self and others and results in constraints--whether benevolently or malevolently imposed--in freedom. And it results in taking the choice for constraint out of the hands of the individual to be constrained and placing it in the hands of another who, while also seen as corrupted, is credited with being wiser (more in control)--governor, teacher, adult, psychoanalyst. It does not seem accidental that the primary technique of psychoanalysis is neutral interpretation, which is nothing more than imposing on a person, under the guise of scientific objectivity, your beliefs as to what he is "really" experiencing. Nor does it seem accidental that the process is labeled "treatment," that analyses refer to the experience in the passive mode as "being analyzed," or that the final measure of its successful outcome, "insight," is the extent to which the treated comes to agree with the treater.

Vitalo (1967) beautifully describes the consequence--devitalization. While he is primarily addressing himself to psychoanalysis and to intervention, his views seem worth summarizing here for what he has to say applies to a wide range of human interactions in our culture and embodies an objection to a popular view of man.

The process of psychoanalytic therapy creates a deadened man, one who has given up "the vital immediacy of life" for "the placid non-immediacy of thoughts." As such he is as adjusted and as dead as is the rest of the alienated society in which he lives: "hollow," "without conviction or passion," "he suffers little and enjoys less," "an individual ultimately indistinguishable from others (p. 276)." Freud, living in a society cut off from id, unconscious, eros, libidinal instincts, the part of man "which is most personally and vitally his, the source which infuses words and ideas with flesh and blood (p.273)," feared this source as much as does the civilization which fosters its alienation. Sadly, "His keen awareness of the sacrifice man makes for the sake of civilization was hardened by his inability to see an alternative to this type of civilization (p. 273)." While "He saw and described how man was shaped and shackled by society via its internalized agent--the superego (p. 273),"he did not see that "his own view of the id as alien and brute" and "his embracing of the ego as the favored structure was also a shackle, and not a necessary one (p.273)." Freud feared that "when man operated completely for himself (p. 273),"when he operated from id, the result would be an engrandized self, operating at the expense of others. Perhaps this is because "Constrained men are embittered. Perhaps all Freud could sense below the orderly areas of his life and the lives of others, even below those unseen areas which he explored and to which he brought order--was this embitterment, waiting to burst out (p. 273-74)." "The child's original desire for nurturance and unqualified acceptance for who he is" is frustrated by the civilizing process and "his pleas turn to demands (p. 275)." Freud "could only see the demanding child; he could not see the earlier, pleading child (p. 275)." And as "raw feeling is threatening to a mind," and as Freud had cast his lot with reason, he wrote off the child's corruption, the corruption of id, as "necessary accommodation to reality (p. 275)." The response of his society to its shared fear was repression and denial. Freud saw this as unnecessarily costly, but his response was basically in the same genre--while gradual release of repressed id was encouraged, its final shackle was the "binding" of its energy through a process of intellectual insights, reflection and thought: "The ego tames the raw energy of the id by deflecting it into thought. Affect is allowed to seep into awareness but it is neutralized by this diversion (p. 276)." In essence, "the process of psychoanalysis is the process of devitalizing the world within and without. It is the triumph of the death instinct, not as it is usually seen in terms of its gross manifestations, outer and inner directed aggression, but, rather the more subtle workings in the process of 'binding' energy --the process which solidifies the patient's gains in therapy (p. 275)."

> We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom and love...We oppose depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things...men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal...
>
> S.D.S. 1962 Port Huron Statement

Let me say, at the risk of seeming ridiculous,
that the true revolutionary is guided by great
feelings of love.

Che

Let it all hang out!

Organismic or actualizing theorists--those who place primary focus on an inherent actualizing tendency when postulating the givens of human nature--while divergent in their viewpoints share enough in common that a crude attempt may be made here to generalize about their view of man. Their most striking characteristic is that they stand in contra-position to the Freudian view, substituting a conception of "man the angel" for "man the monster." While the position is generally associated with existentialism, it is a position which is closer to Christian existentialism than to the existentialism of Sartre and Camus. It is true that it includes an appreciation of each individual's unique solution to the problems of being ("you are what you are what you are") and that it values choice, responsibility for choosing, and self-creation ["The whole life of the individual is nothing but the process of giving birth to himself; indeed, we should be fully born when we die--although it is the tragic fate of most individuals to die before they are born (Fromm, 1955, p. 32)."] Nevertheless it sidesteps the pain and loneliness which comes with the renunciation of absolutes--whether god-given or biologically given--for it is a position which emphasizes not so much the capacity of man to create his own nature, as the capacity of man to creatively live in such a way as to fulfill his nature. In Maslow's words (quoted in Hall & Lindzey, 1957, p. 325):

> [M]an has an essential nature of his own, some skeleton of psychological structure,...he has needs, capacities and tendencies that are genetically based, some of which are characteristic of the whole human species, cutting across all cultural lines, and some of which are unique to the individual. These needs are on their face good or neutral rather than evil...[F]ull healthy and normal and desirable development consists in actualizing this nature, in fulfilling these potentialities, and in developing into maturity along the lines that this hidden, covert, dimly seen essential nature dictates, growing from within rather than being shaped from without...[P]sychopathology in general results from the denial or frustration or the twisting of man's essential nature.

To repeat Maslow, human "needs are on their face good or neutral rather than evil." Destructiveness is not indigenous to man, it emerges when his nature is twisted or denied or frustrated. "Higher" needs or motives are neither derived from primary needs nor are they the result of sublimation. They are inherent thrusts which unfold when the more immediate press for physical survival has been met. In Fromm's (1955) terms, "the necessity to find ever-new solutions for the contradictions in his existence, to find ever-higher forms of unity with nature, his fellow men and himself, is the source of all psychic forces which motivate man, of all his passions, affects and anxieties (p.31)." The "goals of mental health," or what we would here call the actualizing process, "are not ideals which have to be forced upon the person, or which man can attain only if he overcomes his 'nature' and sacrifices his 'innate selfishness.' On the contrary, the striving...for happiness, harmony, love, productiveness, is inherent in every human being...Given a chance, these strivings assert themselves forcefully...It takes powerful constellations and circumstances to pervert and stifle this innate striving...and indeed, throughout the greater part of known history, the use of man by man has produced such perversion. To believe that this perversion is inherent in man is like throwing seeds in the soil of the desert and claiming they were not meant to grow (p. 241)."

The actualizers tend to postulate a human nature which is not only inherently social (inherently interpersonal), but which is inherently harmonious (inherently caring). When man is truly for himself--when he relies on the organismic valuing process--he is likewise truly for the other. As Rogers (1959, p. 223) asserts, the need for positive regard (whether learned early in infancy or inherently given is irrelevant) is universal in human beings; its satisfaction "is reciprocal, in that when an individual discriminates himself as satisfying another's need for positive regard, he necessarily experiences satisfaction of his own need for positive regard."

Like the Freudian view of man, that of the actualizers did not emerge full blown, spontaneously generated. It, too, stretches into the prehistory of Christianity. Christianity has always contained a basic dualism, despite the recurrent attempts to squash this heresy. Man the fallen, flawed by the taint of original sin, ever prey to the dark lures of the cast-out angel. Man the holy, the vessel of God, created in God's image, ever striving to reach the perfection of the Heavenly City. Freud, writing in an era fearful of the whore lurking within the constrained virgin, secularized the Christian fear of man the fallen, grounding the dark strand of dualism in biology, and offering reason, the 18th century's road to salvation, as final redemption. The actualizers secularized the light strand of theistic dualism, transmuting the Christian belief in the God-given goodness of man and his striving for the goal of godly perfection into a faith in the biologically-given nature of the actualizing process--a sophisticated revitalization of the 18th century Rationalists' attempt at secularization as embodied in the concept of earthly progress.

> I do my thing, and you do your thing.
> I am not in this world to live up to your expectations
> And you are not in this world to live up to mine.
> You are you and I am I.
> And if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful.
> If not, it can't be helped.
>
> Perls (1969, p. 4)

Perhaps all this moralizing--for that is, at base, what preoccupation with human nature is all about--is profoundly irrelevant. We only become concerned with human nature, with assuming a biological basis for "shoulds" and "shouldn'ts," in pursuit of our wants and non-wants for others, or when attempting to convince the more powerful to let us be. Conceptions of human nature inevitably become tied to such political aims, making science and philosophy handmaidens for justifying our "I don't likes" and our "you should lets."

But such justification has no part in our awareness of our "wants" and "don't wants." It is a postscript, not a forward to heed. It is irrelevant when need is felt. When a human being takes into his own hands the responsibility for creating himself, preoccupation with human nature, with absolutes, becomes superfluous and fades. The question is not how I am defined by you, by God, by biological givens, but how I choose to define myself. We can see the actualized consequences of this realization in both the Black Liberation and the Women's Liberation movements. In Women's Liberation, "feminine nature" and its definition is not debated, for it is irrelevant once a woman has decided she no longer wishes to live according to a prevalent definition and is willing to assert the power of her choice. The task has become for women, in face-to-face groups, to share personal experiences and thereby become increasingly aware of where they are in their life situations, leaving them free to create and struggle for alternative life paths for themselves. "What I am as a woman" is replaced with "where I wish to be as a person." With its focus on the primacy of experience, responsibility for choice, and active self creation, it is a profoundly existential movement.

Man the monster; man the angel; man the creator. The counter culture, and with it, counter theory, have transcended the former; they have entered the realm of the second, and are moving into the realm of the third.

F. THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL ILLNESS:

Although dissatisfaction with the medical model of deviance is not new, it has been only in the last ten years, primarily through the writings of Thomas Szasz (1960, 1961, 1970), that objections to the medical framework of psychiatry have received widespread publicity. Szasz argues that while the concept of mental illness and its correlaries--diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment--make good *historical* sense, stemming as they do from the historical association between neurology and psychiatry, they make no *scientific* sense. Charcot, through dint of personality and the authority of his position as the foremost neurologist of his day, succeeded in redefining "hysteria" as a "functional nervous disease," as an *illness* which *resembles* neurological disorders, thereby creating and legitimizing the illness model not only with regard to hysteria, but providing an illness paradigm for other deviant behavior syndromes as well. Charcot's accomplishment, however, was more truly an achievement for humanism than an advancement of science, for its primary function was to secure the mercies and aid usually reserved for the sick for those who had previously been regarded as undeserving sinners or annoying malingerers. Ironically, however, we have come full circle, for "mad" and "bad" have once more become associative links (Laing and Esterson, 1970), the adjective "sick" serving today to describe those interpersonal behaviors which we find repugnant, undesirable, unacceptable. In Szasz's words, "Although mental illness might have been a useful concept in the nineteenth century, today it is scientifically worthless and socially harmful (1961, p. IX)."

While the controversy regarding biophysical vs. environmental etiology is one in which many researchers and practitioners are engaged who likewise object to the concept of mental illness (see, for example, Laing and Esterson, 1970, who argue against viewing "schizophrenia" as a "medical fact," asserting that so-called schizophrenic behavior may be understood as meaningful responses to the current social and existential context within which the labeled schizophrenic must function--a shift in viewpoint which they believe "has a historical significance no less radical than the shift from a demonological to a clinical viewpoint three hundred years ago (p. 22)," this controversy is not the main thrust of Szasz's concern. Szasz's primary battle is with the majority of environmentalists who, while acknowledging some form of interpersonal theory of behavior causation, nonetheless are conceptually and behaviorally entrapped within the medical model, using its assumptions, language, and techniques. Szasz reminds this audience that "our adversaries are not demons, witches, fate, or mental illness. We have no enemy whom we can fight, exorcise, or dispel by 'cure.' What we do have are problems in living... (1960)." Viewed from this perspective rather than from that of medicine, psychiatry "consists of the study of personal conduct--of clarifying and 'explaining' the kinds of games that people play with each other; how they learned these games; why they like to play them; and so forth...," making communication "a central area of interest for psychiatry (1961, p. 7)." It is with such questions as "How does man live?" and "How ought man to live?"--traditionally the domains of philosophy, ethics, and religion, not medicine--with which psychiatry and psychotherapy deal. "In sum, inasmuch as psychiatric theories seek to explain, and systems of psychotherapy to alter, human behavior, statements concerning goals and values ('ethics') will be considered indispensable parts of theories of personal conduct and psychotherapy (1961, p. 8)."

The medical model "makes the abstraction 'mental illness' into a [behavicral] cause, even though this abstraction was created in the first place to serve only as a shorthand expression for certain types of human behavior (Szasz, 1960)." In so doing, it tends to shift our focus away from the behavior and the interpersonal network in which it is occurring, leading us to look elsewhere (whether to chemical imbalances or psychosocial developmental failures) for the basis of the pain and disharmony. It places us in the highly questionable position of assuming that "social intercourse...is...inherently harmonious, its disturbance being due solely to the presence of 'mental illness' in many people (Szasz, 1960)," and leads to the logical absurdity of seeking remedial actions "in a therapeutic--or covertly medical--framework" for "psychosocial, ethical, and/or legal deviations (Szasz, 1960)," as for example, when prescribing tranquilizers for marital conflicts and hospitalization (the heir of the ocean voyage) for untenable situations.

More important, it robs the labeled patient of his responsibility and his sense of himself as a willing, creating, choosing being (see C. B. Hazen, 1970, for a first-hand account of the infantalizing result of hospitalization). It places him in a conceptual system where "doctor knows best," where, for example, "it is all right for medical and psychiatric experts to decide whether or not a woman should bear a child she does not want, but it is not all right for her to do so (Szasz, 1970, p. 90)." It encourages a we-they split, establishing a dichotomy between he who has the disease (the patient) and he who doesn't (the doctor), a split which results in the de-valuation of the "sick" party's experience, with the doctor's inadequacies all too often being treated as evidence of the patient's disorder (as in the concept of transference distortions and the use of the doctor's failure to understand a patient's communications as evidence of the patient's insanity). While the concept of mental illness may secure for the patient the grace of forgiveness ("He can't help it"), it likewise results in not being taken seriously, and in the loss of self-respect that comes with being placed in a childlike (i.e., not responsible) stance.

Most important, the concept of mental illness serves to obscure the fact that "life for most people is not a struggle for biological survival, but is a struggle for the attainment of some human value, a struggle with the problem of how one should live (Szasz, 1960)." In actual practice, "the finding of a mental illness is made by establishing a deviance in behavior from certain psychosocial, ethical, or legal norms (Szasz, 1960)." With its focus on the "normal," the medical model is tied to the adjustment model, both models sharing the assumption that the majority's methods of coping with life's problems are somehow inherently desirable, deviation representing a pathological state which needs adjustment, which must be mercifully cured. The fact that this, like any other judgment about how one ought to live, is a value judgment rather than a scientific one, is obscured by the concept of mental illness. Herein lies the most dangerous consequence of the medical model: it allows the practitioner to treat his own views on problems in living as if they were facts rather than opinions, allowing him to transmit complacently (at times, forcibly) his own value orientation under the name of neutral science--mystification at its worst. As Szasz (1960) concludes, "mental illness is a myth, whose function it is to disguise and thus render more palatable the bitter pill of moral conflicts in human relations."

G. ADJUSTMENT:

"They aren't delusions, Doctor. Two sets of threats have been given to me, one on my life, one on my freedom. I was awake and not suffering from hallucination both times. My hearing is better than normal, it's acute. My knowledge of people is sound. I've been threatened to make me lay off a peculiar line of questioning."

"Then lay off. That's what a sane man would do. A sane man solves his problems in the most direct manner. Laying off would seem the most direct manner for you."

"But I don't want to lay off."

"Then you probably *are* insane, to an extent, on this one subject. Why don't you want to lay off of the thing that threatens your life?"

"I have a certain amount of stubbornness. And I have my principles."

"Neither is a sign of sanity, Mr. Foley. More often they're the opposite. An insane man will always have a considerable amount of stubbornness, intractability. And he'll have *very* strong principles, though usually for very weak reasons. A sane man bends to reality, and his principles die a little as he gets older. Yours should at least have begun to weaken. You aren't a child. Children, you may not realize it, are never sane. But sanity should have begun to develop by your age."

"We may not mean the same thing by sanity. I was sane when I was a boy, Doctor. This is one thing I do know, and other boys were mostly sane. Some of them have lost it, a little, when they came to be men. I don't believe I've lost very much of mine."

"No, we certainly don't mean the same thing by sanity, Mr. Foley. You have a backward idea, an insane idea of it. Sanity is adaptability to the world as it is, even though that world may be a little insane by ideal standards. You seem to be in fine health, and I'm sure that your senses are acute. Your attitude isn't truculent, so far. If committed, you probably wouldn't make a difficult patient; that's one thing to be thankful for."

R. A. Lafferty (1969) p. 159-60

[A young man who has come to live in a remote tribe of congenitally blind people, is examined by their doctors.]

Then afterwards one of the elders, who thought deeply, had an idea. He was the great doctor among these people, their medicine man, and he had a very philosophical and inventive mind, and the idea of curing Nunez of his peculiarities appealed to him. One day when Yacob was present he returned to the topic of Nunez.

"I have examined Bogota," he said, "and the case is clearer to me. I think very probably he might be cured."

"That is what I have always hoped," said old Yacob.

"His brain is affected," said the blind doctor.

The elders murmured assent.

"Now what affects it?"

"Ah!" said old Yacob.

"This," said the doctor, answering his own question. "Those queer things that are called the eyes, and which exist to make an agreeable soft depression in the face, are diseased, in the case of Bogota, in such a way as to affect his brain. They are greatly distended, he has eyelashes, and his eyelids move, and consequently his brain is in a state of constant irritation and distraction."

"Yes?" said old Yacob. "Yes?"

"And I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in order to cure him completely, all that we need is a simple and easy surgical operation--namely, to remove those irritant bodies."

"And then he will be sane?"

"Then he will be perfectly sane, and a quite admirable citizen."

"Thank heaven for science!" said old Yacob, and went forth to tell Nunez of his happy hopes.

H. G. Wells, from "Country of the Blind." quoted in Fromm, 1955, p. 171.

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UNUSUAL IDEAS IN EDUCATION

Everett Reimer

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UNUSUAL IDEAS IN EDUCATION

Everett Reimer

1. INTRODUCTION

Since this paper is committed to controversy, if not by its title then by the outlook of its author, it is important to define early what is at issue. I do not regard schools as truly educational but, more nearly, as an institutional perversion of education. In my opinion, schools not only prevent true education from occurring, they actually miseducate. They teach not what is relevant and true but what is irrelevant and untrue to the interests of their students. They do this, however, in the service of a society of which they are a central institution and a major bulwark. They effectively adjust their students to the requirements of this society. It is a society which has as its basic principle the maintenance of power and privilege differentials among nations, classes and individuals, but which attempts to disguise this principle by promising all things to all men. One of the main purposes of schools is to make this false promise appear plausible.

Schools do this partly by appearing to be open to all comers while in fact they reserve their higher levels to the winners of competition of the early grades. Since only those who succeed in school get access to the higher levels of consumption, influence, information and respect, schools serve to ration the goods and services which technological societies pretend to be able to supply to everyone. By convicting their drop-outs of failure, schools justify the limitations under which they are subsequently forced to live. Since everyone with less than a Ph.D. is by definition a drop-out--and actually limited in what he can earn--the schooled society could keep its promise only by keeping everyone in school for twenty years. Since this would expose the myth of schooling, we propagate instead the myth of genetic deficiency. To make the goods which man has learned to produce abundantly available to all would violate the law of God--this has to be the basic rationale for the present organization of affairs. The actual rationale, the production is limited by manpower skills, is patently false as myriads of production restrictions, if nothing else, make amply clear. There are some real limits--ecological and other limits--on how much can be produced but they do not provide a convenient rationalization for the distribution of the social product.

Since my views of school and society are spelled out elsewhere it would be repetitious to amplify and justify them here. It may be worth noting that they play no favorites in terms of current political alignments. There may be more awareness of the basic issues I raise in China than elsewhere but I have little evidence to support this view. To me, Russia appears to have as rigid a hierarchy of privilege as the United States and to have schools which work just as effectively to justify and maintain this hierarchy. Cuba, Yugoslavia, Israel and Sweden, to select four countries which from one point of view or another might be expected to offer hopeful signs, appear to be as committed to schools and to international, interclass and interpersonal competition as other nations.

I define education as the conscious use of resources to increase people's awareness of the relevant facts of their lives, and to increase people's abilities to act upon these facts in their own true interests. Of major importance to most people are the laws which govern them, the ideologies which influence them and the institutions, and institutional products, which determine the impact of their laws and ideologies upon them. Practical education, then, is increasing awareness for individuals and groups of their laws, ideologies and institutions, and increasing ability to shape these laws, ideologies and institutions to their needs and interests.

This definition of education need not exclude the teaching of respect for existing laws, ideologies, institutions and other facts of life. So long as what *is* can meet the challenge of what *should be*, respect and critical awareness are compatible. It is not permissible, however, to give respect priority over truth since this is to induce respect for falsehood. To argue that the youth of students makes this unavoidable is to beg the question. Until the present century youth was given no prior claim on educational resources nor can the current priority be justified except in terms of the present functions of schools, which are to shape the young to the requirements of a social system which cannot, itself, bear critical appraisal.

These statements assume the possibility of an objective test of truth, and I am not unaware of nor unimpressed that objective truth can exist only in a just society but I believe, also, that the prevision of such a society can induce the shadow of a criterion of objective truth. I define justice as the life-time opportunity of every individual to enjoy at least his share of the universal values of his society and only as much more as will not inhibit the opportunities of others. Only in such a society would people have a relatively undistorted view of social reality.

In this paper I shall present and recommend two radical educational alternatives to schools and evaluate two more. Paulo Freire's method of "Conscientization" and an "alternative" which Ivan Illich and I have developed are the two programs I shall recommend. "Free Schools" and "modern media" are the two alternatives I shall evaluate. Description and documentation will be concentrated almost entirely upon the first two of these alternatives. They are much more specific, less well known in general and much better known to me. Free schools and modern media are subjects too broad and diffuse to be definitively discussed, or usefully documented in a paper of this size. Broad evaluation of their educational meaning and potential may, however, serve to increase slightly the scope and balance of a paper which might otherwise be judged too narrowly parochial. As topics, free schools and modern media include many of the more commonly suggested alternatives to schools. An evaluation of them, in the light of the two recommended alternatives, may have implications, therefore, which go beyond the direct statements of the paper.

2. PAULO FREIRE'S "CONSCIENTIZATION"

Paulo Freire's philosophy and method is, in my opinion, the most completely worked out and generally most satisfactory approach to education in the modern world. While I try to incorporate it into my own proposals I feel that this incorporation does Freire less than full justice. My reason for going beyond his ideas at all is that in today's world these ideas may have only limited political possibilities. While Freire's practice has been confined largely to illiterate agricultural workers, this is not only the most numerous clientele in the world but also the one most in need of education. Many members of the elite world would also agree that it is the most critical, since it contains the key to the growth of world population.

Conscientization is a general approach, however, applicable to any client population. Freire is too well known to require summary exposition and his system is too complex to be safely summarized.

I shall concentrate, therefore, on the promise and feasibility of his approach, which is best illustrated by his own experience. Freire taught Brazilian peasants to read in from twenty to thirty hours of instruction, by discovering a vocabulary highly relevant to their critical interests. As soon as they learned to read, Freire's peasants organized peasant leagues and tried to bargain with their employers for improved conditions of life and work. These leagues were suppressed and Freire himself was forced to leave Brazil by the military regime of that country. Invited to Chile by the then governing Christian Democratic party, he was, nevertheless, unable to work freely in Chile. Freire's method is, clearly, highly effective and economical educationally and, equally clearly, it is disruptive of existing political relationships where these are unjust and oppressive. Since most political relationships today are of this kind, in socialist as well as in capitalist nations, the Freire method may appear to have limited application except in the hands of revolutionary activities as legitimate and even necessary so long as they remain within certain bounds and do not constitute an immediate threat to the existing order. In principle the Freire method, which achieves educational efficiency by selecting subject matter in terms of the students' true interests--as manifested in the students' own responses--should be acceptable everywhere. In fact it would be and is widely acceptable when not applied to major populations suffering extreme injustice, or in otherwise highly sensitive situations. In most countries dissemination of the Freire philosophy and principles and the training of a "teaching" cadre would probably not encounter political opposition. While such dissemination clearly has a revolutionary potential it is the kind of potential which many governing elites would tolerate and some would even welcome. Few members of the elite today deny the inevitability of revolutionary changes in social organization and many ask only that it be achieved rationally. While this is in most cases a disguised plea that the cup pass them by, personally, it is also an attitude which permits preparatory action for revolutionary change to occur peacefully within the context of existing power structures. First priority on any list of radical educational proposals should go to worldwide dissemination of the education philosophy, principles and practices of Paulo Freire. It goes without saying that the widespread application of these practices should be carried as far as local situations will allow.

3. THE ILLICH-REIMER ALTERNATIVE

Second priority should go to the proposed treatment of educational resources outlined by Ivan Illich and myself, in materials which have been published by CIDOC, and are in the course of more extensive publication.

3.1 Educational Accounts

We call first of all for a distribution of the public financial resources which now support schools to the entire citizenry of the political entities providing this support. We propose life-time educational accounts, with credit accrued to each citizen in equal annual installments. Unused educational credit would accumulate, possibly at interest, to be used whenever the individual desired. The account could be used for any kind of educational expenditure--which would have to be defined by each jurisdiction but which should be defined as broadly as possible. It would initially be defined, in all probability, to include schooling although most school costs are incurred for custodial care and other non-educational functions of schools.

In order to assure an adequate supply of real educational resources, which would give the holders of educational credit educationally efficient options, Illich and I recommend the establishment of four educational resource networks, to be operated as public utilities. These are described in the four sub-sections which follow.

3.2 Network of Educational Objectives

This network might be described as a vastly expanded system of libraries, cataloguing and, in some cases, storing educational objects. These objects should include not only books but all types of records, equipment for production, dissemination and decoding of all kinds of records, examples of all types of energy converters (insofar as costs allow), examples of all kinds of natural and artificial objects, stressing those with the highest educational value for the entire population (considering the probable use as well as the potential value of the object if used). An initial inventory of educational objects would, of course, have to be decided upon by educators but subsequent use of this inventory, by students, should be the major determinant of the distribution of the ultimate investment among educational objects. It cannot be too much stressed that while libraries offer a good model of the directory and access services to be provided, current libraries and museums are hopelessly elitist in their selection and treatment of inventory and clientele. A department store would, in many respects, provide a better model except that profit potentials outweigh human interests and needs in the selection and display of department store goods. In the case of expensive objects, it would not be necessary that the public utility administering the network acquire ownership but merely that it provide directory information and insure access. Rivers, mountains, farms and factories are examples of objects which it might not be feasible to acquire but which are educationally important. Laboratories, which now are often closed to public access, might be particularly important.

3.3 Network of Skill Models

Next to educational objects, skill models are the most indispensable resource of the potential learner. Skill models need not be teachers but may be merely people able and willing to demonstrate a skill. In addition to necessary objects, this is all that most people interested in learning a skill really require. A directory of skill models should, of course, include all kinds of skills which may legally be practiced and no requirement in addition to the ability to demonstrate the skill in question should inhibit the listing of a willing model. Other characteristics would, of course, be listed in addition for the guidance of potential learners. The administration of a skill model network would consist, centrally, in the maintenance of convenient and up-to-date directory service. Supplementary services could be offered limiting the widest possible choice of the learner in selecting models and, equally, that of models in deciding whom they will serve.

3.4 Network of Peers

After skill models the most necessary human resources for learners are fellow-learners. Education, in the original sense of the word, implies more the use of skill to explore unfamiliar terrain than the mere acquisition of skills. For such exploration peers are frequently indispensable, persons with the same learning interests, similar preparation for the learning in question and compatible secondary characteristics. Since interest and preparation for learning are usually both specific and ephemeral, the central problem of a peer network is to continually match and rematch individuals in groups which may vary in size from two to a million (see the medieval crusades and the recent popular music festivals in the United States).

Methods of peer-matching may vary from the local bulletin board to the computer, with various kinds of publications in between. The user of a peer-matching system would identify himself by name and address, describe the activity he wanted to share and his preparation for this activity. A computer, or other medium, would send him back the names and addresses of all who had inserted similar descriptions. With the computer it would be possible to insure that people using the system would become known only to their potential peers.

3.5 Network of Educators

Educators are the least essential of the major learning resources, less essential than objects, skill models and peers. They may, nevertheless, be valuable at times especially if they can be dissociated from schools. There are two kinds of educators, those who provide general guidance to a learner regardless of what he wants to learn and those who are experts in a content area. The first we call pedagogues. Given educational credit and an ample supply of educational resources many people, especially parents who have been abdicating their educational responsibilities to schools, might want advice and assistance in the development of educational programs for their children. An independent profession, practicing as medical doctors used to do, would constitute one network of educators. The other, made up of experts in all fields of activity, would parallel and overlap the network of skill models. Administratively the network of experts might be treated as a subset of the network of skill models although, in some areas, there might be divergences. Educationally the difference is that skill models are needed by those who are beginning to learn a skill. Experts or leaders are needed by learners either perfecting a skill or using it in exploratory endeavor. In practice skill models, peers and experts would all overlap but it is important to distinguish them so as to avoid the practices by which schools have rendered plentiful resources scarce.

3.6 The Economics of Educational Resources Reform

In relation to the number of potential learners there is an ample supply of educational objects, skill models, peers and experts, at every level of skill. Only the improper combining of these resources and other artificial barriers, including monopolization by a privileged class of students, make educational resources scarce. Removal of irrelevant restrictions, adequate comprehensive directories, and universal personal educational credit are all that is needed to make as much education available to everyone as he wants--wants enough, that is, to make the reasonable effort which learning sometimes requires.

Part of the money now going to the support of schools would have to go to the organization and basic maintenance of the networks described above. The rest, as much of the total as possible without jeopardizing the comprehensive character and efficient maintenance of the networks, should go to citizens in the form of educational credit, as above described. The use made of this credit in acquiring access to the resources administered by the networks should provide major, but not total, guidance to their operation. The public interest, as reflected in political rather than market behavior, should also have a voice.

The money now spent on public schools would, probably, be more than enough to provide as much education as people would want. There are three major sources of savings in comparison with the support of schools. First, school budgets are spent largely in the provision of custodial care for persons old enough not only to look after themselves but able to perform a large variety of socially useful services, the performance of which would also be highly educational. There is, thus, not only a large saving to be made on custodial care but the realization of positively useful social services from those who are now cared for. Under the proposed plan there would be a further enormous saving in that learning would occur at the initiative of the learner--he would learn what and when he wanted. Learning under these circumstances would be many times more efficient than now. Finally, the real price of educational resources would be greatly reduced by the removal of artificial restrictions on the supply and by the economics of scale implied in increasing the effective demand.

3.7 Criteria for Judging Educational Innovations

The two alternatives to schooling which I have discussed provide a basis for evaluating other innovations. The essence of the above proposals is that they counteract the tendencies of today's institutions, including the school, to shape men to the requirements of institutions rather than preparing them to shape institutions to meet human needs. I give priority to the Freire approach because it provides a positively countervailing force, exposing and otherwise offsetting existing institutional forces for the domination of man. The proposal developed by Illich and myself is, if more general, relatively neutral. It merely frees and redistributes educational resources so that men can use them as they wish. Since it is neutral rather than directly opposed to the purposes of existing institutions it may have a better chance of adoption even while these institutions still prevail. In time, implementation of our proposal would also free men from their present bondage, although not as quickly or effectively as the Freire method if that were given free rein. The criterion on which other innovations should be judged is their potential for freeing men from the bondage of their present institutions, i.e., from the bondage of the institutional habits and attitudes which they exhibit as clients, employees or citizens.

4. FREE SCHOOLS

One weakness of the free-school movement is that it is largely ancillary to schools. Most free schools exist as free-loaders, economic parasites, on schools. Their faculty services, particularly, are usually donated by individuals who draw pay from a nearby school. Their students, also, are assembled by existing school systems.

Free schools have not yet found, nor proposed, a method of financing which would make them independent of existing schools and, thus, a full-fledged alternative to them. They remain an ameliorative institution and, from the record so far, a fairly weak and transient one. The more fundamental weakness of the free school lies in its being still a school, in most important respects. It remains a means by which a privileged elite, highly selected by the very school system to which free schools are supposed alternatives, attempts to achieve alternate certification to elite occupations. There are a few free schools dedicated to education, as such, or to education aimed at the reconstruction of society. Only schools whose students, in the main, renounce their use as status ladders can make this claim. Such free schools offer true alternatives. Some might even fit into what I have designated as the Freire approach. They would, then, of course, be subject to the political problems faced by that approach.

In principle, free schools have the potential of reviving the community of scholars which was the original university and perhaps its only valid form. In fact, this eventuality appears highly unlikely so long as free schools develop in the context of a school system which monopolizes educational resources. If these resources were distributed to individuals in the form of universal educational credit, free schools might very likely develop into and survive as true communities of scholars.

5. MODERN MEDIA

Modern media are, in fact if not in principle, a more important educational innovation than free schools. McLuhan goes too far but there is much in what he says. Both the main asset and the principal liability of modern media, as an educational alternative, is that they are so unpredictable. This is an asset in that it promises to free education, regardless of anyone's intentions, of many of its present strictures. People who don't learn to read will not, therefore, be condemned to ignorance nor, necessarily, to ineffectiveness. Elvis Presley and the Beatles would probably be just as effective if they couldn't read. People can also learn computer programming without being literate, sometimes perhaps even better than if they were.

The main problem in evaluating the educational impact of modern media is the difficulty of predicting, and therefore of controlling, their development as media. Most modern media are, on the other hand, highly susceptible to centralized control of program content--or, more generally, message selection. The medium is by no means the total message. Monopoly of message control in modern media is in fact one of the major threats to man's freedom. There appears to be only one general way of avoiding the total control of men's minds which a monopoly of modern media threatens. This is true education of those who receive the messages. Some of this education may be achieved, inadvertently, by the media themselves. It is entirely possible that intensive exposure to television, early in life, may produce adults with high ability to tune out television. It would be extremely dangerous, however, to depend upon the media inoculating against themselves.

The critical educational question, with respect to modern media, is whether they will become resources for individual learners or instruments for institutions. Telephones and videophones which permit individuals to communicate are one thing, a captive television audience is another. Proliferation of movie cameras and offset presses, permitting anyone to make movies and print leaflets, is one thing, passive clients hooked on commercially or governmentally produced movies and magazines are another. The problem is not so much who controls the message--there is relatively little to choose between governments and corporations if the degree of monopoly is the same. The important point is that messages not be institutionally controlled. Establishment of schools, of press, of sight and sound, should be prohibited, just as establishments of religion are now prohibited in almost every democratic constitution. All such establishments are equally prisons for the mind of man.

If the objects required to produce and transmit as well as to receive messages of all kinds are widely available; if access to models of the skills involved in producing, transmitting and receiving these messages is widely available; then modern media can significantly contribute to educational efficiency. If critical objects and/or skills are monopolized, on the other hand, the educational process will be that much more efficiently perverted by the development of modern media--shaping man to conformity with the requirements of existing institutions rather than preparing him for the shaping of these institutions to his needs.

6. CONCLUSION

It may appear that this paper poses a dilemma for an existing institution dependent for support upon other institutions, among which many of the most powerful are dedicated to the maintenance of privilege rather than to the equalization of educational opportunity. In major part this charge is not admitted. Nevertheless, there are in every institution degrees of freedom. Many individuals, occupying key roles in all of the most powerful institutions in the world, are deeply ambivalent. They recognize that the present struggle for power and privilege cannot long continue its present course and even that any such continuance is fraught with grave dangers for mankind. Furthermore, the ideologies which most institutions propound already express the values which these institutions subvert in operation, and the proclamation of these ideologies is not wholly hypocritical. There is room for maneuver, therefore, and while not everything is possible, much can be done to free educational resources from their present shackles, and even to use them in weakening these shackles further.

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CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE:

SOME OTHER THOUGHTS

Michael Lawrence Tracy

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COUNTER CULTURE AND THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

"Mass education is a child of a mechanical age. It grew up along with the production line. It reached maturity just at that historical moment when Western civilization had attained its final extreme of fragmentation and specialization, and had mastered the linear technique of stamping out products in the mass," writes Marshall McLuhan (1962). As McLuhan's analogy suggests, the educational institution bares a striking resemblance to the production line. It provides highly fragmented and specialized services. Its sanction to categorize children by a vast labeling process gives it a rationale for existence while expanding its powers. The child is described not as an integrated whole, but as a diverse set of labels and adjectives.

The implication of the analogy is that mass education has manufactured "mass man." Utilizing the concept of normality as a master die, it impresses, shapes, and manipulates children into a mold of standardized behavior. In such a system, there is little room for deviance.

The child labeled "emotionally disturbed" is doubly deviant. He is initially deviant because he is a student. A student must be seen as deviant, since so much energy and so many resources are devoted to his socialization and assimilation. If, in addition, his behavior is hyperactive, aggressive, or hostile he is labeled deviant. His deviance cannot be tolerated. Therefore, he receives special treatment. He must be persuaded to adjust to the standardized, regimented behavior of his peers. Since this "double deviance" provides greater visibility for the child labeled "disturbed," his treatment becomes the prototype for the treatment of all children. For purposes of this discussion the disturbed child is "Everyman."

Writers of the counter culture speak directly to educators in their criticism of the child socialization patterns and institutions typical of contemporary culture. The writers have diverse backgrounds and opinions but agree in their condemnation of the status quo. No attempt will be made in this paper to represent all viewpoints or perspectives which may fall under the ample umbrella of "counter culture." No attempt is made to seek reconciliation or agreement between writers where none exists. Instead this paper will sample the writings of the counter culture, particularly those concerned with education. The underlying tenets of the counter culture will be discussed and a general historical perspective given. Among writers examining the "School As Community" are those who advocate the abolition of institutions as well as those concerned with the "process" of education apart from the institutional structure. They disagree with some of the basic assumptions made by traditional educational institutions.

(1) Counter theorists oppose the notion that education provides a

means of distributing a quantifiable set of knowledge or skills which must be mastered by each successive generation (Bestor, 1955).
(2) The traditional role of the active, knowledge-filled teacher dispensing pre-determined gems of "truth" to passive or resistant students brings, from counter theory, not only complaints of pedagogy and irrelevance, but also shouts of slavery and exploitation (Silberman, 1970: Farber, 1969: Ayres, 1968).
(3) The concept of literacy and the value system implied by it is questioned by the literature of the counter culture. Literacy is often viewed as a political device for propagandizing a population.
(4) Many writers are concerned with the dangers of all institutions and particularly the personal destruction brought about by the institution of the school. Some writers would abolish the institution; others would reform it. However, most attempt to describe innovative structures and processes which would lead to a new form of interpersonal community revolving about the educational process.

Points of Contention Within Institutionalization

Counter culture is a reaction to the growth and subsequent dehumanizing effect of service-oriented institutions that serve deviant children and detrimentally affect all children. To understand the nature of the counter culture, its reactions and the alternatives it presents, it is necessary first to examine the character of the institutions it opposes.

Society has set up institutional systems to share the responsibility for socialization and dealing with deviance. These systems have been catagorized by Rhodes and Gibbins (1972) as (1) legal, (2) medical, (3) educational, (4) social-welfare, and (5) religious. Each institution has a modus operandi, historically and philosophically characteristic of that institution. The legal-correctional institution serves by coercing, the educational by training, the medical by prescribing, the social-welfare by helping and the religious by exhorting. All these institutions direct a specific service at their target population. The service systems may be ranked in the order given from most to least controlling. It might be noted that in the past services were limited to the polar modes of coercion and exhortation. Through evolution and revision the intermediate modes of prescribing, training, and helping have been institutionalized. All changes, however, have merely established new points on the same continuum of service. Since institutional behavior is internally controlled and institutions are notoriously hard to change, the establishment of entirely new institutions is inevitable.

Traditionally, the primary institutional response to deviance has been to exclude the individual from the mainstream of the population (Szasz, 1970; Trippe, 1966). Professional groups are appointed to set criteria for re-admission. These criteria require that the deviant internalize societal norms before reentering the community. For several reasons, this process has been called into question. Several institutional studies (Cumming & Cumming, 1968; Goffman, 1961; Dunn, 1968) have shown the futility of procedures in which the criteria for exclusion and re-admission are defined, and programming efforts based on the criteria.

Counter theorists reject the entire continuum of institutional service (Pearl & Riessman, 1965: Szasz, 1970, Tracy, 1971). One of the objections is the nature of the helper-recipient contract. Such a contract is based on the assumption that the one who administers the service (teaching, therapy, rehabilitation, etc.) is superior to the recipient. Thus, the contract relegates the recipient of service to an inferior status. Further, all responsibility and accountability is assumed by the professional. The recipient of the service is powerless and cannot actively contribute to the outcome. The contract only increases the helplessness and dependency of the recipient.

A second objection of counter theorists is that societal institutions develop self-perpetuating mechanisms. In order to assure survival and growth of professional interests and institutions, these mechanisms stimulate the identification and labeling of increasing numbers of youngsters as deviant (Cohen, 1966: Matza, 1969: Mercer, 1971). Many children are repeatedly labeled by various institutions. This seemingly endless string of labels does nothing for the child, since few relevant program recommendations are made. But the labeling process is vital to social institution, for without a target population the institution cannot maintain itself.

Counter culture, of course, objects first of all to the concept of normality, a concept without definition. There can be no standard, no "grand mean" of human behavior; and there are no "natural" divisions or discrete units of behavior. The categorization, and the labels based on it, must then be totally arbitrary and therefor meaningless. The assumption of the existence of normality is more frightening, since it is the purpose of institutions to assimilate and readjust aberrant behavior to this vague model.

The revolutionary position rejects the subordination of people to any categorization scheme. The validity of the scheme itself must be examined (Scheff, 1966: Szasz, 1970; Mercer, 1965). To the extent the individual internalizes labels, to the extent that he "puts on," wears, and identifies his inner self with a set of categorical objectives given him by an exterior force, he is alienated. He tends to act in accordance with the label, to play the appropriate role. A child who is once labeled "disturbed" is treated as though he were disturbed. And such a child has no recourse but to play the role of the disturbed child. Thus the individual is not seen as an integrated whole (even by himself) but rather as a set of labels, acting out a set of roles that match the adjectives. The implications for the maintenance of racism through institutional structures is apparent (Kozol, 1967; Herndon, 1971; Thomas, 1971).

Alienation can be overcome only by a personalization of the individual, which revolutionary thought insists is impossible within an institutional structure. Thus, the philosophy of personalism is necessarily revolutionary in an institutional society.

Counter Culture and Education

The school demonstrates all the evils of institutional structure. Counter theorists object, first of all, to the basic assumption of normality. It is the "normalcy" standard, the great American mean, that gives rise to many of the ills seen in American education. Without a mean, there can be no comparison of students, and hence no deviation. The normality assumption provides an implicit sanction for racism (Crow, 1969; Kagan, 1969). If the institution can define a standard of performance and behavior, it can establish the differentness of ghetto behavior from that of the model. The deviance is then accounted for by genetic differentiation, or more explicitly, racial inferiority (Jensen, 1969; Bereiter, 1966).

The categorization scheme on which the school system is predicated demands the classification of children on the basis of various aspects of learning and behavior. One example is unit grading; children are assigned to a grade on the basis of age; then discrete units of learning and behavior are deemed appropriate for that grade. The expected performance at any level is totally arbitrary. No two children in the first grade could possibly share equivalent learning experiences. To expect all children to master the same quantum of knowledge in an arbitrary time interval is an absurdity. Yet this standardization persists.

Interval years of learning as a classification scheme is based on the notion of a closed linear set of knowledge. It assumes that a student cannot understand concept C until he has mastered concepts A and B. Knowledge, as presented by the school curriculum, is hierarchial in nature. A fourth grader cannot read a sixth grade book because, of course, he has not yet read the fifth grade text. A hierarchial body of knowledge provides another basis for sorting and classifying students that bears little resemblance to their learning experiences.

Children are also sorted on the basis of intelligence and behavior, thus fostering the growth of special education. Within classification schemes based on intelligence and behavior, there is a proliferation of categories. Counter theorists reject the proliferation of categories and the parallel fragmentation of specialization. Their response is deinstitutionalization. Their aversion to institutions has roots in the history of the counter culture phenomenon.

Evolution of Counter Culture

Reacting to the overwhelming, pervasive effect of institutionalization on our society, two radical movements are developing alternative means of dealing with socialization and deviance in children. Their efforts demonstrate a deep commitment to existential thought. The first of these groups are neo-humanists (Goodman, 1960; Kohl, 1967; Perls, 1969) who seek to reform and redirect the professional child servers to provide more appropriate services within the context of existing institutions. The second group rejects the concept of reform and redirection and seeks the destruction of present institutions. This paper will present primarily the views of the latter group, although both factions avow a common "radical thought."

Although the writers of revolution diverge in many directions, they share a common broad philosophical position based on a hybridization of Marxian insight into the development of man and existential thought on individual alienation.

Though at first glance existentialism and Marxism seem unrelated, they are not irreconcilable. Contrary to the position of behavioral science, existentialism sees time as a determinant of human behavior. Each man's experience is uniquely his own and cannot be separated from the context of time and setting (Green, 1966). Unfortunately, this highly subjective viewpoint has not facilitated the development of the existential position as other than a critical view of man. Programmatic implications about socialization and deviance in children have not developed. The existential goal of socialization is growth and adaptation through optimal utilization of individual experience (Macquarrie, 1955). This goal does not conflict with Marxist thought.

The marriage of Marxism and existentialism in revolutionary thought may be seen as a reaction to contemporary political philosophy. However, the roots of the movement can be traced to the nineteenth century. Institutional functions in society arose to augment the Industrial Revolution. The concept of more efficient utilization of resources through specialization of tasks is based on the well-articulated rational position of Kant (Wright, 1941; Turner, 1967). His deification of the human mind becomes the core characteristic of the then emerging and now dominant middle class in Western culture. His assumption of total rationality denies the existences of solutions to problems outside the realm of logic. His concept of individual freedom frees men of obligation to their fellow man so long as they can logically justify their own behavior. A way of life characterized by "rugged individualism" ensured the maintenance and extension of a classed society and the colonial structure which supported it.

The idea that anything may be thought moral as long as it can be justified before the "bar of reason" led liberal-capitalist thinkers of the 19th century (Gilson, et al; 1962) to reject all institutional philosophy beyond the limits of their own bourgeois system. Man is morally bound to avoid influencing his fellow man and he is not responsible for the behavior of his fellow man. One man's losses are justifiably the gains of another. The exploitation "veiled in religious and political illusions" is replaced with an overt economic and political exploitation justified by individual freedom. The manufacturer replaces the feudal lord as slave-master; but the masses remain the slaves, alienated from the social and economic power base.

In response to the system of laissez faire "rugged individualism," the Marxist philosophy of the classless state developed (Aptheker, 1965). The intent of this philosophy and the consequent revolution was to assure the lower classes of social justice. The classless state rejects the economic domination of one group by another. The dominant middle-class manufacturer is replaced by a representative of the workers who is accountable to them through the government. While this change does eliminate domination by a minority, it does nothing to avoid the alienation that the individual worker feels as a result of industrialization.

In summary, the individualistic laissez faire economic system supports the growth and development of an industrialized society. This type of society, however, allows evils to be perpetrated on the lower classes: 1) domination, and 2) alienation. The historical Marxist philosophy deals with the danger of domination but in its pure form ignores the evils of alienation.

Contemporary Marxist philosophy has been extended to deal with the issue of alienation of the worker. A blend of Marxist political thought and existential personal philosophy focuses on this problem (Odajnsyk, 1965). The goal is the provision of a system of social justice in which the individual can assure himself of a personally satisfying existence. A major problem is the tendency for societal institutions to insulate the individual from himself. If the individual determines who he is on the basis of his membership in one or more institutional structures, to that extent he becomes personally alienated. This process is complicated by the institutional tendency to become specialized and impersonal.

The alienation process occurs in all societal institutions whether economic, political, religious, medical, educational, etc. In any industrialized society, whether capitalist or Marxist, institutions are set up which generate professional roles within themselves. Persons employed by these institutions no longer are addressed as persons (i.e. Dr., Father, Judge Wagner, etc.). The professionals in these institutions have merged their own personal identification so completely with their role in the institution that they are no longer seen as accountable outside their institution. To maintain this autonomy, the professionals insulate themselves from those whom they serve by labeling them as clients rather than as consumers of a service. By such labeling and through specialization, the professional roles insure the maintenance of the status quo. Both ascribed roles, that of professional and that of client, alienate the individuals who fill them. The roles artificially discourage opportunities for intimacy and personal identification. This depersonalization and alienation allows the individual to project the responsibility for his own behavior onto the generic role, thus eliminating any personal accountability. Aside from creating numerous personal problems, this process recreates the pattern of domination that socialism sought to redress.

The educational institution has reflected these political and economic philosophies more than it has shaped them. The personal alienation which occurred as man's behavior fell more and more under the aegis of specialized institutions was compounded as the school emerged as a principal instrument of socialization. The school was made the mold from which emerged masses of students with "appropriate" skills. Furthermore, the process of education and teacher-pupil interactions was heavily tainted with the evils of domination and alienation.

EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE COMMUNITY

The protests of the counter culture, whether demands for the abolition of institutions or plans for modifying present structures, may be viewed as striving toward a re-definition of "community." ("Community"is used here in the sense of a structure for interpersonal relationships.) No longer content with the types of relationships created by present institutional forms, writers of counter culture advocate that the educational institution be eliminated or changed at all levels to promote a different type of educational process involving radically different forms of interpersonal relationships. The definition of the community varies with different writers. Some are concerned with the role of education at a national and international level while others speak of a teacher and a child. This writer has arrived at the following definition of community to describe the dimension along which the literature of counter culture has been sampled:

> "Community is defined as the dynamic balance of mutually satisfactory reciprocal roles in a setting designed to achieve human potential."

The reciprocal roles may involve several nations, or nations and the governed, as a teacher and a student. It is the process and content of their interaction which is the concern of counter-theorists.

The term "community" connotes interdependence with individual integrity and respect. Though cooperation and mutual benefit is stressed, most writers emphasize the importance of the individual and his right to authority over his existence. To all of these writers, the contemporary institution of the school is incompatible with the fostering of such "community."

Community Within the Classroom

Most criticism of present classroom structure and process stems from the "achievement orientation" impressed on the school during the "Sputnik competition" of the 1950's. Governmental influence in the form of funds from the National Education Defense Act greatly emphasized the schools' function as producer of a product. Great emphasis was put upon academic study, competition and glorification of intellect. The few non-academic goals acknowledged by educators such as physical and mental health, social learnings and extra-curricular interests were labeled as "frills" and luxuries (Conant, 1961; Silberman, 1970)." Labels also proliferated within the classroom. In order to accomplish the competitive and intellectual goals of the school, children were sorted and categorized as to their academic aptitude. Special education mushroomed and classes for the educably retarded, socially maladjusted, emotionally disturbed, slow learners and other such ambiguously derived categories became the "dumping grounds" for children falling from the academic sieve (Trippe, 1966; Dunn, 1969).

This sudden preoccupation with "academics" facilitated and augmented the work of such cognitive psychologists as Bruner (1966) and Piaget (1963). Their theories, however, were widely misunderstood and misused. Their constructs of "stages of growth" were used as rigid categorical systems into which children were pigeonholed. The concept of individual differences espoused by cognitive theorists was de-emphasized in the drive to bring all children to a "golden mean" of behavior and performance. To defend this system and its goals, means were devised to segregate the children who for some reason could not "keep up" in the classroom. The segregated classrooms were then provided with a "watered down" curriculum to occupy the children until they could legally be excused from school. "Progressive" schools devised materials which, when presented to the deviant child, attempted to "remediate his disability" or reprogram the child to fit back into the system (McCarthy & McCarthy, 1969; Peter, 1965).

The absurdity of such linear programming providing no viable alternatives was demonstrated by a physicist, Jerrold Zacharias (1968), whose case for an individualized curriculum is based upon the scientifically-oriented "discovery method." A chief contribution of Zacharias is the notion that the child must be an active, inquiring participant in the acquisition of knowledge. The teacher's role, through the selection and presentation of materials, is to aid the child in his own unique method of discovering scientific facts, laws, etc. The academically-oriented goal has not really changed for Zacharias but the non-directive methodology re-establishes the importance of individual differences, creates fewer "deviants," and gives the child a more active role in the learning process.

The content and goals of the curriculum are the targets of writers advocating the inclusion of materials and methods concerning affect or emotion in the school's program. Leonard's Education and Ecstasy (1968) and Jones' Fantasy and Feeling in Education (1968) are both attempts to "re-humanize" the curriculum. Jones (1968) attempted to demonstrate that education without affect produced a learner devoid of internal motivation. The introduction of affect into the curriculum by stressing interpersonal relations and by fostering a sense of interdependence or "community" is seen as facilitating the learning process.

This "pseudo-dichotomy" between the cognitive and affective goals of the schools is related to the contention of Cleaver (1968) that black men are aware of their bodies and not their minds while the opposite holds true for white men. Cleaver's prescription for world community rests on the assumption that by coming together black and white may help one another to integrate mind and body into a fully functioning being.

A combination of the emphasis upon affect and "community" and upon the active, exploratory participation of the child in the learning process is found in current practices in British Infant and Junior School programs. Based upon the Plowden Report (Central Advisory Committee, 1967) and described in glowing terms by American Joseph Featherston (1967), the "Infant School idea" has been a model for radical American "free schools" as well as for innovative programming in public schools. The environment is structured around an "activity center" in which children are free to explore many interests. Provision is made for many activities of an affective nature, such as drama, art and music. Group problem-solving activities such as those of Randolph (1967) are introduced as a means of achieving a learning community. Unfortunately the structure of these Infant Schools is not easily imposed upon the American public schools, since the British schools tend to serve children from the working class who are not expected to achieve academically. Few studies have adequately described the success of such schools in preparing children for higher education.

Nevertheless, new approaches to classrooms are proliferating, most in reaction to the absence of affective content or child participation in the traditional classroom. Recently two surveys of the American educational scene were conducted. Gross and Gross (1969) reviewed the "radical" education literature on the assumption that though "radical," these approaches were the vanguard of more generalized change. Silberman (1970) conducted the most prestigious and comprehensive study today of the American educational system and concluded that the concerns voiced by the educational "radicals" and the alternatives they offer are valid and viable. Silberman also supports the "radical" contention that contemporary schooling is devastating not only to the child labeled as deviant (where the adversive effects of the system are blatant and obvious) but also to the "normal" child where damaging effects are not always so easily detected.

Documentation of the futility and absurdity of the traditional elementary classroom is given by Holt (1964) in his personal journal How Children Fail. Both the content and the pedagogy of the classroom fall under attack as Holt illustrates mechanisms for insuring failure in the classroom. A follow-up effort, How Children Learn (Holt, 1969), is an attempt to go beyond criticism and offer alternatives for classroom practice. Most of these alternatives focus upon removing the artificial barriers separating adult and child in the learning situation. Holt places the burden of change upon the teacher, since most of his suggestions modify the teacher role. The teacher becomes more a designer of a learning setting rather than a dispenser of knowledge. However, few if any suggestions are offered for a "support system" to aid the teacher in the redefinition of role. Holt has had great insight into the problems of the learner, but unless the total system is prepared to support a change in approach, no lasting change will occur.

The relationship of teacher and pupil is also the interest of Jonathan Kozol (1967) in his vivid descriptions of life in an urban ghetto school. He illustrates the cleavage between the culture of the dominating white, middle-class faculty and administration and that of the dominated black and Puerto Rican students. The school is depicted as destroying the lives of children as it denigrates their ethnic culture. Ghetto children are labeled as inferior if they show resistance to being pressed into a middle class mold. The documentation of the dehumanization occurring when attempts are made by teachers to enculturate children are no more chilling than the descriptions of teacher alienation when an attempt is made to teach these children in a nontraditional manner. Kozol finds no alternative but to close the schools or permit the domination of children.

Kohl (1967) in his analysis of this dilemma offers a possible alternative in the establishment of community between teacher and children of disparate cultures. Kohl's experience in a ghetto school led him to create a classroom atmosphere which would be instructive both to teacher and to children--both cultures meet and learn from one another. Kohl, too, may be adjudged a failure since he eventually left the classroom. He did, however, make several significant contributions toward the goal of educational change. He demonstrates the absurdity of attempting to implement a "valueless," "culture fair" curriculum in a school setting composed of persons from conflicting cultures.

In a classroom the value of the dominant culture are found in the organization of the building, the curriculum, and the roles assumed by participants. Kohl suggests it is the adult's responsibility to explain the cultural biases to the children and to assist them in an almost "sociopathic" pseudoadaptation to them. Kohl builds his curriculum on this compromise, using the thesis of Margaret Mead (1970) that the responsibility of one generation to the next is to teach the process of growth, but not to dictate the content of it. Kohl attempts to implement the process of education using the content which children bring with them. Though this approach moves beyond traditional classroom goals, one must question the necessity for compromising conflicting value systems.

The creation of community, despite cultural differences, is portrayed by Hentoff (1966) in his description of Elliot Shapiro's attempt to humanize and revitalize a ghetto school. This account is different from most in that the "change agent" is a school administrator rather than a teacher. The opinions of a prominent social critic, Hentoff, also enhance this book.

A change of pace occurs with James Herndon's books (Herndon, 1966) since he espouses no theoretically oriented criticism, nor does he delineate a viable alternative. Any generalities or conclusions must be those of the reader. The author describes the successes and failures of a teacher working in a system of which he thoroughly disapproves. Such books, though not often cited in reviews of the literature, may finally spark the changes needed to make classrooms into true communities.

Community in a School

The arguments of some writers are directed toward the general school complex or total curriculum rather than at specific classroom structure. Paul Goodman, for example, represents the extreme in criticism of the nature of the system. He is particularly concerned with issues relating to fundamental teacher-student relationships. His writings concentrate upon what is wrong with the system of schooling and few alternatives are offered (Goodman, 1964). Goodman admits that his criticisms demand changes which cannot be instituted, but defends his position as one of philosophy--the burden of change implementation not falling upon his shoulders.

A reorganization of the school and its curriculum is advocated by Fantini and Weinstein (1968). Falling under the rubric of "humanistic education," their program efforts attempt to achieve a proper balance in cognitive and affective education. Their emphasis is on the establishment of a curriculum relevant to student growth needs and one which offers choice and student participation. Their curriculum, designed to make real "contact" with the student at a basic need level, is based on an idea similar to that of Sylvia Ashton-Warner's "organic reading" approach (Ashton-Warner, 1967). The "contact curriculum" is designed to help the student answer the questions and fulfill the needs which he, the learner, feels most relevant. This curriculum involves the learner as an active participant in its formulation and execution.

Such learner participation is labeled as "subversive" to the system by Postman and Weingartner (1969) and they whole-heartedly support the concept. The critical condition in achieving change in the educational system according to Postman and Weingartner is that students have the responsibility for reform.

Recently,"reform community" schools have been established with the goal of implementing reform outside of the established school system. One of the most cited efforts was the Ann Arbor Community School (Ayres, 1968). The school was based upon the felt need for children to have an arena in which they could experiment and experience success and failure, without the usual adult-imposed consequences. Many cultures provide for such natural and spontaneous activity free from adult domination but the American culture appears schizophrenic in its approach-avoidance attitude toward childhood freedom. (Friedenburg, 1962, has documented the curious American phenomenon of the glorification and simultaneous elimination of adolescence.) The Ann Arbor Community School in attempting to meet this need for total freedom and total acceptance was eventually closed because of criticism involving the lack of consequences for behavior (Ayres, 1968) The Ann Arbor experience was only one of many, however, which are rapidly developing across the country as an alternative for people disenchanted with public schools.

A whole new literature has begun to develop as these "radical schools" set up communication linkages in the form of newsletters and journals. One of the foremost of such efforts is This Magazine Is About Schools, a quarterly offering articles by "radical" educators, poems and writings by children, and anti-war, anti-establishment literature, and classified advertisements. It is the official organ of an experimental school in Toronto, a center for "new school" activity. The "New Schools Exchange" in California serves a similar function with a newsletter format and less emphasis upon articles.

"Freedom Schools" (O'Gorman, 1970) have been established in storefronts in urban areas where ghetto children do not succeed in public schools. These schools report a great deal of success in teaching basic skills by accepting the value system of the recipient culture and formulating goals congruent with demands of that culture.

A children's community in a ghetto area is described by George Dennison (1969) in his account of the First Street School. Here are documented the triumphs and problems of the first year of a "radical" school as seen by the director-teacher. Composed of a few dedicated teachers and serving those children rejected as "unteachable" by the public and parochial schools, the First Street School utilized the principles of student participation in curriculum formulation and execution, extensive "field trips" and an informal teacher-learner relationship. The account might well serve as a handbook for others initiating such an effort.

Expanding the Learning Community Beyond a School

The participation of children in curriculum design and the emphasis upon relevance to the learner, is leading "radical educators" more and more outside the walls of a school setting. Though "field trips" as an enrichment activity are found in even the most rigid and orthodox public school classroom, the concept of shared, first-hand learning "on location" as a major part of the curriculum is a keystone of most new school efforts. Some efforts seem to aim toward an almost apprenticeship approach to education.

The Philadelphia Public Schools have an experimental high school program which has been described as a model of "open education" on a secondary level (Greenberg & Roush, 1970). The Parkway Program and its "school without walls" concept places students in the community in various apprenticeship roles. Small group discussions are held in various storefronts and art and music enjoyed at municipal institutions. This program attempts to utilize all aspects of the city which have something to offer students--whether it be a job skill or more academic or artistic pursuits. The Parkway School derives its name from the fact that most of its resources in the form of industry, business and service institutions lie along the Philadelphia Parkway.

Though subjected to the criticisms of "tokenism" by "radicals" and to cries of irrelevance by some educators decrying visits to the Philadelphia Museum of Art by the illiterate, the effort may provide a glimpse of a new approach to secondary education. Perhaps the criticisms raised reflect the American culture's ambivalence in granting freedom and license on one hand while constricting growth simultaneously. The demands of critics seem to say that the students should have the freedom to choose, but only those things which are deemed "best for them."

Should education become the arena wherein cultural expectations and personal goals confront each other and are negotiated? Brazilian educator, Paulo Friere (1970), has answered in the affirmative, while the Brazilian government responded in the negative to his largely successful campaign to erase illiteracy by using the entire community as the learning setting. Friere argues that schools should take the teaching of values and the promotion of self-growth out of the philosophical realm and put them into a political one. To Friere, controlled schooling is an anti-educational vehicle for the control of the masses. Dominant groups maintain control through the schooling process. This contention is in agreement with the statement by McLuhan that a minimal level of literacy is necessary before successful domination of tribal cultures is achieved. Friere believes that the educational establishment fosters the manipulation of the masses by an elite oligarchy through the content and process of its teaching. Literacy is purposely kept at animal levels for political purposes. Too ignorant or too educated a populace is dangerous to govern.

Planned illiteracy is only one method of control which the school imposes on those who pass through its doors. Its system of categorization for deviance, the content of its courses and the relationship established between teacher and pupil all may have great political significance. The mandate for the use of these devices is given the school by the literate oligarchy. For this reason, Illich (1970) maintains that all attempts at change within the educational system are doomed to being co-opted by the educational source of power. Illich insists that instead of attempting to achieve a more open or egalitarian educational system, one should, instead, "de-school" society. This can be achieved by removing all forms of institutionalized education. By removing the vestiges of imposed curriculum and values, the individual would then be freed to learn. The criteria for learning may then be shifted from a normative or parametric standard to one based upon the individual's achievement in terms of self-growth. The learning community expanded to the individual and his culture may then provide the primary goal as a celebration of awareness (Illich, 1970).

COUNTER CULTURE ALTERNATIVES

The protests of the counter culture might be summarized as dealing with three types of recommendations:

1) A new advocacy for deviance.
2) A search for new socialization patterns.
3) A reformation of the educational institution.

Advocacy for Deviance

Marcuse (1964) has taken a position advocating deviance in the individual. He rejects tolerance of deviance, since "tolerance" implies that deviance is not a desirable thing, but a necessary evil. At present, tolerance of deviance is limited by characteristics of the socializing institutions which see themselves as responsible for man's behavior. Each institution has its own definition of "correct" behavior, and cannot tolerate behavior which is beyond its particular definition. For example, in some school systems, children who do not conform to the behavior norms are required to be removed from regular classrooms. Furthermore, each institution feels responsible for only a subset of behaviors that are limited by time parameters (a school's responsibility is only for the duration of the school day), or situational parameters (a hospital clinic is not responsible for aftercare).

Man's tolerance for deviance is also limited by the nature of the socialization process itself. As Montesquieu points out, man most primitive is not in fact most desirable. As man takes on, in addition to his animal nature, the components of thinking and rationality, he becomes a more "purified being." Then when, as Rousseau (Archer, 1964) points out, he enters into complex human relationships, the evils of society, specifically domination and alienation, get in the way of man's function. Traditionally, man puts limits on his relationships in order that his ability to deal with deviance is not taxed. Man usually imposes a qualitative limit; that is, he extrudes certain types of behavior and the persons who indulge in them. Deviants are categorized and excluded.

An alternative to "tolerance" of deviance is to advocate deviance as a right of citizenship. This position is in direct conflict with institutional tolerance of deviance. As institutions develop, more and more institutional forms are created. Durkheim (1939) described the specialization which occurs as a result of the phenomenon of division of labor. It may be seen as a contract situation, in which the individual gives up certain rights and responsibilities when he participates in a representative democracy or in a mental health institution or in an education institution. The individual personally creates a form of institutional domination, and sets up the criterion for interpersonal diffusion or alienation.

On the other hand, the advocate for deviance places the responsibility for behavior upon the individual. It is not possible to exclude an individual on the basis of his behavior. When a community of men becomes complex beyond its ability to advocate for deviance, some criteria for exclusion becomes necessary. However, those individuals who advocate for deviance do not support arbitrary qualitative exclusion of the individual. Instead, they suggest an egalitarian cut-off point, beyond which the size of the community is no longer viable. Rather than using a complicated rationale for excluding individuals, one then excludes a person because there is no room. Each basic human group consists of a limited number of individuals, all of whom are part of a mutual feedback system. Individual responsibility within the group is for providing behavioral feedback to one another. The call is for a community which, while limited in size, advocates for deviance, and one in which the only criterion for membership is humanity. Means of obtaining this type of society are now developing.

Alternative Socialization Patterns

The second component of counter culture is the search for an alternative means of socialization outside of the institutional setting. While some of these proposals seem to replace the existing institution with another one such as substituting a day care center for home child rearing, many writers do indeed advocate the abolition of institutions. The school has come under particular attack as an outmoded form of socialization maintained to foster the domination of the masses by an intellectual and economic oligarchy. The institution of the Church has probably been the site of the greatest such erosion (Cox, 1965) and the decline in influence of the home has been well-documented (Mead, 1970). Counter theorists maintain that these signs of institutional atrophy are not omens of ill fortune as usually purported, but rather healthy signs of a society throwing off the yoke of institutional oppression for a new freedom for the individual.

Reformation of the Educational Institution

The third component proposed by revolutionaries involves the reconstituting of the teaching-learning contract. The nature of the present teaching-learning contract delineates the entire responsibility for learning with the institution. The school system determines the substance and nature of that learning, the student is only a passive recipient of that learning. He shares no responsibility for his learning, and hence, no accountability. If the learning fails, the institution can be blamed.

But counter theorists hope to revise this contract such that both teacher and student share equal responsibility for the outcome. To achieve this, the student must be a full participant in the learning process. He must be able to determine his own needs, interests, and resources and negotiate these with the system to produce an outcome for which he is fully accountable. Sharing equal partnership to the teacher in this contract, the teacher becomes a resource and facilitator in the learning process. As a resource, the teacher can help the student determine his needs and resources, not determine them for him. This gives autonomy to both teacher and student. And it is the only way in which both student and teacher can act as truly free agents in a contract of mutual consent and responsibility.

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AN OVERVIEW: TOWARD SYNTHESIS OF MODELS OF DISTURBANCE

William C. Rhodes

TOWARD SYNTHESIS

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I. THE PARADIGM OF THE WHOLE

A. Differences in Part-Whole Emphasis

No matter which theory we examine, we find consensus regarding emotional disturbance as a property of an action system or field, composed of man and environment bound together by various equilibriating forces. There are different ways of picturing this composite system and the relative contributions of parts of the system to the disturbance of the whole. Some theories employ a basically reductionist approach to the disturbed whole, treating it as revolving around separate individuals, whose separate actions when taken together form the whole. The distinction between man and his environment is usually sharply drawn. The functions of individual and environment are divided into two distinct realms, with the disturbance pictured as residing primarily in the relationship of the individual to the environment.

Other theories begin with the whole as a composite system whose distinctive characteristics are greater than the sum of its component parts. This composite whole has its own controlling and regulating principles independent of the individuals within it. (This is true in many ecological, sociological, and existential theories.) The distinction between the environment and the individual is less sharply drawn by these "systems" theorists. The behavior of one individual is part of the environment of another individual, so that behaviors of individuals are also components of the behavior of the environments.

For some of the wholistic theories, almost all properties of the whole are incorporated into "environment." This is common among sociological theories. The individual is considered almost as though he was an indistinguishable part of an aggregate body. His independent responsivity is treated as though it is a simple representation of collective responsivity. The individual is a faint, shadowy reflection of the group.

Other wholistic theories (such as ecological and existential theories) feature the individual as a distinguishable subsidiary part of the whole, with an independent history and an individual, reciprocal effect upon the whole.

The additive theories arrive at the whole through the summation of the elemental units, although they do attempt to reduce the whole to some ultimate building block material (as in the biogenetic theories) or an ultimate energy source (as in psychodynamic or behavioral theories). The synthesis systemic theories (such as ecological, sociological, and existential theories) begin with the composite whole and look at its influence upon the parts (man and environment) within the whole. The whole regulates its component parts, and the fate of a part depends upon its place in the whole.

The differences in part-whole emphasis among models becomes apparent only in the detailed elaboration of their theories. If we return to fundamental doctrine in the models, these differences fade in importance. All look upon disturbance as referring to a process of painful disequilibration. To use Freud's description of the relationship between man and environment, "They are firmly mortised together (1958, p. 138)" in their tensions and actions.

B. Behavioral Theories

Pavlov, for instance, isolated the conditioned reflex as the mortising force which bound the reflexive actions of environment and organism into a composite whole. Out of the flux and change of the energy properties of environment and the energy properties of organisms acting upon each other, a mutually binding connecting force, the "reflex," organizes the mutual actions into a predictable behavioral system. In his Nobel speech, delivered in Stockholm in 1904, Pavlov said that the animal organism as a system exists in surrounding nature only because of the continous equilibration of this system with the environment; i.e., thanks to definite reactions of the living system to stimulation reaching it from without. He contended that this equilibration of the field is ensured first by the simplest unconditioned reflexes (such as coughing when foreign substances enter the larynx) as well as by the most complex ones, which are usually known as instincts--alimentary, defensive, sexual and others. Unconditioned reflexes are caused both by internal agents within the organism and by external agents. But the equilibrium attained by these reflexes is complete only when there is absolute constancy of the external environment. Since the latter is always fluctuating, the unconditioned connections are not sufficient; they must be supplemented by conditioned reflexes. Here we have conditioning mortising the two realms of active matter into a new energy form composed of both--behavior.

Gantt (1944), further explicated the equilibrating process occurring in the pattern of shared action between the individual and his surrounding environment when he described the reflexes as:

> ...variable, fluctuating, appearing, disappearing, symbolizing, substituting reactions, when a delicate equilibrium is maintained in a system surrounded by a changing environment where the system itself is perpetually changing.
>
> (Gantt, 1944, p. 6)

Thus, although the total patterning process is reduced to a basic exchange unit--the reflex--nevertheless, the constant flux which is the organism and the constant flux which is the environment are brought together as an enduring, predictable pattern by the reflex. The process brings about patterned constancy of expressed energy (behavior) out of the flux of stimuli (environment and reactions).

In more recent expressions of behavioral theory there is a decided shift to environmental control of the equilibration between man and environment. Here, "environment" becomes a man-made or social agent which, by its particularized patterning, determines whether or not certain acts or behaviors of the organism are maladaptive or adaptive.

In discussing maladaption, Skinner pictures disturbance as an emotional by-product of control by various social agencies such as religion, family, government and legal agencies. This by-product has come about as a result of punishment (1953, p. 367).

> What is "wrong" with the individual who displays these by-products of punishment is easily stated. A particular personal history has produced an organism whose behavior is disadvantageous or dangerous. In what sense it is disadvantageous or dangerous must be specified in each case by noting the consequences both to the individual and to others.
>
> (Skinner, 1953, p. 372)

The explicit inclusion of society, social roles, cultural expectations and social control as the baseline for determination of disturbing consequences of individual behavior is clearer in current behavioral theories.

> The person whose behavior is maladaptive does not fully live up to the expectations for one in his role, does not respond to all the stimuli actually present, and does not obtain the typical or maximum form of reinforcement available to one of his status.... Maladaptive behavior is behavior that is considered inappropriate by those key people in a person's life who control reinforcers.
>
> (Ullman and Krasner, 1965, p. 20)

From this statement we conclude that the environment not only produces the disturbing consequences to certain individual behaviors, but also actively codifies behaviors into appropriate or inappropriate kinds at the moment of their occurrence. Here we have the picture of a negative refluence between the behaviors of individuals and the behaviors of environment as constituting disturbance and maladaptation.

Current behaviorists simplify the complexity of this refluence by focusing upon very specific, discrete, behaviors as the sign of maladaptation between a specific organism and a specific environment. They seem to imply that this is the extent of maladaptation and that it can be thus isolated as a phenomenon. However, in the much neglected experimental neurosis studies of W. H. Gantt (1944) the wholistic nature of the disturbance--at least as it is measured within the individual organism--is more clearly demonstrated. Disturbance is shown to be a very general phenomenon:

> In any measurement that we make--whether general behavior, motor, secretatory, respiratory, cardiac, metabolic--it is imperative to recognize that no single measure represents the whole picture. We are, so to speak, fishing in the stream of life, and bring up only that for which we have appropriate bait.
>
> (Gantt, 1944, p. 21)

In reporting on individual dogs, Gantt demonstrates the interplay between environmental and organismic events. One can see, in a global fashion, the way in which insults, drastic shifts, intense stimulation, or inordinate demands from the environment place extraordinary strain upon the adaptive capacities of the organism and the equilibration between organism and environment. One can observe how the genetically established adaptive patterns within individuals, released by natural or given stimuli in the environment, can be radically altered, deformed, or transformed by artificial, external intervention into this equilibration. One can also see how a shift from one environment (the laboratory) to another (a farm) can bring about diminution of the intensity of experimental neurosis in an animal and a return to equilibration between the dog and his environment, or the creation of a new Gestalt for the organism.

C. Analytic Theories

In current analytic theory we find very close agreement with current behavioral theory. Heinz Hartmann (1958) says:

> Thus adaptation is primarily a reciprocal relationship between the organism and its environment (Hartmann, p. 24), and ...individual propensities which amount to disturbance in one social group or locus may fulfill a socially essential function in another (p. 32).

He acknowledges that adaptation is a central concept in psychoanalysis:

> Now adaptation---though we do not discuss its implications frequently or thoroughly---is a central concept of psychoanalysis, because many of our problems, when pursued far enough, converge on it (p. 22).

The psychoanalytic interpretation of the nature of derangements in adaptation between individual and environment is clearly stated in Freud's Civilization and its Discontents. He pictures civilization as racked by conflict and torment due to the constant battle between "eternal Eros" on one hand and aggression and destruction on the other. He depicted the whole of communal life as being deranged by this conflict and looked upon man-made culture as the possible counteracting force. He says:

> The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural processes developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction (pp. 143-144).

Although psychoanalysis is accused of locating disturbance in the individual alone, Freud himself was not guilty of such reductionism. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud described the processes of individual development and the cultural processes in humanity as the same process:

> When, however, we compare the cultural processes in humanity with the processes of development or upbringing in an individual human being, we shall conclude without much hesitation that the two are very similar in nature, if not in fact the same process applied to a different kind of object (p. 133).

He then goes on to discuss the conflict between the individual's striving for happiness and the culture's striving to create a single unity out of individual men and women. The conflict is resolved when the happiness of the individual includes the need to be incorporated into the community. There is, then, a community superego and it is possible for a community system--possibly even the whole of humanity--to become neurotic under the pressure of civilizing trends.

Psychoanalysis has always been cognizant of the fact that the "reciprocal neurosis" of individual and environment can be modified by changes in the environment, as well as by changes in the individual. Hartmann (1958) highlights the wholistic nature of maladaptation by discussing the three ways in which maladaptation can be brought about:

1. Adaptation may occur through changes which the individual effects in his environment. This was called "alloplastic" adaptation by Freud.

2. It may come about by appropriate changes in the psychophysical system. This was called "autoplastic" adaptation by Freud, and it is the type of adaptation given most attention by psychoanalysis.

3. It may come about by the individual choosing a new environment which is advantageous to his functioning (adaptiogenesis).

Hartmann places these three methods of adaptation into a systems context when he says:

> Man not only adapts to the community but also actively participates in creating the conditions to which he must adapt. Man's environment is molded increasingly by man himself. Thus the crucial adaptation which man has to make is to the social structure, and his collaboration in building it (p. 31).

D. Sociological Theories

Durkheim, (1950), presenting a sociogenic point of view outlines a patterned field of exchange and regulation between environment and individuals, similar to the view of the psychogenic theorists already discussed. He sees the function of the whole as regulation of its component parts. The fate of an individual part is dependent on its place in the whole. Society is seen as a collective force structuring and containing basic needs of individuals. Although Durkheim does not devote much attention to the development of the need concept, as do the psychogenic theorists, the concept is central to his thinking.

An interdependence exists between social norms and human needs. Human needs are unlimited and indefinitely expandable. Man's activity is bounded only by group norms, by social limits. Without such external limitations man's needs expand to the point where they cannot possibly be fulfilled. This leads to individual frustration and to the pain of unlimited needs...of anomie. The result is a proliferation of socially deviant behavior.

In societies in transition, the patterns of consensus are loosened just as the other basic patterns of the society are loosened. The solid framework of social norms is broken up, and this disintegration is reflected in the release of men's needs from their social containment.

For Durkheim, the locus of the major equilibrator is in the environment, in social norms. Durkheim, like Freud, finds that disturbance predates the individual, and exists within the composite whole. It is a chronic state of societies.

Durkheim relates anomie to a particular type of suicide--anomic suicide, which "...results from man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent suffering (p.258)."

The discussion of anomic suicide is a special corollary of Durkheim's more general thesis expressed in The Rules of Sociological Method. This thesis states that the collective inclination is a reality in itself, exterior to the individual and exercising a coercive effect upon him. Individual inclination reflects collective inclination which, in turn, reflects the social structure in which the individual lives. The whole is not an additive phenomenon. It is something other than its parts and exerts great influence upon its parts.

When common views are well articulated and organized (as in Catholicism, for instance), there is a reduction in the rate of deviation (as in suicide, for instance). Suicide is condemned in Catholicism, therefore, individual suicide is relatively infrequent. Protestantism, however, which stresses individual thought and individual views, has a lesser hold over the individual. He is not tightly bound to the group and suicide is more likely to occur.

When there is a sudden and violent breach in social equilibrium, there is an accompanying breach in the network of collective views on life. The adjustment between the individual and the common belief system is loosened, and man experiences anomie. Under such circumstances we see a rise of individual deviations.

In Suicide, Durkheim demonstrated that different geographical areas, ethnic groups or populations have different rates of suicide. The characteristic suicide rate for a specific population in a particular place remains stable across the years (unless the particular society undergoes a drastic upset or change), no matter what individuals inhabit the place and population.

In his study he demonstrated that this characteristic rate of suicide was even more uniform than deaths within the same populations which could be attributed to exterior material forces such as climate, temperature, etc. We must, therefore, admit, he says, that "moral" facts such as suicide depend, to a great extent , upon forces external to the individual.

> Wholly different are the results when we forget the individual and sought the causes of the suicidal aptitude of each society in the nature of the societies themselves. The relations of suicide to certain states of social environment are as direct and constant as its relations to facts of a biological and physical character were seen to be uncertain and analogous.
> (Durkheim, 1951, p. 299)

The capacity of specific environments to replicate again and again rates of characteristic deviations even with complete turnover of individuals within its boundaries has been demonstrated again and again by sociology, psychiatry and psychology. Durkheim has pointed out the fact that the population of Paris renews itself very rapidly; yet the Paris share of total French suicides remains practically the same. Ecological studies of delinquency have demonstrated the same phenomemon. These same studies have further demonstrated that distinctive geographical parts (or natural areas) of a city also have characteristic rates, if the natural area remains unchanged, no matter who inhabits them (Shaw, et al., 1929, 1942). Faris and Dunham (1939) repeated the methodology of these delinquency studies in the area of mental illness and obtained the same results. Jenkins and Brown (1935) showed that mental retardation rates were distributed in the same way.

Durkheim speaks of an individual and a social state of consciousness:

> Since everyone leads this sort of double existence simultaneously, each of us has a double impulse. We are drawn in social directions and tend to follow the inclinations of our own natures. So the rest of society weighs upon us as a restraint to our centrifugal tendencies, and we for our part share in this weight upon others for the purpose of neutralizing theirs. We, ourselves, undergo the pressure we help to exert upon others. (Durkheim, 1951, p. 319)

In Durkheim's theories we see some of the same patternings that we find in Hartmann. The adaptations between individual and environment are reciprocal and mutually influencing. The analytic theories, of course, provide for a greater range of mutual equilibrators. Adaptation is possible alloplastically, autoplastically or adaptiogenically.

E. Ecological Theories

In ecological theories the environmental aspect of emotional disturbance is most pronounced. This may be due to the fact that ecological analysis of behavior has focused upon the study of spatial and territorial environments of human activity. Such an emphasis has concretized "environment" to a greater extent than other concepts of "culture," "social structure," or "group-relationships." Although implicit in sociological theories such as that of Durkheim, the geo-spatial distribution of human variants was not made explicit until the early Chicago School of Parks and Burgess explored the processes which link organism and place in terms of negative consequences of their linkage.

Paul Shepard (1969), in describing the viewpoint of ecology said:

> Man is in the world and his ecology is the nature of his "inness"...what does he do there in nature? What does nature do in him? What is the nature of the transaction? (p. 1)

In speaking of the inness of man and nature, the ecological model moves definitely toward a synthesis of theories of emotional disturbance. Instead of viewing individual and environment separately, it tries to integrate their processes into a single whole. Emotional disturbance becomes a community property rather than an attribute of the individual.

In the Faris and Dunham studies of mental illness (1939), different parts of the city of Chicago were differentially represented in the aggregate population of schizophrenics, and, in turn, the aggregate population of schizophrenia was differentially distributed within various subparts of the city. The relationship possessed a regularity across time, in much the same way that suicide demonstrated frequency, time, and place regularities in Durkheim's studies. These constant relationships help define an ecosystem.

The ecosystem, within the ecological perspective, is an active, energetic composite, bounded by the "natural" boundaries of an intra-dependent activity network. It is not only the individual members of the system who act and react, but the total ecosystem "behaves" as a whole. In this sense, behavior is not only a function of an individual, it is also a function of the ecosystem or its sub-systems. Therefore, a territory is not merely an inert geographical mass. It is also a set of forces which encompasses the behavioral forces of the individual. Together, they form living patterns which have their own, inbuilt self-sustaining behavior-selecting regularity. Reinforcement applies not only to behavior of individuals, but also to action patterns of the aggregate patterned energy milieu. By repetition the action patterns are renewed.

Therefore, in speaking of emotional disturbance, one cannot speak only of the disturbance of the individual, but one must speak of the disturbance of the system. The acts of the individual affect and are affected by the system. Therefore, disturbance is in, and of, the system. Conflictful stimuli or reactions in the environment are reflected in conflictful stimuli or reactions in the individual, and vice-versa. This interlock can only be changed when the reciprocity pattern is changed.

Disturbance is detected in an individual when one applies a disturbance-detector to that individual. Disturbance is occurring at the same time in the total action pattern, or in that part of the pattern, of which he is an integer. Any therapist who has gone into a classroom or a home, knows that he can identify disturbance in the parents and sibs in the home, or in the peers and teacher in the classroom. This is not to deny that the individual is a contributor to the process, as well as a reactor to the disturbance. But it says that he is only an integer of an "ecological whole."

"Ecological trap" is the term coined by John Calhoun (1967) in describing the way in which an ecosystem and its members can collude in an ecologically destructive and disharmonious process--which he exemplifies in his demonstration of a "behavioral sink" in a rat colony. The same process is described in Durkheim's study of the storing of collective suicidogenic forces or "tendencies" in the environment of varying societies. The same type of storage has been shown to exist in component parts of a system, such as an urban community.

Once established, such an ecological trap has a compelling influence on new members moving into that part of the system. It seems capable of recruiting a steady and precise number of new participants into the process.

The general process through which specific members of the whole are recruited is not yet clear, but work such as that of Jane Mercer (1970) sequential recruiting of one variant individual rather than another, into an educational system's ecological trap of "mental retardation" begins to shed some light on the process. She shows how the operational patterns of the man-made environment in the school system select specific new recruits, and sequentially process their careers as mental retardates. The sub-system of special education requires a special constituency so it actively recruits its own.

F. Agreement Among Models

There emerges, then, a broad area of surprising agreement across models of disturbance. Whatever causes or consequences of disturbance are postulated, they occur in a composite, equilibrated and equilibrating system of patterned exchanges and interactions made up of interdependent component action subparts. The composite field of energy exchanges is represented as reciprocal and refluent, with emotional disturbance moving across the field in a fluid fashion.

Allan Watts has summed up the current scientific view of the system of exchanges involved in the process:

> There is a colossal disparity between the way in which most individuals experience their own existence and the way in which the individual is described in such sciences as biology, ecology and physiology. The nub of the difference is this: the way the individual is described in these sciences is not a freely moving entity within an environment, but as a process of behavior which is an environment also. If you will accurately describe what an individual organism is doing, you will take but a few steps to describe what the environment is doing. To put it more simply, we can do without such expressions as "what the individual is doing" or "what the environment is doing," as if the individual was one thing and the doing another, the environment one thing and its doing another. If we reduce the whole business simply to the process of doing, then the doing which was called the behavior of the individual, is found to be at the same time the doing which is called the behavior of the environment...More and more, a"field theory" of man's behavior becomes necessary for the sciences.
>
> (Watts, 1969, p. 140)

This statement is not very different from Durkheim's:

> So the rest of society weighs upon us as restraint to our centrifugal tendencies, and we for our part share in this weight upon others for the purpose of neutralizing theirs. We, ourselves, undergo the pressure we help to exert upon others (1951, p. 319).

Nor is this foreign to Goldfarb's "theoretical continuum:"

> A cyclical, reverberating interplay between causes and consequences is postulated in a theoretical model, in which consequences dynamically induce new transactions or, in feedback fashion, facilitate prior transactions (1961).

It seems to be related very closely to Gantt's statement about the fluid, flowing reflexive exchange between individual and environment.

> ...variable, fluctuating, appearing, disappearing, symbolizing, substituting reactions, whence a delicate equilibrium is maintained in a system surrounded by a changing environment where the system itself is perpetually changing (1944, p. 6).

It seems to fit very nicely with Hartmann's statement about man's participation in his own environment at the same time that he is adapting to it.

> Man not only adapts to his environment but also participates in creating the conditions to which he must adapt (1958, p. 31).

Since man's action upon the environment is part of the environment to which he must react, man and his community are, at least in part, the same thing.

There seems, therefore, to be no inherent disagreement among the models, with regard to representing disturbance as a systemic feature which can be sampled in many parts of the system. For instance, it can be picked up in key individuals acting in conjunction with the singled out one (peers, parents, sibs, teachers, etc.), in a bounded social structure (i.e. suicide, a la Durkheim's studies), or in the culture (i.e. cultural "contingencies" in the culture, as in behavior modification). The place in the behavioral field in which the theorist concentrates his sampling will determine where he will locate "the disturbance." It is possible to relate Gantt's observations regarding "experimental neurosis" to the larger behavioral field. When taking measures within a definitive behavioral system, whether in an individual, his associates, the social pattern or the reflexive culture, it is important to recognize that no single measure represents the whole picture. We are, so to speak, fishing in the stream of life, and bring up only that for which we have appropriate bait. Each of the models acknowledges and incorporates this fact. What "is happening" in disturbance is happening to a total composite of individual-environment...to a patterned behavioral field...to a definitive unified system; and what is perceived as "behavior" as examined from the perspective of an individual member of the field, is, at one and the same time, part of "environment" as looked at from the perspective of the field itself. Even when we take the perspective of the individual, his own behavior, in its act, becomes part of his own environment.

II. THE INDIVIDUAL PARADIGM

A. Locus of Disturbance

Emotional upset in a circumscribed behavioral field is not unique. External threats of many kinds can disrupt the life of a city, a neighborhood, a family, a school, etc. Current interpersonal and intrapersonal tensions, such as group conflict, racial strife, etc., can also produce waves of disruption in a behavioral field.

As we look closely at the models, what makes emotional disturbance unique among other kinds of emotional upset is the conjunction of two factors. (1) An unresolved problem out of the past history of this behavioral field converges upon individuals. Individuals thus become the vortex of the disturbance storm. (2) Each time the disturbance is repeated by the field in one of its members, it is treated as a unique, new problem peculiar to the individual in whom it surfaces.

In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (1958), says that in addition to an individual superego: "It can be maintained that the community, too, develops a superego under whose influence cultural evolution proceeds (p. 136)." The cultural superego, like that of the individual, frequently sets up impossible ideals and standards for the individual to live by and then harshly punishes any failure to fulfill them. Thus, the cultural superego deliberately "sets-up" individuals to become objects of punishment. In a particular community, these injunctions can be impossible even for so-called normal people to live up to.

Such a situation leads him to say:

> ...would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization--or epochs of it--possibly even the whole of humanity--have become 'neurotic' under the pressure of the civilizing trends? (p. 141, underlining mine)

Freud says that when the injunctions in an individual superego are brought to consciousness, we find that they coincide with the particular demands of the prevailing cultural superego.

> At this point the two processes, that of the evolution of the group and the development of the individual, are always firmly mortised together, so to speak (p. 138).

In addressing himself to the question of how this "cultural superego" originated in the first place, he says:

> The superego of any given epoch of civilization originates in the same way as that of an individual; it is based on the impression left behind by great leading personalities (p. 137).

In a sense, Freud is saying that the neurosis of the individual is merely a part of the whole originating in the past. He says that when tension arises, the aggressions of the cultural superego voicing its noisy reproaches are all that is seen, while the injunctions of the cultural superego often remain unconscious in the background. It is at this point that the two processes, that of the evolution of the group and the development of the individual, are firmly mortised together. The mutual contributions of individuals and society are clearly represented in this conceptualization.

Powerful figures in history make their imprint upon culture. The imprint is left behind in the form of unrealizable expectations and demands upon the individuals who follow in their wake. Failure of human beings to measure up are then harshly punished by the society, still under the hypnotic influence of an individual long since dead.

Hartmann (1958) says that adaptation is guaranteed not only by the individual's in-built equipment and maturation, but by those "ego-regulated actions" which (using this equipment) counteract the disturbance in, and actively improve the relationship to, the environment (p. 25, underlining mine)."

He seems to be saying, like Freud, that the disturbance has prior existence in the environment, and that the unique problem of emotional disturbance arises when individuals' actions fail to counteract the disturbance. Thus, unsolved social adaptation problems, carried over from the past, come to a focus in some individuals.

Durkheim (1951), in describing the involvement of the individual in the collective suicide tendencies of a particular area or group, seems to be in close agreement with Hartmann:

> Thus, victims of suidice complete their destiny only in successive layers of generations... Therefore, all these individual manifestations, however independent of one another they seem, must surely actually result from a single cause or a single group of causes, which dominate individuals. Otherwise, how could we explain that all these individual wills, ignorant of one another's existence, annually achieve the same end in the same numbers? (p. 305)

In describing how certain individuals are selected, he says:

> In a given moral environment--certain individuals are affected and certain others not--because the former's mental constitution, as elaborated by nature and events, offers less resistance to the suicidogenic current (p. 323).

In speaking of the choice of the individual, out of all the "pre-disposed candidates," he says:

> Only certain ones are called, if this manner of speech is permitted. These are the ones who through circumstances have been nearer the pessimistic currents and who consequently have felt their influence more completely (p. 304).

Durkheim sees two processes at work in the "field" selection of individuals who will carry out the disturbance legacies of the definitive environment. First, an individual possesses constitutional characteristics, which are further developed by nature and events, and which leave him without resistance to the collective and accumulating influence of previous generations. Secondly, among these individuals with the low-resistance factors, those are selected who are nearer the full force of the enduring "pessimistic currents" of the society which come to bear on the aggregate population of the field at a particular point in time.

Skinner's conception of the selection of the disturbance-prone individual is less clear. He does say:

> We have seen that a social environment is never wholly consistent. It is also probably never the same for two individuals (1953, p. 424).

However, he seems to be in accord with Hartmann, Freud, and Durkheim with regard to the time-location of the individual in the historic process, when he points out that:

> Science probably has never demanded a more sweeping change in a traditional way of thinking about a subject--in the scientific picture a person is a member of a species shaped by evolutionary contingencies of survival, displaying behavioral processes that bring him under the control of the environment in which he lives, and largely under the control of the social environment that he and millions of others like him have constructed and maintained during the evolution of a culture. The direction of the controlling relation is reversed. A person does not act upon the world; the world acts upon him (p. 80).

He also says:

> The environment determines the individual even when he alters the environment (p. 448, underlining mine).

And in this way he at least acknowledges the potential reciprocity of individual and environment. This reciprocity is also acknowledged when he jokingly pictures one mouse saying to another, "Boy, have I got that guy up there fixed! Every time I press this bar, he gives me some food!"

It is this insight into the nature of the reciprocal process which has made it possible for operant conditions to approach maladaptation in a unique way. Instead of requiring the action of "the environment" (teachers and peers) to re-shape maladaptive behavior in a school child, the "disturbed" child has been taught to alter specific behaviors of his own. These behaviors may then act as environmental contingencies to alter specific teacher or peer behaviors which are part of the negative reciprocity. Here the child acts as environment rather than as receptor of the environment. Thus, we see that operant concepts do provide a way in which individuals, by their behavior, might actually reciprocate in their own selection for the maladaption process.

Skinner also comes close to hinting at the differential capacity among individuals for resisting environmental control of behavior. He says that we are not justified in assigning to anything or anyone the role of prime mover. So that when one individual controls the behavior of another, we generally do not ask who or what controls the first. When we say the government controls the citizens we consider this without identifying the event which controls the government.

And:

> When the individual is strengthened as a measure of counter control, we may, as in democratic philosophies, think of him as a starting point (p. 449, underlining mine).

Here, then, is the implication that some individuals are not strengthened as a measure of counter control similar to Durkheim's suggestion that certain individuals, by their constitution and its "elaboration by nature and events," offer less resistance to "currents" in the environment. It seems also to coincide with Hartmann's concept that certain individuals, by their "in-built" equipment and by "ego-regulated actions" using their equipment, are able to counteract the disturbance in one environment and improve their relationship to the environment, while others are not.

The point of view of ecology begins with the concept of an individual as an integer in a disturbed behavioral field. Watts (1969) says:

> When we move, it is not simply myself moving inside my skin, exercising energy upon my limbs, but also that in some marvelous way the physical continuum in which I move is also moving me.

Therefore, ecology can incorporate the "I" of Hartmann's "ego-regulating actions," the biogeneticist's constitutional characteristics, Skinner's environmental contingencies and conditioning, and Durkheim's "collective tendencies," combined with differential concentrations of "pessimistic currents" upon the vulnerables in an environment.

According to Watts' statement above, we must consider the individual as part of a total field. He is not just an ego locked within a skin, nor a passive part of a machine. He is a cross-point of concentration of everything inside his skin and outside it.

The individual is an active component in a disturbance process. The process has varying concentrations in varying parts of the field at varying times; but a "pathological" process has an existence independent of the individual. It can endure in a particular behavioral field at a specified rate and intensity over a long period of time in spite of total replacement of individuals in the field.

The disturbance process is not equally distributed across the field, however, so that concentration may be greater in some parts of the field than in others, and some periods of time rather than others. Its concentric refluence moves in and out from the center of concentration like ripples moving out in water and doubling back upon itself. An individual, because of conditional and constitutional characteristics and the circumstances of the moment, may provide the occasion for particular dramatic disturbance discharge into the field. From the behavioral point of view, a pattern of conflicting behavior releasers may happen to converge upon him, releasing painful conflictful behavior which triggers a chain or refluent pattern of conflictful behavior throughout the field; which, in turn, reinforces or feeds back to the conflict releasers--thus perpetuating the painful reverberating exchanges of conflict releasers --conflictful behaviors.

However, any individual is only a part of the painful reverberations, regardless of his moment-to-moment contributions to the process. The process endures in the field without him, even though it has a particular expression through him. It can converge upon different individuals in the field at different times, to bring about a dramatic expression, at a particular time, and it is differentially influential in different individuals in the field at all times. But in general, it is affecting all individuals in the field at all times.

Perhaps in a definitive behavioral field, the currents of disturbance release complementary behavior only when they are not resisted (as in Hartmann's picture of the individual counteracting environmental disturbance), or when the individual provides reciprocal currents of his own to the joint product of both. It may be, as suggested by Durkheim, that two processes are at work: (1) the gradual "conditioning" of the reciprocating individual; (2) a special concentration of "currents" at varying times, in varying parts of the field, involving those individual vulnerables who are closer to the center of concentration.

It may be, of course, that certain individuals are singled out by a process of associated conditioning. If an individual is often part of, or contiguous with, painful reverberating discharges, the discharges can become associated with him. They are then interpreted as his disturbance. The pain of the whole, or of the whole in which he is embedded, may then consistently be attributed to him.

However, from the ecological perspective, he is only a part of the painful, behaving field. Skinner has said that "we are not justified in assigning to anyone or anything the role of prime mover (1953, p. 449)," and that science must ultimately interpret the whole series of events. This is the position taken by ecology with respect to the individual in disturbance. He is not the prime mover, but part of the whole revolving sequence of disturbance.

At any rate, as we examine the various models of emotional disturbance, we discover this additional area of consensus. As distinguished from other kinds of disturbances in a field of behavior, emotional disturbance becomes dramatically activated when its conflicted forces make contact with vulnerable individuals in the field. These individual force centers are the elements of the field most receptive to, least "resistant to," least "countercontrolling" of (or, at least, "counteracting" of), the disturbed forces in the contiguous behavioral field. This vulnerable individual thus revives a social adaption problem which has festered in this particular field for a long time. However, the rest of the field may not view the problem as a property of the field itself, but may view it as a unique adaptation crisis of an individual.

Different names have been given by different theorists to the standing conflicted forces in the field. They have been called currents, contingencies, reinforcers, stimuli, behavior releasors, environmental field forces, etc. These aggregate forces in the field are activated when they directly encounter and join with reflective forces in individuals. Reflective forces are labeled responses, released behaviors, operants, etc. It is the fitting together of these "aggregate-individual" forces which produces disturbed behavior. The individuals selected are least resistant by virtue of constitution and previous exposure to these field forces. These very individuals, at the moment their behavior is triggered, become part of the conflicting environmental field forces which then select other individuals. Thus this ensemble of repetitive, reciprocal, rippling activities forms a particular kind of action pattern in the behavioral field which shapes and maintains itself through individual instruments of its expression.

The various permutations and combinations of vulnerability and contribution to the process might be boiled down to three basic paradigms describing the place of the individual in the process:

1. The disability paradigm
2. The deviation paradigm
3. The alienation paradigm

Although one or the other of these basic paradigms are featured in particular models of emotional disturbance, any model may actually harbor more than one paradigm.

B. The Disability Paradigm

The disability paradigm designates a defective organism as the central problem in emotional disturbance. The defect can be located in the psyche (as in psychodynamic theory) or in the soma (as in biogenic theory), or in the psyche and the soma (as in psychosomatic medicine). Although this conception of disturbance does not ignore components outside the individual as contributing to the central correlation, the paradigm does lead to a minimization of the importance of the setting in interpreting the disturbance and fixes the problem in the time-frame of the individual's own biography.

The paradigm obscures the connection between the individual and his circumstances or situation, and ignores any connection which may exist between these circumstances and the history of his culture. It does not consider the possibility, stated so dramatically by Freud, that the disability assessment may be a punishment of the individual for failing to fulfill the impossible ideals and standards of a distorted community superego.

The disability paradigm is consistent with a reductionist orientation to human problems. The individual is perceived as self-determining and self-regulating, to a major extent. The paradigm places maximum responsibility upon the genetic and experiential history of the individual. What has happened to the individual is semi-independent of what has happened to the culture, or what has happened to his reference-groups, or what has happened to this setting.

The disability paradigm requires the view that problem-solving is a repetitive, endless process of applying amelioration or prevention to individuals one by one, as they are born into, or fall into, the condition of disability.

Since the disability is a property of, and even a product of, this individual, his only resource is to alter the course of his own, personal, developmental history and adaptation. Changing him is not seen as involving a possible change of a chain of circumstances and events connected to him. Intervention is of minor consequence to events outside the individual and his own life space. The change-agent does not necessarily predict that changing one individual could have chain reactions of wide-rippling effects in the larger whole in which this individual is imbedded. Nor does he suppose that cultural change may have any dramatic effect upon the disability of the individual.

In the disability paradigm, the intervention of choice is usually treatment of the individual or provision of compensatory prosthetics or aids to the individual. It may also involve special accommodation of the environment to his handicap, and an acceptance of the handicap as a permanent condition of the individual.

The disability paradigm adopts the medical perspective toward disease, health, diagnosis, treatment, prescription, prevention, pathology, patients, cure, recovery, clinical research, etc. The individual with the disability submits himself to the ministrations of a specialist trained in the disability area.

The disabled individual bears no direct responsibility for his condition, just as he is not responsible for a physical defect or a chronic disease. His cooperation is required in the sense that he accepts the professional judgment about his condition and involves himself in the prescribed regimens and recommendations.

The disability paradigm ignores the relativity or contextual nature of normality and abnormality. It does not even entertain the notion that what is abnormal in one culture may be the norm for another culture and may be treated as a highly desirable and prized state of being. There is an unspoken assumption that the condition is a culture-free condition whose negative consequences in the individual's adaptation to his environment would hold true in any group, any setting, not just in the particular context in which it is occurring.

C. The Deviation Paradigm

The deviation paradigm refers usually to a special group of people, such as delinquents, drug addicts, prostitutes, alcoholics, homosexuals, retardates, schizophrenics, criminals, etc. It is a culturally-relative paradigm which specifies that deviation is culturally defined. The deviation paradigm assumes that normal or abnormal behavior depends upon the codes and taboos of individual cultures. What is abnormal in Western culture may be quite normal in other cultures, such as India.

Most people can be shaped to the codes of a particular culture. Most people can be somehow included in the great, faceless, indistinct majority of the culturally "normal." A few, for various reasons, are not included in this perceived "normal" category. These are the "deviants."

The deviation paradigm includes concepts which describe how a few "deviants" are excluded from the normality blanketing process of the major cultural group. Some theorists adopt a scapegoat concept as an explanation of deviance. The assumption is made that all communities or societies require scapegoats and actively search them out as the receptacle for the "sins," "deviations," "bad fortune," "pressures," anxieties, etc. of the whole group. The deviation is seen as projected onto individual members of the community at random. Some see deviation as beginning with a real "just-noticeable difference" in a member of a group. The group and society deliberately widen the gap between the aggregate body and this particular individual in an attempt to more clearly define themselves.

Other theorists acknowledge distinctive differences in characteristics of the individual which could be responded to either as a positive or negative characteristic depending on the shibboleths and values of the particular culture. Some see deviants as individuals who, for one reason or another, are not susceptible to the conditioning processes of the society and who escape the effects of group shaping.

While deviance may be dysfunctional for the individual in his relationship with a referent group, it is not necessarily dysfunctional when seen in the context of the whole. According to various theories, it may unite the group; it may perform the function of social invention; it may act as a safety valve for a social system (i.e., prostitution may preserve marriage by relieving strain); it may establish the boundaries of acceptable behavior for the normative group, etc.

Unlike the disability paradigm, the time-frame employed is an historical, evolutionary time-frame, rather than the biographical time-frame of an individual organism's life span. The deviation paradigm usually addresses itself to group continuity through time rather than the life span continuity which separates the individual as a distinctive, self-contained and self-regulating system. The historical career of a group such as alcoholics, delinquents, blacks, hippies, etc. is the usual focus--and when the individual's deviance career is investigated, it is usually handled as an instance of a sub-group of the larger whole rather than an entity in and of itself.

For this reason, the intervention applications related to the deviation paradigm are usually group or societal interventions rather than interventions into the individual and the individual's life history. The one-to-one applications of the disability paradigm are usually outside the scope of the deviation paradigms.

The deviation paradigm, unlike the disability paradigm, also conceives of disturbance as a product of the encounters between the labelled group and the dominant culture. It is a reciprocal process in which the disturbing minority interacts with the disturbed majority in an uneasy alliance. Therefore, the referent body for the deviation paradigm is always a composite whole made up of both groups--the dominant and sub-dominant parts taken together. Disturbance, then, exists in the whole and not in its individual parts.

Deviation concepts also imply an aura of unpleasantness or undesirability. Though not necessarily a part of the theories, there is surplus attitudinal meaning attached to that part of the system which condemns the distinctive individual to deviance. This surplus aura is very difficult to separate from the essential characteristics of the paradigm.

In a sense, the deviation paradigm implies that the properties of the whole are the only properties which exist, and that these are almost the sole determinants of individual behavior. There is an implication that the laws which govern the whole are the same laws which govern any part of the whole, and that independent laws which govern parts cannot exist. Therefore, deviation, as a paradigm, treats the laws of the aggregate as both a necessary and sufficient explanation of the social problem of emotional disturbance.

In this sense, the concepts of disability and the concepts of deviation are almost polar concepts. One is almost totally individual or organismic-bound, while the other is aggregate-bound. The time and space location of the disability paradigm is almost totally ideographic in nature, whereas the deviation paradigm seems to be wholly nomathetic. The time and space location of disability is in the life span and in the biological, sociological, and psychological properties of the unique, concrete, specific individual. The unique individual is the center of the universe of discourse. He is an independent system of self-regulating processes. Other properties to be considered are extra-systemic and they revolve around him. The time and space locus of the deviance paradigm is current aggregate bodies behaving in current communal territory; with both of the bodies and the territory shaped by a sequential chain of cumulative history. The oppositional attraction which the referent body and the divergent body exert upon each other comprises the system which is treated by deviance theory. The individual is not the center of the universe, but rather, is an integer in a specific aggregate body.

D. The Alienation Paradigm

The alienation paradigm encompasses a much larger universe of phenomena common to emotional disturbance. It includes both the set of phenomena of the disability paradigm and the set of phenomena of the deviance paradigm. The alienation paradigm, then, subsumes both the disability and the deviance paradigm under the rubric of a more composite whole--the ecosystem which includes the groups of the deviance paradigm, their environmental housing, and the semi-autonomous individual.

To a certain extent the alienation paradigm is an extension of the deviation paradigm, except that it is not limited in orientation. It moves inside the individual and views the world of events from the individual's own perspective, thus viewing both sides of an emotional upset simultaneously. In assuming both stances the alienation paradigm captures the essence of separation between individual and his world which is so characteristic of emotional disturbance. The alienation paradigm accepts the scientific objectivity of both the disability and the deviance paradigms at the same time that it adds a subjective dimension of personalized suffering as experienced by the sufferer. It stands outside the individual and views him through the eyes of the world around him at the same time that it moves inside him and views the world experienced by him.

In terms of time and space frames for the alienation paradigm, there is a multidimensional quality. Alienation exists in the here and now within the stimulus world of the alienated individual. However, it straddles the unidimensional, biographical time span of the individual at the same time that it encompasses the multidimensional time span of the stimulus world he is experiencing. This latter time-frame spans the history of the territory and the dominant culture from which he is estranged.

The alienation paradigm clearly and poignantly portrays the pain of emotional disturbance. The individual's pain is the world pain personified. The individual, even when scapegoated by his world, expresses the suffering of his scapegoaters. They have been able to insulate their suffering and hold it outside themselves, emptying it into the willing receptacle who knows their suffering even though he may think of it as his own. The suffering cannot be banished from the world, but it may be centralized in a convergent individual. To this extent the alienation paradigm projects emotional disturbance as convergent suffering arising from unreconciled strains in the surroundings of the suffering individual. Disturbance is the pain of the whole at the same time that it is the pain of a part of the whole.

At the same time alienation requires active participation on the part of the individual. He is not a helpless receptor of the drama enacted. He alienates himself at the same time that he is alienated, and joins forces with those who are alienating him in creating his alien condition. He willingly defects and seeks asylum outside the perceiving world. As a defector he is more than just a pawn. He rejects at the same time that he is rejected. He refuses to be in his world.

The implied interventions into alienation are also multidimensional as is alienation's time- and space-frame. Multivaried interventions can occur simultaneously. The alienated themselves can borrow parts and pieces of the world around them to create new worlds for themselves which then have to be integrated with the larger world. This is the experiment being tried by the current "counter culturists."

The intervention can be to destroy the insulation of the surrounding projectors to the suffering which they have assigned to their alien proxy. Thus, their own suffering is made assessible, and they are galvanized to action in solving the specific conflict which gave rise to the suffering. This action requires cooperative analysis of the culture which they are carrying within themselves. The current group examination of sexual mores is an example of this intervention.

The intervention could also be to ask the alienated, some of whom are capable of enormous developmental efforts, to accept the world, re-enter it at the same time that they suffer because of its terrible imperfections. Not all alien individuals have the capacity for such a profoundly creative act. Therefore, the other intervention is to confront the world surrounding the individual with its active complicity in the alienation process and keep the mirror firmly in front of these alienators, forcing them to acknowledge their own suffering and their own rejection of reflective feelings and behaviors in themselves.

Alienation, deviation and disability are all paradigms for the "individual" in models of emotional disturbance. Some models stress one or the other of these paradigms, but they can be found distributed across all of the models to some degree. Therefore, these paradigms are a base for integrating theories around the individual. He is disabled, he is a deviant integer, and he is alien to and alienated from the world surrounding him. It may be that at different periods in history, during different eras, that one emphasis or the other can most appropriately explain disturbance. It could be that our current era is less characterized by disability and deviance than it is by alienation--that the experience of alienation is profoundly predominant in our time.

III. CULTURAL RELATIVITY

There is agreement among models that (1) emotional disturbance is a property of an action system composed of man and environment bound together in a composite interactive whole by various equilibriating forces; and (2) that it is an unresolved problem of a particular field which, through compulsive repetition, appears over and over in individual members of the field. There also appears to be agreement that emotional disturbance is abnormal only when so defined by the culture and its structures. Ruth Benedict says:

> ...one of the most striking of acts that emerge from a study of widely varying cultures is the ease with which our abnormals function in other cultures. It does not matter what kind of "abnormality" we choose for illustration, those which indicate extreme instability, or those which are more in the nature of character traits like sadism or delusions of grandeur or of persecution, there are well described cultures in which these abnormals function at ease and with honor, and apparently without danger or difficulty to the society (1934, p. 60).

Whether the traits be trauma, catalepsy, homosexuality, paranoia, etc., these traits, denigrated and feared in our culture, are the cornerstone of other cultures. In his own culture, members with exhibiting traits are the pillars of their society, and bear the mark of the ideal man. In the developed cultures the standardization of custom and belief over at least two continents has given a false sense of the inevitability of the particular cultural forms which have gained currency for us. Anthropology has shown us what the major theorists of disturbance are saying in unison. This agreement is that there are a wide series of possible human adjustments to communal life; and that what is considered abnormal in one culture or society may be considered either normal or ideal in another. It is only the rare individual who cannot be molded in whatever direction the culture wants. Therefore, the deviants remain few in number. According to Ruth Benedict (1934) there

> ...seems to be no more difficulty in moulding the vast malleable majority to the 'normality' of what we consider an aberrant trait, such as delusions of reference, than to the normality of such accepted behavior patterns as acquisitiveness (pp. 74-75).

The cultural relativity of abnormality has not escaped any of the major theorists already mentioned in this overview section. It is, of course, a chief doctrine of the behavioral model. Ullman and Krasner (1965) say:

> ...the designation of a behavior as pathological or not is dependent upon an individual's society (p. 20).

Heinz Hartmann put it this way:

> Individual propensities which amount to disturbances in one social group or locus may fill a socially essential function in the next (1958, p. 32).

The range of possible culture-wide adjustments, whether they are ways of showing anger, joy or grief, or in principal biological drives such as sex, prove to be much more variable than experience in any one culture would suggest. Catalepsy and hallucinations have been highly valued in some cultures such as the Shasta

Indian tribe in California, or the Shamans of Siberia or the Zulu of South Africa. Some might even include the saintly visitations which are revered in Catholic countries in this category. Homosexuality in Plato's Republic or as expressed in the men-women of earlier Siberian cultures is an example of cultural relativity. Whole cultures have been paranoid (e.g., a northwest Melanasia society studied by Fortune some years ago).

Every society, beginning with some slight inclination in one direction or another, selects out of the wide range of potential behavior, a particular set of traits, characteristics, and behaviors which it values. This process goes on over long periods of history and is influenced by innumerable accidents or profound events in that history. Certain behaviors are chosen, certain are rejected.

As Freud put it in Civilization and Its Discontents (1958):

> The analogy between the process of cultural evolution and the path of individual development may be carried further in an important respect. It can be maintained that the community, too, develops a superego, under whose influence cultural evolution proceeds.

Durkheim spoke of collective tendencies evolved over an historical period in a particular society, which determined what was acceptable and unacceptable in behavior.

Gradually, over a period of time these choices of traits and personalities can become bizarre and inhuman to the point of deforming a whole society. Freud says that:

> ...the cultural superego, just like that of an individual, sets up high ideals and standards, and failure to fulfill them is punished by both (p. 137).

He says that the cultural superego, like the individual superego, can command and prohibit so severely that it violates the happiness of individuals and ignores the difficulties in complying with its proscriptions. The cultural superego:

> ...presumes...that a man's ego is psychologically capable of anything that is required of it... This is in error; even in so-called normal people the power of controlling the id cannot be increased beyond certain limits (p. 137).

As quoted earlier in this paper Freud then asks a profound question about civilization:

> ...would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization...or epochs of it...possibly even the whole of humanity...have become "neurotic" under the pressure of civilizing trends? (p. 141)

Ruth Benedict (1934) points out that some individuals, in any culture, for one reason or another, escape or cannot assume the formative pattern for individuals in that culture. These are the abnormals. In the Douban culture the individual who is not susceptible to fear of treachery, who enjoys work and likes to be helpful, is neurotic and regarded as silly. On the Northwest coast the person who does not see life in terms of insult, who cannot humiliate a neighbor, who is genial and loving, will be considered abnormal.

As pointed out by Skinner (1971):

> What a given group of people call good is a fact. It is what members of a group find reinforcing as a result of their genetic endowment

and the natural and social contingencies to which they have been exposed. Each culture has its own set of goods, and what is good in one culture may not be good in another (p.63)." ..."The practices of a culture, like the characteristics of a species, are carried by its members, who transmit them to other members (p. 63)."

IV. THE PAIN OF EXCITATION BREACHES IN THE FIELD

Consternation and pain appear to be a part of all emotional disturbances. It is one of the major characteristics of the disturbance phenomenon. Freud has seen the avoidance of pain and the search for pleasure as the biologically determined basis of all human motivation. Most of the pain which we experience, according to Freud (1950) is perceptual unpleasure: either perception of pressure by unsatisfied instinct which are blocked by the cultural or personal superego, or external perception which is either distressing in itself or which excites unpleasurable expectations in the mental apparatus; that is, which is recognized by it as a "danger."

Freud sees man as striving toward pleasure and away from unpleasure. In its ultimate sense, final pleasure means the absence of excitation--this perfect quiescence is death, toward which he suspects the organism strives in all cells other than the germ cells. All cells, including the germ cells, also contain sexual instincts which neutralize the drive toward ultimate quiescence. The germ cells themselves lack any of the striving toward cessation of excitation, but devote themselves totally to their own continuation beyond the time-span of the individual which they inhabit. They also strive toward rejuvenation or renewal through conjugation with their counterpart germ cells (Freud, 1950, pp. 58-69).

The individual's striving toward diminution of excitation is continually interrupted by bombardment from external and internal sources. The individual organism can be pictured as a vessel of a substance that is susceptible to stimuli. In its development it defends itself against its own receptivity to external excitation by forming a barrier to the inward passage of excitation:

> This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an external world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli...." "Protection against stimuli is an almost important function of the living organism as reception to stimuli. (p. 32)

Freud describes as "traumatic" any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale and set in motion every possible defensive measure. For the moment the pleasure principle is abandoned, and the individual is flooded with large amounts of stimuli. The organism is confronted with the problem of mastering this massive dose of painful incoming stimuli and breaking them, in a psychical sense, so that they can be subsequently discharged (p. 36) The organism rushes all of its energies toward the breach in an attempt to ward off or discharge the inflow. This defensive reaction is reflexive. It is an unthinking, violent phenomenon of discharge occasioned by the pain of the breach of excitations. This violent reaction follows without the intervention of the mental apparatus.

Thus, we see that when an unusual inflow of excitations from the outside breaks through the stimulus shield of the individual organism, pain takes over and produces violent and massive reactions of defense on the part of the individual organism. It is this massive, pain-induced violent reactivity which is the external sign of disturbance.

We noted earlier, in the section on The Individual Paradigm, that Durkheim accounted for the societal choice of an individual as the suicide victim by two factors:

(1) his "...mental constitution, as elaborated by nature and events, offers less resistance to the suicidogenic currents (1951, p. 323)."

(2) The ones who are chosen "...are the ones who through circumstances have been nearer the pessimistic currents and who consequently have felt their influence more completely (1951, p. 304)."

We noted also that Skinner acknowledges that some individuals can be strengthened in their capacity to resist environmental control. We also noted that Hartmann sees some individuals as having the capacity to counteract the disturbance existing in the environment and improve their relationship to the environment while others do not have equal counteracting capacity.

If we can accept Freud's analysis of pain as a breakthrough of unexpected, unaccustomed or unusual doses of excitation from outside, and the violent individual reflexivity as the manifestation of disturbance, we can apply it both to the individual and to the aggregate units to show how the process works in both.

If all living units, both the individual and the aggregate units, strive to avoid any disturbance of achieved equilibrium or patterning, and strive toward a defense against external inputs which would disrupt quiescence; then we can understand how both the individual and the aggregate suffer pain and reflexive, violent reactions when confronted with unaccustomed or unacceptable excitations. When its carefully patterned circle of actions and activities are breached, when its historically mortised behavioral-environment network or system is violated, there is painful recoil and violent extrusive action. When faced with the "strange," "alien," "repressed" or forbidden influx, pain flashes across the unit, both the individual and the cultural-aggregate unit, and the unit acts as a whole, with violent upheaval and action which converges upon the perceived source of pattern breach.

According to ecological theory, we can see this reaction occurring in all forms of living aggregates. Such violent reflexiveness to strange or unaccustomed intruding presence can be observed in the reactions of a Brown Rat Colony to a stranger rat whose odor is not syntotic with the nesting material and dirt of a rat colony (Lorenz, 1966, pp. 151-158).

According to Konrad Lorenz (1966):

> It is also well known that among bees, termites and ants the members of such a large clan

> recognize each other by a characteristic hive, nest or anthill smell, and that murder occurs if a member of a strange colony inadvertently enters the nest (pp. 151-152).

This composite or collective reaction of a colony, herd, school of fish, or tribe of primitives to an unaccustomed or changed presentation of one of its own kind has been demonstrated over and over.

To generalize from such ecological observations, we might say that when a strange or deliberately excluded excitation enters the "stabilized" system of patterned reciprocities in a behavioral field or sub-field, it produces immediate pain and defense. When it focuses upon or converges upon one of the individual members of the field and attributes the full disturbance to that individual, we have an instance of emotional disturbance.

As long as the patterned system of activity has a means of accommodating the input into the process structures of the system or sub-system, it can "bind" it psychically and discharge it. However, when it has specifically excluded certain inputs from its pattern, and an individual within the pattern is "invaded" by, and acts out, the excitation, he produces consternation in the whole field. A variety of defensive reactions can occur. These can include attack upon the focal individual, insulating him from the aggregate, or attempting to neutralize his behavior within the aggregate by suppression, containment, extinction or transformation of the behavior which represents the "invasion."

Under any circumstances during such moments the individual whose defenses are breached is in pain and the aggregate body of which he is a part is experiencing reciprocal pain. The individual is reflexively reacting to his own invasion, and as part of the environment his own behaviors are part of the reflexive response of the aggregate in which he is embedded. At the same time the aggregate is in shared pain and taking joint defensive actions against the same invasion.

V. AGREEMENT AMONG MODELS

In discussing pain and violent reflexive defense, we have added the final important ingredient of emotional disturbance. It is the final major commonality among the theoretical models of emotional disturbance which will be discussed in this overview of models.

At this point it might be helpful to review for the reader the sorts of agreement across models which has been discussed in this paper. To begin with, the models of emotional disturbance have, together, described a phenomenon which moves like a stroke of lightning across, and within, a behavioral field, affecting all parts, as well as the totality of that field. The models, when taken together, indicate that the phenomenon of disturbance exists simultaneously in all parts, and that soundings or samples taken only in an isolated part is an inadequate representation of the phenomenon. In any measure that we make across the field--whether in component behavioral, physiological, or psychological aspects of the individual, or in component parts of the institutional unit to which he belongs (the school class, the family, etc.), or in the surrounding community components--it is imperative to recognize that no single measurement represents the whole picture. We are fishing in the stream of life and bring up only that for which we have appropriate bait.

We have also shown that emotional disturbance is a community phenomenon which converges upon certain representative individuals. Disturbance is a socially convergent problem which lodges in individual behaviors. The individual is but a reflection of the same condition existing in all the other members of the aggregate to which he belongs, but he is the convergent focus of the social adaptation problem he reflects. He becomes both a symbol for and an expresser of the problems of those around him.

The convergence process is a phenomenon which occurs as a compulsive repetition of an old adaptation problem which has resided in the fabric of this particular culture and its related institutions for long periods of time. This compulsive repetition is received by the aggregate as a unique and isolated event in its midst which has disturbed an equilibrated pattern of ecological transactions. Each time this convergent phenomenon occurs, it is treated by the fellow-residents of the community as an alien intrusion, creating consternation and recoil-reaction. The convergent individual is treated as an unassimilable new input into the whole, rather than as an action symbol of a long-standing social-adaptation problem of the community. He becomes a threat to the integrity of the community and the institutional unit (such as family or school) in which he is imbedded. Something has to be done with or about him to allay the consternation of the whole and restore the accustomed activity and tension pattern which existed prior to his intrusive posture. By exorcising the problem in him it is expected that the tranquility and cohesiveness of the setting will be restored.

There are at least three distinctive paradigms representing the state of the individual so involved; any one or any combination of these paradigms can be found in each model to be presented. The paradigm of disability, of deviance, or of alienation are variously stressed in the treatment of the individual component of the behavioral process field.

Consternation and pain, then, are necessary components in all models of emotional disturbance. They are the characteristics of the phenomenon which make it an ever present characteristic of community life.

The Models

In this paper no effort has been made to perform the synthesis of theory fragments within models. This task is to be accomplished by each reader as he examines the material in each paper.

It is recognized that the equally important task of collecting, sorting and organizing the field of intervention strategies, procedures and treatments which flow from the theoretical models, has not been accomplished in this project. However, this task has begun and it is hoped that the product can be made available to the readers of these papers in the future.

The writer of this synthesis paper would like once again to make the point that the models are not presented as competitive explanatory systems. Instead, they are conceived by this project as representing different facets of a pervasive community phenomenon whose magnitude can only be grasped when one lays out the vast array of insights and investigations represented in the total body of theory presented here.

The writer has a sense of urgency in presenting the whole of this array. The thesis presented by Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents appears particularly prophetic for our time. The technological consummation of operational death and destruction embodied in nuclear weapons makes Freud's concluding comments about civilization a final warning:

> Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate one another to the last man. They know this--hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension. And now it may be expected that the other of the two "heavenly forces," external Eros, will put forth his strength so as to maintain himself alongside of his equally immortal adversary--self-destruction.
>
> (Freud, 1958)

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ABSTRACTING FORMS

The research assistants who prepared the theory papers for the Conceptual Project carried out a number of research tasks in connection with the papers. One of these tasks involved the preparation of abstracts of critical references. The abstracts were used in the course of writing the papers.

The abstracting forms which were used appear on the next three pages.

ARTICLE ABSTRACTING FORM REFERENCE IDENTIFICATION

NAME ______________________

DATE ______________________

1. APA Reference

2. Brief Evaluation

3. Is article:

   a. Landmark

   b. Useful, not landmark

   c. Not useful, not landmark

4. Does theory apply only to certain types of disturbance:

   a. No

   b. Yes

      If yes, specify: ______________________________

5. Synopsis of article (or insight)

6. Cross reference

THEORY FORM REFERENCE IDENTIFICATION

NAME______________________

DATE______________________

1. Author and title of article

2. Principle theme, problem, proposition, etc.

3. Line of argument

4. Supporting data o· constructs

5. Discussion

6. Author's evaluation

7. Your evaluation

8. Contrast or congruence between this theme and opposing theme in another major theory or theories.

9. Cross reference

INTERVENTION FORM REFERENCE IDENTIFICATION

NAME______________________

DATE______________________

1. Title and author of article

2. Principle intervention concept

3. Description of intervention (Location, subjects, controls, etc.)

4. Evidence for effectiveness

5. Author's evaluation

6. Your evaluation of idea, adequacy of translation of the idea into practice, evaluation of the evidence

APPENDIX 2

FEEDBACK FROM CONCEPTUAL PROJECT PARTICIPANTS ON THEORY PAPERS

The Conceptual Project participants include one or more professionals from every university in the U.S. offering a graduate level program for training teachers of the emotionally disturbed. This group of about 225 teacher trainers received each of the theory papers along with a Feedback Form which they were invited to return with their comments. Information from the form is summated in the pages which follow.

The "General Reaction" of participants was judged on the basis of written remarks. Positive statements about the value of the papers were coded +. Negative statements were coded -. If no subjective judgements were included, the response was considered neutral, and coded 0. In some cases both positive and negative statements were included in a response. In that case, the coding was +/- .

SUMMARY OF FEEDBACK DATA

	RESPONSES				SUGGESTED ADDITIONS			
	Total	%+	%0	%-	Information on Synthesis of Models	Information on Application of Models	Glossary	Annotated Bibliography
BIOPHYSICAL	65	57	40	3				
SOCIOLOGICAL	49	59	37	4	33%	78%	46%	46%
LEARNING THEORY	51	49	47	4	31%	81%	49%	61%
ECOLOGICAL	42	40	52	8	19%	61%	33%	51%
PSYCHODYNAMIC	37	43	46	11	28%	62%	26%	40%
TOTAL	244	51	44	5	24%	67%	32%	32%

FEEDBACK ON BIOPHYSICAL PAPER

General Reaction

+	0	-	+/-
x	x	x	
x	x	x	
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x x	x		
x x			
x x			
x x			
x x			
x x			
37	26	2 = 65	

Suggested Additions

Doman & Del.
biofeedback
Bleuler, 1930
vitamin studies
psychosomatology
D.N.A.
Zingales
biochemical factors
Skinner
Wendles, 1968
nutrition studies
psychopharmacology
Brandes, 1967
Windle, 1968
Blum, Kety,
McConnell,
McCullach,
Delgado, Luria
Chess, Thomas, Birch

Other Comments

informative, liked clarity and objectivity, more emphasis on milder problems desirable

readable, informative, more on applications

more on applications, specific and clear, concise

opinionated, needs summary statements, need more complete coverage of theorists, organization good, expected more detail, sections brief, yet comprehensive

liked organization, needs summaries, liked clear organization, more on applications, liked clarity wants more on less severe problems, well organized

wide spectrum presented, more on applications, liked integration of material, careful wording

complete, brief yet concise, need applications, applications desirable

readable, current, brief, implications for education? great bibliography, implications for teachers?

needs integration of content, organization good, should summarize findings, comprehensive and clear, succinct and clear, needs implications for treatment

informative, concise, case histories would be useful

summary of all data desirable; objective, balanced

concise, readable, implications for treatment; concise, more on implications, on less severe problems

good coverage

treatment?

Clear, needs summary, comprehensive

liked clarity and organization

liked brevity

FEEDBACK ON SOCIOLOGICAL PAPER

General Reactions +	0	-	+/-	Suggested Additions	Other Comments
x	x	x		phenomenological th.	questions utility of any project focussing on theory
x	x	x			more discussion of unifying factors
x	x			Fantini & Weinstein	first rate scholarship
x	x			SEE, Glasser	more on application
x	x			Szasz	succinct
x	x				more on treatment
x	x			Farber	questions the concept of "sickness"
x	x			*Knots* by Laing	lucid
x	x			Szasz, Matza	clear, concise
x	x			Wasserman, Lippett	more on theories related to children
x	x			and Gold	Asked a sociologist to review paper and got
x	x				favorable report
x	x			Bandura; Social	more on children
x	x			Development Theory	more examples necessary
x	x				easy to follow, more on application
x	x			Rackless, Faris	more application, likes underlining
x	x				more on application
x	x			Anthropological th.	organization good
x					relevance to special education?
x					broad coverage, logical format
x					relevance?
x					
x					
x					
x					
x					
x					
x					
x					
29	18	2	= 49		

FEEDBACK ON LEARNING THEORY PAPER

General Reaction

+	0	-	+/0
x	x	x	
x	x	x	
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x			
25	24	2	= 51

Suggested Additions

- Lindsley
- Lovas
- Lindsley
- Hewett
- Hewett
- Piaget, Lorenz
- Wolpe
- Madison Plan

Other Comments

- liked organization
- more emphasis on strict behavior modification (Skinner)
- more on application, good bibliography
- comprehensive, more on application, requests information on Darlene Russ's credentials
- too theoretical
- more on relationship to spec. ed., good overview, lacks concreteness, most useful for undergraduates
- not up to standard of other papers, references to Miller should be to Dollard, some over-simplification, not enough application, misrepresentation of Bandura
- relevance to black children
- overemphasis on behavioristic approaches
- discussion of relationship to psychodynamic theory would be interesting, liked double spacing, more depth if to be useful at graduate level
- useful as a review; summaries too brief for beginning students

FEEDBACK ON ECOLOGICAL PAPER

General Reaction

+	0	-	+/-
x	x	x	
x	x	x	
x	x	x	
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
	x		
	x		
	x		
	x		
	x		
17	22	3	= 42

Suggested Additions

Re-Ed

more Rhodes

Oscar Lewis, Laing

Becker, Goffman

Smith & Geoffrey

Darwin, Krutch

Piaget (Biology and Knowledge)

Erikson

Schnwirla & Rosenbladt, Rosenbladt & Roth; Lehrman, Dubos, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Kuo & Lorenz

Goffman, Berne, Lwein, Bellach

Maslow, Rogers

Guilford's model

Other Comments

more on treatment

questions overlap with sociological

ecology may be a way of tying together, rather than a separate view; like discussion of model

liked concrete examples

something missing, not sure what

wants to reproduce the materials for distribution, too broad to be useful

liked organization

exactly the right length

suggest additional reference section for authors not cited in text, thorough

timely, more synthesis to other approaches needed; theory is in such a formative state that it should not be treated separately; it should be included under sociological theory; discussion of biological ecology was irrelevent; highly relevent paper

well organized, major contribution; liked section on psychodynamic ecologists best

excellent conclusion, some of paper belongs in sociological model

intriguing concept

613

FEEDBACK ON PSYCHODYNAMIC PAPER

General Reactions

+	0	-	+/0
x	x	x	x
x	x	x	x
x	x	x	
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x	x		
x			
16	15	3	2 = 37

Suggested Additions

Dreikers
Redl, Bett.,
Fenichel, Berkowitz
Ellis, Perls
Adler
Jung, Reich, Adler
Horney, Sullivan,
Berne Harris,
Sullivan
Bett., Berkowitz
Berkowitz
Fenichel, Morse
Rubin
Bett., Berkowitz
Lewin, Piaget
Maslow, Bett.
Horney
Maslow, Adler
Sullivan, Kelly

Redl, Bett.
Ekstein, Adler

Other Comments

liked section on Rogers best
liked Rogers section best, disappointed in lack of application
more emphasis on historical approach
liked 3-part organization; feels Adler should be central, liked clarity of writing
feels Rogers irrelevant; coverage sketchy
liked the limited coverage, for clarity
liked organization and clarity
liked succinctness, felt a longer implication section needed
not enough relationship to children
liked organization
liked organization
felt it was the best written paper in the series
more on ego psychology
well-organized
questioned inclusion of Rogers
too limited in scope
more application
liked clarity and historical emphasis
Fromm
questioned use of term psycho-dynamic
too much on Freud and Erikson, but thinks it well written
clearly written

APPENDIX 3

CONCEPTUAL PROJECT PERSONNEL ROLES

The relationship of the Conceptual Project to various of its contacts is shown diagrammatically in the accompanying Figure. The Project brings about a cross-linking of three distinct groups of people in the field of emotional disturbance: theoreticians, teacher trainers, and graduate students.

Selected graduate students in emotional disturbance and related areas at The University of Michigan do the actual preparation of the review papers. The "experts" are selected from the leading theoreticians in fields related to the five major areas of models in emotional disturbance. They assist in selecting the literature sample and they assist in validating the review papers. One representative of the experts in each of the five major areas of theory is selected as a "diplomate." He attends a conference with the other four diplomates, in which current and traditional issues in theory are confronted. Video tapes of this conference form part of the collection of materials generated by the Conceptual Project.

The workshop "participants" are selected from teacher trainers so that in principle every institution in the country with a graduate-level program in emotional disturbance will be represented. Not shown in the diagram is a second source for participants: state department education personnel in emotional disturbance. From a core body of seminal thinkers within the teacher trainers, called the "invisible college" though no formal structure is implied, the Project's advisory panel is selected to provide overall guidance and direction to the Conceptual Project. With the help of the advisory panel, the "fellows" are chosen from the ranks of those emerging into the invisible college. The fellows attend a preliminary training workshop and then serve as a guest faculty to facilitate group functioning at the regional dissemination workshops.

PERSONNEL ROLES


Theoreticians in Emotional Disturbance
Experts
Diplomates
Teacher Trainers in Emotional Disturbance
Workshop Participants
"Invisible College"
Fellows
Advisors
Graduate Students in Emotional Disturbance
Project Researchers and Reviewers
validation
conference
workshops
guest workshop faculty
panel
review papers
CONCEPTUAL PROJECT

APPENDIX 4

THE CONCEPTUAL PROJECT WORKSHOP

During the dissemination phase of the Conceptual Project, five regional workshops were held. Participants in the workshops were selected from teacher trainers in the area of emotional disturbance, so that, ideally, every institution in the country with a graduate level training program in emotional disturbance would be represented.

Staff for the workshop consisted of Conceptual Project Personnel, along with a guest faculty from each region.

The workshop format utilized the theory papers appearing in this volume, along with video-tapes of discussions with experts representing each of the theoretical models.

The objectives of the workshop, and the processes used to achieve the objectives are illustrated in the pages which follow.

CONCEPTUAL PROJECT IN EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Dissemination Phase			Conceptual Project Workshops
Goal 1: Interchange of information Means: A. Distribution of theory papers to teacher trainers. B. Distribution of feedback results. C. Participation of teacher trainers in Conceptual Project Workshops. D. Distribution of Workshop products to subsequent Workshop participants.	→	Day 1 P.M. Day 2 A.M.	Goal 1: Interchange of Information OBJECTIVES: A. Participants will explore Conceptual Project materials, given a multi-media presentation format. B. Participants will evaluate the materials for use in their own training programs. C. Participants will discuss the materials with their colleagues.
Goal 2: Change in conception or process of training programs, toward increased clarity and theoretical consistency. Means: A. Use of Project materials in training programs. B. Use of theoretical positions in preparation of proposals. C. Use of theoretical concepts to reorganize training procedures.	→	Day 2 P.M. Day 3 A.M.	Goal 2: Change in conception or process of training programs, toward increased clarity and theoretical consistency. OBJECTIVES: A. Participants will restructure their own training programs on the basis of the Conceptual Project materials. B. Participants will use and discuss the Conceptual Project itself as a model for innovative change. C. Participants will evaluate the workshop experience in terms of the utility of the experience.

CONCEPTUAL PROJECT WORKSHOP



PHASE I. INTRODUCTION.....to the project.....to the staff.....to the materials.....to the tasks. INTENT: to get off on the right foot.

PHASE II. EXPLORATION.....of materials.....of the video tapes..... of your personal response.....of others' personal responses to the materials. INTENT: to acquire the bits and pieces needed to assemble new knowledge.

PHASE III: SYNTHESIS.....a presentation by Dr. William Rhodes giving an overview of the scattered theories and a pattern for synthesis. INTENT: to start the process of assembling the bits and pieces.

PHASE IV. UTILIZATION.....of materials.....of concepts.....of models .....of insights.....of whatever has been gained during the workshop.....towards your own program. INTENT: to finish the process of assembling new knowledge by using it; to provide a tangible take-home product.

PHASE V. WRAP-UP.....to review.....to summarize.....to project in the future. INTENT: to finalize the workshop experience and to lay out future plans and involvements.

FEEDBACK FROM WORKSHOPS

Impact

The Conceptual ProjectWorkshops yielded the following information about the impact of the Conceptual models presented in the Project.

The figure below illustrates the base position of participants, as they judge elements of their own programs. The relative influence of different positions can be seen from this figure.

	DEFINITION OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE	INTERVENTION
BEHAVIORAL	xxxxx xxxxx x	xxxxx xxxxx x
	xxxxx xxxxx xx	xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx x
	xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx x	xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxx
	xxxxx xxxxx xx	xxxxx xxxxx xxxx
	xxxxx xxxxx	xxxxx xxxxx x
	xxxxx xxxxx xx	xxxxx xxxxx xxxx
BIOPHYSICAL	xxx	xxx
	xx	x
	xx	xx
	xxx	xxx
	xx	x
	xxxx	xxx
ECOLOGICAL	xxxxx xx	xxxxx xx
	xxxxx xx	xxxx
	xxx	xxxx
	x	xxxxx
	xxx	xxx
	xxxxx xxxx	xxxxx xxx
PSYCHODYNAMIC	xxxxx xxxxx	xxxxx xxxxx
	xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxx	xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxx
	xxxxx xxxx	xxxxx xxx
	xxxxx xxxxx x	xxxxx xxxxx x
	xxxxx xxx	xxxxx xxxxx x
	xxxxx xxxxx xxx	xxxxx xxxxx xxxx
SOCIOLOGICAL	xxxx	xxxxx
	xxxxx x	xxxxx xxxx
	xxxxx x	xxxxx x
	xx	xxx
	xxxxx xx	xxxx
	xxxxx	xxxx
COUNTER THEORY	x	x
	:	:
	x	x
	.	.
	.	.

Each X represents one participant listing this model as being influential in his/her program.

The figure below illustrates which models have influenced participants in making plans for changes in their programs.

	DEFINITION OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE	INTERVENTION
BEHAVIORAL	xxxxx	xxxxx x
	xxxx	xxxxx
	xx	xxx
	xxxx	xxxxx
	xxx	xx
	.	.
BIOPHYSICAL	xxx	xxx
	x	xxx
	x	x
	.	xx
	x	xx
	xx	x
ECOLOGICAL	xxxxx x	xxxxx
	xxxx	xxxxx xx
	xxxxx x	xxxx
	xxxxx xxxxx	xxxxx xxxxx
	xxxxx xx	xxxxx xxxxx x
	x	xxxxx
PSYCHODYNAMIC	xxxx	xxxxx
	x	xx
	x	x
	xxxx	xxx
	xx	x
	xxx	xx
SOCIOLOGICAL	xxx	xxxx
	xxx	xxxx
	xxxx	xxxx
	xxxx	xxx
	xxx	xxxxx x
	xxxx	xx
COUNTER THEORY	x	xx
	xx	x
	.	.
	x	x
	.	.
	xxxxx x	xxxx

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FEEDBACK SHEET

Research on the theoretical models described in this report is an ongoing concern of the Conceptual Project. Therefore, we invite your comments and criticisms. If you would like to participate in this effort, please remove this Feedback Sheet, and mail it, along with your comments, to:

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What changes in content or organization would you suggest?

What extensions, or supplementary materials, would you find useful?

What do you like best about this volume?

What is your main criticism of this volume?

Other comments?

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